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

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EDITED BY

HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D.

DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSES

VOLUME III

HISTORY OF LANGUAGE
HISTORY OF LITERATURE
HISTORY OF ART



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DEPARTMENT V—HISTORY OF LANGUAGE

DEPARTMENT V—HISTORY OF LANGUAGE

(Hall 4, September 20, 2 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE HEMPL, University of Michigan.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR T. R. LOUNSBURY, Yale University.

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THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS AND METHODS OF THE HISTORY OF LANGUAGE

BY THOMAS RAYNESFORD LOUNSBURY

Thomas Raynesford Lounsbury, Professor of English, Yale University. b. January 1, 1838, Ovid, New York. A.B. Yale College, 1859; LL.D. *ibid.* 1892; *ibid.* Harvard College, 1893; L.H.D. Lafayette, 1895; *ibid.* Princeton, 1896. Instructor in English, Sheffield Scientific School, Yale University, 1870-71. Edited complete edition of Charles Dudley Warner's Works, with biographical sketch. Author of *Life of James Fenimore Cooper*; *Studies in Chaucer*; *History of the English Language*; *Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist*; *Shakespeare and Voltaire*; *Standard of Pronunciation in English*.]

It is only within comparatively recent times that the principles which underlie the development of language have been clearly understood. By those who went before us speech was usually regarded, not as an emanation from us, not as an expression of us, but as something outside of us, a sort of mechanism with which we had to do; which was sometimes good, sometimes bad, but having largely an independent life of its own. Hence it could improve or degenerate without much regard to the character or attainments of those who spoke it. All that it behoved these to do was to improve it, and so far as that could be done, perfect it. When that happy result was reached care was to be taken that no further changes were to be made in it; but preserved as much as possible unimpaired, be transmitted to posterity, and so continue the length of years it was permitted to live.

For along with this belief existed another. Every language, it was supposed, went through the same sort of experience as the individuals to whom it was a possession. It had its period of birth, of growth, and of maturity. Then followed the inevitable decay. This could be retarded, but it could not be averted. The generally accepted view was expressed by Dr. Johnson in the preface to his dictionary. "Life," he said, "may be lengthened by care, though death cannot be ultimately defeated: tongues, like governments, have a natural

tendency to degeneration; we have long preserved our constitution: let us make some struggles for our language."

Undoubtedly traces of this belief still linger among us: but in general it meets no longer with acceptance. We have come to feel, even when we have not come to know, that language has no independent life outside of the life of those who speak it. Their spirit it expresses, their hopes and aspirations it embodies; and as a consequence it is operated upon by the same influences which affect their action in other ways. It shall be my aim in the present address to point out how it is so thoroughly the reflex of man's nature that even the very agencies which affect the character of its vocabulary and the development of its grammatical structure are essentially like those which determine his conduct and career in other respects. My illustration will naturally be drawn from the speech with which I am most familiar; but parallel illustrations will occur to any one to whom the possession of any cultivated tongue belongs by right of birth.

Language is constantly acted upon by numerous influences, all of which are diverse and some of which are not only different but actually hostile. Speech is really a compromise between opposing tendencies in the minds of its users. The peculiar character it exhibits in any given case is a result that has been brought about by these various agencies. The time is too short to treat the subject with exhaustive detail. Here it may be sufficient to give a general idea of its nature by setting forth two or three of these conflicting agencies which are always operating upon the users of speech, whether educated or illiterate, and affect unconsciously their methods of utterance. Then we shall be in a position to consider with more advantage the broad distinctions which prevail between the development of cultivated and uncultivated tongues.

The first, to which I call attention, of these contradictory tendencies that are always manifesting themselves in speech, is the disposition to practice economy of utterance and the antagonistic disposition to indulge in prodigality of utterance. By the former I am not referring to orthoëpy, where its effects have been most frequently noted, tending as they do to induce the speaker to spend as little time as possible in the pronunciation of words, and as a result of this economy of effort, modifying their form. It is the material itself of language, the words as they are weaved into the sentence, that comes here under consideration. The one aim that the user of speech has constantly in mind is to express himself as briefly as possible consistent with easy and full comprehension. This is a feeling which affects all men in every conceivable stage of intellectual development. Grammatically speaking, we are all endeavoring to convey our meaning in any given sentence with the fullest economy of utterance. Mark me, I say grammatically speaking, not rhetorically.

The latter is a personal influence acting upon individuals and not upon the body of speakers as a whole.

This practically universal disposition towards economy of utterance has been one — though doubtless not the principal one — of the agencies which have contributed to the development and diffusion of the sign language. In a rudimentary form this prevails everywhere. We see it exemplified daily in numerous gestures in which the movement of some part of the body indicates to the eye what the lips neglect to put into words. But what concerns us here specifically is the effect of this disposition upon the structure of the sentence. No small number of the rules laid down in our grammars are for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the situation produced by the desire of the users of speech to express what they have to say with the least expenditure of effort. Take as one illustration out of many the grammatical construction called apposition. It is called into being for no other purpose than to explain a practice of omitting words for the sake of economy of utterance, which has established itself so generally that it has come to seem normal. Hence we never take into account the fact that it denotes nothing more than the abridgment of a complete dependent phrase. This is but a single fact out of the multitude of facts of this sort which the student of the grammar of every tongue meets on every side. In going through the process we call parsing we are constantly under the necessity of declaring some word to be understood. Its presence is not required for comprehension; but grammar requires it for the explanation of the construction. Language abounds in these short cuts to expression. Every tongue has peculiarities of its own in this respect which other tongues, at least some other tongues, will not tolerate at all. We have a striking illustration of this in English in the constant omission of the relative. In such a sentence as "The man you saw yesterday came to-day," no one, whether speaking or hearing, feels the absence of the pronoun. It is only when we set out to analyze the sentence grammatically that we recognize the need of dragging into light the suppressed relative. This is a usage to which many languages cannot resort; but there is probably not a language on the globe in which a single word is not made to do often the duty of a whole sentence.

But there is another side of the shield. We find a force at work which impels men not to economize effort, but to put it forth in profusion. They are not content with the fewest words or abridged constructions in order to make themselves understood. They amplify, they vary, they employ expressions which abstractly may seem unnecessary. Here again I am not referring to the expansion of the thought in the way of adorning it or illustrating it, which belongs to the domain of rhetoric and not of linguistics proper. But the reason

for the course indicated as being followed is that the user of speech often feels that with the words sufficient to make his meaning comprehended, it may not after all be fully comprehended. He seeks therefore to add to its clearness by the addition of terms and phrases which will not leave the hearer or reader in the slightest doubt. Hence always has come and always will continue to come into speech an army of expressions which we group under the general names of expletives and redundances. These often cause great grief to the grammarian; but the user of speech cannot be deterred from employing them because he recognizes that the first aim of his utterance is to be distinctly understood. These expressions, in consequence, are not really expletives and redundances. So they might be deemed, were men always in a state of mental alertness, so that nothing whatever escapes their attention. But unfortunately the human mind is apt to be inattentive. It often misses the sense, which in theory has been sufficiently expressed to be conveyed fully. Therefore in every tongue and at all periods men resort to strictly superfluous words and expressions to prevent their meaning being missed or overlooked. As one illustration out of scores, take in our own tongue the placing of the preposition *from* before the adverbs *hence*, *thence*, and *whence*. From the fourteenth century to the present day it has been so employed constantly by the best speakers and writers. Strictly speaking, the preposition is unnecessary. There are places, indeed, where its introduction could be deemed no other than an impertinence. There are other places where it adds distinctly to the ease of comprehension.

Nor is clearness the only thing aimed at by the users of speech in the employment of what from one point of view is superfluous. There is equally the desire to impart force to expression. Examples of this abound on every side. "Forever and ever" is a phrase that theoretically conveys no more meaning than the simple "forever"; but it makes more of an impression upon the mind. Linguistically, not morally, the desire to strengthen the expression is the justification of the vast variety of expletives which make up the vocabulary of profanity. When the practice of it is frequent, it defeats its own end; but when sparingly indulged in, especially in situations where great interests are at stake, it conveys an intensity of meaning that the mere words, though carrying the full sense, do not even remotely suggest.

Let us now proceed to the consideration of two other opposing agencies, always operating upon language, which more especially affect the inflectional system. They might be called the principles of unity and diversity; but as these words are susceptible of being misunderstood, I shall call them, from the paths they mainly adopt, the principles of analogy and authority. In the matter of inflection

there always prevails a disposition in the users of speech to reduce everything to a common procedure. A certain form is not only in use, but it is in far the most common use. The principle of analogy at once asserts itself, for it appeals to every speaker. As most of certain classes of words follow one particular inflection, why not make them all assume it? The tendency manifests itself to have the leading form grow at the expense of the others, and to discard from use all forms which are different from it or in conflict with it. It does not often meet with absolute success, to be sure, but it frequently meets with great success; and the effort to make its success complete never ceases. There is no better illustration of this than the history of the declension of the noun in English. When we first come to the knowledge of our tongue during the Anglo-Saxon period, we find that certain vowel declensions which had once existed had very largely passed away. The comparison of other Teutonic languages reveals what they must have been. The survival of occasional forms leads to the unavoidable inference that there was a time when these declensions were flourishing; indeed, they may have been flourishing at the very time itself in some then existing dialect of which no memorials have been preserved. What these declensions had lost, other declensions had gained, especially the one most predominant. Owing to agencies of which I shall speak later, the process of effacement was temporarily arrested, or at least was largely shorn of its strength. But the moment the restraining power of literature was withdrawn in consequence of the Norman Conquest, the principle of analogy resumed and carried out its work on a grand scale. When English in the fourteenth century emerges with a literature so valuable as to possess an authority of its own, not only have the varying vowel declensions been reduced to the common inflection exhibited by one of them, but even to that has been entirely conformed the single but important consonant declension which had once been in wide use. In the case of this last the process has gone on so steadily that English furnishes to-day but the one word *ox*, with its plural *oxen*, as the single genuine survival in common speech of a declension which embraced at one time about half the nouns of the language.

Powerful as is the influence of analogy in reducing diversities to a common unity, there is in existence an opposing agency which furnishes resistance and at times the sturdiest resistance to this leveling tendency. This, which, for the lack of a better name, I have called the principle of authority, cherishes and strives to retain all variant forms of inflection which are actually in existence and makes a determined stand against any change whatever, whether the change would be for the better or the worse. That which is established has authority simply because it is established. This influence varies distinctly with the intellectual status of the users of speech; but it is

more or less in operation at all times. In cultivated tongues it is exceedingly powerful, if not actually dominant. What it saves from the wreck which has been brought about by the principle of analogy, it clings to earnestly, and indeed will never let go, if it can be avoided. Illustrations of this tendency need not be given here; for they will be exemplified in the part of the subject with which we now come to deal.

These are some of the agencies which are always operating upon the internal life of a language. They are largely responsible for the changes which take place slowly or rapidly in methods of expression. So far as we can discover, they are true of the speech of the most illiterate and degraded races; they are certainly true of those which have attained any degree of intellectual development. This leads us to the next topic, the difference in the agencies which act upon cultivated and uncultivated speech.

It is a mere commonplace to say that every living language constantly undergoes change. It may be little or it may be great; it may go on very slowly or very rapidly. These are the accidents of circumstance. But so long as it has life, it must undergo modification or alteration as do the persons who speak it.

These changes belong generally to two classes, those affecting the vocabulary and those affecting the grammatical structure. Both of these agencies are always in operation; but they operate very differently at different periods and under different conditions. Here arises at once the great distinction which exists between the life and growth of cultivated and uncultivated speech, or perhaps it would be better to say more specifically between speech with a literature and speech without one. The processes that are going on in each are precisely the same. Changes are taking place in each both in grammar and vocabulary; but they manifest themselves in ways essentially distinct and they proceed at entirely different rates of movement. The differences, indeed, are so marked that they may be called fundamental. This is not to maintain that there will not be in each class apparent and it may be real exceptions to the rule laid down; it is only the general principle which is here stated.

Now the first point is that in uncultivated speech changes in vocabulary under ordinary conditions take place slowly and on a somewhat petty scale. Very few new words are introduced into the speech, and any extension of meaning in the case of those already existing happens rarely. The reason for this lies on the surface. The users of uncultivated speech are themselves uncultivated. They have comparatively little knowledge and few ideas outside of the range of those which are brought to their attention by their necessities or limited opportunities for observation. Their vocabulary is not ample, to start with, and as time goes on they do not add to it many words.

It is not that any open hostility exists to their adoption. They are not introduced into the speech because they are not needed. The circle of knowledge and of thought being small, the existing stock of terms is amply sufficient to meet all the demands which are made upon it. Consequently the vocabulary suffers little enlargement, and indeed may remain practically stationary for an indefinite period, though it is of course liable to be added to whenever the desire for a new word to express something previously unknown cannot be satisfied by any new meaning which can be attached to an old word or to a combination of old words.

But in the case of the grammatical structure the reverse of this is apt to be true. It is not so necessarily, indeed, but there is no counter-acting agency powerful enough of itself to prevent its being so. The one great object of speech which every man, educated or illiterate, sets always before his eyes is to make himself understood. Now if the speaker in an uncultivated tongue succeeds in effecting this, he has secured all that he cares for. In so doing he may discard old forms, old inflections; or he may unconsciously develop new ones; or he may confuse with one another those which already exist. He may vary his expression essentially from the construction which he himself has been wont to use as well as those he is addressing. But about none of these things does he trouble himself, if he can succeed in making himself comprehended. There is no one to find fault with him; or if such a person could be supposed to exist, the violator of usage does not feel himself under the least obligation to heed the censure he receives. All this implies that in uncultivated speech there is nowhere a standard of authority of any sort which any one feels bound to respect. Consequently changes in grammar are effected easily, if they are effected at all. If outside agencies ever operate upon the users of such a speech, if these are subjected to conquest, if they are brought in frequent contact with the speakers of another tongue, and are under the necessity of communicating with them constantly, modifications of the grammatical structure are likely to take place on a grand scale, though the vocabulary may be affected but slightly. There is no better illustration of this principle than that which has actually happened in the history of our own speech. For more than two hundred years after the Norman Conquest the English added scarcely anything to their stock of words from the language of the men of the race to whom they had become subject, though with them they came into constant contact. On the other hand, during this same period the grammatical structure underwent violent and extensive alteration.

Such are the principles which control the development of unlettered speech. In exceptional circumstances these may undergo modification, and perhaps in some instances reversal; but their

general applicability to the facts of linguistic history cannot well be gainsaid. But the moment a speech comes into the possession of a great literature, this condition of things is changed. The same agencies are at work as in the case of an uncultivated tongue; but they vary distinctly in the influence they exert, and the results in consequence are in striking contrast to those just given.

In cultivated speech addition to the vocabulary goes on extensively, goes on rapidly. Furthermore it goes on with little opposition. The hostility to the introduction of new terms is almost invariably directed against particular words, and in the case of these it is often confined to particular persons. It therefore takes the form of an expression of individual prejudice and not that of general aversion on the part of users of speech. In cultivated speech addition to the vocabulary is in truth a necessity of the situation. The circle of knowledge and thought is constantly enlarging. The new facts learned, the new discoveries made, the new inventions originated, the new ideas entertained, the new distinctions set up, all these demand either the use of old words in new senses or the introduction or formation of new words. The latter is the course most usually followed. It is not, nor is it felt to be objectionable. Men indeed frequently make it a matter of boast that they were the first to hit upon the employment of some term which designates exactly the view of some new fact or theory or condition which all recognize but have found difficult to express. The irruption of a large number of words hitherto unknown into a speech is under the circumstances just mentioned not an indication of the corruption or decay of a language, but an evidence of the intellectual health and vigor of its users. Scores and even hundreds of terms will be proposed for admission which find no permanent lodgment; for speech can ordinarily be trusted to reject that which is really needless, that which adds nothing to clearness or to force of expression; on the other hand, to choose and to hold fast with an instinct which may almost be deemed unerring that which it requires for its best and fullest development.

Consequently in a cultivated tongue the introduction of new words is something that is going on constantly whenever and wherever intellectual life exists. But when to such a tongue comes the consideration of new grammatical forms or constructions, there ensues at once a complete change of front. The attitude, instead of being one of friendliness or acquiescence, is that of violent hostility. The newcomer meets with examination from everybody and with denunciation from many. There is a feeling on the part of the cultivated users of speech that any alteration of grammatical structure cannot be an improvement upon existing usage, as would be conceded by all in the case of the introduction of some new word. Rightly or wrongly the disposition does not prevail to look upon it as a process of evolu-

tion. So far as it goes, it is regarded as revolution, and therefore to be resisted. Accordingly no change can take place in the grammar of a cultivated speech which is not compelled to fight its way to acceptance. It never succeeds without going through a struggle which lasts at least scores of years. If it triumphs, it triumphs because it recommends itself to the users of speech as accomplishing something for expression which had not previously been secured. If once they become thoroughly imbued with that view, vain are the protests of purists and grammarians; for the educated users of speech know better what they want than any or all of their self-constituted instructors.

The reason for this contrast between the attitudes assumed by lettered and unlettered speech is due to a factor which has at all times played an important part in the development of language, but with the wide diffusion of education in modern times is destined to play one still more important. This is the creation of literature. Its existence in any tongue tends immediately to weaken or overthrow entirely other influences which have been operating upon the speech. Few even among scholars have learned to appreciate fully the conservative influence which literature exerts over language. Men used to take the ground that speech was always moving away from its sources; that the longer a tongue continued to live, the more increasingly difficult of comprehension became its earlier form to its later speakers. There is, or at least there may be, a great deal of truth in this view so long as we confine our attention to tongues which can boast of no literary monuments of excellence. It becomes absolutely false, however, after a great literature has been created and has become widely diffused. If the speech then undergoes changes on any great scale, that result will be owing to outside influences and not to any which belong to its own natural development.

Yet this belief about the steady recession of speech from its sources has lasted long after any reason for it has disappeared. Even to-day it can be heard occasionally expressed. It is therefore not surprising to find it once widely prevalent. By the great authors of the time of Queen Anne and the first Georges dismal forebodings were universally entertained and frequently uttered as to the ruin which was to overtake their own writings, in consequence of the changes constantly going on in English speech. Their works, they complained, could not hope to outlast a century, unless the language became what they called fixed, and they were in perpetual distress of mind because some person or some organization could not be induced to undertake and accomplish that impossible feat.

The fact which these men did not perceive at all, and which is none too clearly comprehended now, is that the moment a great literature has been established, the language revolves about it, and,

so long as a healthy national life exists, never moves far away from it. The great authors are read and studied everywhere and at all times. They make familiar to the knowledge of their admirers the words and constructions they employ; and these in turn are reproduced by their imitators. The operation of this influence has been curiously illustrated in the history of our own tongue. To us the language of the Elizabethan age is much nearer than it was to the men of the eighteenth century, mainly because the authors of that earlier age are now much more read. As a result their words and usages have unconsciously become a part of our own intellectual equipment. Very few would be the men found now who would take the view, widely entertained at the beginning of the eighteenth century, that a great deal of Shakespeare's language was not merely archaic but practically obsolete. The numerous imitators of Spenser later in that same century furnished glossaries to their productions, explaining the antiquated or unusual terms they had employed. In some cases this was needed distinctly; for the words they used had never any existence outside of their own pages. But they frequently defined those about whose meaning no man of ordinary education would now entertain a doubt. Even the necessity they seemed to have felt themselves under of explaining the more purely poetic words excites a certain surprise. What poet would think now of apologizing, as did Prior in 1706, for using such obsolete words, as he called them, as *behest* in the carefully defined sense of "command," *band* in that of "army," *I ween* in that of "I think," *prowess* in that of "strength," and *whilom* in that of "heretofore." Some of these very definitions show too that in all cases he did not understand the exact meaning of the word he employed.

But far more than in the vocabulary is the conserving power of literature — especially of a great literature — exhibited in the grammatical structure. The moment it has been in existence long enough to make its influence felt, it at once proceeds to restrict change there within the closest possible limits; or if it permits any to be made with comparative ease, its action is directed in such instances to the selection of one out of two or more forms in common use. Let me illustrate its methods in this particular by a reference to the history of the two conjugations of our tongue. After the Norman Conquest English lost the literature she possessed which had attached to it any authority. Though not entirely disused as a written speech, there existed no standard to which any one felt bound to conform. In consequence a general dissolution of the grammatical structure took place. One of its results was that verbs of the strong conjugation went over to the weak in great numbers. It seemed for a while as if it were merely a question of time when every one of the former would disappear from the language. Analogy was entirely against them. Any new verbs

that came in, and a full half, if not the majority, of the old ones formed their preterite by a syllable usually represented in modern English by *-ed* or *-d*. Why should not this rule be extended to all? This was a feeling that operated constantly upon men before they came into the possession of a literature. So general was the movement, so large were the losses of the strong conjugation, that this early transition has imposed upon the men of later times. There were not wanting in the nineteenth century linguistic scholars of considerable eminence who gravely announced that the strong conjugation was destined to disappear from English speech. As a matter of fact, the moment that literature had been widely enough diffused to exert its full influence, the transition of verbs of the strong conjugation to the weak ceased entirely. Not an instance can be pointed out where a single one of these verbs has gone over since the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Not the least sign of any movement of this nature manifests itself now. On the contrary, the tendency is, if anything, in the reverse direction.

But literature does not content itself with merely arresting change which is going on in grammatical forms. It presents a hostile attitude to anything which takes the shape of grammatical innovation. That which already exists has been found sufficient by the great writers of the past to do all that is required for expression. What then can be the need of new forms, of new constructions, of which they, far greater than we, did not feel the lack? To add anything whatever seems therefore of the nature of an attempt to paint the lily. This is the reason why every effort of the nature of innovation meets, in the case of the grammatical structure, with hostility so general and with denunciation so violent. It is the exhortation of literature to stand fast by the ancient ways.

But the users of speech are always striving for greater clearness and force of expression. If the existing forms and constructions do not exactly meet their requirements, they will cast about for ways to secure what they are aiming at. Let me illustrate this principle by a further example from our speech. For a long period modern English suffered from the lack of a distinct form for the passive which would apply to all verbs. The inflection in common use was made up of the substantive verb with the past participle of another verb. This worked very well in many cases, especially so in the case of words which denoted a continuous action or state of mind. The phrase, "the man is loved or is hated," conveys adequately the sense of the speaker when he is referring to the present time. But when the word employed itself denoted a single act, the form just mentioned meant an action fully completed and not one in process of going on. It was really something past which was indicated and not anything present. The phrase "the man is killed" could not possibly suggest the idea

that the subject of the verb was merely in danger of death; it meant that he was actually dead. The form therefore, as applicable to all verbs, broke down.

There is hardly anything more interesting in the history of our speech than the various devices to which speakers and writers resorted to get round the difficulty the construction of the passive presented, the efforts they put forth to contrive something which would be of universal applicability. The various attempts made give us a peculiarly vivid conception of the infinite pains that are taken in speech, often unconsciously, to render expression clear. All of these efforts were for a long time unsatisfactory. They involved a change of construction or a change of the form of the sentence or they were made ineffective by the clumsiness of circumlocution. At last a way was opened. A construction already existed in the speech which, though fully authorized, belonged in its origin to the class of so-called corruptions. To certain verbs, but especially to the substantive verb, a verbal noun preceded by the preposition *on* or *in* had been added to complete the sense, as, for instance, "he was gone on hunting." The form of the connecting preposition was in the first place corrupted into *a*; finally it was dropped altogether. This caused the verbal noun, when joined to the substantive verb, to be regarded not as a noun, but as the present participle; but a present participle, not in its usual active signification, but in the sense of a passive. Hence arose such expressions as "the dinner is preparing," "the house is building." In these the verb is active in form but passive in meaning. But the goal could not be reached in this way. The form suffered from exactly the same embarrassment which attended the ordinary one with the past participle. Satisfactory with certain verbs, it could not be used with all. The moment an object with life was introduced as the subject, the passive sense disappeared. When we hear it said that "a man is eating," we think of him as the doer of an action and not the object of one. It does not occur to us that he himself is undergoing mastication from others. Here, too, in consequence the form broke down. It was to remedy this condition of things that the verb *to be* was at last united with the compound past participle. This passive form conveyed an unmistakable meaning, and if desired could be applied to any verb whatever. When we are told, to use the previous illustration, that "a man is being eaten," there is not the slightest doubt in the mind of any one as to what is actually taking place.

This particular form first began to be distinctly noticeable towards the end of the eighteenth century. For a while, however, it attracted but little attention. But no sooner did the sentinels who profess to watch over the purity of speech have their attention called to it, than a violent outcry at once arose. Few at the present day have any

conception of the clamor to which this new grammatical form gave rise during the early and middle part of the nineteenth century, and of the denunciation to which it was subjected. According to its assailants its introduction and use was a distinct foreshadowing of the ruin that was impending over the speech. Direful consequences were predicted if the objectionable form should succeed in establishing itself in the language. But the construction was too desirable an acquisition to be allowed to disappear. Its usefulness prevailed over all opposition, and at present it is fully accepted, or meets at least only now and then with a protest from some belated survivor of the conflict which once raged so violently.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the hostility to the introduction of new grammatical forms, though sometimes manifesting itself absurdly, is an undeniably healthy hostility. So long as it continues, the speech can be trusted to remain steadfast to its moorings. It is the existence of this feeling which keeps a language moving not from but about its literature. The vocabulary can be increased almost indefinitely without affecting the character or intelligibility of the tongue which retains in familiar use the words employed by its greatest writers. But the moment its grammatical construction undergoes a violent upheaval, that moment the language is on the road to decay and death. For additions there, unlike those made to the vocabulary, do not range themselves alongside of the ones already in use, or usurp at best merely a part of the domain of signification. A new grammatical form is not long content with standing side by side with an old one. It first displaces it from its supremacy, and then supersedes it altogether: and this means in process of time a complete change in the character of the tongue.

From the hasty consideration which has been given here of the characteristics which attend the development of cultivated speech, we are enabled to draw certain positive conclusions. A language cannot be made either to improve or degenerate of itself. It is nothing but the reflex of the spirit and aims of the men who employ it, and it will rise or fall in accordance with their intellectual and moral condition. Its continued existence, therefore, depends solely upon the fact whether the men to whom it is an inheritance are cultivated enough to enrich its literature, virtuous enough to elevate and maintain its character, and strong enough to uphold and extend its sway. All these conditions are necessary to its permanence, but in modern times the last has attained an importance it never before held. The most insignificant of tongues has, it is true, tremendous vitality: it will cling to life long after the most conclusive reasons have manifested themselves for its death. Yet it is a question whether under modern conditions any language can be sure of continued existence which does not have behind it the support of a great nationality. It is

a question whether the languages of smaller peoples will not recede before the encroachments of their powerful neighbors, just as dialects steadily tend to disappear before the advance of the literary speech.

At all events the danger which once threatened cultivated languages from the limitation of the knowledge of their literature to a comparatively small number of men, has largely disappeared with the invention of printing and the diffusion of education which increasingly reaches every one in the community, the low as well as the high. Forecasts about the future of any speech and its permanence must therefore now be made subject to conditions which never before prevailed. The one thing only, which has been indicated, can be relied upon with certainty. The continuance of any language rests upon the ability, upon the character, upon the strength of the men to whom it belongs. Its literature may be its glory. It may be a source of just pride to the race which has created it or has inherited it. But however rich and varied it be, it cannot of itself preserve its life, though it may retard its death and hallow its memory. No tongue can depend for its continuance upon the achievements of its past. It can exhibit no more than the vigor, the purity, and the vitality of the men who speak it now, or are to speak it hereafter: and if their vigor, their purity, and their vitality disappear, the language as a living speech will not survive their decay.

THE PROGRESS OF THE HISTORY OF LANGUAGE DURING THE LAST CENTURY

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It cannot be the purpose of this brief address to present even in outline a history of the science of language in the century past; it can undertake only to set forth the chief motives and directions of its development.

A hundred years ago this year Friedrich von Schlegel was in Paris studying Persian and the mysterious, new-found Sanskrit; Franz Bopp was a thirteen-year-old student in the gymnasium at Aschaffenburg; Jakob Grimm was studying law in the University of Marburg. And yet these three were to be the men who should find the paths by which the study of human speech might escape from its age-long wanderings in a wilderness without track or cairn or clue, and issue forth upon oriented highways as a veritable science.

Schlegel the Romanticist, who had peered into Sanskrit literature in the interest of the fantastic humanism modish in his day, happened to demonstrate (*Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Inder*, 1808) beyond cavil the existence of a genetic relationship between the chief members of what we now know as the Indo-European family of languages. Bopp¹ found a way to utilize this demonstrated fact in a quest which, though now recognized as mostly vain, incidentally set in operation the mechanism of comparative grammar. Grimm,² under the promptings of a national enthusiasm, sought after the sources of the German national life, and, finding in language as in lore the roots of the present deep planted in the past, laid the foundations and set forth the method of historical grammar. The grafting of comparative grammar upon the stock of historical grammar gave it wider range and yielded the scientific grammar of the nineteenth century. The method of comparative grammar is merely auxiliary to historical

¹ First work: *Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache*, 1816.

² *Deutsche Grammatik*, vol. 1 (1819).

grammar; it establishes determinations of fact far behind the point of earliest record, and enables historical grammar to push its lines of descent in the form of "dotted lines" far back into the unwritten past.

It was the discovery of Sanskrit to the attention and use of European scholars at the close of the eighteenth century that gave occasion to an effective use of the comparative method and a consequent establishment of a veritable comparative grammar. But in two other distinct ways it exercised a notable influence upon the study of language. First, it offered to observation a language whose structure yielded itself readily to analysis in terms of the adaptation of its formal mechanism to the expression of modifications of thought, and thus gave an encouragement to the dissection of words in the interest of tracing the principles of their formation. Second, the Hindoo national grammar itself presented to Western scholars an illustration of accuracy and completeness in collecting, codifying, and reporting the facts of a language, especially such as related to phonology, inflection, and word-formation, that involved the necessity of a complete revolution in the whole attitude of grammatical procedure. The discovery of Pāṇini and the *Prātiçākhyas* meant far more to the science of language than the discovery of the Vedas. The grammar of the Greeks had marked a path so clear, and established a tradition so strong, guaranteed in a prestige so high, that the linguistics of the West through all the generations faithfully abode in the way. The grammatical categories once taught and established became the irrefragable moulds of grammatical thought, and constituted a system so complete in its enslaving power that if any man ever suspected himself in bondage he was yet unable to identify his bonds.

The Greeks had addressed themselves to linguistic reflection in connection with their study of the content and the forms of thought; grammar arose as the handmaiden of philosophy. They assumed, without consciously and expressly formulating it as a doctrine, that language is the inseparable shadow of thought, and therefore proceeded without more ado to find in its structure and parts replicas of the substances and moulds of thought. They sought among the facts of language for illustrations of theories; it did not occur to them to collect the facts and organize them to yield their own doctrine. Two distinct practical uses finally brought the chief materials of rules and principles to formulation in the guise of a system of descriptive grammar: first, the interpretation of Homer and the establishment of a correct text; second, the teaching of Greek to aliens, and the establishment of a standard by which to teach. These practical uses came in, however, rather as fortunate opportunities for practical application of an established discipline than as the motives to its creation. With the Hindoos it was the direct reverse. They had a

sacred language and sacred texts rescued from earlier days by means of oral tradition. The meaning of the texts had grown hazy, but the word was holy, and even though it remained but an empty shell to human understanding, it was pleasing to the gods and had served its purpose through the generations to bring gods and men into accord, and must be preserved; likewise the language of ritual and comment thereon, which, as the possession of a limited class, required not only to be protected from overwhelming beneath the floods of the vernacular, but demanded to be extended to the use of wider circles in the dominant castes. Sanskrit had already become a moribund or semi-artificial language before grammar laid hold upon it to continue and extend it. But from the outstart the Hindoo grammarian sat humbly at the feet of language to learn of it, and never assumed to be its master or its guide. Inasmuch as the language had existed and been perpetuated primarily as a thing of the living voice and not of ink and paper, and had been used to reach the ears rather than the eyes of the divine, it followed, in a measure remotely true of no other grammatical endeavor, that the Hindoo grammar was compelled to devote itself to the most exactly accurate report upon the sounds of the language. The niceties of phonetic discrimination represented in the alphabet itself, the refinements of observation involved in the reports on accent and the phenomenon of *pluti*, the formulation of the principles of sentence phonetics in the rules of *sandhi*, the observation on the physiology of speech scattered through the *Prāti-çākhyas* are all brilliant illustrations of the Hindoo's direct approach to the real substance of living speech. None of the national systems of grammar, the Chinese, the Egyptian, the Assyrian, the Greek, or the Arabic, had anything to show remotely comparable to this; and up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, despite all the long endeavors expended on Greek and Hebrew and Latin, nothing remotely like it had been known to the Western world. The Greek grammarians had really never stormed the barriers of written language; they were mostly concerned with establishing and teaching literary forms of the language. Even when they dealt with the dialects, they had the standardized literary types thereof before their eyes rather than the spoken forms ringing in their ears. When the grammars of Colebrooke (1805), of Carey (1806), and of Wilkins (1808) opened the knowledge of Sanskrit to European scholars, it involved nothing short of a grammatical revelation, and prepared the way for an ultimate remodeling of language-study nothing short of a revolution. Though these Hindoo lessons in accurate phonetics as the basis of sure knowledge and safe procedure had their immediate and unmistakable influence upon the scientific work of the first half century, their ¹ full acceptance tarried until the second half was well

¹ Cf. H. Oertel, *Lectures on the Study of Language*, p. 30 ff. (1901).

on its way. Even Jakob Grimm, whose service in promoting the historical study of phonology must be rated with the highest, was still so blind to the necessity of phonetics as to express the view that historical grammar could be excused from much attention to the "bunte wirrwar mundartlicher lautverhältnisse," and though von Raumer in his *Die Aspiration und die Lautverschiebung* (1837) had not only set forth in all clearness the theoretical necessity of a phonetic basis, but had given practical illustration thereof in the material with which he was dealing, it still was possible as late as 1868 for Scherer in his *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache* justly to deplore that "only rarely is a philologist found who is willing to enter upon phonetic discussion." The phonetic treatises of Brücke¹ (1849 and 1866) and of Merkel (1856 and 1866)² failed, though excellent of their kind, to bring the subject within the range of philological interest, and it remained for Eduard Sievers in his *Grundzüge der Lautphysiologie* (1876) and *Grundzüge der Phonetik* (1881), by stating phonetics more in terms of phonology, to bridge the gap and establish phonetics as a constituent and fundamental portion of the science of language. The radical change of character assumed by the science in the last quarter of the century is due as much to the consummation of this union as to any one influence.

But it was not phonetics alone that the Indian grammarians were able to teach to the West; they had developed, in their processes of identifying the roots of words, a scientific phonology that was all but an historical phonology. In some of its applications it was that already, for in explaining the relations to each other of various forms of a given root as employed in different words, even though the explanation was intended to serve the purposes of word-analysis and not of sound-history, the grammarians virtually formulated in repeated instances what we now know as "phonetic laws." The recognition of *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*, which antedates *Pāṇini*, must rank as one of the most brilliant inductive discoveries in the history of linguistic science. The theory involved became the basis of the treatment of the Indo-European vocalism. The first thorough-going formulation, that of Schleicher in his *Compendium* (1861), was conceived entirely in the Hindoo sense, and it was to the opportunity which this formulation offered of overseeing the material and the problems involved that we owe the brilliant series of investigations by Georg Curtius (*Spaltung des a-Lautes*, 1864), Amelung³ (1871,

¹ E. Brücke, *Untersuchungen über die Lautbildung und das natürliche System der Sprachlaute* (1849); *Grundzüge der Physiologie und Systematik der Sprachlaute* (1856).

² C. L. Merkel, *Anatomie und Physiologie des menschlichen Stimm- und Sprachorgans* (1856); *Physiologie der menschlichen Sprache* (1866).

³ A. Amelung, *Die Bildung der Tempusstämme durch Vocalsteigerung im Deutschen*, Berlin, 1871. *Erwiderung*, KZ. xxii, 361 ff., completed July, 1873, published 1874 after the author's death. *Der Ursprung der deutschen a-vocale*, Haupt's Zeitschr. xviii, 161 ff., 1875.

1873, 1875), Osthoff (*N-D declination*, 1876), Brugmann (*Nasalis sonans*, 1876; *Geschichte der stammabstufenden Declination*, 1876), Collitz (*Ueber die Annahme mehrerer grundsprachlichen a-laute*, 1878), Joh. Schmidt (*Zwei arische a-laute*, 1879), which led up step by step steadily and unerringly to the definite proof that the Indo-European vocalism was to be understood in terms of the Greek rather than the Sanskrit. These articles, written in the period of intensest creative activity the science has known, represent in the cases of four of the scholars mentioned, namely, Curtius, Amelung, Brugmann, Collitz, the masterpieces of the scientific life of each. Though dealing with a single problem, they combined, both through the results they achieved and the method and outlook they embodied, to give character and direction to the science of the next quarter-century. Karl Verner's famous article, *Eine Ausnahme der ersten Lautverschiebung* (KZ. XXIII, 97 ff., July, 1875), which proved of great importance, among other things, in establishing a connection between Indo-European ablaut and accent, belongs to this period; and Brugmann's article, *Nasalis Sonans*, which served more than any other work to clear the way for the now prevailing view of ablaut, was influenced by Verner's article, which was by a few months its predecessor. Both articles, it is worthy of noting, were distinctly influenced by the new phonetic; Verner's, it would appear chiefly by Brücke, Brugmann's, through a suggestion of Osthoff's, by Sievers, whose *Lautphysiologie* had just appeared within the same year. The full effect upon Western science of the introduction of the Indian attitude toward language-study appears therefore to have been realized only with the last quarter of the century.

More prompt than the response of European science to the teachings of Hindoo phonetics and phonology had been the acceptance of the Hindoo procedure in word-analysis, especially with relation to suffixes and inflectional endings. The centuries of study of Greek and Latin had yielded no clue to any classification or assorting of this material according to meaning or function. The medieval explanation of *dominicus* as *domini custos* was as good as any. Besnier in his essay, *La science des Etymologies* (1694), counted it the mark of a sound etymologist that he restrict his attention to the roots of words, for to bother with the other parts would be "useless and ludicrous." And when Horne Tooke in the *Diversions of Purley*, II, 429 (1786-1805), just before the sunrise, wrote the startling words, "All those common terminations in any language . . . are themselves separate words with distinct meanings," and (II, 454) "Adjectives with such terminations (that is, *-ly*, *-ous*, *-ful*, *-some*, *-ish*, etc.) are, in truth, all compound words"; and when he flung out like a challenge the analysis of Latin *ibo*, "I shall go," as three letters containing three words, namely, *i* "go," *b* ($= \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$) "will," *o* ($= \epsilon\gamma\omicron$) "I," no one seems to

have been near enough to the need of such instruction to know whether or not he was to be taken seriously; for the words bore no fruit, and only years afterward when Bopp's doctrine had been recognized were they disinterred as antiquarian curiosities. Eleven years later, in the full light of the Sanskrit grammar, Bopp published his *Conjugationssystem*, and the clue had been found. To be sure Bopp was misguided in his belief that he could identify each element of a word-ending with a significant word, and assign to it a distinct meaning, but he had found the key to an analysis having definite historical value and permitting the identification of such entities as mode-sign, tense-sign, personal endings, etc. The erroneous portion of his doctrine based upon his conception of the Indo-European as an agglutinative type of speech dragged itself as an incumbrance through the first half-century of the science, and, though gasping, still lived in the second edition of Curtius's *Verbum* (1877). This, along with many other mechanical monstrosities of its kind, was gradually banished from the linguistic arena by the saner views of the life-habits of language, which had their rise from linguistic psychology as a study of the relations of language to the hearing as well as speaking individual and the relations of the individual to the speech community, and which asserted themselves with full power in the seventies. We shall have occasion to return to this subject later.

Bopp had from the beginning devoted himself to language-study, not as an end in itself, but as we know from his teacher and sponsor Windischmann,¹ as well as infer from the direction and spirit of his work, he hoped to be able "in this way to penetrate into the mysteries of the human mind and learn something of its nature and its laws." He was therefore unmistakably of the school of the Greeks, not of the Hindoos; for the Greek grammarian in facing language asks the question "why," grammar being to him philosophy, whereas the Hindoo asks the question, "what," grammar being to him a science after the manner of what we call the "natural sciences." There is indeed but slight reason for the common practice of dating the beginning of the modern science of language with Bopp, aside from the one simple result of his activity, which must in strict logic be treated as merely incidental thereto, namely, that he gave a practical illustration of the possibility of applying the comparative method for widening the scope and enriching the results of historical grammar.

As Bopp had tried to use the comparative method in determining the true and original meanings of the formative elements, so did his later contemporary, August Friedrich Pott² (1802-87), undertake to use it in finding out the original meaning of words. The search for

¹ Introduction to Bopp's *Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache*, p. 4, 1816.

² A. F. Pott, *Etymologische Forschungen*, 2 vols. Lemgo, 1833-36; 2d ed. 6 vols. 1859-76.

the etymology or real meaning of words had been a favorite and mostly bootless exercise of all European grammarians from the Greek philosophers down, having its original animus and more or less confessedly its continuing power in the broadly human, though barely on occasion half-formulated conviction, that words and their values by some mysterious tie naturally belong to each other. In the instinct to begin his task Pott was still with the traditions of the Greeks and the Græco-Europeans, but in developing it he was guided into new paths by two forces that had arisen since the century opened. Under the guidance of the comparative method whereby the vocabularies of demonstrably cognate languages now assumed a determinate relation to each other, he came unavoidably to the recognition of certain normal correspondences of sounds between the different tongues. On the other hand, in almost entire independence hereof, Jakob Grimm in the pursuit of his historical method had formulated the regularities of the mutation of consonants in the Teutonic dialects, and had set them forth in a second edition of the first volume of his grammar, appearing in 1822. In all this was contained a strong encouragement as well as warning to apply these new definite tests to every etymological postulate, and therewith arose, under Pott's hands, the beginnings of a scientific etymology. It was a first promise of deliverance from a long wilderness of caprice.

The positivistic attitude which had been gradually infused into language-study under the influence of the Hindoo grammar finally reached its extremest expression in the works of August Schleicher (1821-68). The science of language he treated under the guise of a natural science. Language appeared as isolated from the speaking individual or the speaking community to an extent unparalleled in any of his predecessors or successors, and was viewed as an organism having a life of its own and laws of growth or decline within itself. Following the analogies of the natural sciences and trusting to the inferred laws of growth, he ventured to reconstruct from the scattered data of the cognate Indo-European languages the visible form of the mother speech. His confidence in the character of language as a natural growth made him the first great systematizer and organizer of the materials of Indo-European comparative grammar (*Compendium der vergleichenden Grammatik*, 1861); as confidence in the unerring uniformity of the action of the laws of sound made Karl Brugmann the second (*Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik*, 1886-92).

It is not by accident that the first one to voice outright the dogma of the absoluteness (*Ausnahmslosigkeit*) of the laws of sound was a pupil of Schleicher, August Leskien (*Die Declination in Slavisch-litauischen und Germanischen*, xxviii, 1876). The use of this dogma as a norm and test in the hands of a signally active and gifted body

of scholars who followed the leadership of Leskien and were known under the title of the *Leipziger Schule* or the *Junggrammatiker*, and the adherence to it in practice of many others who did not accept the theory involved, — a use which was undoubtedly greatly stimulated by Verner's discovery (1875) that a great body of supposed exceptions to Grimm's law were in reality obedient to law — gave to the science in the two following decades not only an abundance of results, but an objectivity of attitude and procedure and a firmness of structure that may fairly be said to represent the consummation of that positivist tendency which we have sought to identify with the influence of Hindoo grammar.

This movement, however, derived its impulse by no means exclusively through Schleicher. A new stream had meanwhile blended its waters with the current. The psychology of language as a study of the relations of language to the speaking individual, that is, of the conditions under which language is received, retained, and reproduced, and of the relations of the individual to his speech community, had been brought into play preëminently through the labors of Heymann Steinthal,¹ who though as a psychologist, a follower of Herbart, must be felt to represent in general as a linguist the attitude toward language-study first established by Wilhelm v. Humboldt. William D. Whitney shows in his writings on general linguistics the influence of Steinthal, as well as good schooling in the grammar of the Hindoos and much good common sense. His lectures on Language and the Study of Language (1867) and the Life and Growth of Language (1875) helped chase many a goblin from the sky. Scherer's *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache* (1868) combined, more than any book of its day, the influences of new lines of endeavor, and especially gave hearing to the new work in the psychology as well as the physiology of speech. To this period (1865-80), under the influence of the combination of the psychological with the physiological point of view, belongs the establishment of scientific common sense in the treatment of language. By virtue of this, as it were, binocular vision, language was thrown up into relief, isolated, and objectivised as it had never been before. Old half-mystical notions, such as the belief in a period of upbuilding in language and a period of decay, all savoring of Hegel, and the consequent fallacy that ancient languages display a keener speech-consciousness than the modern, speedily faded away. The centre of interest transferred itself from ancient and written types of speech to the modern and living. Men came to see that vivi-

¹ H. Steinthal, *Der Urprung der Sprache, im Zusammenhang mit den letzten Fragen alles Wissens*, 1851; *Charakteristik der hauptsächlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues*, 1860; *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, 1881; *Gesch. der Sprachw. bei den Griechen und Römern*, 1863; 1890-91. Also editor with Lazarus of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, from 1859.

section rather than morbid anatomy must supply the methods and spirit of linguistic research. The germs of a new idea affecting the conditions under which cognate languages may be supposed to have differentiated out of a mother speech, and conceived in terms of the observed relations of dialects to language, were infused by Johannes Schmidt's *Verwandschafts-verhältnisse der indogerman. Sprachen* (1872). The rigid formulas of Schleicher's *Stammbaum* melted away before Schmidt's *Wellentheorie* and its line of successors down to the destructive theories of Kretschmer's *Einleitung in die Geschichte der griech. Sprache* (1896). Herein, as in many another movement of the period, we trace the results of applying the lessons of living languages to the understanding of the old. A remarkable document thoroughly indicative of what was moving in the spirit of the times was the Introduction to Osthoff and Brugmann's *Morphologische Untersuchungen*, vol. I (1878). But the gospel of the period, and its theology, for that matter, was most effectively set forth in Hermann Paul's *Principien der Sprachgeschichte* (1st ed. 1880), a work that has had more influence upon the science than any since Jakob Grimm's *Deutsche Grammatik*. Paul was the real successor of Steinthal. He also represented the strictest sect of the positivists in historical grammar. As a consequence of the union in Paul of the two tendencies, his work acquires its high significance. He established the reaction from Schleicher's treatment of language-science as a natural science; he showed it to be beyond peradventure one of the social sciences, and set forth the life conditions of language as a socio-historical product.

The work of the period dominated by Paul and the neo-grammarians, as well as the theories of method proclaimed, shows, however, that the two factors just referred to had not reached in the scientific thought and practice of the day a perfect blending. A well-known book of Osthoff's bears the title *Das physiologische und psychologische Moment in der sprachlichen Formenbildung* (1879). The title is symptomatic of the times. The physiological and the psychological were treated as two rival interests vying for the control of language. What did not conform to the phonetic laws, in case it were not a phenomenon of mixture, was to be explained if possible as due to analogy. This dualism could be expected to be but a temporary device, like the setting up of Satan over against God, in order to account for the existence of sin. A temporary device it has proved itself to be. The close of the first century of the modern science of language is tending toward a unitary conception of the various forms of historical change in language. The process by which the language of the individual adjusts itself to the community speech differs in kind no whit from that by which dialect yields to the standard language of the larger community. The process by which the products of form-association

or analogy establish themselves in language ¹ differs no whit in kind from that by which new pronunciations of words, that is, new sounds, make their way to general acceptance. The process by which loan-elements from an alien tongue adjust themselves to use in a given language differs psychologically and fundamentally no whit from either of the four processes mentioned. In fact, they all, all five, are phenomena of "mixture in language."² The process, furthermore, by which a sound-change in one word tends to spread from word to word and displace the old throughout the entire vocabulary of the language is also a process of "mixture,"³ and depends for its momentum in last analysis upon a proportionate analogy after the same essential model as that by which an added sound or a suffix is carried by analogy from word to word. All the movements of historical change in language respond to the social motive; they all represent in some form the absorption of the individual into the community mass. It has therewith become evident that there is nothing physiological in language that is not psychologically conditioned and controlled. So then it appears that the modern science of language has fairly shaken itself free again from the natural sciences and from such influences of their method and analogies as were intruded upon it by Schleicher and his period (1860-80), and after a century of groping and experiment has definitely oriented and found itself as a social science dealing with an institution which represents more intimately and exactly than any other the total life of man in the historically determined society of men.

Within the history of the science of language the beginning of the nineteenth century establishes beyond doubt a most important frontier. To appreciate how sharp is the contrast between hither and yonder we have only to turn to any part or phase of the work yonder, — the derivation of Latin from Greek, or mayhap to be most utterly scientific, from the Æolic dialect of Greek, the sage libration of the claims of Dutch as against Hebrew to be the original language of mankind, the bondage to the forms of Greek and Latin grammar, as

¹ Gustaf E. Karsten, *The Psychological Basis of Phonetic Law and Analogy*, Public. Mod. Lang. Assoc. ix, 312 ff. (1894), first sought a unitary psychological statement for the two impulses. We are here, however, speaking of the establishment of the results of the impulses in linguistic use.

² See O. Bremer, *Deutsche Phonetik*, Vorwort x ff. (1893); B. I. Wheeler, *Causes of Uniformity in Phonetic Change*, Transac. Amer. Philol. Assoc. xxiii, 1 ff. (1901).

³ A point of view involving the recognition of a more recondite form of speech-mixture is that first suggested by G. I. Ascoli (*Sprachwissenschaftliche Briefe*, pp. 17 ff. 1881-86; tral. 1887), whereby the initiation of phonetic and syntactical changes in language, and ultimately the differentiation of dialects and even of languages, may assume relation to languages of the substratum, as they may be termed, that is, prior and disused languages of peoples or tribes who have through the fate of conquest or assimilation been absorbed into another speech community. Notably has this point of view been urged by H. Hirt (*Indog. Forschungen*, iv 36 ff, 1894) and by Wechsler (*Giebt es Lautgesetze*, pp. 99 ff.). With this point of view the science of language will have largely to deal, we are persuaded, in the second century of its existence.

well as to the traditional point of view of the philosophical grammar of the Greeks, the subordination of grammar to logic, the hopeless etymologies and form analyses culminating in the phantasies of Hemsterhuis and Valckenaeer, the lack of any guiding clue for the explanation of how sound or form came to be what it is, and the curse of arid sterility that rested upon every effort. All the ways were blind and all the toil was vain. On the hither side, however, there is everywhere a new leaven working in the mass. What was that leaven? To identify if possible what it was has been the purpose of this review. I think we have seen it was not the influence of the natural sciences, certainly not directly; wherever that influence found direct application, it led astray. It was not in itself the discovery of the comparative method, for that proved but an auxiliary to a greater. If a founder must be proclaimed for the modern science of language, that founder was clearly Jakob Grimm, not Franz Bopp.

The leaven in question was comprised of two elements. One was found in the establishment of historical grammar, for this furnished the long-needed clue; the other was found in the discovery of Hindoo grammar, for this disclosed the fruitful attitude for linguistic observation. Historical grammar furnished the missing clue, because it represented the form of language as created what it is, not by the thought struggling for expression, but by historical conditions antecedent to it. Hindoo grammar furnished the method of observation because by its fundamental instinct it asked the question *how* in a given language does one say a given thing, rather than *why* does a given form embody the thought it does.

The germinal forces which have made this century of the science of language are not without their parallels in the century of American national life we are met to celebrate to-day. Jakob Grimm was of the school of the Romanticists, and he gained his conception of historical grammar from his ardor to derive the institutions of his people direct from their sources in the national life. The acquaintance of European scholars with the grammar of India arose from a counter-spirit in the world of the day whereby an expansion of intercourse and rule was bringing to the wine-press fruits plucked in many various fields of national life. Thus did the spirit of national particularism reconcile itself, in the experience of a science, with the fruits of national expansion. After like sort has the American nation in its development for the century following upon the typical event of 1803 combined the widening of peaceful interchange and common standards of order with strong insistence upon the right of separate communities in things pertaining separately to them to determine their lives out of the sources thereof. Therein has the nation given fulfillment to the prophetic hope of its great democratic imperialist Thomas Jefferson,¹

¹ Letter to Mr. Madison, 1809.

"I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire *and* self-government."

The linguistic science of the second century will build upon the plateau leveled by the varied toils and experiences of the first. More than ever those who are to read the lessons of human speech will gain their power through intimate sympathetic acquaintance with the historically conceived material of the individual language. But though the wide rangings of the comparative method have for the time abated somewhat of their interest and their yield, it will remain that he who would have largest vision must gain perspective by frequent resort to the extra-mural lookouts. Language is an offprint of human life, and to the student of human speech nothing linguistic can be ever foreign.

SECTION A — COMPARATIVE LANGUAGE

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(Hall 4, September 21, 10 a. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANCIS A. MARCH, Lafayette College.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CARL D. BUCK, University of Chicago.

PROFESSOR HANS OERTEL, Yale University.

SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. W. FAY, University of Texas, Austin, Tex.

THE Chairman of the Section of Comparative Language was Professor Francis A. March of Lafayette College, who stated, in opening the Section, that the scientific study of language takes its facts largely from ancient languages, and interprets them as human institutions by means of which society is organized and man developed. Comparative philology rejoices in unfolding the history of nations. It has sought to find its laws in the forces of nature, the bodily organization, and external habits of life, the influences of climate, the law of least effort working throughout like the law of gravitation. Its success has been as wonderful as that of the astronomers, and it will be a pleasure to hear of it to-day.

THE RELATIONS OF COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR TO OTHER BRANCHES OF LEARNING

BY CARL DARLING BUCK

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IN considering the relations of comparative grammar to other branches of learning it is essential to bear in mind that the term is used in a wider and a narrower sense, and is applied to more than one recognized field of scientific inquiry. Comparative grammar in the widest sense, or general comparative grammar, does not restrict itself to the study of some one group of related languages, but deals with all the known languages of the earth. It classifies them in groups, as far as possible according to genetic relationship, but also according to general structure, and compares not only the general mechanism for expressing relations, but the very distinctions and relations which find linguistic expression at all.

Comparative grammar in a narrower sense is used of the grammatical study of a group of genetically related languages, and in this application represents as many distinct fields of inquiry as there are well-defined groups of cognate languages. There is the comparative grammar of the Indo-European languages, of the Semitic languages, of the Finno-Hungarian languages, of the Malay-Polynesian languages, etc., etc. But the term Comparative Grammar is often applied still more specifically to the study of one of these groups of languages, namely, the Indo-European. It is obvious that this has no exclusive right to the title, and is more properly designated Indo-European Comparative Grammar. Yet the use of the broader term in this connection has a certain justification in the fact that it is in the field of the Indo-European languages that the methods and principles of comparative grammar were first established and have reached their highest development.

I believe I shall not go far amiss if, while not unmindful of its broader aspects, I shall consider comparative grammar mainly from the point of view of its application to a group of related

languages, as especially exemplified in Indo-European Comparative Grammar.¹

The Relation of Comparative Grammar to the Study of an Individual Language

The most intimate relation which comparative grammar sustains is to the study of an individual language. No one to whom language is an object of intrinsic interest, and not merely a means to an end, is satisfied with purely descriptive grammar, the bare statement of the facts of a given language, however essential this is as a foundation for historical investigation. And even he who believes it the function of the grammarian of an individual language to state only facts, and prides himself on the avoidance of anything even remotely savoring of comparative grammar—and there are still some eminent scholars who maintain such an attitude—is almost certain to deceive himself as to what constitutes a fact. If in recording a form *a* and a somewhat different form *b* appearing at another time or place with the same meaning as *a*, he states that *a becomes b*, he is going beyond the facts and introducing what is none the less an hypothesis because it seems so obvious. Indeed, comparative grammar may furnish conclusive evidence that both *a* and *b* are independent inheritances from the parent speech. The moment that one begins to deal with the relations of facts to one another, with their historical development, it becomes impossible to treat a given language as an isolated set of phenomena, and to ignore the evidence of the other languages of the same family. What is obscure from the point of view of a single language may become clear when the evidence of the sister languages is taken into account. If the comparative method is essential in the history of other human institutions such as art or religion, how pre-eminently is this true of language, for in no other sphere of intellectual activity is there such continuity of development as in language, which in *this* respect is more analogous to the biological sciences.

¹ I have employed the term Comparative Grammar throughout as the one, of those in actual use, which best conforms to the classification of the sciences represented in the programme of the Congress, and is the most suitable for the intended subject of discussion in this Section. But as the name of what is actually the Indo-Europeanist's field of interest, I prefer Indo-European Comparative Philology (Indo-European Philology would be sufficient, since Indo-European implies that it is comparative, but the term Comparative may well be retained in deference to the familiar Comparative Philology). It is true that Philology in the term Comparative Philology was originally intended in its narrower and secondary application to purely linguistic study, so that Comparative Philology and Comparative Grammar were identical. But since Philology is also used in English, as always in German, in its wider application to the study of the whole intellectual activity of a people, no matter how manifested, we may so understand it also in Indo-European Comparative Philology, which will then embrace a branch of inquiry which holds a legitimate, though quite subordinate, position in the Indo-Europeanist's field of interest; namely, the comparative study of Indo-European institutions, to which reference will be made below.

The history of a given language belonging to a well-defined family can be regarded only as a section of a long and continuous development.

Between historical grammar and comparative grammar there is no essential difference. One may for convenience apply the term historical grammar preferably to the study of the actually quotable material belonging to different periods of the same language, and the term comparative grammar where the evidence of cognate languages is introduced. But both alike are historical and comparative. A given form, meaning, or construction is traced back step by step to the earliest stage of which there is historical evidence. And it is with the object of taking a still further step in the same direction, of penetrating the prehistoric period, that one resorts to the comparison of the cognate languages. There can be no more fundamental misconception of the purpose and value of comparative grammar than is shown in the utterance of one of Germany's most eminent Hellenists in the preface to a Greek grammar which is unrivaled for its collection of facts, though marred by too many antiquated explanations. His words are substantially as follows: "The function of comparative grammar is to compare, that is, to recognize the like and the unlike in related languages, from which the explanation of the forms of the individual language often results of itself, but not always, and when it does not, the comparative grammarian has nevertheless fulfilled his duty by the correct comparison. I do not regard it as the business of comparative grammar to reconstruct the Indo-European, that is, a language which is wholly hypothetical and of which no one knows or ever will know when and where and by what sort of a people it was spoken. How does such a language concern us? Still I will not object if one wishes to write a grammar or even a lexicon of Indo-European." Presumably it is the representative of a science, and not one who is not even in sympathy with it, who is most competent to define its scope, and it is safe to say that no professed representative of comparative grammar will accept any such limitation of its function as is prescribed in the words quoted.

Comparison is only a means to an end. The recognition that a certain Greek form is the equivalent of a certain Latin form, or a Sanskrit form of a Greek, may be interesting, but of what importance in itself? Its value lies in the conclusions it enables us to draw as to the parent form. The form of any one language will admit of various possible origins, but the range of possibilities will not be the same for each language, and by a process of exclusion we reduce these to the one (or sometimes more than one) which satisfies the requirements of all the related languages. Often the evidence is so complete and conclusive that we feel as certain of the actual existence of the parent form thus reconstructed as of the existence of the historical forms

coming from it. If we say, for example, that the Indo-European form for "is" was **ésti*, there is every reason to believe that we are coming as near the exact truth as when we say that the Greek form was *ἔστι*, the Latin *est*, the Gothic *ist*, etc. To be sure, we are ignorant of the precise physiological character of each sound in the Indo-European **ésti*, we do not pretend to know the exact quality of the *e*, or whether the *t* was a pure dental or an alveolar, like our English *t*. But the finer nuances of pronunciation are unknown also in the case of the Greek or Latin form. All that one claims for the assumed **ésti* is that it represents the parent form as nearly as our ordinary written symbols ever represent the spoken form. However, the assumed Indo-European forms differ widely not only in the degree of certainty which attends their reconstruction, but also in the degree of accuracy intended by them,¹ and, while every such reconstructed form implies a belief in its existence on the part of the one who employs it, they are in general best regarded as convenient formulæ, furnishing the means of expressing briefly the combined evidence and its interpretation, but subject to change with the progress of the science. Such formulæ are indispensable to such a highly organized science as the Indo-European Comparative Grammar of the present day, and from the fact that but little use is made of them in Semitic Comparative Grammar the Indo-Europeanist is prone to infer, subject to correction, that it is still on a stage of development parallel to Indo-European Comparative Grammar of the time of Bopp.

I have said that the comparison of related forms was not an end in itself, but a means of reconstructing the parent form. But I do not wish to imply that these parent forms are of great intrinsic interest or that the reconstruction of the parent speech is the ultimate aim. No one is ambitious to speak this hypothetical language, nor does it, as Bopp fondly hoped, furnish the key to the problems of primitive linguistic development. Indeed, this language which we arrive at by reconstruction is itself a highly developed form of speech, which has behind it thousands of years of history which is forever inaccessible to us.

Its value lies rather in the light which is thereby reflected on the history of each individual language belonging to the group. Each language contributes its share of evidence for the reconstruction of the parent speech, and each in turn is illuminated by it. The real

¹ For example, in the reconstructed **pōtē(r)*, "father" (Skt. *pita*, Grk. *πατήρ*, Lat. *pater*, etc.), no such degree of accuracy is claimed for the first vowel as for that of **ésti*. Indeed, the *ə* is merely a convenient symbol for a certain vowel which appears, in a whole series of words, in Sanskrit as *i*, in the European languages as *a*, but which must have differed originally both from *i* (which is *i* in European as well as in Sanskrit) and from *a* (which is *a* in Sanskrit as well as in European), and which moreover appears as the reduced grade of a long vowel. The usefulness of the symbol is not impaired by the fact that the original pronunciation of the vowel cannot be determined.

object throughout is to trace the development of a linguistic phenomenon from its earliest attainable stage to its latest expression. Comparative grammar is simply a history of a group of related languages, and when that is said, its relation to the history of an individual language of the group is obvious. They are not different sciences, one merely auxiliary to the other, but represent a wider and a narrower range of the same subject. Whatever differentiation exists is consequent only upon a division of labor. The historian of the Greek language, for example, is, from the purely linguistic standpoint, a specialist within the Indo-European field. And if the wider outlook of comparative grammar is essential to the intelligent study of the history of the individual language, it is no less true that comparative grammar depends for its very existence upon the investigation of the special facts and conditions of each language. The material presents itself in various forms, and its critical employment involves an acquaintance with paleography, epigraphy, metres, numismatics, history of private and public institutions, in fact, every branch of philology in its wider sense. The errors to which the historian of a single language ignorant of the results of comparative grammar is liable are no whit more serious than the dangers which await the comparative grammarian who deals with material of which he has only a superficial knowledge, whose familiarity with a given language is limited to turning the pages of the grammar and lexicon. The comparative grammarian covers so wide a field that it is obviously impossible for him to possess an intimate, detailed, acquaintance with all the languages of the group. He may be expected to know something of all, at least in their earlier stages, and a good deal about some. He should have the broader philological training in some of the fields, in classical philology, Indic or Indo-Iranian philology, Germanic, Celtic, or Slavic philology, if only to make him fully conscious of his limitations and need of coöperation in the others. And his selection of such a field will depend upon his individual tastes. But at best he must rely to a considerable degree upon the investigations of those whose interest is largely concentrated on the individual language.

In all this I hope I shall not be understood as ascribing to the student of one language the rôle of a handmaiden who gathers materials only to lay them at the feet of the comparative grammarian. It is true that no special investigation however minute can fail to be of some interest and value to the comparative grammarian, but its author is certainly not debarred from drawing his own conclusions simply because he is not a professed comparative grammarian. Each language offers numerous problems of its own, which involve processes taking place within the historical period, and which can be

solved upon the basis of internal evidence, if only one attacks them with that better insight into the principles of linguistic development and greater precision of method which has been gained by the assistance of comparative grammar. Indeed, it can be said of many specific matters which belong properly to comparative grammar and which the comparison of cognate forms first made clear, that precisely the same result would now be reached even if these cognate forms were not in existence. Only without the help of comparative grammar we should never have attained that knowledge of the characteristics of each language which makes this possible.

To demand that every student of a special language should be a comparative grammarian or that every comparative grammarian should have equal knowledge of each language with a specialist, would be to deprecate that division of labor which is absolutely essential in such a wide field of investigation. But what can and should be expected is the fullest coöperation, each recognizing that both are working within the same general field and that neither can with safety ignore the other's results.

The Relation of Comparative Grammar to Physiology

The comparative grammarian has to do primarily with the history of *spoken* language. It is true that except in its latest stages the material is available only in its written form. The invention of the phonograph unfortunately came some thousands of years too late to admit of our possessing reproductions of the speech of the Vedic Hindus, of the Homeric Greeks, of the early Romans, the Goths or the Norsemen, the Celts and the Slavs. One might as well ask outright for a reproduction of the parent Indo-European, or even of the primitive language or languages of the earth. The school-boy who is taught the proper "pronunciation of the letters" may conceive of speech-sounds as invented to represent these letters, and even the fathers of comparative grammar had not shaken off the domination of the written symbol when they discussed what is now called phonology under the head of "History of the Letters." But now at least there is no failure to recognize that the written language is something secondary, merely an attempt, at best only crude and inadequate, to represent the spoken language, which is the real object of investigation. Spoken language is made up of a succession of speech-sounds, and the changes with which the historian of language has to deal, so far as they concern the form rather than the content, consist in large part of certain shiftings of the individual speech-sounds which are found to occur with a degree of uniformity which makes their study the very foundation of all comparative

grammar. These speech-sounds are molecular vibrations produced by the organs of speech and perceived by the organs of hearing. The historian of language must know something of the nature and mechanism of these organs, of the organic and acoustic character of the sounds, of the processes or more often combination of processes involved in their changes. The branch of science which deals with such matters, known as practical phonetics or the physiology of sound, is an application of physiology and physics to linguistic material, and in its latest development, experimental phonetics, has reached a degree of refinement never suspected as possible. Direct visual observation, which can be employed only to a limited extent, is supplemented by mechanical devices of all sorts, ranging from the simple artificial palate, upon which is marked the exact position and area of the tongue contact, to the various instruments used to record the manifold vibrations of a vowel, from which a curve of vibration is plotted, the extent of each vibration measured in millimetres and transferred by a formula to time measurement to the hundred thousandth of a second. In many cases the knowledge gained experimentally is of undoubted interest and value to the historian of language. On the other hand, some of the experimental investigations are so refined that one cannot conceal one's skepticism as to their availability for the history of language. Certainly they go beyond the present interest of linguistic students and appeal more to physicists and physiologists. "The physical definition of a vowel will consist of the mathematical expression for the course of the molecular vibrations which it involves" are the words of one of the principal exponents of experimental phonetics in this country. The comparative grammarian cannot yet foresee the time when his comparison of vowels will be so minute as to be based on a study of their vibration curves, even if this were not impossible for any language not actually spoken to-day. Yet he should be the last to depreciate any investigations which deal, from whatever point of view, with the material which is his chief concern.

The Relation of Comparative Grammar to Psychology

The advent of comparative grammar and the historical method forever put an end to the rôle which speculative philosophy had so long played in linguistic discussions, from the time of the Greeks, who debated the origin and nature of speech while still ignorant of even the crudest analysis of the forms of their own language, to the *grammaire générale* or universal grammar of the eighteenth century, to Gottfried Hermann, who decided that the number of original cases must have been six, as in Latin, corresponding to Kant's categories

of logic. But a daughter of philosophy, modern psychology, has taken its place and established itself in a relation with the historical study of language which is as vital and as fruitful of the best results to both sciences as the old relation was artificial and barren of anything but vague speculations which only disguised the ignorance of the time as to linguistic development. One of the chief characteristics of the language-study of the last fifty years is the increased attention paid to the psychological factors in language, and never has the relation between linguistics and psychology been so close as at the present moment. There is no better external evidence of this than the two large volumes which one of the most eminent psychologists has devoted to the psychology of language and the attention which has been given them by students of language, or the numerous special investigations of problems in language psychology, whether written by one who is primarily a comparative grammarian or by one who is primarily a psychologist, or, as in some cases, under the joint authorship of a representative of each science.

In one sense all linguistic phenomena are psychological. Even the regular phonetic changes which we have treated as involving physiological relations have of course their psychological background, are, in other words, psycho-physical.¹

But the historian of language is constantly dealing with matters which involve purely psychological factors. Language is a register of associations on the grandest scale. One of the most important functions of the general comparative grammarian is to compare the distinctions and relations which find expression in the grammatical categories of different groups of languages. These grammatical categories show the various ways in which objects and their relations group themselves in the minds of different peoples. What in one language is an important grammatical distinction may be ignored in another. For example, gender, which plays such a rôle in our own family of languages, follows only one of the many lines of division between objects which find grammatical expression in this or that language, such as between objects animate and inanimate, human and non-human, high or low in rank, beneficent or otherwise. Again,

¹ In certain classes of phonetic changes the psychological element seems to be the more obvious factor, notably in the assimilation, dissimilation, or metathesis of non-contiguous sounds, which are most common in rapid or careless speech and in a state of fatigue, and which are essentially pathological, momentary lapses due to imperfect attention, only occasionally gaining general currency. Or since such changes are by far the most common in the cases of liquids *l* and *r* (e.g. *marble* from French *marbre*, Latin *marmor*, *pilgrim* from late Latin *pelegrinus*, earlier *peregrinus*, etc.; in New Orleans one hears a certain confection called indifferently *praline* or *plarine*), shall we not rather say that the physical relationship of these sounds in their formation is such as to require greater attention than other sounds for their proper adjustment to one another, so that even here the physical element is equally fundamental? The question at least illustrates the impossibility of separating the factors sharply.

some kind of formal distinction between singular and plural is common to practically all languages, but some have also a special form for the dual, which is the linguistic expression of association between objects occurring in pairs. Had familiar objects occurring in sets of five, like the fingers and toes, been as numerous as those occurring in pairs, the hands, feet, ears, eyes, etc., their association with one another might equally well have reflected itself in another grammatical category. Not that we are to imagine any conscious effort in the beginning to differentiate objects occurring in pairs and to provide their names with endings significant of this. It is rather that, given an expression, let us say, for "the hands," not in itself indicative of their number, the expression for "feet," "eyes," etc., whether in their initial creation or later, would be assimilated to this, until finally from a sufficient number of such forms there would arise a consciousness of the significance of the common element, which now becomes a "dual ending." But this consciousness of the significance of the dual is only the prelude to its gradual loss as a distinct formal category. For with the increasing clearness in the perception of relations, the difference between one object and more than one comes to be felt as the all-important one and the dual is sooner or later merged in the plural.

The vocabulary is also significant of modes of thinking. It has often been noted that people on a low stage of civilization show what seems a high degree of differentiation, as when they have separate words for washing, according as they mean washing the hands, washing the face, etc. But in reality this is only a lack of generalization, characteristic of what is termed fragmentary thinking. The savage does not differentiate the concept *wash* into *wash the hands*, *wash the face*, etc., but the notions of washing the hands, the face, etc., are distinct, concrete concepts, not yet put into relation with one another and generalized under the abstract *wash*.

But aside from the psychological significance of such general linguistic phenomena, the every-day problems of the comparative grammarian in the narrower sense are, to a large degree, psychological. For whether he is dealing with forms or with syntax, he finds that the history of the individual word or construction is affected by its associations. Changes in the form of a word are by no means confined to those caused by the regular phonetic processes, but are frequently due to the influence of forms which are for any reason associated with it in the mind. All the phenomena classed under Analogy, Leveling, or Contamination are examples of associative interference. If the child says *teached* for *taught*, if *blowed* for *blew* is not uncommon, and if we all now say *snowed* for an earlier *snew*, it is owing to the influence of the great body of words in

which the relation between present and past is that seen in *love*, *loved*, as *vice versa* the child's *think*, *think* is due to the unconscious association with *drink*, *drunk*, *sink*, *sunk*, etc., as *dove*, *strove* after *drove* are not uncommon in place of *dived*, *strived*, as we all now say *dug* for earlier *digged*, probably after *stuck*, *struck*, etc. The historical grammar of any language is replete with examples of such functional analogy or external grammatical leveling. Or, the leveling may be between different inflectional forms of the same word, that is internal grammatical leveling, as when we say *hoofs*, *roofs*, instead of *hooves*, *rooves* (like *calves*, *halves*, *shelves*), under the influence of the singular *hoof*, *roof*, or as Latin *honor* beside earlier *honōs* owes its *r* to *honōris*, *honōri*, etc., where the intervocalic *r* for *s* is due to regular phonetic change. Other changes are due to the association between congeneric words, such as words of relationship, of color, of sound, numerals, etc., as in Homeric *viáoi* after *παρπάσι*, etc., Sanskrit *pátyur* (genitive of *pāti*-, when used in the sense of "husband") after *pítur* (genitive of *pitar*-, "father"), etc., late Latin *Octember* after *September*, *November*, English colloquial *Febuary* for *February* after *January*, though in this last example the dissimilating influence of the second *r* has also been a factor (cf. *libary* for *library*). Associations of this kind are not only productive of changes in existing words, but are influential in the creation of new words, and to them is due in large part the growth of significant suffixes.

The vocabulary of every language is full of contaminations, like *Popocrat* from *Populist* and *Democrat*, like Modern Greek *διάτνας* from *διάβολος*, "devil," and *Σατανᾶς*, "Satan." Some indeed are conscious inventions of authors striving for humorous or picturesque effect, like Stockton's *whirlcane* (*whirlwind* and *hurricane*). But most of them are in their origin as naïve as the child's *begincement*, in which *beginning* and *commencement* are merged. Current slang is full of examples, as *hustle* (*hasten* and *bustle*, *rustle*, etc.), *swipe* (*sweep* and *wipe*), *stunt* (*stint* and *stump*). But there are plenty of thoroughly respectable words which have originated in the same way, as German *bin*, O. H. G. *bim*, which represents a merging of the two forms seen in English *be* and *am*.

The manifold changes of meaning which words undergo in the course of their history are also mainly due to associative processes. A concept represents a complexity of elements, any one of which may at one time or another be the centre of associations. With the shifting of the dominant element come new associations. When *crescent* was first applied to the crescent moon, the dominant element was, as the origin of the word shows, the notion of growing, but this was replaced by the notion of shape, forming a new centre of asso-

ciations, so that we say "the bay forms a crescent," etc., or even "the crescent-shaped moon." In *horn*, as applied to an instrument for producing sound by blowing, the dominant element was at first the material, but ceased to be so before we could speak of a *tin horn*, etc. Language is full of "faded metaphors," that is, metaphors which have become so commonplace as no longer to be felt as such (and which therefore are no longer metaphors in the stylistic sense), representing all conceivable types of associations, as between various sense-perceptions (we speak of a *sweet smell* or a *sweet voice* as freely as of a *sweet taste*), between physical and mental activities or conditions (*understand*, *forget*, that is, *for-get* the opposite of *get*, *horror*, originally a *bristling up of the hair*, *glad* cognate with German *glatt*, "smooth"), between abstract and concrete (*kindness* as a quality or a concrete act), subjective and objective (*glad* of a person, and *glad tidings*, *fear* cognate with German *Gefahr*, "danger"), transitive and intransitive (*show* cognate with German *schauen*), and so on without limit. The most frequent changes in meaning are those which are classified, from the logical standpoint, under the head of specialization, as *hound*, formerly *dog* (cf. German *Hund*), *poison* from Latin *pōtiō*, "drink," German *Gift*, "poison," originally "gift," — or generalization, as *barn*, originally "a storehouse for barley," *butcher*, originally "one who kills he-goats" (French *boucher*, from *bouc* = *buck*), *smell* and *reek*, both referring originally to the odor of something burning (cf. *smoulder* and German *Rauch*), *equipped*, originally "furnished with horses," etc. Specialization means the restriction of scope through the enlargement of content, caused by the absorption of associated elements, as when from a *hunting-hound*, that is, a "hunting-dog," *hound* has absorbed the content of *hunting*, thus restricting its scope. Generalization, on the other hand, means the enlargement of scope through the narrowing of the content by the ignoring of certain of its elements, as when in *barn* the notion of barley is lost sight of.

The most scientific classification of semantic changes is without much doubt the strictly psychological one, according to the character of the associative processes involved, although the comparative grammarian will probably prefer a more external grouping as the best means of presenting the material.

Syntactical changes exhibit associative processes very similar to those seen in the history of individual words. One construction is modified by another which has some point of contact with it, or there may be complete contaminations of two constructions. A given inflectional form or phrase may change its force to any extent by the gradual shifting of the dominant element.

But it is unnecessary to illustrate further the intimate connection

between psychology and comparative grammar, and we may consider for a moment how far it is possible to define the respective functions of each in the study of language. It is the part of comparative grammar to present the facts of language in their historical relations, to show what changes language has actually undergone, and under what immediate linguistic influences. The psychological processes of which the linguistic changes are the outward sign it is the part of psychology to interpret and define. The psychology of language is of course a branch of general psychology, and is in a sense the application of general psychological principles to linguistic phenomena. At the same time it is justly claimed for the newest psychology of language that it does not represent a sort of external application to linguistic phenomena of a preconceived system of psychology, but that its principles are deduced from its linguistic phenomena themselves. In other words, it does not regard itself merely as an auxiliary to language history, furnishing it with a set of principles determined from other sources, but it holds that language is in itself one of the most worthy objects of psychological investigation, one of the most promising sources of psychological truth. From this point of view, according to which language is an object of intrinsic interest no less to the psychologist than to the historian of language, the relation between the two sciences is closer than ever before. And if we have correctly defined their respective functions, it does not by any means follow that the representatives of each confine themselves strictly within these limits. The comparative grammarian may supplement his historical investigation of certain linguistic phenomena by a consideration of the more immediate psychological factors involved. Nor will the psychologist feel debarred from all independent assumptions as to historical relations. Such overlapping of their activities is not only permissible but desirable, for it should lead to increased sympathy and coöperation.

The Relation to Ethnology and History

The vital relation of language and history was recognized by Leibnitz in the seventeenth century, and his deep interest and activity in collecting linguistic material was determined by its value in the study of ethnological relations. And when in the beginning of the nineteenth century comparative grammar was established on a scientific footing, the possibilities of the new science made a deep impression upon Alexander von Humboldt, whose words (*Kosmos*, II, p. 142), slightly abridged, are as follows: "Compared among themselves and separated into families according to their inner structure, languages have become (and this is one of the most brilliant achieve-

ments of the studies of recent times), a rich source of historical knowledge. They lead us to a distant past to which no tradition reaches. The comparative study of languages shows how widely separated peoples are related with one another and have migrated from a common home. It points out the course of migrations; it recognizes in the greater or less degree of change, in the stability of certain forms or in their advanced decay which people has kept closer to the speech once spoken in the common home."

No comparative grammarian of to-day would venture to express the relation of linguistic evidence to ethnology in such unqualified terms. The application of linguistic evidence is not as simple as was once believed, it has its limitations, and is not capable alone of laying bare all the events of prehistoric times. Yet I for one do not believe that anything in our present views of its application has actually diminished its importance. Whatever value we attach to other factors, it remains true that language furnishes the most tangible evidence and will always hold the first place in any ethnological discussion.

It is true, of course, that language is not always a key to race. History furnishes numerous examples of the adoption by one people of the language of another, whether it be the speech of the conquerors or the conquered that survives, and there is no reason to doubt that this was equally frequent in prehistoric times. Hence the fallibility of assuming community of race from community of language. Yet the warning against the confusion of language and people is uttered so vigorously, we are so emphatically admonished of the absurdity of speaking, for example, of Indo-European or Aryan *peoples*, that I believe there is nowadays more danger of underestimating than of overestimating the historical bearing of linguistic evidence. It is still a truism that language implies a people speaking it. Even in those cases where a people has changed its language, this has been effected only by mixture with another people. If this other people whose language becomes dominant is numerically stronger than the people whose language is lost, then kinship with peoples of related languages will be true of the larger contingent of the resulting mixed people. And if the people whose language becomes dominant is numerically weaker, this is in itself proof that it is intellectually stronger, superior in civilization and organization, so that kinship with peoples of related languages will still be true of what is the more important contingent in the mixed people. The mere physical domination of a small body of invaders, forming only the ruling class, is not sufficient to impose their language upon the masses. Witness the fate of the Franks or the Normans in France, the Swedish rulers of Russia, the Turkish Bulgarians, the Manchus in China. If the Romans in Gaul, in spite of their numerical inferiority, imposed

their language upon the subject Celts, it was due to the power of the Roman organization, of which they continued to form a part, the country being governed from Rome and receiving from it a constant influx of officials, soldiers, and tradesmen. The statement, often made, that the Greeks, for example, may have received their Indo-European language from a small body of invaders, so that they would be only to a slight degree of Indo-European descent, is unwarranted by historical analogies. This of course is not to doubt the existence of one or more than one pre-Indo-European peoples in Greece and the adjacent islands, and we are anxious for all possible information in regard to them, especially if the so-called *Ægean* civilization, wholly or in part, antedates the appearance of the Indo-European Greeks. (And let it be noted in passing that this question awaits its decision from linguistic evidence. Are not all scholars impatient to learn what is the language of the Cretan pictograph and linear signs?) But the Indo-European Greeks must have come, like the Anglo-Saxon invaders of England, in vast hordes and in successive waves of migration, and the very fact that their language became dominant entitles them to be regarded as the most important element of the historical Greek people, however much may have been contributed to their civilization by earlier conditions.

And if linguistic evidence is subject to some reservation, what of anthropological evidence? One after another of the anthropological criteria has been found inadequate to serve as an absolute basis of ethnological classification. Leading anthropologists like Virchow hold that a mixture of dolichocephalic and brachycephalic, of blond and brunette, etc., is the rule rather than the exception, and furthermore that such racial characteristics are not in themselves unchangeable. And even if the matter of racial classification were in a more satisfactory state than it is at present, it would take us back to such remote periods as to have comparatively little bearing upon the immediate prehistory of even the earliest known peoples. The period of Indo-European speech-unity, for example, which no one need place earlier than 5000 B.C., and is probably later than this, represents a late date from the anthropological point of view, and it is altogether likely that the people speaking this parent speech was already of mixed race. Furthermore, is it not true in general that the physical characteristics of a people, in and of themselves, are subordinate in historical significance to their institutions? Community in myths and customs, but above all in language, is that which goes to make up kinship as a subjective element, that is, that consciousness of kinship which is an important factor in history. Language is the most vital factor in the growth and retention of national feeling. Nothing is so zealously guarded as essential to racial survival. No-

thing has been so systematically attacked in efforts to crush nationality, from the time of the Assyrian kings, one of whom boasts of having carried into captivity the subjects of the four quarters of the world and made them of one speech,¹ down to the present day, when the "language question" is a burning problem in nearly every European state.

Recent years have seen much discussion of the nature and origin of dialects, the result of which only emphasizes how inseparable are the linguistic and historical aspects of the question. In the first place, "dialect" is not a purely linguistic concept. It does not, any more than the term "language," represent a definable degree of speech-variation (or speech-unity, according to the point of view). It rests upon a combination of linguistic and historical elements. It is true that in place of the popular conception of a dialect, a precise and purely linguistic definition has been suggested,² but it is one that yields a concept too limited in scope to be usable, and if adopted would only necessitate the invention of a new term as elastic as the

¹ "The subjects of the four quarters (of the world, speaking) strange languages and varied dialects, inhabitants of mountain and plain, over whom the warrior of the gods, lord of all, rules, whom I had carried into captivity in the name of Ashur, my lord, with my powerful staff, I made of one speech and settled them therein." From the cylinder inscription of Sargon (722-705 B. C.), in *Assyrian and Babylonian Literature. Selected Translations*, R. F. Harper.

² Oertel, *Lectures on the Study of Language*, p. 92 ff. Strictly, there is always some variation between the speech of any two persons and even between two utterances of the same person, so that, objectively considered, the only absolute dialectal unit is the momentary utterance of a single individual. To call this a dialect would obviously be absurd. But such variations may be too minute to be noticed, so that subjectively they do not exist. Accordingly it is proposed to make the test subjective instead of objective. "A dialectal unit is constituted by the speech of all those persons in whose utterances variations are not sensibly perceived or attended to. Subjective uniformity makes the dialect," is Oertel's thesis. Higher groups he would classify as dialect-family, language, and language-family, emphasizing that these represent only ideal types in contrast to the concrete type represented by a dialect as defined. It may be admitted that in this way one can make of dialect a concrete and purely linguistic concept, and one that is somewhat more comprehensive than that obtained objectively. But it is still a too limited concept to which to restrict the term dialect. We could not speak of the dialect of a single town, so long as it included, as often, perceptible variations in the speech of different classes. Its speech-form would rather be a dialect-family. Or, waiving the matter of variation within a single town, we could speak for example, to illustrate from Greek dialectology, of the speech of Tegea in Arcadia as a dialect, but what we commonly call the Arcadian dialect would be a dialect-family, what we commonly call the Arcado-Cyprian dialect-family would be a language, and what we commonly call the Greek language would be a language-family. The fact is, of course, that we cannot have a complete set of terms of absolute value for all degrees of even perceptible variation, and if all but one must necessarily be ideal types, not to be defined precisely, what is the advantage of making an absolute concrete type of this one? Yet we had no right perhaps to illustrate from the Greek, for it is obvious that the term dialect as defined cannot be properly applied to any phase of speech no longer extant. For it is only in the case of living speech that it is possible to take testimony as to what variations are perceptible and so secure the subjective test.

I see no objection to the continued employment of the term dialect, as of dialect-family, language, etc., in its present elastic sense, its special application being shown by the context.

present "dialect." For we need a term to designate the speech of certain territories or communities, without regard to the precise degree of variation (or unity) represented.

But the very existence of dialects as ordinarily understood has been denied, especially by certain eminent Romance scholars, one of whom is honoring this Congress by his presence. Emphasizing what has come to be rightly an accepted belief since J. Schmidt's exposition of his famous wave-theory, namely, that a linguistic change starts at a certain point and gradually spreads over contiguous territory, and that different linguistic phenomena may start from different centres and so cover wholly or partially different territories, they conceive the resulting conditions to be such as would be illustrated graphically by a large series of intersecting circles drawn from different centres and representing the areas of the different linguistic phenomena. They assert that there will be only an infinite series of gradual variations, that we may if we choose give the name dialect to the area of a particular linguistic phenomenon, but that any broader grouping of dialects is purely arbitrary and unscientific. Such a conception is possible only upon the basis of purely linguistic theorizing, defying every historical probability. If we could imagine a given territory occupied all at once by a people of uniform speech, in settlements equally large and equally distant from one another, like the squares on a checker-board, with no natural boundaries by mountains and rivers, and further imagine that these settlements remained of the same relative strength, no one of them gaining predominance over others, then, indeed, speech-variation might proceed with such a result as has been pictured. But such conditions never exist. Even if the incoming people were wholly homogeneous without even the germs of dialectic variation, which is rarely if ever the case, there would inevitably arise certain social and political groupings which would reflect themselves in speech. Some degree of centralization is as certain in speech as in politics. The evolution of a standard language is only the culmination of what on a smaller scale is always operative. There is no time when the centrifugal force of speech-variation starting from innumerable centres is not being more or less counteracted by a centripetal force combining certain phenomena in groups. The extent and the definiteness of these groups vary with the historical conditions. How clearly do the linguistic conditions of ancient Greece reflect that particularism which was so characteristic of the Greeks politically! No single standard of speech until a late period, just as there was no political unity, but numerous dialects, as there were numerous states, showing centralization within certain limits. And will any one deny the existence there of well-defined dialects so clearly marked by certain

combinations of linguistic phenomena that the language of an inscription rarely leaves any doubt as to what part of Greece it comes from, provided, of course, it antedates the *κοινή* period? Or will it be objected that we know these dialects only in written form and that the relative uniformity within their limits may be artificial? There may be *something* in this, and it is not unlikely that there was more merging of one dialect into another near the boundaries than the few inscriptional examples of this would indicate. But from the varied character of the inscriptions, private as well as official, there is no sufficient reason for doubting that we have in general a faithful representation of what was actually spoken. And if evidence is demanded of dialects which can be studied in their spoken form, it may be pointed out that, as the whole discussion started with an attack on certain groupings of French dialects, it has been shown by minute investigation that well-defined French dialects do exist, if only one recognize that the boundaries need not be mathematical lines, but may be intermediary zones.

There can be no doubt that it is the first necessity of dialect-study to define precisely the area of each linguistic phenomenon, as is done in Wencker's *Sprachatlas des deutschen Reiches*, or on a still more elaborate scale in the *Atlas linguistique de la France* of Gilliéron et Edmont, which is to contain some eighteen hundred maps, each showing the pronunciation of some word or phrase in upwards of six hundred places. But it is the legitimate aim of the dialectologist, with constant reference to available historical data, to classify such material in larger groups and unfold their history.

Since dialect relations reflect historical conditions, their evidence may be used in turn to control and supplement imperfect historical data. Nowadays one scarcely hears even echoes of the once lively discussion of wave-theory *versus* Stammbaum-theory, for it is tacitly recognized that there is truth in each. The difference is only one of chronological emphasis, if I may so express it. There is no doubt that points of agreement between dialects, so far as they are not accidental, that is, due to independent development in each, are significant of geographical continuity, — at some time. But this may be the geographical continuity of the historical period, and this is what was emphasized by J. Schmidt in his famous work; or it may be that of a prehistoric period, and this is what is emphasized by a tree-scheme, which is intended to illustrate how dialects or languages have diverged from a common prehistoric source. One may object to specific tree-schemes as arbitrary, and certainly the attack on existing tree-schemes of the Indo-European languages was entirely justified. One may dispute in each case as to how far it is possible to go in such a scheme. But one cannot doubt the existence of

migratory movements such as are properly represented by a tree-scheme, or that such movements often reflect themselves in dialect relations in an unmistakable fashion. Let me illustrate from the Greek dialects. If we survey the whole body of linguistic phenomena we may divide the points of dialect agreement into three classes. Some we regard as accidental. Others are significant of geographical continuity in their historic positions, as probably the psilosis on the coast of Asia Minor in which the Æolic, Ionic, and Doric dialects of this region share. Others are obviously significant of geographical continuity in a period preceding the great migrations, and there of course are the points upon which are based all attempts to classify the dialects and stems. No one can possibly doubt the historical significance of the agreement in features not found elsewhere between Arcadian and the remote Cyprian, between Asiatic Æolic and Thessalian, or of the mixture of Doric and Æolic characteristics in Thessalian and Bœotian. And I have no hesitation in asserting that those historians, fortunately few, who regard the tradition of the Doric migration as a pure myth, either have no first-hand knowledge of the dialects or are absolutely impervious to linguistic evidence. There is enough that is still obscure in the relations of the Greek dialects, but there is also much that is as clear as day.

It may be said of this or any other like case that it is arbitrary to regard certain points of agreement as accidental and others as significant, and that in combining the latter with vague traditional data and then drawing historical conclusions we are guilty of reasoning in a vicious circle. Perfectly true. But where is there a branch of inquiry in which the so-called vicious circle is not employed, and justified too, if only the circle is completed without undue pressure? When a number of linguistic facts fit together with one another and with traditional data, which in itself may be of little weight, we are entitled to regard them as significant.

I can only allude to the historical significance of borrowed words not due to any racial mixture, such as the Greek words in Latin which bring before us the successive periods of Greek influence: first, the remote period when certain articles of commerce were brought to Italy by Greek mariners, then the influence exerted by the Greek colonists of Magna Græcia, then the time when educated Romans were familiar with Greek literature and sent their sons to Athens for study, and lastly the period when Rome was filled with Greek-speaking slaves. Or, to take an example of a totally different and less usual character, the words which the Gypsies have adopted from the various languages with which they have come in contact since leaving their home in India, some of them, like the Armenian and Modern Greek words, common to all dialects and so significant

of their wanderings as an undivided people, others indicative only of the wanderings of certain groups.

But something must be said of the relation of comparative grammar to the study of prehistoric antiquities. For it is this phase of the subject which is regarded with the greatest suspicion within the ranks of comparative grammarians; and at the same time makes the strongest appeal to popular interest. What Woman's Club has not been privileged to listen to a paper upon "The Cradle of the Aryans"? Linguistic Palæontology, as it is often called, refers to the study of the reconstructed vocabulary of a parent speech with reference to the light it throws upon the civilization of the people using this language. Investigation along this line was initiated and has been most vigorously pursued within the Indo-European field, but similar studies have been made for the Semitic and other families of languages. The common possession, by the various languages of a family, of a given word in the form appropriate to the known phonetic characteristics of each is evidence of the existence of such a word in the parent speech, and consequently of the object designated by this word. Such a series as Sanskrit *çvā*, Avestan *spā* (cf. also *σπάκα*, quoted as Median by Herodotus), Armenian *šun*, Greek *κύων*, Latin *canis*, Old Irish *cú*, Gothic *hunds* (certainly not to be separated, though possibly contaminated with the root seen in English *hunt*), Lithuanian *szū*, Old Prussian *sunis* (Russian *sobaka* must have been borrowed from Iranian), leaves no room for doubt that the primitive Indo-Europeans were acquainted with some species of dog. Similar evidence is sufficient to show their acquaintance with numerous other animals, with certain trees, with at least one metal, with a kind of grain, with some means of conveyance both by land and by water, with three seasons, including winter with snow, with the art of sewing, plaiting, weaving, and making vessels of earthenware, with a complete family organization, etc., etc.

But the earlier essays at a comprehensive view of such conditions, those idyllic pictures of primitive Indo-European life with the milkmaid in the foreground, were marked by so little appreciation of the limitations of linguistic evidence as to bring the whole subject into a disrepute from which it has never fully recovered. Later progress has consisted in a more precise valuation and a more critical application of the evidence from language, and especially in controlling and supplementing it by evidence from other sources, such as prehistoric archæology, historical accounts of early conditions among the various Indo-European peoples, and general ethnology as showing what conditions are likely to be found together. With regard to linguistic evidence, we must recognize that absence of agreement in the designation of an object is no proof that it was

unknown, since the old word may for various reasons have been lost or replaced, just as the old words for brother and sister have been replaced in Greek, those for son and daughter in Latin; further, that agreement in a given word is not always proof of its existence in the parent speech, since, aside from the possibility of independent formation, this agreement may rest on a succession of borrowings, as is the case with the word for wine; lastly, even where the existence of the word in the parent speech is not open to question, its precise meaning may be uncertain. From the series, Sanskrit *ayas*, Avestan *ayah-*, Latin *aes*, Gothic *aiz* (English *ore*), which in different times and places mean copper, bronze, iron, or metal in general, we can, indeed, infer that the Indo-Europeans were acquainted with some metal, but when we conclude that this was probably copper, we do so on other than purely linguistic grounds. Furthermore there are countless points upon which linguistic evidence is altogether silent.

But when the skepticism is carried so far as to assert that no value, or at the most very slight value, is to be attached to linguistic evidence,¹ this can only be stamped as an unwarranted exaggeration. The elimination of borrowed words from apparent cases of agreement has long been recognized as an important corrective. But it is a mere splitting of hairs to urge that *all* cases of agreement may rest upon borrowing, only in the remote period when the later Indo-European languages, though already somewhat differentiated, were still spoken in contiguous territory. No exception need be taken to such a statement if intended only as a warning that the conclusions reached may not be applicable to precisely the same period and that the combination of the various conclusions may not be truly homogeneous. The same is true of the reconstructed forms, and I would emphasize again what was said in reference to the parent speech, that we are concerned with it not so much for any intrinsic interest it possesses for us as for its bearing on later development. If we are able to trace a given institution back to a period before the bonds between the Indo-European peoples were severed and antedating the more individual development of each in the land of its permanent home, what more do we ask? We may deny the application of linguistic evidence in individual cases, but not in principle. It must be used with caution, but the danger of its abuse is not greater than is the case with archæological evidence. Often it fails us entirely, but often it is, in the nature of things, the only available evidence. What archæological evidence can tell us how far the numeral system was developed, or can throw such light on the family organization

¹ I refer especially to the radical position taken by Krestcher, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der griechischen Sprache*, p. 48 ff., in the criticism of which I am in entire accord with the remarks of Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertümen*, p. 8 ff.

as the restriction of the inherited words for father-in-law and mother-in-law to the parents of the husband? It is idle to discuss whether the study of Indo-European antiquities is a branch of linguistic science to which prehistoric archæology is auxiliary, or *vice versa*. For the relative importance of each kind of evidence will vary according to the individual problem. It is only by the recognition of the claims of each, by the conservative employment of evidence from whatever source, that this branch of investigation can attain its highest development, and even then we must content ourselves with what is only a fragmentary picture at best.

I have now mentioned, not indeed all branches of science which could be adduced as standing in some sort of relation to comparative grammar, but those which seem to me to stand in the closest relationship to it, a relationship which is not merely theoretical but a vital fact, the importance of which to each science concerned has never been so fully recognized as at the present day.

SOME PRESENT PROBLEMS AND TENDENCIES IN COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY

BY HANNS OERTEL

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IN an address delivered almost sixty years ago (in 1846; printed in Lassen's *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. VII, 1850, p. 25 ff.) Schleicher divided the new science of comparative philology, which owes its name to Friedrich Schlegel, into the following three departments: (1) The "philosophical," in so far as the comparative study of languages aims to discover the laws and processes of linguistic development ("die für die Sprache geltenden Entwicklungsgesetze aufzustellen," p. 36). Included in this are also questions touching the relation of speech and thought, and the origin of language. It is immaterial here whether the languages compared are genetically related to one another or not. (2) The "historical," which deals with such ethnological information regarding prehistoric times as may be inferentially derived from a comparison of *cognate* languages; it thus appears as a valuable ally of history. In contradistinction to the preceding division, the interest here does not centre in language itself, but in the historical, mythological, institutional, inferences which may be based upon language. Language plays here the same part in the investigation of *prehistoric* periods which Wolf, in his *Alterthumswissenschaft*, assigned to it for *historic* times. (3) The "grammatical," in which the grammatical system of a given language is illumined and cleared up by the comparison of cognate languages. While the first two departments dealt respectively with language in general and with the historical inferences to be derived from a set of cognate languages, this third department is concerned with some one definite language whose structure it analyzes by means of the comparative method.

Although these three divisions are not mutually exclusive, still less antagonistic to each other, and although the work of most scholars has been, to a certain degree, extended over more than a single one of the three subdivisions, it is easy to name the pioneer and earliest representative for each, namely, Wilhelm von Humboldt for the first (the "philosophical"), August Schleicher himself for the second (the "historical"), and Franz Bopp for the third (the "grammatical").

Now since all investigations along any one of the three main lines indicated by Schleicher — if they are to be inductive — must necessarily rest upon a careful examination of the facts of actual languages and dialects, the large mass of special problems which are connected with each individual language and dialect form, in a sense, problems of comparative philology, nor can they be regarded as minor problems, inasmuch as the whole structure of linguistic science ultimately rests upon their correct solution. And yet a discussion of even a select number of such special problems seemed both impossible and unsuited to the present occasion. For, extending over a great variety of languages, they would require for their adequate presentation the combined labor of many specialists. On the other hand, their very nature would restrict an interest in them to a comparatively small number, as their discussion would, of necessity, have to be of a very technical character. But since these lectures are addressed, I take it, to a wider audience, I have selected a number of problems which are more general, and I shall endeavor to discuss briefly some general problems and tendencies of linguistic thought, which by influencing the methods of investigation, determine, to a considerable extent, the manner in which special problems present themselves for treatment, the point from which their objects are viewed, and the way in which they are grouped and correlated.

In his division of the comparative study of language, Schleicher distinguished between the "historical" and the "grammatical" application of the comparative method to a group of cognate languages. And the contrast between these two as to the ultimate purpose and end for which the comparative method is used is, even now, so important for a proper valuation of the results achieved that I cannot forego dwelling briefly upon it. The difference may perhaps be summed up in these words, that in its last aims Schleicher's "historical" method is *reconstructive*, while his "grammatical" method is *interpretative*. In taking Bopp as representative of the latter, I do not, of course, refer to his attempt at explaining the origin of those forms which express grammatical relations (or, in simple words, the origin of inflection), but rather to what he considered a preliminary step toward the solution of this problem, namely, the comparative description of the organic structure of the Indo-European languages. In fact Bopp's lasting importance does not lie in the attempted solution of the riddle of inflection, but in what his comparative method allowed him to do for each individual and concrete language embodied in his Compendium. By it he was enabled "to extend his gaze beyond the narrow confines of a single language and to group its facts, in the light of all the cognate members of the same family, so as to bring system and organic connection into the linguistic material presented by each individual

language" (p. VIII of the preface to the *Vergleichende Grammatik*). Schleicher, on the other hand, used the comparative method for an entirely different ultimate end, namely, to reconstruct inferentially a parent language upon the basis of a comparison of the really existing cognate languages, and in his Compendium "the attempt has been made to place the inferred Indo-European parent language alongside of its really existing descendants" (2d. ed., p. 8, note). The contrast is clear. For Bopp the comparative method is largely a means of bringing order and system into the grammars of the individual historical languages. For Schleicher it is a key to open a prehistoric period by recovering its lost language. Save only where he proceeds to speculate upon the ultimate origin of inflection, the former's face is turned toward the historical periods of a language, the facts of which he interprets from his higher pinnacle; while the latter uses the historical languages as a basis for his inferences, as a spring-board, if one may use the figure, for a leap into the prehistoric.

Any one who has followed the trend of recent discussions cannot have failed to see that there is at present a growing disinclination to believe in the historical reality of reconstructed forms and meanings. The more thoroughly we study the nature and mechanism of linguistic development the clearer it must become that it can properly be compared neither, in Schleicher's biological fashion, to the propagation of an animal, nor, as has been done more recently, to the derivation of a number of manuscript copies from one archetype. The processes of consolidation and disintegration to which dialects owe their constantly changing being are so complicated and of so peculiar a character that such comparisons can be made in the most general and figurative way only, and they cannot justify the application of a method designed for and capable of restoring a lost archetype to the reconstruction of a language. The recent anthropological discussions of Ratzel¹ make one point perfectly clear, namely, that for the development of a secondary ethnic group with such definite and uniform characteristics as the fair, blond, tall, and long-headed Indo-Europeans exhibit we are forced to assume a very large area; for its dispersion over a wide area was its only protection against alien influences and the guarantee of its survival. To think then of this period as one "in which the individual members of the Indo-European family were still united by the consciousness of a common tongue" seems to me to imply a complete reversal of all that we know empirically of political and linguistic history, for in both the course appears to be uniformly from multiplicity toward unity. As all historical nations are the result of a consolidation of tribes, so all historical languages are the result of a consolidation and unification

¹ *Berichte d. sächs. Gesel. d. Wiss.*, 1898, p. 1, and 1900, p. 25.

of dialects.¹ What else does the great diversity of the Italic dialects, with their marked divergence in the most common words as well as in the grammatical material, indicate but that the hordes and tribes which invaded Italy were far from uniform, and that the linguistic unification accompanied the political and economic consolidation of Italy under the leadership of Rome? If we once admit that the Indo-European ethnic group long before the opening of history inhabited, and developed in, a large area embracing Middle and Eastern Europe and reaching far into Western Asia, then the assumption of a well-rounded and evenly developed grammatical structure² becomes as impossible as that of a uniform culture. It is not necessary to assume that all Indo-Europeans once possessed knowledge of, and terms for, agriculture, and that the absence of such terms among the Eastern branch is due to loss. Are we not justified in seeing here primitive differences? Exactly³ so it seems to me unnecessary to assume a fully developed and generally accepted differentiation of optative and subjunctive throughout all Indo-European territory. Is it not possible that the Italic tribes, for instance, did not fuse what was originally distinct, but represent a section and stage which never utilized the *iē*: *ī* etc. forms for the purpose of differentiating between wish (optative) and will (subjunctive)? And may it not be just as incorrect to speak of the meaning of a common Indo-European optative as it would be to speak of a common Indo-European agriculture? In other words, are not many supposed losses and fusions in reality rather primitive and original local absences and primitive and original local failures to differentiate? It seems to me that considerations like these must have been the cause which have led, in recent standard works on comparative syntax, to the substitution of "Gebrauchssphaere" for the older "Grundbedeutung." The latter implied unity, local uniformity; the former puts in its place multiplicity, and thus allows for primitive local differences which we may find continued in the historical languages.

I am not here attacking the starred, constructed forms of our comparative grammars, the value of which no sane scholar under-rates. What I try to combat is the belief that these constructed forms can be utilized for historical inferences. Since the method by which they are produced is purely logical (namely, a summation of correspondences and an elimination of differences), their character is essentially *unhistoric*. But this unhistoric quality in no way impairs their value as aids in the grammatical study of a given lan-

¹ Heyck, *Histor. Zeitsch.*, vol. 85, p. 68; Wrede, *ibid.*, vol. 87, p. 39; Koegel, *Götting. Gel. Anz.*, 1897, p. 648.

² A. Ludwig wrote in 1867: "Auch die Ursprache in der Zeit ihrer (natürlich immer nur relativen) Vollkommenheit bot keine vollkommene Einheit." (*Sitzungsberichte d. phil. hist. Cl. d. Kais. Akad. d. Wiss. Wien*, 1867, vol. 55, p. 134.)

³ The following paragraph has been elaborated more fully by E. P. Morris and the author in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* for 1905.

guage. Instead of attaching to these constructed forms the historical value which they possessed in Schleicher's eyes, I should rather regard them as algebraic grammatical notations¹ in which the comparison of parallel forms of two or more languages may be most easily and conveniently summarized and expressed. The construction of a form like *kmtóm* means that Greek *ἑκατόν*, Latin *centum*, German *hund*, Sanskrit *çatam*, etc., should be grouped together. It is in other words the common denominator of these forms. The constructed *m* is a convenient symbol to mark the fact that Greek *α*, Latin *en*, German *un*, Sanskrit *a*, etc., are to be paralleled and are alike in so far as they are weak grades, a fact which for some does not lie at all close to the surface and, indeed, is brought to light by the comparison of cognates only. The signs which go to make up the alphabet of the Indo-European are the symbolical expressions of grammatical parallelisms rather than representatives of the historical sources from which the sounds of the concrete languages are descended. But even those who would grant historical reality to the *formal* reconstructions of Indo-European words will hardly go so far as to extend it to the *semantic*² reconstructions dealing with the force and meaning of Indo-European cases, modes, and tenses. So long as it was believed that from the very beginning the mode and tense formatives were charged with a definite modal and temporal meaning inherent in them, a formal reconstruction of the formative carried with it semantic reconstruction also. But all recent investigations (they have just been summarized and extended by Hirt³) uniformly tend to show that there was, generally speaking, no such inherent meaning in these formatives. What we call the modal or the tense-system of a language is the result of a very gradual development in which old *formal* material has been adapted to certain *semantic* uses. Witness, for instance, the use made of thematic (*asa-ti*) and unthematic (*as-ti*) forms for the differentiation of subjunctive and indicative, or the turning of the *s*-formative into a tense-sign. If, as seems incontestable, the tense-system of the Indo-European languages is by no means primitive, but a secondary structure, into which material of a previous period was built by charging old forms with new meaning,⁴ it is not necessary to assume that this new system was uniformly worked out in what is called Indo-European times, and the attempt to construct universally accepted Indo-European meanings from which, by loss or addition, those of the

¹ This statement agrees with Delbrück, *Einleitung in das Sprachstudium* (1880) p. 52. *Einleitung in das Studium der indogermanischen Sprachen* (1904), p. 126.

² For a fuller discussion of this see E. P. Morris's and the author's paper in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* for 1905.

³ In the seventeenth vol. of the *Indogermanische Forschungen*.

⁴ Compare also the acquired modal force of the augmentless preterites, Thurneysen, *Bezz. Beitr.* VIII, p. 282.

individual languages *must* be derived would seem unwarranted. It is for this reason that I should be slow to assert that the Latin subjunctive forms are *semantically* the product of a fusion of Indo-European subjunctive (ferās) and optative (faxīs) forms. I cannot see what obstacle should prevent our interpreting these forms as reflexes of a section of Indo-European speech in which the adaptation of forms terminating in long $\bar{a}$ $\bar{e}$ $\bar{o}$ and those with the formative $i\bar{e}$: $\bar{i}$ to subjunctive and optative uses respectively had never taken place; just as the Italic and Celtic *r*-forms of the passive have their *formal* but not their *semantic* counterpart in Sanskrit. Thus, while in dealing with the *formal* side of Indo-European speech the construction of parent forms is a useful and convenient device and cannot under any circumstances do harm, the case is different in syntactical work with its emphasis on the *semantic* side. Here insistence on a uniform parent language with well-defined semantic systems shared in by all sections of Indo-European folk seems fraught with danger and must often tend to cloud the issue by injecting foreign semantic elements, which in reality were, perhaps, never present in the history of a mode or tense. It seems methodologically wrong to assume that because certain formatives in a given number of languages can be *formally* united, their respective semantic contents must also be unified under one denominator, which is to be regarded as starting-point and fountain head from which the meanings in the individual languages are to be historically derived. Early formal identity of formatives may well go hand in hand with primitive semantic differences due to separate and sectional development.

I turn from this general discussion of the value of inferred forms and meanings to a number of problems connected with the different departments of grammar, selecting a few which are of a more general nature.

In phonetics the problem of the causes upon which rests the striking uniformity of sound-changes is not yet finally solved. The investigation of the nature of phonetic changes has been, in the main, confined to the causes which produce primary changes, that is, those which originated in, and were created by, the individual, who therefore plays an active part in their production. While these changes have received detailed treatment, another phase of the subject, namely, the cause which underlies the comparative uniformity of these changes in a large number of individuals scattered over a considerable area, has been touched only lightly and in a more or less general way. There are two possible ways of accounting for such uniformity. One theory (and it is important to note that the foremost authority on the psychology of language holds this view, cf. Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie, Die Sprache*, vol. I, p. 391) explains it as

due to simultaneous changes which rise independently in the members inhabiting a certain area. Its collective character is, if I understand Wundt aright, due to the fact that the causes for its existence are uniformly present in many members, who, therefore, at about the same time independently hit upon the same change. According to this view, every change starts *and spreads* as a primary change. The other theory makes a sharp distinction between primary and secondary changes and explains the spread of a change as due to the *adoption* of the innovation by the rest of the speech-community. Having been originated elsewhere, the change is afterwards accepted and — mostly unconsciously — imitated. In two ways this latter view (which is shared, among the latest writers, by Delbrück, cf. his *Einführung in das Studium der indogermanischen Sprachen*, 4th edition, p. 149) seems to me to have an advantage over the other. In the first place, it bridges the gulf which separates phonetic changes from those of a semantic and syntactical kind. For it seems hard to maintain that the change in a syntactical construction or in the meaning of a word owes its universality to a simultaneous and independent primary change in all the members of a speech-community. By adopting the theory of imitative spread, all linguistic changes (*formal* as well as *semantic*) may be viewed as one homogeneous whole. In the second place, the latter view seems to bring linguistic changes into line with the other social changes, such as modifications in institutions, beliefs, and customs. For is it not an essential characteristic of a social group that its members are not coöperative in the sense that each member actively participates in the production of every single element which goes to make up either language, or belief, or customs? Distinguishing thus between *primary* and *secondary* changes and between the *origin* of a change and its *spread*, it behoves us to examine carefully into the causes which make the members of a social unit, either consciously or unconsciously, willing to accept the innovation. What is it that determines acceptance or rejection of a particular change? What limits one change to a small area, while it extends the area of another? Before a final decision can be reached in favor of the second theory of imitative spread it will be necessary to follow out in minute detail the mechanism of this process in a number of concrete instances; in other words to fill out the picture of which Tarde (*Les Lois de l'Imitation*) sketched the bare outlines. If his assumptions prove true, then we should have here a uniformity resting upon other causes than the physical uniformity that appears in the objects with which the natural sciences deal. It would enable us to establish a second group of uniform phenomena which is psycho-physical in its character and rests upon the basis of social suggestion. The uniformities in speech, belief, and institutions would belong to this second group.

In another direction, also, a study of the process of the spread of linguistic changes, combined with a study of the mechanism of dialect formation and early tribal migrations, would be of considerable interest. Hirt, some time ago (*IF*, ix, 292), directed attention to the similarities, both phonetic and morphological, in neighboring but unrelated dialects.¹ "It is a well-known fact that the same phonetic changes are met with in different but adjacent dialectal areas. Most striking are such parallelisms in the languages of the Balkan peninsula. Though much is uncertain, one fact is plain, namely, that Rumanian, Albanian, and Bulgarian, three fundamentally different languages, possess similar features which it is hardly possible to ascribe to mere chance." It seems possible to explain these similarities by assuming at the beginning a large number of many small ethnic units of great mobility and only moderate coherence.² These, moving with considerable ease³ within a comparatively large geographical area, combined, often only temporarily, with other units into larger bodies which may frequently enough have employed a variety of heterogeneous dialects. These, according to the degree of intensity of intercourse and according to the duration of the union, could not help influencing each other. Finally, a certain number of these units permanently consolidated, and, being held together by a common material civilization, they began to form a larger and more coherent unit, became more and more closely knit as time went on, and in the same proportion in which the members of this new body politic coalesced and began to feel their unity, they were further and further separated from their neighbors, and this contrast, which grew up on a political and economic basis, was reflected in the independent development of the language which the new group produced. Such must have been the process which gave rise to definite dialects,⁴ and this manner of forming them explains why — though in historical times we have clearly established dialectal boundary zones — we yet find surprising correspondences between dialects which, in historical times, are completely independent and distinct. They are due to the admixture of small roving bodies of a different linguistic complexion which were themselves absorbed by the larger mass, but which left a trace in the language of those with whom they united.

And, finally, if we maintain the distinction between primary and secondary changes, we shall look for the causes of a change only where that change is primary. It is, of course, true that all sec-

¹ On such similarities and their explanation see Kretschmer, *Einleitung z. Gesch. d. griech. Sprache*, p. 98.

² Edward Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alterthums*, II, p. 44; Kretschmer, *loc. cit.* p. 75.

³ Note, e. g. the ease with which German tribes moved and combined, Lamprecht, *Deut. Gesch.* I (1891), p. 7; *Caes. B. G.* I, 31.

⁴ Bremer in *Paul's Grundriss*, III, pp. 747, 763.

ondary changes must have originated as primary changes, and *as such* they are the direct result of certain forces. But as secondary, that is, adopted changes, they appear where these forces never existed. Not everywhere, therefore, where a certain change is observable may we expect to find the causes also to which it is due; such generative forces can only be discovered where the change is primary. It is wrong to infer that the mere use of a certain syntactical form is *prima facie* evidence of a given mental attitude. As soon as any syntactical phenomenon, such as the order of words in a sentence, has become habitual, it is vain to seek for the causes which lead a given speaker to arrange his words in the accepted order.¹ And Sütterlin (*Das Wesen der sprachlichen Gebilde*, p. 11) very properly points out that for the modern naïve French speaker the analytic *il a aimé* is as much a unit as was the synthetic *amavit* for a Roman. "At the time when the phrase *il a aimé* was first created, the single elements were still comparatively clearly felt; but after it had once become habitual [that is, when uttered by those who simply imitated it] it was fused into one whole. As a matter of fact, the uneducated Frenchman has no idea whether he pronounces one word or three." In a similar way we may speak of the grouping and moulding of a compound concept in the sentence only in those cases where the process is really one of original analysis, but not in those cases where we have a repetition of an analysis already made and cast into linguistic form.² A good portion of the ordinary talk of many persons is undoubtedly of this second, mechanical type.³

I pass over the problem of the origin of Indo-European inflection which has been discussed in its various bearings in two very recent papers by Delbrück (*Einleitung in das Studium der indogermanischen Sprachen*, 4th ed. p. 127) and Hirt (*IF*, xvii, 36). The latter especially, collecting the scattered results of previous investigations (including his own concerning Indo-European gradation and dissyllabic bases), makes four points perfectly clear: namely, that the inflectional system of the Indo-European languages was preceded by an inflectionless period, traces of which are not at all rare in the historical forms. Second, that the distinction of verbal and nominal inflection is not original and that the whole sentence-architecture of the Indo-European, with its characteristic division into subject and verbal predicate, is a secondary growth. Third, all the tense-formatives do not originally refer to time, but to the kind of verbal action. Their tense-force is secondary throughout. And, fourth, that a certain number of what used to be considered suffixes (but not all) are not external accretions, but are the final syllables of a base,

¹ Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, *Die Sprache*, II, p. 365 ff.

² Compare Jerusalem's discussion of the "Erinnerungsurtheil" in his *Urtheilsfunction* (1895).

³ Compare Howells's *Lady of the Aroostook*, pp. 106 and 215.

which in the course of time acquired the force and function of a suffix.

In syntax, the most important feature which has influenced the methods of investigation has been the tendency to carry into practice Humboldt's maxim that language is not so much an *ἔργον* as an *ἐνέργεια*,¹ in other words, to view language not solely as a collection of facts (spoken or written words or sentences) but rather as an activity and a psychical process of which the spoken word itself is only the outward and audible sign. This desire to turn from the finished product to an examination of the producing agency explains the change from the logical to the psychological treatment of grammar.

The arrangement of facts in grammars viewing language as static is largely a classification of linguistic products according to external similarities, similar to the Linnæan classification of plants. Whether this be rougher or finer, whether the subdivisions be few or many, the character of this classification remains essentially the same, inasmuch as it is based upon the present external appearance of things and often cannot take into consideration the genesis of the very qualities according to which it classifies. Now, while such a descriptive classification is necessary, useful, and sufficient for the *practical* mastery of the details of a language, where the sole object is acquaintance with the facts as they are or were, it is *scientifically* insufficient because it fails to indicate how these objects came to be what they are. More than that, it may be positively misleading when it groups together facts which have an external similarity but owe their existence to different causes. These genetic differences a descriptive classification at times veils and obscures. For while it is a truism that a like combination of like forces must produce like effects, it is no less true (though sometimes forgotten) that a different combination of different forces may produce like effects also. It is wholly wrong to work on the principle that like effects must necessarily imply like causes.² Many illustrations might be given of the grouping together of genetically different material under such general descriptive heads as "assimilation," "anaptyxis," etc. And only recently Meumann³ has called attention to the abuse of the term "metaphor" when applied to the variations in the semantic sphere of the child's vocabulary, by showing how entirely different are the psychological processes which underlie the creation of a poetical or rhetorical metaphor from the so-called "generalizing tendency" of the child.

The desire to investigate processes of development rather than classify finished products has affected semantic investigations in

¹ Delbrück, *loc. cit.*, p. 45.

² Cf. Foy in *IF*, xii, 33.

³ *Die Sprache des Kindes*, pp. 60-63.

two ways. In the first place it has directed attention to the study of modern dialects and some of the most important contributions (like that of Schiepek, *Der Satzbau der Egerländer Mundart*, 1899) have been along that line. In the second place it has necessarily led to dealing with concrete and individual forms and phrases rather than with general, abstract, and purely conceptual grammatical categories. The advantage of this mode of procedure is that the treatment of a single concrete phrase can take into account all those factors which in the generic treatment by grammatical categories must be disregarded, for all classification implies a more or less judicious slighting. Consequently, "the inevitable result of over-attention to classification is a diversion of attention from details."¹ To illustrate by an example from the author just quoted (p. 210): "It is common . . . to speak of the deliberative subjunctive. But the function [does not abide in the single verb-form, for example, *faciam*, but] belongs to the whole word-group. In the typical form *Quid ego nunc faciam* each word contributes to the total meaning. . . . If both [*ego* and *nunc*] are omitted the question is not necessarily dubitative. The subjunctive form also contributes to the expression of the function of the group, though it is not essential, since the same function is occasionally expressed by sentences with the indicative. But deliberation cannot be expressed by any one of the four words alone, and it is not, therefore, a function of any one of them alone. There is no such thing as the deliberative or dubitative subjunctive; to use the term is to attribute the function of the whole word-group to a single member of the group."

The mention of grammatical categories suggests an important problem which awaits investigation, namely, in how far our so-called grammatical categories exist in the mind of the naïve speaker. Does the untutored speaker who is not sicklied o'er with the pale cast of grammar really possess the categories of number, case, substantive, adjective, etc., apart from the individual forms? The strongest argument in favor of the independent existence of such categories would be the process of so-called functional association. By this is meant the association of words which are neither related in root-meaning (as "father" and "mother"), nor resemble each other in sound (as "co(h)ors" and "curia"), but which play the same part in the construction of the sentence (as two nominatives plural or two first persons of the imperfect). I am not aware that this sort of association appears in any of the experimental investigations which the psychologists have furnished. They are in the habit of distinguishing two main kinds of association only: one by sense, the other by sound. The nature of the material on which they base their classification may account for the absence of this kind of association in

¹ Morris, *On Principles and Methods in Latin Syntax*, p. 217.

the cases which they investigated. But it would seem important to subject the cases of alleged functional association and analogy-formation to a renewed scrutiny with a view of determining whether the psychological process in these cases has not, perhaps, been misinterpreted.

We say, for instance, that in the Oscan dialect the ending of the nominative plural *-ōs* of the masculine *-o-* stems has affected the corresponding case of the relative pronoun (*pōs*) and displaced its regular and distinctive ending (seen in Latin *quī*), much as in vulgar English the sigmatic plural of the noun has affected the personal pronoun of the second person, changing *you* to *yous*. And, since in these cases neither the meaning of the words nor phonetic resemblances can have given rise to associative connection, we are inclined to attribute it to *functional* likeness. It may, however, be submitted that there is another possibility, namely, the transfer of the termination of one word to an adjacent word simply on account of this local contiguity. Words, we must remember, do not in actual speech ordinarily occur isolated, but combined in phrases. Words like the article or pronouns habitually occur in closest proximity to the noun they qualify, and, in general, words with like grammatical function cannot help being placed together in very many instances. Under these conditions it would not be at all surprising if — without any realization by the speaker of their functional similarity — the ending, or the accent ¹ of one member of the group should encroach upon that of the other member, especially if both form a phonetic unit or speech-bar. Such interference may operate in either forward or backward direction, and its character would not be different from that of the so-called regressive and progressive assimilation of sounds within the same word. And this explanation is actually proffered by Wackernagel (*IF*, xiv, p. 367), for some transfers of endings: "Transfer of endings," he says (p. 374), "is not only due to proportional analogy, but also to the fact that the words affected are construed together. . . . Hence the influence of pronominal words on nouns." And he appears to regard in this light the transfer of the ending *-es* which, petrified, appears first in numerals like *tétrapes* with accusative function, and thence spreads over the adjacent nouns. I am inclined to believe that what is now regarded as "functional analogy" owes — if not wholly, at least in good part — its existence to such spread. When we have, for example, in Greek *ὅκτω* and *ὅπτω* (after *ἐπτά*) I doubt whether the connecting link between the two words was simply their grammatical category and that the change originated in the isolated words, for the experiments which I made concerning the association of numerals (*American Journal*

¹ For the latter see Brugmann, *Berichte d. sächsischen Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften* for 1900, p. 371 (with references).

of *Philology*, XXII, p. 261) and which were supported by Ebbinghaus's observations (*Zeitschrift f. Psych. und Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane*, XIX, 1902, p. 142) showed¹ that cases where one isolated numeral was associated with another were excessively rare. I am, therefore, inclined to believe that the frequent juxtaposition of these two words, without reference to the likeness of their grammatical category, lies at the bottom of the change. And, in general, it would seem as if too little weight is given in our whole treatment of analogy-formation to the associations due to frequent juxtaposition and habitual combinations. We are too apt to take words singly and treat them apart from their ordinary setting. If a word for "day" grammatically influences the word for "night" (as *Nachts* after *Tags*²) is it not because they frequently occur in close proximity in the sentence rather than because the two are associated by sense?³ The coherence of the members of a phrase in the spoken language is much greater than is usually supposed, as is proved by those instances (rare enough in the revised written texts) in which one member of a common word-group may be observed to carry in its train its mate, though the latter be not needed or be even disturbing. Interesting cases of such "agglutinative association" (cf. the author's *Lectures on the Study of Language*, p. 183, sec. 16) are given by Kemmer (*Die Polare Ausdrucksweise in der griech. Litteratur, Schanz' Beiträge*, vol. xv, p. 2; 45, 50, 57). They are paralleled in English by such phrases as Colonel Henry Watterson's:⁴ "It (*Life*) is racy of the soil, even as *Punch* in London is racy of English soil, a reflection of the *moods and tenses* of the time, of the thoughts and fancies of the people"; and in these passages from a letter: "As J. was out *till morning doth appear*, mother and I talked till late"; "This is my regular *in the springtime gentle Annie* feeling." Such cases⁵ are the morphological counterparts to those phonetic alterations where a word either loses or gains an initial by too intimate union with another word, as *Meisenbühl* (from *im Eisenbühl*, cf. *Zt. f. d. deut. Unterricht*, xvii, 1903, p. 728), and which, for English, are very exhaustively treated by C. P. G. Scott (*Transactions of American Philological Association*, xxiii, 1892, p. 179, xxiv, 1893, p. 89).

¹ Cf. also Ebbinghaus, *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, 2d ed., I, 1905, p. 704. The objections of Marbe and Watts are discussed in *American Journal of Philology*, xxvi, 1905, p. 95, note 1.

² In the same way Latin *noctu* after *diu*, Bartholomae, *IF*, x, p. 13.

³ In this way Gothic *haimos* owes its feminine gender to its frequent connection with *baurgs* (Dieter, *Allgerm. Dial.* p. 571, sec. 330, 2, note 3), late Icelandic *setr* its feminine gender to frequent connection with *hendr* (Dieter, *ibid.*) etc.

⁴ In an editorial in the Louisville *Courier-Journal*, reprinted in *Life*, vol. xiii (1903), no. 1099, p. 479.

⁵ Cf. also 'high and dry protectionist' in the editorial of the New York *Evening Post* for May 22, 1905, and similar instances collected by H. Willert, *Archiv f. d. Stud. d. neueren Spr. u. Lit.*, vol. cxi (= N. F. xi) p. 420.

SHORT PAPER

MR. ROBERT STEIN, of the United States Geological Survey, read a short paper before this Section on the "Proposed International Phonetic Conference to adopt a Universal Alphabet." The speaker said:

To prepare such an alphabet is a comparatively easy task. Scores of such alphabets exist already, but not one of them possesses sufficient authority to compel its universal use. How shall such authority be secured?

To this question, the circular recently issued by Boston University seeks to obtain an answer. It invites opinions on the plan to hold an international conference for the purpose of adopting a universal alphabet to be used first of all as a key to pronunciation in all dictionaries of the leading languages. I may state at once that the replies received from the editors and publishers of the great American dictionaries are highly encouraging. They state with practical unanimity that, if a universal alphabet were drawn up by a commission composed of the foremost experts, and invested with the requisite authority by scientific bodies of high standing, they would introduce that alphabet as a key to pronunciation in future editions of dictionaries, primers, readers, grammars, and language-manuals as fast as practicable.

It will be noted that the acceptance of the universal alphabet by the dictionaries was made subject to an "if." They are willing to use this alphabet if it is presented to them invested with a sufficient degree of authority. Nothing should be neglected that can add to this authority. Hence the commission which is to prepare the universal alphabet must fulfill four conditions:

- (1) It should be composed of the foremost experts in phonetics.
- (2) They should be invested with representative power by learned bodies of the highest standing.
- (3) They should receive their final commissions from various governments.
- (4) They should conduct their work not merely by correspondence, but should have at least one meeting, preferably several meetings, occupying an adequate length of time.

The scholars able to do this work exist; it only remains to enable them to organize. For this purpose, the circular issued by Boston University is to serve as a preliminary step. Its aim is to obtain the opinion of the learned public. Thus far it has been sent only to the members of the Philological Association, and it may be stated that out of the sixty-seven replies received up to September 16, only four questioned the utility of the conference, the great majority being emphatic and even enthusiastic in its advocacy.

SECTION B — SEMITIC LANGUAGES

SECTION B—SEMITIC LANGUAGES

(Hall 4, September 21, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR G. F. MOORE, Harvard University.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES A. CRAIG, University of Michigan.

PROFESSOR CRAWFORD H. TOY, Harvard University.

THE RELATION OF SEMITICS TO RELIGION

BY JAMES ALEXANDER CRAIG

[James Alexander Craig, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures, and Hellenistic Greek, University of Michigan, since 1893. b. Fitzroy Harbour, Ontario, Canada. A.B. McGill University, 1880; A.M. *ibid.* 1880; B.D. Yale, 1883; Ph.D. Leipzig, 1886; Instructor and Adjunct Professor of Biblical Languages, Lane Theological Seminary, 1886-91; Acting Professor of Old Testament Languages and Literature, Oberlin Theological Seminary, 1891-92; engaged in Semitic Studies in London and Berlin, 1892-93; Instructor in Sanskrit, University of Michigan, 1893-94. Member of Vorderasiatische Gesellschaft, Berlin. Author of *Hebrew Manual*; *Assyrian Religious Texts*; and other works.]

THIS is a subject so intricate in its nature and so extended in its scope that much more time should have been given to its consideration than the few hours which circumstances beyond my control have permitted me to bestow upon it, and furthermore, it demands even under the most favorable circumstances a more varied and profound knowledge for an adequate discussion of it than it is my good fortune to possess. I am reminded at the outset of the famous saying of Euclid, one of the members of the early Ionic school of Greek philosophers, the saying for which he was chiefly remembered by posterity, and which contributed to his recognition by his contemporaries, namely, that it is necessary at the beginning of every discussion to lay down some undeniable principle to start with.

It is self-evident that my subject, The Relation of Semitics to Religion, stands in need of definition. It is, at least, necessary to have some general understanding as regards the sense in which we here use the word "religion." Religion in its largest sense would comprise all its manifestations in all ages and lands, but it is manifest that it cannot be in this sense of the word that I am invited to discuss the relation of Semitics to religion, for the very plain reason that in many instances no relations exist or have existed. At least there have been no historical periods of contact in which a reciprocal influence may have been exerted, or periods of transmission through an

intermediary in which Semitic ideas may have penetrated to remote peoples, as, for example, to the Incas or the Indian tribes of our own continent.

The most that can be said is that in certain particulars there may be found in all religions concepts similar to those held by the Semites at certain stages of their development. Neither, on the other hand, does our subject *necessarily* limit us to a consideration of the relation of Semitics to those great religions which fall either entirely within the field of Semitics, such as the Babylonian, Israelitish, and Jewish, or to the various forms of Christianity which are based upon the religious ideas of the Semites, and more especially upon those of Israel and Judah. The subject calls for a discussion not of Semitics in relation to religions, but in its relations to religion.

The subject tacitly and properly assumes that religion is natural to man, and, if so, that men are universally religious. This fact also bears upon the subject. Go the wide world around, if you have any doubt about that. Pass through its cities, its towns and hamlets and rural regions, and note on every hand what myriad mute, yet convincing, testimonies there are to the religious nature of man. Here are its grand cathedrals; on every street arise its pointing spires, its mosques and minarets, its temples and pagodas; on highway and byway are its chapels, its capellas of saints, its sacred stones. Or, reflect a little along historical lines. How much, for example, of the best artistic creation of the ancient Babylonians and Assyrians drew its inspiration from the religious spirit and religious genius? The fervor of adoration was felt in every chisel-stroke which brought to form their imaginary deities, and their religious sense found finest satisfaction in weaving into their decorative work their conventionalized sacred trees and other emblems of their religious world. With the exception, perhaps, of the animal form, which they studied closely from nature, they are at their best in the religious sphere. Look at the Greeks, the world's preceptors in this region, to whom, more than to any others, it was "the eternal law that first in beauty shall be first in might." Their art was born of their religion. By art they bodied forth their gods, and gave to them most glorious form. By the perfect sculpture of their temples they strove to express the excellency of their religion.

Literature brings unimpeachable witness to the same fact. Even their letters, said the ancients, they learned in the kindergarten of the gods. As their art did, so their literature drew much of its power, permanence, and beauty from religion. Peasant and prince alike have been caught up by its power and taught majestic speech. The Chrysostoms of Judaism were its prophets, and its national library its books on religion. And these, mark you, have preserved its people in their solidarity through all the catastrophes of war,

through all the persecutions of hate. A doubt of man's religious nature in the face of these clamant facts in the history of this one people would be the supremest paradox of thought. But Jewish literature does not stand alone in this respect; the religion of Babylonia has lifted her books of common clay out of the category of things common and unclean. Her myths and epics, her hymns and prayers, furnish us with the finest specimens of her literary art. The stylus was of priestly invention. The "king's ear was enlarged" by Nebo and Tashmit, and the *nishik dupsharuti*, the excellent art of tablet-writing by which the wisdom of Nebo was recorded, was the gift of the gods.

Go to India. There we find a literature that is nothing less than wonderful, immense in quantity and rich in quality. Beginning with the Mantras, almost two thousand years before Christ, with a grand collection of over one thousand selected hymns known as the Rig-Vedas, followed by three other Vedas, it continues down to that comparatively modern body of doctrine known as the Puranas or Traditions. Between this oldest and youngest collection there lie the Brahmanas and Sutras. We have epic and philosophy, ethics and law, brilliant teaching, which, in many an instance, is capable of throwing unsuspected rays of light upon hard problems that lie near to the human heart. What is the great distinguishing note sounding through all this vast body of literature? What was its inspiration and to what end is it primarily addressed? If we must give answer in one word, that word must be Religion.

It would be idle to point to Greek literature or to any other for further confirmation. As the best of Greek art looked toward the gods, so the highest reaches of Greek literature were attained along the ascents of religious thought.

We assume then with our subject that religion is natural to man. It is an essential and necessary part of human life. It gives to itself, moreover, public expression wherever men live together in social organization; but it has its origin in *individuals* who become socially related in religious thought or expression. I do not mean to affirm that every individual has a religious nature, though any other conclusion with respect to the normal man seems difficult. All peoples, and almost all individuals, have a language and the power of speech, have vision and are able to discriminate colors, yet here and there a man is color-blind, or one is dumb. Such a man is said to be defective; the same reasoning must apply in the sphere of religion. Man apparently can no more escape from religion than he can escape from himself. And now, further, these last observations lead to another view which stands in noteworthy contrariety to that which is pre-vaillingly held. Religion is not of the church. This great fact, which is inherent in the nature of man and grows up out of his nature in

connection with the world-order in which he finds himself, exists independently of the churches, and would still exist if there were no churches. Out of it, and for it, the churches have arisen, not *vice versa*, religion out of the church and for the church. In some ecclesiastical organizations this fact of the priority of religion to, and independence of, the church has been utterly forgotten or unrecognized. When, for example, an order of Christians is said to be "a religious order" because of its peculiar connection with the church and its peculiar mode of life, or when a member of such a body is briefly said to be "a religious," the church with its rites and ceremonies is tacitly declared to be the author and guardian of religion, whereas, in fact, it is neither. Religion created the church and is ever re-creating it, because it abides not in temples made of hands, nor, in its last analysis, in courts and ecclesiastics, but in the unspoiled hearts of individual men. It is the individual pure in heart who sees God. Religion belongs to us as individuals, not to the churches. The church is merely an agency for the promotion and cultivation of religion, helpful to the majority of men within its pale, but utterly powerless to affect or make appeal to the higher intellectual and spiritual side of many profoundly religious minds without it, though they may be deeply sympathetic towards many of its aims.

If, then, religion is something that belongs to us all as individuals, possessed by each, and possessing us in turn in absolute and unrestricted thought and service, except in so far as we by moral choice subordinate our individual privilege to altruistic purposes, let us go a step farther and ask whether we are mutually agreed as to what religion is. One thing we have settled and I hope are agreed upon, namely, that religion, being natural to man, belongs to the individual, to me. As regards religion, I am, as an individual, to use a legal phrase, "seized in fee and of right." It is neither a church doctrine, nor a church service, nor both. It is neither of, nor from, nor by the churches. The church did not create it, and it has not the right to demand it of me, nor to command me with respect to it. Its duty is simply to cultivate it among its free worshiping members and promote among men generally, by the functions over which it presides, its highest ideals.

How shall we define religion? It is something that has been variously defined as well as variously conceived. Not long ago I heard a prominent American divine define religion as "An attempt on the part of man to get into right relations to God." The defect of this definition is at once apparent. Religion is not necessarily an attempt of any kind, and if it be nothing more than an attempt, it is not religion at all.

Frequently we find it of advantage in analyzing a concept to

turn for assistance to the etymology of the term by which it is expressed. In this instance, however, we look in vain to the Latin lexicon. The word connotes for us something quite different from that which it suggested to the Romans, who did not agree among themselves as to its meaning. Cicero in his *De Natura Deorum* connected *religio* with *relegere*, and says "those are said to be religious who diligently recur to, and, as it were, repeat all those things which pertain to the worship of the gods." But others, followed by the great church father, Augustine, connect the word with *religare*, to bind back, or firmly; thus rooting it essentially in a sense of obligation. If we come down to more modern times, we find that philosophers and theologians, in discussing religion, are divided into three classes: those who seek its explanation in the intellect alone, who make it purely a matter of thought, as Hegel; or of belief, as Jacobi; or of intuitively perceived truths, as Schelling. Those who would make it a matter of belief only exclude reason or make it antagonistic to belief, thus making of the human mind the proverbial house that is divided against itself. As for intuitive knowledge, that, I think, finds little support from present-day philosophy. A second class declares that religion has its *fons et origo* in the feelings alone. It grows out of a sense of dependence. This is doubtless an important source, but the old maxim *Ex nihilo nihil fit* is an immediate stay to this conclusion. There can be no feeling where nothing but feeling is involved. The case seems to be no better with the third class, who derive it neither from the intellect nor from the feelings, but from the conscience. Conscience is not an independent, separate, faculty, wholly dissociated from intellect and feeling. On the contrary, it presupposes both. The common and fundamental defect of all these views of religion is that they limit it to a single sphere, whereas it operates within and issues out of them all. The mind of man is not made up of a series of bulk-head compartments. Any adequate view of religion must, therefore, take cognizance of all the factors supplied by these different sources. We would, consequently, define religion as man's reasoned thought of the world-order of which he forms a part, the feelings produced in him by this thought, and the deliberate conduct in which it issues. This definition is comprehensive, sufficiently apt, and adequate. I may indicate this by quoting two or three definitions of prominent thinkers, all of which seem to me defective. Herbert Spencer defines religion as "A feeling of wonder in the presence of the unknown." Feeling is everything, and even that is limited to the feeling of wonder. Test that by your thought of Jesus, or of Paul. Were they simply wonderers? Newman, in his *Grammar of Assent*, says, "Religion is the knowledge of God, of his will, and of our duties toward him." Here the definition, taken explicitly, makes knowledge everything. Martineau, in *A Study of*

Religion, describes it as "a belief and worship of the supreme mind and will," and here the main element in Newman's definition is entirely ignored.

I need not pursue this question further, or add to these quotations. I proceed in the next place to ask what relation do Semitics sustain to religion as thus defined? The importance of holding to this definition is obvious. Suppose I were to take Spencer's definition of religion as my starting-point, my subject would then run: The Relation of Semitics to a Feeling of Wonder in the Presence of the Unknown. How could I, how could you, discuss a question like that?

This historical and genetic relation of Semitic thought to religion is unparalleled in degree, if not in kind. Semitic thought has been the matrix whence have been born three of the greatest historical, still extant, and dominant religions, — Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. And, since the study of Semitics is the study of Semitic thought as it has expressed itself more especially in language and literature, the subject of the hour possesses a practical interest and is of paramount importance. It is not a question of academic interest solely, but one that may well engage the attention of pew and pulpit, of all men who try to discover truth or find their relations and do their duty in the world. But the subject as a whole cannot be discussed in a single lecture.

Let us take the first element of religion as we have defined it, — man's thought of the world-order of which he forms a part, — and ask what relations has Semitics to that. Or let us put the question differently: How and to what extent is that thought affected by the study of Semitics? And, since the study of Semitics, as distinguished from some branch of Semitics, is confined practically to Christian scholars, or scholars in Christian nations, we shall deal with that thought as it exists among Christians. To the preceding question the Semitist must answer, it is affected in many ways and to a much greater extent than is popularly supposed. Let us take the God of Christian thought. Semitics, so far as I can discover, has no positive contribution to make to our present understanding of the nature of God. Polytheistic Semites and monotheistic Semites alike believed in the personality of Deity. On the nature of the ultimate and eternal cause, or principle, we cannot now expect to learn better than we know from a literature that was closed for the most part two thousand years ago. But I think Semitics does aid us in arriving at some reasonable conclusion with respect to the origin of the idea of a God, or gods, and this points clearly in the direction of an animistic doctrine. It is true, of course, that when we meet a race in the possession of a literature it is no longer in a primitive stage, but we are fortunate enough to be able in the Semitic field to catch the people almost, as it were, in passage from the earlier to the more advanced state.

The prevailing idea of a *primitive monotheism* is one that has come down to us through the church. It has found, and finds, its advocates among theologians, and also among archæologists, and philosophers. The theological view of it is derived from supposed explicit and final statements in the Old Testament, especially in the opening chapters of Genesis. In early times, during the Middle Ages, and, indeed, down to a period not far removed from our own times, it was supposed and held that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. This is not to be wondered at in view of the almost universal ignorance of clergymen not only of Hebrew but also of general Semitic literature. In the field in which they are supposed to be masters they are, as a rule, lamentably uninformed. So ran the teaching — the history of his own times Moses wrote from personal knowledge, the period of the patriarchs he learned from tradition, and the history of creation and the earlier experience of man in Paradise he got from the highest authority, the Creator himself. This view so fixed itself in the minds of theologians that even scholars like Dillmann thought it necessary to combat it in his last edition of Genesis. This one God, it was said, revealed himself to mankind at its start, and this primitive monotheism was handed down from the beginning through the line of Adam, Seth, Noah, Abraham, the Prophets, and Jesus. The simplicity of the idea diverted attention from its astonishing naïveté.

The philosophical view approached this doctrine from another side. To cite only one writer, let me take Creuzer, in his work *Symbolik und Mythologie*. To him all old myths are theological. Almost all of the myths of the Greeks were derived from the Orient. From the Oriental point of view these myths stand for comprehensive conceptions, and the myth is but the development of the religious teachings of the priesthood. He holds that between the different mythologies a close relation exists and that there is an original unity of thought toward which the various mythologies point, and that this unity presupposes, as its original type, a pure monotheism. We shall say nothing about the logical, or better, the illogical leaps by which he reaches his conclusion. This original monotheism, although in the process of time it was corrupted into polytheism, yet never wholly disappeared, but was preserved even in the priestly traditions of the anthropomorphic systems of Greece. So long as the race was a unit, this original monotheism, he claims, could and did maintain itself, but the breaking up of the original stock into separate peoples resulted also in the breaking up of the one-God idea — a suggestion which sounds much the same as the one by which the origin of language is explained in the eleventh chapter of Genesis, in which we have a sound religious teaching based upon a popular and worthless etymology of the word Babel. We can understand how one language could give rise to a number of different though cognate lan-

guages, but we should not expect any particular one of them to preserve the original language in its purity, but all alike to change and modify it. Neither should we expect the postulated original one-God idea to be preserved in one out of all the tribes of the earth, and to be sunk so completely beneath the religious consciousness of all the other tribes as to be irrevocably lost to them. That supposition is possible only by the help of another sheer assumption, namely, that of a perpetual miracle which operated to preserve an idea in the minds of the few in order that they might give it back again in the course of the ages to the many, all of whom had it at the beginning.

What does our earliest historical literature in the field of Semitic study teach us on this question of a primitive monotheism? In Babylonia, at least, it teaches us what from other considerations we had reason to anticipate. One of the many important results achieved by the expedition sent out by the University of Pennsylvania to Babylonia was its discovery in Nuffar, the site of the ancient Nippur, of some of the earliest royal inscriptions that have yet come down to us. An inscription of one of these kings, Lugalzaggisi, who, about 4000 B.C., ruled over a territory almost as vast as that of the later Sargon I, was brought to light. It contained over one hundred and thirty-two lines and was written upon scores of large vases which the king's piety had prompted him to present to the old national sanctuary in Nippur. This king calls himself the priest of Ana, that is, the sky-god. He was looked upon by the faithful eye of Lugal-kurkura, that is, Bel. Intelligence was given to him by Ea, the son of Bel, or the Babylonian Hermes. He was invested with power by Utu, the sun-god, and nourished by Ninharsag, the great Abarakku of the gods. It is highly probable that this Bel, whose epithet here is "lord of the mountains" or "lord of lands," was in early times an astral deity, in fact, the sun-god, although an earlier designation of Bel was Enlil, "lord of demons." In any case, the story of Tiamat, which represents the primeval conflict in which the gods of darkness were assailed by the gods of light, the story of the struggle by which cosmic order was wrested from the body of Chaos — this story appears to have passed through different recensions, and, in one or more of them, Bel seems to have been the hero, and, if so, he was in early times a god of light. This would make it all the easier for the priestly schools to transfer to the solar deity Marduk, the god of Babylon, the attributes of Bel when Babylon acquired the political ascendancy among the city kingdoms which had long struggled for supremacy. This same Bel was worshiped in other early Babylonian cities, in Erech, and Kish, for example, and Sin, the moon-god, was the chief deity of the ancient city of Ur, and of the north Mesopotamian sanctuary in Harran. The temple of Bel at Nippur was erected, if the estimate of its excavators be correct, as early as 6000

or 7000 B.C. That means, then, that we have evidence of the worship of the sun and other heavenly bodies as early as this period, a couple of millenniums before the time when, but a few years ago, sober-minded men, on the basis of the Bible, declared that the world was created.

When we meet with the old Babylonian on the threshold of history, we find him prostrate before the sun and other heavenly bodies, though not worshipping astral deities exclusively. The Egyptian, likewise, bows before his Osiris and Ra, and the priests of India teach their followers to worship Surya, the same word as the Greek Helios, the sun. The sun is the most awe-impelling and thought-awakening object of the visible universe, majestic in splendor as he marches across the heavens upon his daily round. What a contrast to human experience he forms! Man sees himself and everything that is about him subject to change, his plans are frustrated, his way is blocked, but yonder is a power, a being, for so the early-minded must have thought, that knows unerringly his way and walks it unhindered, unafraid. He is also beneficent and good, so good that when the Hebrew prophet wishes a simile expressive of the goodness of his national redeemer, he calls him "the sun of righteousness" who comes with healing in his wings, as the Babylonian sun-god is represented on the cylinders.

"Unpropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it
That downward turned he falls not downward?
The guide of his ascending path, who saw it?"

Thus speaks the sage and worshiper of India.

Every lifeless thing unsupported in space, experience tells him, falls. How does *he* always find his path so unerringly in the heavens when there is none to guide him? He must choose it and adhere to it himself, and it must be that behind all this regularity and persistence of movement there is a purpose, for even the most primitive man is conscious of a purpose within himself.

The Semitic literature of Babylonia, so far as I am able to see, furnishes no evidence for the doctrine of a primitive monotheism, but points rather to a polytheistic astral worship as, at least, one of the earliest forms of religion. I am well aware that some Semitic scholars have endeavored to support the monotheistic theory from a study of other Semitic literature. This has been done especially by one scholar, to whom I may refer, the eminent Assyriologist and Semitist, Professor Hommel, of Munich. In his *Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, published a few years ago, Dr. Hommel makes extended use of the South Arabian Minæan and Sabæan inscriptions, so laboriously collected by Dr. Glazer. In dealing with the proper names of these inscriptions, and while admitting the polytheistic character of the South Arabian religion, he nevertheless endeavors to make it appear

that the prevalence of names compounded with the generic name *Ilu*, god, points back to an earlier monotheism. Characteristic of the reasoning of this book, however, is another statement. In dealing with a certain type of name of the period of Hammurabi, he points out that the most of them are compounded with the names *Sin*, *Shamash*, and *Ramman*, and, as in the case of the *Minæan*, the generic *Ilu*. He then continues, "Notwithstanding the countless greater and lesser deities in which Babylonian polytheism abounded, the names in general use seem to prove that it was only the moon, sun, and sky which conveyed an impression of deity to the Babylonian mind" (in this point he supports the idea of an original astral worship); "but then," he adds further, "if we substitute the simple word god, *Ilu*, for the moon, the sun, or the sky, these names express no sentiment which is inconsistent with the highest and purest monotheism." This is much like saying, that, if we were to substitute for Fritz Hommel the title Kaiser, he might pass for the Emperor of Germany. I modestly own my inability to perform the syllogistic feats implied in this mental process.

The more spiritual view which came in with the ethical monotheism of the prophets is a development from the cruder stage of polytheistic belief. "That was not first which was spiritual, but that which was natural, and afterward that which was spiritual."

But granted that this result is achieved, some may say it is a negation and, therefore, nugatory? It is a negation, — a negation of a widespread doctrine pertaining to man's knowledge of God. But every negation establishes an affirmative as its opposite, and a negative conclusion may determine my action as forcibly as an affirmative. If I establish the fact that there is no more gold to be found in yonder mountain ledge, I will cease to dig there for gold. Action, as we have seen, is motivated by feeling, and feeling issues out of knowledge. If we find that there is no evidence of a primitive revelation of one God from the one God, we have cleared the field for the inquiry, how did man arrive at the idea of God? and our answer to this must, in the nature of things, affect our religion.

Another question may now arise: assuming the existence of deity, or first cause, or, perhaps better, constant cause (we are not here concerned about the name), how is knowledge of this deity and his will ascertained? The study of Semitics is, I think, in many quarters at least, leading to different conclusions on this point. The Jewish and the Christian doctrine especially have made this knowledge wholly a matter of direct revelation, received in ecstasy, or otherwise. Philo, the Alexandrian Jewish philosopher, taught that God's word was obtained directly from God while the prophet was in a state of ecstasy. Philo, who was widely read in classical literature, borrowed his theory from Plato. The Egyptian priests taught the same. Abam-

mon, in reply to Porphyry, says, "the divinity comprehends everything in us, but exterminates entirely our own proper consciousness. The divine possession also emits words which are not understood by those that utter them." And Philo says, God plays upon the soul of the prophet just as the musician plays upon the flute. He uses the lips of the prophet without any coöperation on the part of the prophet. As the flute was not conscious of the music it produced, so the prophet was not conscious of his message. This *pagan doctrine* was widely adopted in the early Christian church and has come down to modern times. Hengstenberg advocates it strongly in his *Christology of the Old Testament*, differing from Philo only in making the prophet aware of what he was saying. In one form, or another, this supernaturalistic theory has found and finds many advocates. Among English writers, it has been stated in its extreme form by Lea, who, in his work on Inspiration, declares that the sacred authors were but the "instruments" used by God in the communication of his word; that they occupied the same relation to God as the pen does to the hand of the writer. It is implied also in the teaching of theologians nearer home, who would account for all defects and errors in the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments by the absurd theory of an "infallible original."

The study of the works of Mohammedan philosophers and theologians shows how Mohammedanism, starting out from the same point, by accepting the revelations of Mohammed as divine, developed a doctrine of sacred scripture that equals the extremest views of Christianity. The Shafi'ites with their doctrine of tradition outran the thought of the Princetonites, and that almost one thousand years in advance of them. Over against those who have insisted upon the literal meaning of the word, are others, like the Shi'ists, who look for a higher spiritual meaning in the verbal form, similar to the Schoolmen who taught the *multiplex intelligentia*, which they borrowed in turn from the Talmudists and Kabbalists. Then again we have the Mutazilites, who held that the Quran was the work of Mohammed, but was produced under divine influence, that it had, therefore, a human as well as a divine side. Those things in it which were not conformable to the truth, as they conceived it, could be ignored. In the same way modern theologians refer the irreconcilable views or teaching of the Bible, for example, the unfulfilled and unfulfillable predictions of the prophets, to their human origin. The facts, they say, which point to a human origin of the prophetic teaching, "are no less striking than those which point to a divine origin." (They should say they are much more striking.) This is the admission of the Mutazilite professors in our present orthodox theological seminaries. There were those who held that the Quran was uncreated, and those who held that it was created; those who, like Ahmad ibn

Hanbal, held that religious truth had no other source than the Quran and tradition, and that reason availed nothing. Ahmad, the Mohammedan, was the Jacobi of Christianity, who said, "by my faith I am a Christian, by my reason a heathen." The drift back to the primitive monotheism of Mohammed, and the drift to an agnostic mysticism, marks the thinking of many Mohammedans at the present time, just as similar movements may be found among ourselves. Starting out from practically the same principle of revelation, there is a remarkable parallelism in the development of doctrine among the followers of Mohammed with respect to the Quran to many views held by our fellow Christians in different ages with respect to our Scriptures. Christians will not admit the legitimacy of the Mohammedan's reasoning with respect to his sacred Suras, though it is in all essentials the same as their own.

Just so long as Semitists and theologians were shut up to the use of the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, it was easier to hold to the historic ideas of revelation and inspiration. But the thoughts of men are widening with the emergence into view of the life and thought of other branches of the Semitic family. No one needs now to be told of the immense literature that fills the museums of the world, which, during the last few decades, has been recovered from many mounds in the traditional ancestral home of the Hebrews. In the light of these histories, legends, myths, cosmogonies, these epics, hymns, prayers, religious rituals, and incantations, legal codes, etc., we read anew the life and thought of Israel. The first twelve chapters of Genesis clearly draw from a Babylonian source. The original matter came to the Hebrews by the way of Babylon. The whole is recast in the spirit of the later prophetic and priestly monotheistic schools, but none of us can hereafter look upon these chapters as possessing that *kind or degree* of inspiration which, until lately, it has been customary to ascribe to them. The two accounts of creation in the first and second chapters of Genesis, it has long been recognized, are utterly irreconcilable. The story of the building of the tower in the land of Shinar, Gen. 11, and the "confusion of tongues," with its impossible accounting for the name of Babel, are removed at once from the sphere of history to that of legendary fiction, and *Volks-Etymologie*. The laws purporting to have been revealed to Hammurabi by the god Shamash, twenty-three hundred years B.C., are in many instances as wise, humane, and ethical, in others more so, as those commonly supposed to have been given to Moses by Yahwe one thousand years later.

When we come to the history of "Yahwe's Wars," we read such an account as that of the destruction of the Amorites at Gibeon in the light of the victories of other gods "beyond the River." "And Yahwe discomfited them before Israel, and he slew them with a great slaugh-

ter at Gibeon, and chased them by the way of the ascent of Beth-horon, and smote them to Azekah. . . . And it came to pass as they fled from before Israel . . . that Yahwe cast down great stones from heaven upon them . . . and they died. They were more who died with the hailstones than they whom the children of Israel slew with the sword." Such a passage has no longer a unique claim upon our confidence. We must now place side by side with narratives like these others supplied from the Babylonian archives, for example, Ashur's response to Esarhaddon in the presence of his enemy the Gimirrai. "Thou thy mouth hast opened. I thy distress have heard. From the gate of heaven I will curse. Thou shalt stand within their fortress. Before thee I shall arise. To the mountains I shall chase them. Stones of destruction I shall rain down upon them. Thy foes I shall cut off, with their blood I shall fill the river." As Yahwe fought for Joshua and the kings of Israel, so Ashur fought for Esarhaddon and the kings of Assyria. When King Mesha of Moab saw that the Israelites were winning the day, the only strategy he knew was to sacrifice his son upon the walls of the city to his *offended* god, "and lo! the battle was stayed. There was great indignation against Israel and they departed from the king of Moab and returned unto their own land." Israel's god and Moab's god are seen in this story to be twin deities, bone of the same bone, and flesh of the same flesh, as the relationship of Moab and Israel might have led us to expect. It matters not that the sacrifice of children died out in Israel before it did among the people of Moab.

As we read the Hebrew scriptures in the light of the larger literature of the Semitic peoples, we find more and more justification for the significant attempt made years ago by Robertson Smith when he undertook to treat "The Religion of the Semites" as a whole. We see more reason for laying stress upon the human side which was emphasized by the Mutazilites in their theory of the origin of the Quran.

Let us look for a moment at Prophecy in the light of this new view we are learning from Semitics. Prophecy is more and more seen to be the outcome of the conflicts and milling of kingdoms. Political conditions, social conditions, moral sentiments, and patriotic impulses on the one hand, on the other hand the prevailing conception of Yahwe, who has not yet outgrown all the features of his early tribal origin. These were its inspiration and are the most evident facts in its explanation. It presents on its ethical side some of the very best that is in our Bible. Its authors often walk on moral heights far above their fellows, at times appear to soar in the serene sublimities of the spiritual world. But how clearly we see the play of situation and circumstance in the uttered message!

Look at Amos, the prophet of law. He learned a simple science of nature as he trod the plains by day and tented beneath the stars

by night. He saw the seasons come and go with regularity and with their constant phenomena. The thinking shepherd saw and learned. He grasped in some rude fashion the thought of nature's uniformities. Even in the lion's roar there was proclaimed the mighty law of cause and effect. That which he learned from the world of nature he carried up into his thought of Yahwe's moral government. Here, too, there was invariable antecedent and consequent, cause and effect; evil antecedents, evil consequences, evil causes, evil effects. It must be so. He thunders it forth before the calf-worshipping priest Amaziah, before Israel's king, that moral emasculate, Jeroboam, before the vampire nobles and their wine-soaked courtesans, before venal priests and sycophant prophets. "It must be so" runs through his stern denunciations. Doom dogs the heels of crime. Thus Amos became the prophet of law, the stern Puritan, bred, as so often, where the limpid waters run, on the hillside where the horizon is wide, on the open veldt, wherever the air blows free and pure.

Look again, this time at Hosea, who followed Amos, and see him swinging clear to the opposite pole and declaring the transcendent attribute of Yahwe to be Love. Why Love? Why? Because it was the feeling that welled up in his own heart. Won by the natural charms of beauty in woman he had taken to himself Gomer *bath* Diblaim. Alas, that beauty is not always the seamless cloak of nice virtue! Temptation came, and Gomer sinned, but the cry of Hosea's heart went up for her. The steel of anguish entered his soul, but the noble affection of his heart was not outraged. He loved her still, and out of this human experience in which the eternal passion emerged triumphant over the assaults of shame and crucifying pain, there came, eight hundred years before Jesus and John, the message to men that God is Love. God could not be less good than he.

Look again at Isaiah, patrician and priest of the temple. What is his distinctive message? What as priest could it be but holiness, with its antithetic correlates of sin and righteousness? It was most natural that the live coal which purged his unclean lips should be carried by cherub hands from the temple altar. Amos the herdsman found God and his call as he wrenched the leg of the lamb from the mouth of the lion. Note again, that Isaiah, of noble birth, a resident of Jerusalem, a sort of Judæan metropolitan as compared with the other prophets, proclaimed the inviolability of Zion. The spears of the enemy, the arms of Assyria, would break upon her walls. With all Isaiah's sincerity and moral uprightness, he lived too near the centre of evil to see it in all the hideousness lent by perspective. His aristocratic shield protected him from its worst assaults. He was not deaf to its cries, not blind to its miseries, far from it, but they did not touch home to the bone of him or his. How was it with his contemporary in the country village — Micah of Moresheth of Gath?

It was from places such as this that the foul fiends of Jerusalem plutocracy could be seen stripped of all the softening airs of gentility, that the bones of the peasant and husbandman, of the widow and orphan could be seen, ground, as in the fable, to make bread for the plutocrat giants of Jerusalem. What message had Micah for Jerusalem? He had the only message that was possible for one in his situation, a message flatly opposed to the assuring words of Isaiah.

"Zion is built with blood and Jerusalem with iniquity,
Therefore, Zion for your sake shall be plowed as a field,
And Jerusalem shall become heaps,
And the temple hill as the heights of a forest."

What have we here when we look at the very best, that which is instinct with life and moral righteousness? Everywhere we see the man as a mirror of the higher types of his kind; everywhere the play of natural forces, of common, or peculiar, historical and social conditions. If you turn to the less attractive features of prophecy, you will find them, for example, in the later parts of the book of Isaiah — baseless visions of future splendor, mammoth desires for worldly riches, Jerusalem to be the sacred coffer into which all the wealth of the heathen shall be poured, Gentiles crowding day and night with all their treasures to her open gates, the fat rams of Nebaioth smoking upon her altars, high over her towers and temple and lighting up the Holy City Yahwe shedding forth a divine effulgence, the Jews now gathered from the ends of the earth, in lieu of all their suffering and ignominy, shall feast on the fatness of the Gentiles, mumble the beads of the Jewish rosary, and, as for the rest, since there shall be no more need of work or business for them, sit like the anchorites of old in rapt and holy contemplation. How startlingly human all that is! Certainly if in the sublimer lines of Holy Writ we see distinctly the figure of the human impressed in brighter colors upon the page, we here see the darker shadow of the human heart in these ecstatic and baseless visions of impoverished and persecuted Jews. Now I say without fear of successful contradiction that the study of Semitics, even of the book itself, which we all love and revere, is leading gradually but surely to the bringing of it forth from the holy seclusion and isolation to which it has been so long consigned. It is working toward ridding this old literature from the evil of dehumanization, partial or complete, to which a devout but uninformed piety unfortunately subjected it.

I need not here refer to the work which has been accomplished in the last decades in the field of the Old Testament by Historical Criticism. The Pentateuchal books, instead of being the work of one author, Moses, who in the field of legislation was divinely inspired to horoscope the unborn centuries and write *ante factum* a complete code applicable to the minutest details of a future nation's needs,

are finally determined to contain different codes, of gradual growth, and of different ages. They now take their place among legal documents that have appeared in the progress of the world's history and as kindred productions. Formerly they were thought to stand as an exception to all that is definitely known in the history of legal development. In speaking of these codes one might adopt the language of the best legal historians with respect to English law. "The time," says Pollock and Maitland, "has long gone by when English lawyers were tempted to speak as though their scheme of 'forms of actions' had been invented in one piece by some all-wise legislator. It grew up little by little. The age of rapid growth is that which lies between 1154 and 1272. During that age the Chancery was doling out actions one by one, there is no solemn *actionem dabo* proclaimed to the world. . . . It was an empirical process, for the supply came in response to a demand. It was not dictated by an *abstract jurisprudence*. . . . It advanced along the old Roman road which leads from experiment to experiment." And that which was true of adjective law, of which he is here speaking, we are assured, was also true of the substantive law.

The study of Semitics is working in its own degree, and in harmony with other sciences, towards the result of disestablishing the old religious view which confined the revelations of God to a book and his inspiration to the men alone who wrote the book. If God be discoverable, the path of liberty, so long barred by theologic dogma, which has its roots in heathenism, is being cleared of obstructions that men may seek God where they will if, haply, they may find him.

We shall still read reverently that great soliloquy on the divine omnipresence and omniscience contained in Psalm 139:

O Yahwe, thou hast searched me, and known me.
 Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising,
 Thou understandest my thought afar off,
 Thou searchest out my path and my lying down,
 And art acquainted with all my ways.
 For there is not a word in my tongue,
 But, lo! O Yahwe, thou knowest it altogether.
 Thou hast beset me behind and before
 And laid thine hand upon me.
 Such knowledge is too wonderful for me;
 It is high, I cannot attain unto it.
 Whither shall I go from thy spirit?
 Or whither shall I flee from thy presence?
 If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there:
 If I make my bed in Sheol
 Behold! thou art there.
 If I take the wings of the morning,
 And dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea;
 Even there shall thy hand lead me,
 And thy right hand shall hold me.
 If I say, surely the darkness shall overwhelm me,
 And the light about me shall be night;
 Even the darkness hideth not from thee,
 But the night shineth as the day:
 The darkness and the light are both alike to thee.

But we shall also turn with similar appreciation and sense of satisfaction to the words of Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita:

I am the ancient sage without beginning;
 I am the ruler and the all-sustainer.
 I am incomprehensible in form,
 More subtle and minute than subtlest atoms.
 I am the cause of the whole universe,
 Through me it is created and dissolved.
 On me all things within it hang suspended
 Like pearls upon a string. I am the light
 In sun and moon, far, far beyond the darkness.
 I am the brilliancy in flame, the radiance
 In all that's radiant, the light of lights,
 The sound in ether, fragrance in the earth,
 The seed eternal of existing things,
 The life in all, the father, mother, husband,
 Forefather and sustainer of the world,
 Its priest and Lord. I am its way and refuge,
 Its habitation and receptacle,
 I am its witness. I am victory
 And energy; I watch the universe
 With eyes and face in all directions turned.
 I dwell as wisdom in the heart of all.
 I am the goodness of the good,
 I am beginning, middle, and eternal time,
 The birth, the death of all. I am the symbol A
 Among the characters. I have created all
 Out of one portion of myself. Even those
 Who are of low and unpretending birth
 May find the path to higher happiness.

Then be not sorrowful, from all thy sins
 I shall deliver thee. Think thou on me,
 Have faith in me, adore and worship me,
 And join thyself in meditation to me.
 Thus shalt thou come to me, O Arjuna!
 Thus shalt thou rise to my supreme abode
 Where neither sun, nor moon, have need to shine,
 For all the lustre they possess is mine.

The bearing of one branch of Semitic study upon the Bible and, therefore, of course, upon biblical religions, have been treated by Dr. Delitzsch in his recent work, *Babel und Bibel*. Others have written along the same lines, such as the Bible, and Monuments, etc. I have purposely refrained in this address from that individual method of treatment. The facts which were set forth in Dr. Delitzsch's address have been familiar to Assyriologists for many years, and it must have come as a surprise to most of them, as I confess it did to me, that such a theological furore should have been aroused by the publication of his lecture.

Before closing I wish to mention two other facts which are of the greatest importance in this connection and which must be borne in mind in considering any form of religion based upon the commonly accepted doctrine of our sacred books or any form of that doctrine. The first of these is that the idea of conscience was of late development even among the foremost peoples of ancient times. There is no word for conscience in any ancient literature until the time of Zeno,

cir. 320 years B.C.; and the ancient Semites had no word for it whatever. When, then, we find the prophets of the Old Testament ringing out in the face of royal murderers, venal judges, false prophets, a worldly priesthood, their stern and uncompromising denunciations, and threatening the nation's doom, and prefacing these prophecies with a "Thus saith Yahwe," we must ask ourselves in the face of this fact what this "thus saith Yahwe" means. Now many a Christian theologian has laid particular emphasis upon passages so prefaced, and claimed for them a special degree of revelation, but many of these phrases and ideas were formed in the days when men were prattling as children, nearer to savagery than civilization, when there was no science, no philosophy, no psychology, no pathology, when a man's brains were supposed to be in his heart and his tenderest emotions in his bowels, when a sterile octogenarian or a barren concubine could bring the generous stork to the home by chewing a mouthful of mandragoras root or bestowing the proper rites upon the *aban aladi*, or birthstone. It was an age when pain was the poison of demons, or the punishment of the gods, when an eclipse was an almighty frown.

The other fact to which I have alluded is that there was no thought of *Secondary Causation*. That is an idea that was introduced by the Greeks. With the Semites all that happened was the *direct result* of the divine interference. Even in Jesus' day he had to combat the idea when he asked the Jews whether they thought that they upon whom the tower of Siloam fell were more wicked than others. This is the theory upon which the pragmatically constructed Book of Judges rests. All the calamities which befell the tribes were the direct result of departure from Yahwe; every deliverance from foes the reward of return to him. This is the theory, too, which called forth that great religious protest from the author of the book of Job. Conscious of his own integrity, Job became the arch-heretic of his day, bade defiance to all the teaching of the schools, and, though he had no explanation for the mystery of pain, he, nevertheless, became a pioneer of truth, cleared the way for better thought of God, and wrote himself immortal. The pure in heart *see* God.

I have already said enough to indicate the way in which the study of Semitics is contributing to *clear the way* for a new and larger idea of deity and his relations to man and the universe. Biblical as well as Semitic study is beginning to see that the deity of the Bible is a Semitic deity and as such insufficient. And, as every religion must be measured by its thought of God, it is clear that the work that Semitics is performing in relation to religion is of fundamental importance. A circumscribed, or limited God, or a God whose nature is conceived of in terms of our own, cannot have a religion large enough for humanity, any more than a bad God can have a good religion.

TWO SEMITIC PROBLEMS

BY CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY

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THE Semitic questions now under discussion traverse the whole field of Semitological science; they comprise phonological, morphological, syntactical, lexicographical, rhetorical, and historical problems. With every generation, it is true, some advance is made — some questions are more or less definitely settled; for example, the signification of the two verb-forms, the Perfect and the Imperfect. But, as investigation becomes more and more minute, new questions come to the front, there is greater demand for exactness, and old conclusions have to be reviewed and old opinions modified. Out of this mass of problems we may select two for our present inquiry: one relating to the primitive seat of the Semites, and the other to the genesis of the Perfect and the Imperfect.

Primitive Seat of the Semites

The state of this question somewhat over twenty years ago I presented in an article read before the American Philological Association in 1881, and printed in vol. XII of the *Transactions* of the Association. I there considered the arguments which had been employed up to that time for the settlement of the question. These arguments were partly geographical, partly linguistic. In favor of Arabia as the primitive Semitic home it was urged that the central position of this country fits it to be a centre of distribution and that it has always been in historical times a point of emigration. To this it was replied that the geographical situation of Arabia by no means settles the question; for though it has been a centre of distribution in historical times before Islam and for a century or two after Islam, still this cannot prove the case for earlier times. The same thing holds of the Aramean region and of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, both of which have poured forth streams of emigrants — there is nothing in the geographical relations that could establish the

superiority of one of these regions as the centre of distribution in prehistoric times.

It has been urged, also, that the people whose language exhibits the earliest forms must have occupied the original seat of the race. This consideration has been adduced in favor of Arabia as the Semitic home, the Arabic language having preserved in general the earliest Semitic forms, but this consideration is by no means conclusive. The preservation or loss of early forms is a matter of wear and tear. A people occupying the original seat may have had such social relations as tended to degrade grammatical forms; and, on the other hand, a community wandering from the original home may have remained so secluded as to preserve to a great degree the earliest forms of its language. To this it may be added that no one of the Semitic languages has in all cases preserved the earliest grammatical forms; but the formal degradation has been produced by conditions which we are not able to fix with certainty. In any case it may be said that the loss of grammatical forms in the Babylonian-Assyrian could by no means of itself demonstrate that this language was not spoken in the original seat of the Semitic race.

The argument from vocabulary has been stoutly pressed. If, it is said, we can recover the vocabulary of the primitive language, its contents, and especially the names of natural objects, will indicate the region in which the language arose. This argument has been urged especially in behalf of Babylonia as the Semitic home. It is found that the Semitic dialects have the same words for certain objects, as the vine, sheep, goat, camel, gold, copper, winter, summer, heaven, river, canal, sea, and bitumen-brick, and this list appears to point to Babylonia. Yet this argument also is not conclusive. The Babylonian term for a movable object, as, for example, a metal, may be an importation, and so to some extent words for plants and domestic animals; animals might easily pass from one region to another, as, for example, the horse was imported into Egypt. Further, when two dialects agree in a word, one may have borrowed it from the other; or one, having borrowed it from a foreign source, may have transmitted it to others. Moreover, one may have changed its home once or oftener, and its vocabulary may have been affected by its various places of abode; all that can be said for any one region to which the vocabulary points is that it has in some regards affected the language, and such influence indicates a residence of the people there at some time. Further, so far as regards the words mentioned above as apparently pointing to Babylonia, some of them are names of objects (as domestic animals, winter, summer, heaven) which cannot be regarded as peculiar to any one place.

None of these arguments, then, can be regarded as conclusive, nor has additional evidence been adduced along these lines. Recently,

however, certain other considerations have been urged in favor of one or another region as the home of the primitive Semitic people.

One argument is based on what is assumed to be the relation between the civilizations of Egypt and Babylonia. It is affirmed that Egyptian civilization was borrowed from Babylonia, and it is thence inferred that this latter country, having developed so vigorous a culture at so early a time, must be the original Semitic centre. This inference is by no means valid: supposing that Babylonia was the first Semitic region to create a great civilization, it would not follow that it was the original seat of the Semites, since it is quite conceivable that the Babylonians might have migrated from their original home to the Tigris-Euphrates valley. It is, in fact, doubtful how far what we know as Babylonian civilization is of Semitic origin; the Babylonians seem certainly to have borrowed much from their non-Semitic predecessors. But, leaving this point aside, there is no proof that Egyptian civilization was borrowed from the Babylonian. The two have certain things in common, as indeed it is possible to find common elements in all the ancient civilizations. The political constitutions of the two countries show a certain similarity; but the similar features arise naturally out of the social conditions, and there is no reason why they should not have arisen independently in two different countries. It is possible to discover some resemblance in the architecture: the pyramids of Egypt have been compared with the Babylonian tower-temples. Both of these structures consist of a series of platforms built one over another. But similar structures are found in other parts of the world, as, for example, in Mexico and Polynesia. And the uses of the two were very different: in the one case we have a tomb, in the other a temple. Perhaps the most striking difference between the two civilizations is found in the religious development, and that in two respects. In the first place the Egyptians developed a system of departmental or specific gods, while the Babylonians never really reached such a point. The Babylonian deities are constructed after one design: any one of them may take the place of any other — that is to say, they represent simply the conception of superhuman power, and every local deity was sufficient for all the needs of his worshipers. Each in turn becomes universal and omnipotent. Now this is to some extent true of Egypt, as it is true of all ancient countries. But the Egyptian pantheon developed far more individualized divine characters, approaching in that respect the Greek. Then there is the curious Egyptian worship of living animals, to which nothing similar is found in Babylonia. In the second place the two peoples diverged widely in their representations of the future life. No two conceptions could be more unlike than the colorless existence in the Babylonian underworld and the vigorous moral element introduced by the Egyptians into the picture

of the future. Supposed resemblances between names of deities in the two countries amount to nothing. At a comparatively late period Egypt borrowed certain Semitic deities, whether from Babylonia or from some other point is not certain. But this has no bearing on the prehistoric situation. If Egypt borrowed its civilization from Babylonia, the traces of the borrowing are no longer visible. One might with equal plausibility say that the borrowing was in the reverse direction; but for this, also, there is no good ground. There is nothing to prevent our supposing that Egypt and Babylonia were two independent centres of culture, their civilizations necessarily showing certain resemblances, but on the other hand presenting evident marks of independent origination.

In still another way the solution of our problem has been sought, namely, in the relations between the Semitic and the Hamitic races. The grammatical resemblances between the Semitic and the Hamitic languages are of such sort as to force us to the conclusion that the two are intimately related to each other. The pronouns and the numerals are almost identical in the two, and the structure of the verb is substantially the same. It is in the highest degree probable that the two families go back to the same ancestor, and that there was a time when the two peoples, the Hamitic and the Semitic, formed one community. This time belongs to a very remote past, since after the separation of the two the Semitic languages developed their peculiar triliteral stems. If the abode of the primitive Hamito-Semitic people could be determined, this might throw light on the starting-point of the Semites. Hypotheses as to this original abode have ranged over the whole of northern Africa and southwestern Asia, and the absence of historical data makes it difficult to reach a definite conclusion.

It has been supposed that a definite point of view might be gained from the hypothesis of a Mediterranean race. In a remote antiquity, it has been surmised, at a time when Europe and Africa were nearer together than now, a race of people dwelt on both sides of the Mediterranean whose descendants are seen in certain communities of southern Europe and over a large part of northern Africa. It is held that certain bodily features point to an original unity of these communities — the color and form of the hair, the shape of the head, and certain facial marks. If such a Mediterranean people existed, including both Semites and Hamites, then there would be a strong presumption that the original seat of the Hamito-Semitic race was in northern Africa, and it would be from this point that we should have to trace the Semites. But the hypothesis of a Mediterranean race has no clearly demonstrable basis. That certain corporal similarities may be discovered between peoples in Spain and Italy on the one hand and peoples in Africa and Arabia on the other hand may be true. But

such resemblances do not afford a trustworthy foundation for a theory of ethnical unity. The period of the supposed Mediterranean race must have been very remote, and in the lapse of thousands of years it is impossible for us to say what original resemblances and differences may have been effaced, and what new resemblances and differences may have arisen. It is well known that climatic and social conditions tend to affect bodily forms. The period in question was doubtless one of migrations and mixtures, of which, however, there is no historical record. The interval between that remote period and the beginnings of history is a blank. It is not possible, therefore, to rest any trustworthy conclusion on a supposition such as is described above.

Putting the Mesopotamian theory aside, we have to ask whether there is anything in the geographical and social conditions pointing to one place or another as the probable home of the Hamito-Semitic people. In historical times we find the Semites mostly in western Asia, and the Hamites extending over a large space in northern and northeastern Africa. The Semitic peoples form a compact mass — their languages are very nearly allied among themselves; and this suggests an original Semitic unity at a comparatively late period. The Hamites, on the other hand, present a greater variety — their languages differ among themselves in grammar and vocabulary to a much greater extent than is true of the Semitic tongues, and they are spread over a very large territory. Hence it might be inferred that Africa was the original seat of the combined people, since it would be more natural that the larger part, remaining in the primitive abode, should spread over a large space, while the seceding part, smaller and compacter, would occupy a smaller territory. If the body which later became the Semitic race withdrew from the parent body, then the tribes that were left, constituting the majority, might scatter over the whole of northern Africa, while the less numerous body, the germ of the Semites, might withdraw to Arabia or elsewhere. This is a not improbable supposition. But on the other hand it is also not improbable that if the original seat of the Hamito-Semites was in Arabia, a portion should have crossed over into Africa, and there, under conditions which are not known, should gradually have spread over a wide territory, this wide dissemination itself giving rise to a greater diversity of dialects. The transit to Africa might have been made by way of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, or by the Isthmus of Suez. In either case a diffusion over the territory later occupied by the Hamites would be, as far as we know, natural and easy. In the absence of all historical data, there is nothing in the climatic conditions to point to a decision of the question.

We may distinguish between the original abode of the Semites and their centre of distribution. It is possible, as is pointed out above,

that they separated from the original mass and settled in some place in Africa before crossing into Asia — there is nothing to make this inconceivable. But because of the pronounced unity of Semitic peoples, it is more probable that they would have come over into Asia before breaking up into different nationalities. The question as to their first resting-place is referred to above. The arguments commonly adduced in favor of one region or another cannot be regarded as conclusive. There is little in favor of Armenia as the cradle of the Semitic race. The argument for it is that it lies in that central Asiatic region whence so many streams of population have poured forth; but, as we have seen, Arabia and Babylonia also have been centres of dispersion. Recent writers are disposed to decide in favor either of Babylonia or Arabia, the majority preferring the latter region. There is much to say for this, especially if Arabia be understood to include the whole desert region up to the Euphrates and westward to the Aramean lands. More than this can hardly be said. In view of the remoteness of the events involved, the absence of historical monuments, and our ignorance of the social conditions of that early time, it cannot be surprising that we should find ourselves forced to leave the question unsolved. Succeeding discoveries may open the way for a more definite opinion, but at present the data are insufficient to permit a positive assertion or denial in the case of any one of the regions under consideration.

The Perfect and the Imperfect

The basis of the Perfect, it is now commonly held, is a noun — whether an abstract or a concrete noun it is not important in our present inquiry to decide. In the third person this noun is inflected in accordance with Semitic rules. The second and first persons are formed by the attachment of pronouns expressing the subject or agent of the action.

In like manner the basis of the Imperfect is a noun, inflected in the third person according to nominal rules. This noun is not the simple stem, but is made by a prefix. The second and first persons, also, are formed by prefixes. The second person has the ordinary dual and plural endings, and in the singular what seems to be a feminine ending. The prefixes of the second and first persons appear to be pronouns, and the same may be the case with the prefix of the third person. Thus the formal difference between the Perfect and the Imperfect is that in the former the grammatical subject is appended to the stem, while in the latter it is prefixed.

The important part played in Semitic morphology by prefixes is generally recognized. While mere relational modifications are expressed by affixes (as in the case of the feminine, the plural, and relative

adjectives), the substantive modifications are expressed by prefixes (as *ma* and *ta* in nouns). Of the precise history of the development of triliteral stems we know very little. It may be said to be probable that these have arisen from biliterals: biliteral stems exist in Semitic, and certain triliterals have obviously been formed from biliterals (as where the second radical is doubled or a *w* or *y* is inserted). If this be the case, the expansion has not stopped at triliterals. Quadriliteral simple stems have been formed, and a large number of derived stems, which express merely a modification of the meaning of the simple stem. It is by means of prefixes that the Semitic languages have chosen to express the idea of reflex and causative action, the former by *na* and *ta*, the latter by *a* (*ha*) and *sa*. These prefixes are variously combined together and variously attached to the stem. Thus with *na* from *katala* we have *inkatala* (for *nakatala*), and *niktal* (for *naktal*). The mode of combination is merely a matter of euphony. The essential thing is that the signification of the simple stem is modified in a substantive way by means of a prefix. This modification attaches no new content to the signification of the stem, but only indicates a certain direction of the action.

When now we find the Imperfect made from the simple stem by a prefix, the question arises whether it belongs in the same category with the derived stems above referred to. If we compare these derived stems with the Imperfect, we discover an analogy in the two cases, though with a difference. *Niktal* differs from *katal* merely in that it indicates that the act is directed by the subject toward himself; *aktala* in like manner differs from *katala* only in that it states that the action is not performed, but is caused to be performed, by the subject. So *yaktulu* differs from *katala* in affirming not simply that the subject performs the act, but that he moves toward the performance of the act. How such distinctions may inhere in these prefixes it is not necessary to inquire; we do not know their origin or the history of their development. It is sufficient that they have these significations. Thus the Imperfect is naturally based on the Perfect, or rather on the stem which is the base of the Perfect. Both in form and in meaning it comes after the Perfect. It is a peculiar Semitic formation, ignoring the element of time, and choosing only to distinguish between the conception of an act pure and simple (Perfect) and an act toward which the subject moves. This grammatical conception has its advantages and its disadvantages logically and rhetorically. But it falls in with the Semitic system of expressing certain modifications by means of prefixes. The Imperfect may attach itself to any stem, simple or derived, triliteral or quadriliteral. Originally, it would seem, the Imperfect of the simple stem assumed two forms: which, if we leave out the later vowel distinctions, may be written *yakatala* and *yaktala*. Of

these the former was dropped by all Semitic dialects except Assyrian and Ethiopic, and in these two were differentiated in function. Further, there grew up a differentiation by means of vowels: *yaktul* and *yaktal*; and the prefix was written sometimes *yu* instead of *ya* (*yi*). These were originally simple phonetic differences, later functionally differentiated. In the derived stems the Imperfect prefix follows the same phonetic laws as the stem prefix. Thus from *inkatala* (for *nakatala*) we have *yankatilu* (for *yanakatilu*), from *istaktala* (for *satakatala*), we have *yastaktilu* (for *yasatakatala*).

The Assyrian Permansive presents a curious degraded aspect. It resembles the ordinary Semitic Perfect in form, being made by the addition of a pronoun to the simple stem. On the other hand it has a prevailing passive signification, and is of rare occurrence. Two explanations of this state of things are possible: it may be supposed that the Permansive is an embryonic Perfect, exhibiting the attempt to create a form by the addition of a pronoun to the stem, an attempt never completely carried out; or we may suppose that the Permansive was a true Perfect which has fallen into relative desuetude. The widespread use of the Perfect in the other Semitic dialects, taken together with the linguistic unity of the Semitic peoples, is a consideration that tells against the supposition that the Permansive is an abortive Perfect; it would be strange if this form, developed everywhere else in the Semitic area, had simply failed to come to completion in Babylonia and Assyria. On the other hand, the infrequency of its use in Assyrian may be accounted for by the fact that the Imperfect was developed in a peculiar way. The function of the Perfect is to express the act pure and simple. This simple act the Assyrian expresses by means of one of the Imperfect forms. How it was led to this we do not know; but supposing that this usage grew up, then it is conceivable that the Perfect should gradually have fallen out, being retained only to express certain peculiar conceptions. There are examples elsewhere of similar depression of grammatical forms.

In this discussion no attempt has been made to discover the origin of the Imperfect preformatives *ya*, *ta*, *a*, *na*; it is only in regard to their function as prefixes that they are examined. The view stated above is not antagonistic to, is rather intended to be explanatory of, the theory that the *yaktulu* of the Imperfect is originally a noun, meaning "he who kills"; what is suggested is that this noun means properly "he who moves toward the act of killing," and that the Imperfect bears to the Perfect a relation similar to that borne by the derived stems to the simple stem.

SHORT PAPER

PROFESSOR DUNCAN B. MACDONALD, of Hartford Theological Seminary, presented a paper to this Section on "The Poetry of Arabia and the Ballad Problem." The speaker said in brief that the bearing of the poetry of Arabia on the ballad problem has never received adequate, or possibly any, recognition. The Arabists are few, indeed, who have passed beyond the philological and historical stages to an æsthetic appreciation of the material of their labors. To most languages a very few months' work will give an entrance, and the entrance once forced, the garden of poetry lies open, but Arabic yields herself with no such lightness. Days and nights must be spent on a grammar of bewildering subtilty, a vocabulary of utter strangeness and overwhelming abundance, and a range of ideas which conceal their common humanity behind veils of novel circumstance.

The speaker dwelt upon the confusion which lay in the name Arabian, and on the probability that the greater part of Arabic literature had been written by men in whose veins was scarcely any drop of Arabian blood. The medieval monk in Ireland who wrote in Latin was hardly less a Roman than some others of Central Asia, North Africa, or Spain, who wrote as Arabs. After the raid of Muhammad and his successors came the Muslim Empire, in which after a century or two the Arabs had little or no part. The official language of the Empire remained a kind of Arabic, thanks to the Koran and the whole system of Islam, with its commonly and erroneously called Arabian literature, philosophy, science, etc., coming from a multitude of nationalities and sects, which made up Islam. Little attention has been paid to Arabia in the true sense, and the literary ideals, forms, and methods of the Arabian peninsula and race. To Arabia itself and to the Arab people in its own home must the folk-lorist and student of literature turn, when he would seek the true Arabian poetry.

Of the beginnings of Arabian poetry we know nothing; they must lie with the beginnings of the Arab race. The curtain rises with the appearance of Muhammad, and from that point we can trace backward some hundred and fifty years. The Arabs show themselves producing a poetry that is singularly popular in origin and idea, highly developed and polished, and wonderfully rich. Grimm's ballad formula, "Das Volk dichtet," holds most exactly of them, but in a different sense. There is no anonymity, but there is a broad generality of authorship. Of great poets the number was undoubtedly small, but the poetic gift was widely spread. Our best commentaries on the old poems are the records of present-day wanderings. Further we have in it the strange phenomenon of a literature as perfectly popular in origin and use as our ballads, which yet obeys rigid norms of meter, rhyme, and form; clothes itself in language of fixed usage, of breadth and richness; and has crystallized into narrow conventions of structure. It is true that it is not *literature* in the precise sense. These verses were chanted and sung, stored in the memory, and passed from lips to ears. Not till after the time of Muhammad, when the need of interpreting the Koran and fixing the structure of classical Arabic had arisen, were they finally reduced to written form.

In the course of the last century the desert was opened again to Europe by stray adventurers. In the fifties, Wallin brought back from his epoch-making journey some poems which were published in the *Zeitschrift* of the German Oriental Society (vols. v, vi). Later, Wetzstein, German Consul at Damascus, made collections and lectured on contemporary Arabian poetry at the University of Berlin in the winter of 1867-68 and thereafter. Count Landberg also made very extensive collections, which, like those of Wetzstein, are still unpublished. But our most

precise and widest information is undoubtedly due to the late Professor Socin in his posthumous *Diwan aus Centralarabien*. Through this precious volume it becomes abundantly clear that the poetry of Arabia of to-day is the same in all essentials as the poetry of Arabia before Muhammad. From the sixth to the twentieth century, the same stream has flowed, unchanging. The meters, the forms, the ideas, the types, are all the same.

But most significant of all in its bearing on the ballad problem is one outstanding characteristic. The Arabian poet, like the Semite in general, knows nothing but a strictly subjective art. He can sing only of his emotions; all has to pass through the alembic of his feeling and be reproduced as it affected him. He can tell no objective story, as one without, seeing and relating what he sees; he must be in the action, and what he tells us of it is what has come to himself. Thus a description of warriors in battle array is wrought for us out of his own pride or fear at the spectacle. The surge and swing of a charge is pictured to us through what he said to his soul when the shouting line rushed on. Nature, too, we know only because the stars shone brightly on his desert path or mocked in their slow march his sleepless eyes, or because the little spots of verdure and flashing pools after rain were a joy to him and gave him thoughts such and such.

A ballad, then, in our sense was impossible to him. He was not a "maker," a ποιητής, but a "feeler," a "knower," — so *sha'ir*, the Arabic word for poet, means. The event was little; the man who saw it, understood it, told what came to him from it, was all. And so these Arabian songs were never anonymous. If the name of the author by chance has been lost to tradition, there stands at the head some formula, "There said a man of Taghlib," or "There said one unnamed." Some one must have said it, for it tells the emotion of some one. Western ballads tell events, who tells them is of no moment. The ballad stands as a record which might have been made equally well by any one who saw the fact. And therefore the identity of the teller bears no stress. After he has sung his song, another may take it and sing it with equal æsthetic right. The name of that first singer, maker of it as he was, is lost, and the song is the inheritance of the people. But for the Arab ode, that was, and is, flatly impossible. And it cannot but raise the final question whether it is not rather in the objectivity of our Western ballads than in their popular use or any hypothetical communal origin that we are to find the clue to their anonymity.

SECTION C — INDO-IRANIAN LANGUAGES

SECTION C—INDO-IRANIAN LANGUAGES

(Hall 8, September 22, 10 a. m.)

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR SYLVAIN LÉVI, Collège de France, Paris.
PROFESSOR ARTHUR A. MACDONELL, University of Oxford.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF SANSKRIT STUDIES IN THE COURSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY SYLVAIN LÉVI

(Translated from the French by Mabel Bode, Ph.D.)

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AMONG the languages of the Indo-Iranian group Sanskrit takes indisputably the highest place. I shall not make any attempt here to justify this honor which Sanskrit owes to the length of its existence, the wealth of its vocabulary, the vastness of its literature, and to its rôle in history. It would be an easy task, and one flattering to the heart of an Indianist, to take each of these points in turn and treat each in detail. But I have put before myself another aim, more in keeping with the general spirit of our meeting; I would like to show, in dealing with Sanskrit, that a common impulse animates all the efforts of human thought; the more those studies which I represent seem far-away, indifferent, foreign alike to the passions and the interests of real life, the better they will serve to support the thesis I advance, if it be clearly shown that, in the course of their transformations, they reflect the great ideas which lead humanity toward its unknown goal.

The history of Sanskrit studies goes hardly a century back; they came into being with the Independence of the United States and with the French Revolution. In 1785 Charles Wilkins published in London a translation of the Bhagavad Gîtâ, prepared in India with the assistance of native scholars; four years later William Jones laid before Western readers a translation of Çakuntalâ. Before these

initiators, of glorious renown, Europe had already heard of the Sanskrit language. Europeans settled in India had studied it, mastered it, and even used it, but their knowledge had borne no fruit. They were missionaries dedicated to the triumph of the Church, seeking in Sanskrit an instrument of controversy or the spread of doctrine. Certainly patience, energy, learning, and dignity of life were theirs, but they lacked the active sympathy necessary for success, the sympathy which animates research and makes it fruitful. Moreover, they had not only the Brahmans to contend with; outside India they were closely watched by adversaries who forced them to be prudent and paralyzed them. Voltaire and his school witnessed with triumph and joy the fall of the sacred barriers of ancient history at the end of the seventeenth century. Bossuet analyzed the secret designs of Providence and pointed out their workings without going beyond the world known to the Fathers of the Church; the Church was the central point of humanity. And, behold, other peoples, other civilizations, and other literatures, unknown to the Scriptures, had come to light, and were laying claim to such antiquity as to eclipse the ancient Jewish tradition. The Brahmans were not sparing with millions or myriads of years in their chronology. The Encyclopædia only asked to believe them; the Church only thought how to contradict them; there was no one capable of discussing them.

But the mind of humanity was ripening; exact criticism was to supplant idle controversy; facts were about to take the place of the artifices of disputation. England, mistress of India by the fortune of arms, opened up the Hindu genius to the world and the world to the Hindu genius. France, vanquished on the field of battle, at least competed with honor in the conquest of Asia's past. We know the admirable history of Anquetil Duperron who went out as a volunteer to wring from the distrustful *dasturs*¹ the sacred books of Zoroaster, which he eventually brought back to France. The Bhagavad Gītā of Wilkins, the Çakuntalā of Jones excited the imagination of literary Europe; Goethe's celebrated stanza rings in every one's memory. The moment was auspicious; the classical tradition was worn out, since the masterpieces of the seventeenth century; reason, proud of her victory over imagination, too long a hindrance to her progress, had nothing to offer in exchange but an insipid sentimentalism. Men's minds impatiently desired violent emotions, dazzling pictures, new landscapes, glaring lights; the senses demanded satisfaction in their turn. The Persian and Arabian poets found translators and imitators. The Egyptian campaign made the East popular. Bonaparte at the Pyramids conjured up a past of forty centuries before his wondering soldiers. But Sanskrit, only lately won from the Brah-

¹ The learned among the Parsi priests; literally, the chief priest of a Temple of Fire.

mans, still remained the privilege of the English of India; Europe possessed neither books, grammars, nor dictionaries. However, the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris possessed a collection of Sanskrit manuscripts and some clumsy rudiments of grammar due to the missionaries. Fascinated, like so many others, by reading Çakuntalâ, Chézy determined to go back, at any cost, to the original. A worthy rival of the first humanists of the Renaissance, he set to work alone to acquire a knowledge of Sanskrit. Chézy was the son of a distinguished engineer, and destined originally for his father's profession. It was not long before he deserted the too stern science of mathematics for the kindly companionship of the Eastern muses. In him an extreme sensibility was united with firmness and method; a fortunate facility made the study of languages mere sport to him. He became the pupil of Sacy and Langlès, and was a master of his subject at twenty years of age. He had been appointed to take part in the labors of the Egyptian mission, but was stopped at Toulon by illness. He returned to Paris to seek consolation in the Library among the Oriental manuscripts. The story of his gropings and success has the poignant interest of a drama in which science is at stake; it was not even without a tragic catastrophe by which he lost the sweet and precious peace of home life. He was forced to sacrifice his conjugal happiness to the jealous demands of research, but his obstinate enthusiasm did not falter; twenty-five years later, arrived at the goal of his efforts, but overwhelmed with sorrows and filled with bitterness, he crowned the six hundred and fifty pages of the quarto volume, in which he had at last published the text of Çakuntalâ, with this verse of Walter Scott, where he breathes out his very soul:

"That I o'erlive such woes, Enchantress, is thine own!"

I have not been able to resist giving in detail the first steps of this heroic pioneer, to whom I may be allowed to offer homage here, as a Frenchman, as a forerunner, and my own predecessor. It is Chézy's chair which I now occupy at the Collège de France. "On the 29th of November in the year of grace 1814 and the twentieth of the reign," an ordinance of Louis XVIII, signed "at his royal château of the Tuileries," created at the same time two new chairs in the Collège de France; one, to which Antoine Léonard de Chézy was appointed, was for the teaching of the Sanskrit language and literature; the other, for the Chinese language and literature, was first occupied by Abel Rémusat. Silvestre de Sacy, the recognized head of French Orientalism, pompously thanked "Louis-le-Désiré," "through whom letters flourished under the ægis of peace, in the shade of Minerva's olive-tree." A less fervent royalist might have enjoyed recording that the *ancien régime* was no sooner restored but it found itself compelled to give its countenance, at the outset, to the conquests

of the modern spirit in that very asylum which Francis I had thrown open to independent research, opposite the University devoted to tradition. In 1530 Greek and Hebrew were sanctioned by the royal will; it was the overthrow of the principle of authority represented by the Latin of scholasticism. In 1814 Sanskrit and Chinese, admitted on equal terms with classical studies, foretold a wider humanity.

Chézy had not foreseen the far-reaching results of his work, any more than Sacy or Louis XVIII. He was an Orientalist steeped in classic rhetoric, and he sacrificed to elderly Muses and superannuated Graces. His opening lecture seems addressed to the retired magistrates who translated Horace into French verse. "Do not believe, gentlemen, that this literature has treasures only for science and stern reason. No; lively imagination also has a large part, and among no people in the world has brilliant poesy displayed itself in more magnificent outward garb, or been accompanied by a retinue more lovely and more captivating. From the haughty Epic to the timid Idyll the most varied productions of taste will present themselves in crowds to your enchanted gaze and arouse in you by turns every kind of emotion of which the soul is susceptible." And to prove "the fecundity of the Indian Muses" he enumerated all these kinds "treated with equal success by the Bards of the Ganges."

But more vigorous minds were already preparing to resume the work and render it fruitful. It was the period in which the author of *Indian Wisdom*, Schlegel, summed up the programme of Sanskritists in three stages, Paris, London, India. Since 1812 Bopp had settled in Paris, and, without allowing the din of near battles to distract him, patiently collected the materials which his genius was to bring into order. Others before him, since the sixteenth century, had observed the evident relationship of the Sanskrit vocabulary with the classical languages. No European could hear the Sanskrit names of relationship, *pitar*, *mātar*, *bhrātar*, the names of numbers, *dvi*, *tri*, etc., the verb "to be" (French *être*, Sanskrit, *asti*), but there awoke in him a far-off echo of his mother tongue or of ancient languages.

Comparison, discussion, and speculation had gone on without rule or measure; Bopp created the science of comparative grammar, classed facts, and recognized laws. Under the varieties of language prevailing in Europe, Iran, and India he pointed out a common stock and succeeded in explaining most of the deviations from it, going back by way of induction to the primitive type. Then appeared a word which soon became current, a compound no less unexpected than expressive, a symbol which summed up the revolution that had been accomplished. India and Europe, which everything seemed to separate till that time, came together and were henceforth fused into one in the accepted expression "Indo-European." The Brah-

mans, so long mysterious, the obscure peasants of Bengal, the Punjab, Gujerat, had received their heritage from the same linguistic fund as a Homer or a Virgil; the groups which had been unknown, despised, hated, — the German, Slav, and Neo-Latin, — grouped themselves into a new family of languages. Soon new discoveries filled the gaps and attached to the chain those links which were missing. The deciphering of cuneiform inscriptions brought to light the Persian of the Achæmenidæ; Zoroaster spoke in the Avesta, which was even explained in the original, and these ancient documents of Iran connected the shores of the Indus with the valleys of the Caucasus. Never had a Plato, a Descartes, a Leibnitz, in their vastest dreams conceived so large a family within the human species. The learned were dazzled; even their heads were turned, this time. Then arose a strange and at first puerile sentiment, which proved disastrous later, when it spread to the common people; comparative grammar gave birth to Indo-European chauvinism. The Revolution, borne to the far ends of Europe by Napoleon's wars, had awakened the national conscience in one people after another. Allies or adversaries of France, those who had been subjects the day before, awoke suddenly to find themselves citizens; divine right was forgotten; the state ceased to be incarnated in the monarch, and was incorporated in the entire nation. Neither certain of their doctrines, nor of their own inmost essence, but upheld nevertheless by the will to live, the nations grouped themselves with restless fervor around their languages, their institutions, their traditions, which constituted their collective titles of nobility. The national spirit was formed, as in the cities of ancient times, in the struggle with barbarians. When scholars afterwards proceeded to call attention to the linguistic relationships which antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance had neglected or disdained, national pride was willing to lay claim to the kindred groups. Led away by the bewildering charm of a grand discovery, savants, and after them the public, took kinship of language to be a sure indication of common origin. The peoples scattered over the immense area of Indo-European languages saw themselves, in spite of the natural sciences, and on the evidence of their language, grouped into one single race which received the name of Indo-European or Aryan race. The civilized world which was still within the limits drawn by the prejudices current in Europe and the nearer half of Asia, appeared thenceforward as the patrimony and the battle-field of two races eternally hostile, the Aryan and the Semitic races, both pushing forward to conquer the earth.

The fierce struggle between the Encyclopedia and the Church was bearing fruit. In his eagerness to bring contempt on the Bible Voltaire had already been imprudent enough to accept as genuine testimony from ancient India a pretended Veda, the *Ezour Vedam*,

which a nobleman had brought from India and presented to him as a book "translated from the Sanscretan by the high-priest or arch-brahman of the pagoda of Chiringham, an aged man respected for his incorruptible virtue." In reality the original "Sanscretan" had never existed, and the arch-brahman was a Jesuit missionary. The author of the clever imitation had hoped to lead the Hindus to the Christian religion by this pious fraud; if he did not succeed in that, he at least succeeded in duping Voltaire, and might rest satisfied. But now the Sanskrit language, studied and taught in Europe, gave access to the real Veda. The Brahmans persisted as long as they could in defending this coveted treasure from the enterprise of profane men of science; their delays and refusals only served to pique curiosity and inflame imagination all the more. According to them the Veda had no date, it went back beyond all time, back to a past impossible to calculate. They easily imposed their conviction on the earliest interpreters. At last the Aryan race had its Bible; an Aryan Bible. But the Veda was not accommodating; written in an archaic tongue which differed from classical Sanskrit even more than Homer from Plato, bestrewn with puzzling forms and disused words, it seemed to defy the sagacity of philologists. The only help afforded by India was a commentary too late to be authoritative. On these ancient texts was expended a wealth of science, of shrewdness, of patience, and almost of genius. But a foregone conclusion, an unconscious *parti pris*, directed and influenced these efforts. There was a desire to give the Aryans of Europe worthy ancestors. The German scholars who occupied the first rank in philology had naturally substituted for the title Aryan or Indo-European a word which flattered national *amour propre*; they spoke of the Indo-Germanic language, of the Indo-Germanic race. Thenceforward the Vedas were the complement of the Niebelungen. The origins of religion took their place beside the origins of the epic. It was pleasant to picture the singers of the ancient hymns as grave and noble patriarchs, thoughtful, devout, austere, patriarchs formed on the romantic model; their candid soul, filled with enthusiasm for the grand spectacles of nature, poured itself forth in lyric effusions. Lost in the radiance of the Veda, Indianism forfeited its independence and placed itself like a faithful Achates at the side of comparative grammar. The infatuation of the first days had died out some time before. The public, satiated with the East by the Romantic School, found no further charm in it; the successors of Wilkins and Jones pursued their laborious task without exciting attention. But Sanskrit still remained, by well-established right, the corner-stone of linguistic studies; perpetuated without alteration for tens of centuries, it surpassed in purity all the languages of the family. Moreover, the Hindu grammarians had been the real creators of comparative grammar; it was in their school

that Bopp and his successors had learned the art of rigorous analysis of words, the art of classing their elements, explaining their formation, and tracing their derivation through the vocabulary. The Hindus, who have but little taste for observation of external phenomena, who are but mediocre pupils of their neighbors in the domain of the natural sciences, have given the closest study to the data of the inner life; their psychology has penetrated to the unconscious and prepared the way for modern investigation; their grammar, several centuries before the Christian era, established the study of sounds with almost faultless precision. The glorious name of Panini, even to the present day, hovers over Indo-European linguistic science.

Although sheltered under the ægis of comparative grammar, the study of the Veda was nevertheless tending toward a revolution. Linked together from this time forth, the Semitic Bible and the Aryan Bible were doomed to the same fate. Criticism, gradually emancipated from the tradition of ages, had first tried its hand on Homer, and, in spite of the anxious protests of defenders of the past, it had dared to direct a front attack against accumulated prejudices. Emboldened by success, it seized on the Scriptures, braved the scandal, and subjected them to severe examination.

There was no choice but to submit and recognize in the sacred books a late compilation, sacerdotal in its origin and inspiration. The shock of the attack reached the Veda. May a disciple of Abel Bergaigne be allowed, upon this high occasion, to recall the name of the master loved with a filial affection and everlastingly regretted, who was the author of this revolution? The liturgy, when more thoroughly studied and better known, threw a pitiless light on the ancient hymns; those songs in which, as was at first believed, we could almost hear the whimper of humanity in its cradle, betrayed a soulless religion reduced to mere forms, a subtilized religion which confounded the priest with the magician, a priestly poetry which subsisted on old patches and worked to order. The trench which had been ingeniously dug between the Veda and Sanskrit literature narrowed and tended gradually to be filled up. The Veda once Aryan became Hindu. Indianism lost its connection with Indo-Germanic studies; it retired within itself, forming a mighty, organic unity. The Veda lost nothing by this; it continued, by reason of its age and influence, to dominate the development of India. Thus transformed, the study of the Veda renewed its youth and entered on a new era. Among the four great collections (*Samhitâ*) which are the foundation of Vedic literature, the Rig-Veda collection had long kept possession of the favor and attention of scholars; it was the Veda *par excellence*. This collection, methodically arranged, presented to the view of those prepossessed in its favor an *ensemble* as noble and correct as could be wished; it was possible to extract passages

of lofty reach, picturesque or pathetic or grandiose pieces such as the Aryan Bible demanded. Two other collections, the Sâma and the Yajur-Veda, betrayed their liturgic origin too crudely to take rank with the Rig-Veda. The fourth collection, the Atharva-Veda, had nothing edifying about it; the Brahmins themselves had recognized this more than once. It was a strange combination of charms, spells, speculations, and domestic ritual, in which medicine, sorcery, debauchery, political intrigue, and daily life, with its trifling incidents, jostled each other. It was embarrassing for the ideal of Aryan nobility; it was kept at a distance, or at least in the background, like a suspected personage, like a bastard. However, the world was changing; literary nobility and nobility of birth were sinking together; *la grande populace et la sainte canaille* were claiming their turn. History no longer confined herself to a list of exploits connected with illustrious names. Watching the stir in the street, she had guessed at the obscure supernumeraries taking their part in the human drama; she strove to catch a glimpse of them in the shadows of the past. Folk-lore came into existence, and the Atharva supplanted the Rig-Veda, fallen into discredit. Triumphant democracy made its victory apparent in Vedic studies.

If limited to the study of the Vedas and the orthodox classics, Sanskrit philology was in no danger of exhausting its material too quickly; the enormous mass of works accumulated in the course of twenty centuries by unwearying generations of writers gave promise of a long time to be spent in exploiting them. A great number of these works found favor with literary men by the beauty of their form, with thinkers by the loftiness of their ideas or the boldness of their speculations. But history, for which so much had been expected from the discovery and study of these works, was destined to be disappointed. Blinded by puerile vanity, the Brahmins had detached India from the world; they had been wonderfully seconded by nature, which seemed to have isolated the peninsula amid the walls of the Himalayas, the formidable deserts of the Indus, and the yet more formidable expanse of the sea. They delighted in representing "Hindu wisdom" as a fruit sprung spontaneously from the soil, a miraculous production due to their power alone. Their fascinating spell, which still sways so many candid minds, had already had its effect upon the ancients. Did not Pythagoras, among others, pass for a disciple of the Brahmins? With a consistency so strict that it seems to imply a conscious determination, they had put away inconvenient memories, and if, by chance, tradition forced a real name upon them, they shrouded it in the mists of a false antiquity. If we had to trust to their fantastic chronology, a glorious contemporary of Alexander, Candragupta the Maurya (the Sandrakoptos of the Greeks), would be placed seventeen centuries before the Christian

Era! Of Alexander himself and his expedition they naturally remembered nothing. Up to the time of the Mussulman invasion, too positive and too near to be by any possibility denied, they pictured India happy and blissful, enjoying the willing or compelled respect of all the barbarians of the earth. The positive and exact testimony of the Greeks and Latins exposed the fraud of the Brahmins; Hellenism, it was well known, had penetrated victoriously into the "Holy Land." But it was not enough to bring to light the interested falsehoods of the priestly caste; science undertook the colossal task of restoring to India her lost history. Scattered over the vast expanse of the country, steles, pillars, and rocks could still be met with, on which were traced inscriptions in enigmatic characters, mute witnesses of vanished epochs. The patience of investigators — a patience of genius — succeeded in breaking through their long silence. After a century of work the political history of the Hindu world begins to appear to us; still broken up by enormous gaps, confused, uncertain, calling for cautious judgment. It is still easy to mention dynasties which waver, according to the differing hypotheses, within a space of three centuries, the length of time which separates Alexander from Augustus, the discovery of America from the Independence of the United States. But, taken as a whole, the picture is already clear. Political India shows a resemblance to religious India in a continual production of small groups which combine together, now and again, to form a system, and fall apart almost immediately. And this history, which was believed to be as old as the world, does not begin before the morrow of the Macedonian invasion! We have not a single line of an inscription which we have the right to date earlier than this. The epigraphy of India begins with the admirable sermons which a Buddhist emperor, Açoka, caused to be engraved in every corner of his vast dominions toward the year 250 before the Christian Era. A happy chance, perhaps some deep excavations, may open out to epigraphy a more distant horizon; but at the present time our positive documents do not go beyond the date mentioned. Sanskrit epigraphy begins still later. It appears in tentative fashion at about the beginning of the Christian Era, but does not begin to flourish till the middle of the second century. Before this period the authors of the inscriptions used only dialects, related, no doubt, to Sanskrit, but greatly disfigured and altered. I am far from concluding that the Sanskrit language was not formed till this late epoch; but it must be admitted on this testimony that Sanskrit was not one of the vulgar tongues of India three centuries before the birth of Christ. The grammarians who had lovingly fashioned it had detached it from real life when they gave it fixed forms. Doubtless the divorce only became apparent by degrees; the difference between the spoken language and the written Sanskrit at first only

seemed to lie in slight shades of correctness or purity; when the distance widened, the priestly caste remained faithfully attached to the privileged language that separated it from the illiterate masses; it consecrated its own language to religion and imposed it on the orthodox literature. Imagine the Latin of Cicero rescued by the Christian Church, and, under her patronage, accepted as the language of literature by all the peoples of Europe, irrespective of spoken tongues, and you will understand the rôle of the Sanskrit language and literature in India.

The Brahmans had intended to keep the monopoly of Sanskrit; they flattered themselves that they shared it with the gods alone. But two rebellious churches rose up against Brahman pretensions and marked the hour of their triumph by the conquest of Sanskrit. Cultivated by the Buddhists and Jains, the mass, already huge, of Sanskrit literature spread and multiplied in spite of the Brahmans. But Jainism, after a short time of prosperity, sank into a long torpor and was forgotten. Buddhism, receiving a mortal blow by the invasion of Islam, which burnt the convents and massacred or dispersed the communities, disappeared from Hindu soil. The Brahman had his revenge; he wreaked his jealous hatred on the remains of the rival who had disputed empire with him; he thought to efface the last traces of Buddhism, and preserved the mere name only to execerate it. But again Western science baffled his calculations.

In 1816, by the force of British arms, a British resident, assisted by two subordinates, was established at Nepal among the refractory Gurkhas. Ten years later Hodgson with toilsome perseverance extracted the still immense ruins of Buddhist Sanskrit literature from the libraries of Nepal. At about the same time Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, which had remained faithful to the Law of the Buddha, yielded up to investigators a still more considerable collection of works both religious and profane, written in Pali, an ancient dialect, near to Sanskrit and sprung from the same soil, but independent.

Sanskrit texts and Pali texts, coming from opposite points of the Indian horizon, brought with them, each one, a body of tradition and legend on the life of the Buddha and the destinies of the church. By means of strictly critical comparison it was possible to extract their part of history from these stories. Burnouf, the successor of Chézy at the Collège de France, undertook this heavy task, undaunted by the multitude of manuscripts and the variety of languages; by dint of sagacity, penetration, justice, and reason he accomplished at the outset a definitive work. His *Introduction to the History of Indian Buddhism* remains at the end of half a century of new discoveries and researches an authority still safe and still consulted.

With Buddhism Sanskrit finally overstepped the frontiers of India. The bold enterprise of Csoma de Kőrös, who had shut himself

up for several years in a convent of Ladakh, had brought to light an immense Tibetan library, translated, to a great extent, from Sanskrit originals, some of which were preserved in Nepal, others lost. China and Japan, thrown open by degrees to Western research, yielded up in their turn similar collections translated from Sanskrit originals. The history and literature of China added their testimony to the power of the movement which, from the beginning of the Christian Era onwards, carried Indian Buddhism in triumphant marches as far as the palace of the Son of Heaven and even to the islands of the sea, fructifying thought, elevating the souls of men, awakening or transforming art. The memoirs of a Fa-hien, a Hiuen-tsang, and I-tsing described the pilgrims fascinated by the "Holy Land," impatient to adore the footprints of the Buddha, braving the sterile sands and treacherous whirlwinds, the brigands, the mountains, and the storms of the ocean in order to study the sacred Sanskrit language and bring back to their own country a reliable translation, with the authentic words of the master or his disciples. So strong a movement of expansion must necessarily leave positive traces; the expansion of Europe at the present day, following the self-same routes, is bringing about by degrees the discovery of the monuments of this long-perished past. No sooner was France mistress of Indo-China than she began her work by an admirable campaign of archaeological discovery; an immense harvest of inscriptions collected from Cambodia up to Tonkin has revived a history which was believed to be utterly wiped out. Sanskrit had served for twelve centuries to immortalize the praises of the sovereigns of Cambodia and Champa. The *Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient*, founded in 1898, is methodically carrying on the work of the early pioneers; science profits by the fruitful union of Sanskrit and Chinese, brilliantly accomplished by this school. The rivalry of England and Russia in Central Asia has not been less fruitful. Since 1890 the attention of Indianists has been kept awake by a continuous series of discoveries. Under the sands of the Takla Makan sleep Pompeiis, half Hindu in character. Treasure-hunters, according to the chances of their adventurous expeditions, have unearthed fragments of ancient manuscripts written in Sanskrit, mingled with fragments in an unknown language; arithmetic, medicine, sorcery, astrology, jostle one another in these incongruous leaves. A French mission has brought from Khotan a manuscript of the *Dhammapada* written in a dialect closely resembling Sanskrit and dating, without doubt, at least fifteen hundred years back. Dr. Stein's mission in 1900 was the beginning of a methodical and first-hand exploration of the buried ruins; the religious, administrative and artistic history of Central Asia in the first centuries of the Christian Era shines forth with unexpected clearness. The patience of scholars is still busied

with these documents, and, behold, new discoveries are already announced, due to the Grünwedel and Huth mission. This time we have to do not with fragments of manuscript, but a text printed on wood in the Tibetan manner. The work is in Sanskrit, with a marginal title in Chinese, and belongs to the Buddhist Scriptures. What splendid discoveries are we not justified in hoping for, now, if the convents of Central Asia have multiplied copies of the sacred canon, of the Sanskrit Tripitaka, in print!

Thus, a century after its birth, Sanskrit philology sees its field extend to the limits of man's horizon. By its origin, by its grammar, by its vocabulary, by its earliest monuments, Sanskrit belongs to the Aryan group, extending from the mouths of the Ganges to the shores of the Atlantic. By Alexander's expedition and the creation of new kingdoms to the northwest of India, Indian and Hellenic destinies were linked together for three or four hundred years. By the expansion of Buddhism India dominated the politics, the thought, and the art of the Far East. The childish pride of the Brahmans had thought to exalt the dignity of the sacred language by presuming to confine it, like a secret treasure, within the impassable boundaries of India. Science has once more broken down superstition and revealed a truth grander than falsehood. No more than any other nation of the world has India created or developed her civilization alone. Our civilizations, by whatever particular name we choose to call them, are the collective work of humanity. Far from developing in shy isolation, they are only of worth when they borrow largely. The market of thought, like the business market, is a continual movement of exchange. On whatever point of the globe we may live, we are all legitimate heirs of all the past of humanity; the richest are those who claim most of that past. Whether applied to India or other regions, historical studies have grandeur and beauty in so far as they increase the patrimony of man; they awake in the individual the conscience of the species; they reveal to us our double debt towards the past which has formed us, towards the future which we are forming. Thus they raise the labors of scholarship above a vain dilettantism; by them her rôle is carried even into practical life, unjustly disdained, and they show her toiling patiently and consciously for harmony and progress.

THE MAIN PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD OF INDIAN LANGUAGES

BY ARTHUR ANTHONY MACDONELL

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WHEN about to present a survey of the main problems which await solution in my subject, the sacred and classical language of India in connection with its descendants, the first thought which occurs to me is that few realize how large a section of the science of man it covers and how important a part it has played in the history of civilization. Most people know little further than that Sanskrit is now studied not only in India but in all the more advanced countries of Europe and in America. Thus there are now at least four professors of Sanskrit in the United States and about twenty-five in German universities. There is already at least one in Japan, where the subject is beginning to be pretty widely studied. Beyond the small circle of the initiated, few are, however, really aware that Sanskrit is the key to the languages and civilization of nearly three hundred million people in India, that it is, directly or indirectly, through ancient daughter dialects, the vehicle of the religions of nearly the whole of that vast population; and that, chiefly through Buddhism, it has influenced not only the religion, but even to some extent the laws and customs, of some four hundred millions of the human race beyond the limits of India. It has thus been instrumental in raising to a higher level the civilization of nearly one half of the human race. In fact, what Greece and Rome did for the West, ancient India may be said to have done for the farther East. The civilization which it diffused was, though less advanced, distinguished by much originality, profound thought, and deep morality, and that diffusion — what has been so rare in the history of the world — was a conquest of peace and not of the sword, a conquest made solely by the influence of literature, religion, and art. Sanskrit literature and science have had a considerable influence even on the West, — in the Middle Ages, for example, through the migration of Indian fables and fairy tales, but especially through the introduction of

the numerical figures and the decimal system with which the whole world reckons. The effects of the latter debt on civilization in general can hardly be overestimated. Again, the discovery of Sanskrit and its literature led in the nineteenth century to the foundation of the sciences of Comparative Philology, Comparative Mythology, and Comparative Religion; and through the first of these sciences it has appreciably influenced the teaching of Latin and Greek in the schools of the West. The results obtained from the study of Sanskrit are also indispensable in the historical investigation of institutions and customs. Indian studies are here peculiarly important because, with the single exception of China, India is the only country which has had a recorded historical development of some 3500 years. Let me give a few examples to illustrate this remarkable continuity of civilization. Sanskrit is still spoken by thousands of Brahmans as it was centuries before our era. Nor has it ceased to be used for literary purposes; for many books and journals written in this ancient language are still produced. The copying of Sanskrit manuscripts still goes on in hundreds of libraries in India, unchecked even by the introduction of printing during the nineteenth century. The Vedas are still learnt by heart as they were long before the invasion of Alexander, and could even now be restored from the lips of religious teachers if every manuscript or printed copy of them were destroyed. A Vedic stanza, of immemorial antiquity, addressed to the sun-god Savitri, is still recited in the daily worship of the Hindus. The god Visnu, worshiped more than 3000 years ago, has countless votaries in India at the present day. The wedding ceremony of the modern Hindu, to single out but one social custom, is essentially the same as it was hundreds of years before the Christian Era. The only true basis of teaching and learning is still considered to be oral instruction, just as it was in the very earliest times. Owing to such survivals of language, thought, and custom from the days of hoary antiquity, a visit to India is of peculiar value to the Sanskrit scholar. For it is only thus that he can thoroughly realize the actual facts of Indian civilization, and that the full force of much that he has read is brought home to him. Let me illustrate this by the experience of a friend of mine. There is a well-known hymn of the Rig-Veda, in which the sound produced by pupils repeating their lessons is compared with that made by frogs during the rains:

“ When one repeats the utterance of the other
Like those who learn the lessons of their teacher.”

My friend, a Sanskrit scholar, was a few years ago asked to visit a school for native boys in the district of Behar. As he entered the building, the croaking of the frogs in a neighboring watercourse sounded loud in his ears. Making his way through various passages, he at last came to a long corridor, where he was greatly surprised

to hear the same sound with extraordinary distinctness. The door opened, and he stood face to face with a class of Hindu boys repeating their lesson in unison.

In the domain of linguistic study India occupies a unique position. For practically all the languages of this continent, shut off from the rest of the world by its huge mountain barrier, and equal in extent to the whole of Europe excepting Russia, can be traced to a single ancient tongue through a recorded development of some 3500 years. India may, in fact, be regarded as the linguistic delta formed by the stream of Sanskrit speech which, a thousand years before the foundation of Rome, broke, like the mighty river which gives the whole country its name, through the stupendous mountains of the north-west. For this vast period we have linguistic records registering every step of development with a completeness which, especially in its earliest stages, is unparalleled in the history of any other branch of the Indo-European family of speech. At the present day there are in India about a dozen languages descended from the oldest form of Sanskrit and subdivided into nearly 300 dialects, which are spoken by about 220,000,000 of people. Beside them are the four main Dravidian languages which represent the aboriginal speech of India, and are spoken by some 60,000,000. These have, however, been Sanskritized at various periods, while their literature is based on Sanskrit models. These forms of aboriginal speech, existing either below or cropping up through the Sanskritic alluvium, furnish, as we shall see, some highly interesting and important problems to the linguistic investigator which have hardly yet been touched by scientifically trained scholars. In this connection I may mention that modern India furnishes many striking examples disproving the old theory which classified races according to the languages spoken by them. Thus the tribes called Bhil at present speak only three debased Sanskritic languages, though it is ethnologically certain that they belong to the aboriginal race. Other aboriginal tribes partly still retain their primitive tongue, but have partly adopted Sanskritic dialects. There is indeed every reason to believe that a very large proportion of the Hindu population which now speaks Sanskritic vernaculars represents the descendants of the aboriginal race with hardly any admixture of Aryan blood.

As the history of the Indian languages admits of being traced continuously in their successive stages from the earliest period, it will, I think, conduce to clearness if, in considering the problems which they offer at the present day, we follow the chronological order of their development.

Owing to the extraordinary interest created in Europe by the discovery of Sanskrit a century and a quarter ago and the undoubted importance which it possesses, the attention of trained scholars

has been almost exclusively directed to the study of the earliest linguistic phase of India. In consequence of this, coupled with the fact that the study of Sanskrit in Europe began in a scientific age, we have not only long possessed a Sanskrit Dictionary which in comprehensiveness and accuracy surpasses that of any other dead language; but also a grammar dealing on historical principles with the Sanskrit language by that great American scholar, W. D. Whitney, which stands unequalled in a similar way. As having led to the foundation of comparative philology, Sanskrit long maintained an exaggerated preëminence in that science. This was followed about thirty years ago by a reaction which, starting from the discovery that the vowel-system of Sanskrit is less primitive than that of the European languages, tended to assign quite a subordinate position to Sanskrit. Though I have from my student days at the University of Göttingen given a good deal of attention to comparative philology, I do not consider myself entitled to express an authoritative opinion on the details of this science. I nevertheless venture to make the general assertion that Sanskrit still occupies and will continue to occupy a dominant position in comparative grammar. By this I mean that, if all the linguistic material supplied by Sanskrit were eliminated, the lacunæ in comparative philology would be immeasurably greater than if the linguistic material of any other Indo-European language were lacking. This seems to me to be evident in the great authoritative work of Professor Brugmann, the leader of comparative philology at the present day. It will, I have little doubt, be still more clearly established on the completion of the comparative Sanskrit grammar of Professor Wackernagel, of Göttingen, the second volume of which was passing through the press before I left England and has since (1905) appeared. This work will, I think, surpass all other comparative grammars of individual Indo-European languages hitherto published, both in fullness of detail and scientific trustworthiness.

Since in the early days of Sanskrit studies, European scholars became acquainted only with that later phase of the ancient language of India which is familiar to the Pandits, and is commonly known as Classical Sanskrit, research remained almost entirely limited to that dialect till about the middle of the nineteenth century. Since then the earlier language of the Vedas has been assiduously investigated in Europe and America. All the four Vedas have long been accessible in thoroughly scientific editions, and much progress has been made in the study of their language, their matter, and their mutual relations. The Vedas have been proved by internal evidence to be considerably anterior to the rise of Buddhism, that is, to have been composed long before 600 B.C. The language of the three lesser Vedas has further been shown to be posterior to that of the most

important, the Rig-Veda, through the application of the statistical method by Professor Whitney, to whom the historical investigation of Sanskrit owes more than to any other scholar, as well as by Professor Lanman and others. Moreover, in the hymns of the Rig-Veda itself, the existence of chronological strata has been discovered, and some important general results have been arrived at, chiefly by the labors of Professor Lanman, Professor Oldenberg, and the late Abel Bergaigne. The most prominent problem which here confronts Vedic scholarship is, by means of the minute investigation of all the available evidence, phonetic, grammatical, lexicographical, metrical, to ascertain the lines of demarcation dividing these literary strata. The solution of this problem is of the highest importance for the history of the Sanskrit language and literature. The work on *Vedic Meter* recently (1905) published by Professor E. V. Arnold, of Bangor, Wales, contributes valuable material to its solution as far as the metrical evidence of the Rig-Veda is concerned.

Another unsolved problem, which partly depends on the one just mentioned, is the approximate age of the Vedic language and literature, and the approximate date of the Aryan migration into the northwest of India. Its solution appears to me to have made no advance during the last forty-five years. Indeed, the question seems to be invested with more doubt now than it was then. For there is, at the present time, a difference of more than 3000 years between the lowest and the highest estimate of the beginning of the Vedic age. I cannot help thinking that this enormous divergence will, by patient investigation, be reduced to one of a very few centuries. Professor Jacobi's astronomical theory based on the doubtful interpretation of a Vedic word, which would indicate that the rainy season in the early Vedic period began under astronomical conditions different from those of later times, is ingenious, but has in my opinion been refuted by Professor Oldenberg. According to this theory, the Vedic period would begin about 4500 B.C. It seems to me quite incredible that the comparatively small divergence between the language of the earliest Vedic period and that of Pāṇini (who dates from about 300 B.C.), a divergence hardly greater than that between Homeric and Attic Greek, should have required more than 4000 years to accomplish. Considering how very closely the language of the oldest part of the Avesta, the Gāthas, estimated to date from about 600 B.C., approximates to that of the oldest Veda, I find it hard to believe that very many centuries could have elapsed from the time when the Indians and Persians were still one people. In fact, 1500 B.C. seems to me to be rather a high estimate for the approximate date at which the Indo-Iranians separated and the Indians invaded the northwest of India. More definite knowledge of the chronology of the Rig-Veda, coupled with all the evidence which Iranian philology

can bring to bear, and the careful comparison of analogous phases of ascertainable duration in other dead languages, can hardly fail to lead to much greater certainty than is at present attainable.

A further problem presented by the Vedic language is the true principle to be followed in interpreting the meanings of words which are either exclusively Vedic or seem to have a different sense from that which they bear in Classical Sanskrit. All scholars are agreed that interpretation based exclusively on comparative philology on the one hand, or native commentators on the other, cannot lead to satisfactory results. At the same time there is a school of Sanskritists who tend to bring down the Vedas, as being exclusively Indian literary products, linguistically too close to the Classical Sanskrit period, and to color their interpretation too strongly with the thought of that period. To speak of a work as purely Indian does not necessarily take us much beyond fixing the geographical limits of its origin. *Beowulf* is a purely English poem, but I doubt whether more light is not shed on its language and thought by the Old Saxon literature of the Continent than by the English literature of the age of Tennyson. The principle advocated by Professor Oldenberg of admitting every form of evidence, even extra-Indian, which is capable of throwing light on the interpretation of the Vedas, appears to me to be the correct one. What is at present wanted is definiteness in laying down the limitations which should be imposed on the two divergent methods I have indicated.

A branch of this problem is the true relation of Vedic myths to the forms which they present in post-Vedic literature. Some scholars hold that the latter shed much light on the interpretation of the former; others that they add nothing to our knowledge of the former, and are sometimes even based on a misunderstanding of them. I cannot help thinking that the efforts which have hitherto been made to illuminate obscure Vedic legends from the material of the later period have not proved at all fruitful. Judgment should, however, be suspended on the question as a whole, till all the available material has been examined in its historical connection.

We already know pretty clearly, in a general way, the various phases through which the ancient language of India, by the gradual loss of grammatical forms, — a process of decay rather than of growth, — finally arrived at the stage stereotyped by the grammar of Pāṇini about 300 B. C. These phases have, however, yet to be treated in greater detail and to be separated with greater definiteness than has hitherto been done. It is intended that this task should be accomplished in forthcoming contributions to Bühler and Kielhorn's *Encyclopædia of Indo-Aryan Research*, dealing with the language of the Vedas (by myself), and with that of the later period beginning with the Brāhmaṇas (by Professor Lüders).

It is well known that Sanskrit has continued to be written and spoken by the Brahmans from Pāṇini's time down to the present day. The grammar has, of course, remained unchanged; but the construction and style have been to some extent modified, while many words have been borrowed from the Sanskritic vernaculars, some even from the aboriginal dialects. The problem as to the extent of such influences on the Sanskrit both of the earlier and later period has yet to be treated as a whole.

This brings us to the daughters of Sanskrit, the Prakrits, or vernaculars, which have been spoken in India from Vedic times down to the present day. Three main stages can be distinguished in their history. The ancient Prakrits may be regarded as coming down to about the beginning of our era, the medieval Prakrits to about 1000 A.D., and the modern Prakrits down to the present day. There is evidence to show that, even as early as the time of the Vedas, vernaculars derived from the earliest form of Vedic language existed, since borrowed words of the Prakrit type are to be found in the Vedas, though not to the same extent as in later Sanskrit. The exact extent to which vernacular words have been introduced into the Vedic vocabulary has yet to be examined. We know that in the sixth century B.C. Buddha preached his doctrine in a vernacular dialect because the masses were no longer able to understand Sanskrit. We also know that the form of ancient Prakrit called Pali was introduced into Ceylon along with Buddhism in the third century B.C., and has ever since remained the sacred language of the southern or purest form of Buddhism. It is a striking testimony to the antiquity of Sanskrit that a daughter language should have been thus stereotyped long before the beginning of our era.

The literature of Pali is both extensive and important; more important in some respects even than that of Sanskrit. For it embraces in their purest tradition the doctrines of Buddhism, a religion which has been so potent an engine of civilization in countries beyond the limits of India. It contains, moreover, a large amount of material capable of shedding light on the social history of India during the early centuries of our era, in a way which Sanskrit literature cannot do. As the earliest recorded literary daughter of Sanskrit, it occupies a position second only to the parent tongue in the linguistic history of India. By the devoted labors of a very few scholars, a surprising amount of work has already been done in the editing and translating of Pali texts, in utilizing the matter contained in them — as appears from such works as Professor Oldenberg's *Buddha* and Rhys Davids' *Buddhistic India*, as well as in pioneering linguistic studies. But vastly more still remains to be done. Many texts have yet to be edited, others must be re-edited in a form better adapted to the advancement of scholarship. Many important Pali works have yet

to be translated. All the material which is contained in the whole range of this literature and bears on the history of Buddhist India will have to be extracted and worked up. And after all this has been done a critical history of Pali literature will have to be written. Among the most urgent needs in the field of Pali scholarship at the present day, however, is the compilation both of a comprehensive and thoroughly scientific grammar and of a dictionary resembling the Sanskrit work of Böhtlingk and Roth, which will include all the lexicographical material that has become available during the last thirty years since the publication of Childers' lexicon. A Pali grammar of the kind I have indicated will no doubt be supplied by the work which Professor Otto Franke, of Königsberg, is about to contribute to Bühler and Kielhorn's *Encyclopaedia of Indo-Aryan Research*. As to the Pali Dictionary, Professor Rhys Davids is at present planning one on a large scale in coöperation with some other scholars. It is sincerely to be hoped that this undertaking, which would do more than anything else to promote Pali studies, will not be retarded or frustrated by want of funds.

If research in the field of Pali is to be advanced in the manner which the extent and importance of the subject demand, the establishment of a few chairs of Pali is essential. At present there is, I believe, not a single salaried professorship of Pali in Europe or America. Pali studies are meanwhile being carried on either by a few professors of Sanskrit, chiefly in Germany, or by scholars who, being obliged to make their livelihood in some other way, are able to devote only a scanty leisure to their favorite pursuit. I have, for some time past, been urging the advisability of founding a chair of Pali in the University of Oxford, where Oriental subjects are otherwise very fully represented. I do not, however, feel confident of success unless some generous benefactor should step in. Perhaps the King of Siam, the only Buddhist monarch in the world, who is well known to be a munificent patron of Pali learning, having himself published on a magnificent scale a complete set of the Pali canon in Siam, may come forward as the founder of the first chair of Pali in the West.

As to the old Prakrits, they are known to have had a continuous recorded existence in the form of inscriptions for several centuries, beginning with the rock and pillar edicts of Aśoka, the Buddhist Emperor of the third century B.C., which are scattered all over India. These early Prakrit inscriptions, as well as the Sanskrit ones which begin to appear in the second century A.D., have been to a large extent published; but many of them, owing to defective reproduction, will have to be re-edited. Epigraphical research would be greatly advanced by collecting all these inscriptions within the compass of a single work in a critical edition. The reconstruction of the political history of the period from this material, together

with the evidence of contemporary coins, remains an important problem to be solved by Indian scholarship. Medieval Prakrit has, further, a recorded literary use from about 400 A.D., mainly as the vehicle, in a particular dialect, of the extensive religious writings of the Jains. It was, however, also employed in the composition of secular works, for instance epic poems, and as the language spoken, in various dialects, by the less educated classes in the Sanskrit dramas. Only one play composed entirely in Prakrit, and dating from about 900 A.D., is extant. This work has been edited in model fashion, by Dr. Konow, as well as translated by Professor Lanman, in the Harvard Oriental Series. I may observe, in passing, that that series promises to mark a new stage in the method of editing Indian texts. It will, I think, for the first time set an example of how texts should really be edited so as to bring out their full value as instruments of further research. I myself completed, just before leaving England, a contribution to the series in two volumes, in which this object has been kept steadily in view.

A vast advance in the study of medieval Prakrit has been made by the publication of Professor Pischel's epoch-making Prakrit grammar in Bühler and Kielhorn's *Encyclopaedia*. Now for the first time the phonology and inflection of the various Prakrit dialects have been stated and distinguished. The main thing that has to be done is to bring out thoroughly scholar-like editions of the large number of Prakrit texts which exist. It is only on such a foundation that the various dialects of Prakrit can be satisfactorily kept apart and their exact historical relationships to the Aryan vernaculars of modern India clearly defined. Unfortunately the workers are here even fewer than in the field of Pali studies, though a small band of primarily Sanskrit scholars, such as Weber, Bühler, Pischel, Jacobi, Leumann, have already done much valuable pioneering work. Hence the time is probably far distant when the whole of Prakrit literature will be accessible in a thoroughly trustworthy form, when its linguistic facts will have been sifted throughout, when its history will have been written, and when all the material extracted from it will have been utilized to fill in many of the details wanting to complete the still very imperfect picture we at present have of the social, political, and religious aspects of India down to the period of the Muhammadan conquest about 1000 A.D.

About the beginning of our era the Buddhists, and to a less extent the Jains, commenced to learn Sanskrit, so that by the tenth century Sanskrit was practically the only literary language of India. In this way Sanskrit became almost the exclusive vehicle of the literature of northern Buddhism, which spread to Nepal, Tibet, and China. With it a vast number of Sanskrit Buddhistic works were introduced into those countries and translated into Tibetan and Chinese. Thus

there is still in existence the large encyclopedia called *Tanjur*, comprising a collection of 200 translations of Sanskrit works, so faithfully rendered into Tibetan, that where the corresponding Sanskrit text has been preserved and it happens to contain a lacuna, the missing Sanskrit words can be restored with certainty. Among the Sanskrit originals discovered in the countries where these translations have been preserved is the grammar of the Buddhist Candragomin, found in Nepal only a few years ago. The Tibetan translation enabled Professor Liebig, in his edition of the text, to emend successfully some passages which were defective in the original. Diligent search will, it is to be hoped, result in the recovery of many Sanskrit works (at least as far as Buddhist literature is concerned) of which at present only the Tibetan or Chinese translations are known. Much might have been expected in this direction from the British occupation of Lhasa, where the monasteries must contain many manuscript treasures, but the absence of any Sanskrit scholar in the expeditionary force will, I fear, preclude the discovery of valuable Sanskrit manuscripts such as would probably have resulted, had an energetic scholar of the type of my friend Doctor Stein, accompanied the British troops.

Patient search may also lead to the recovery of some of the originals of the numerous Sanskrit Buddhist works which were translated into Chinese from the first century of our era onwards. Much may be hoped in this direction from the labors of the Society of Oriental Research recently founded in Japan, one of the objects of which is to examine systematically the monasteries and temples of China and Corea with a view to the discovery of Sanskrit manuscripts. What is possible in this way will be apparent from the following example. By the year 1879 all knowledge of Sanskrit had died out in Japan. In that year two young Japanese Buddhists, named Nanjio and Kasawara, were attracted by the influence of Max Müller to learn Sanskrit at Oxford, in order to study Buddhist texts in the original Sanskrit as well as in Chinese translations. Through these young scholars (whom I taught Sanskrit during the first year of their studies), Max Müller caused investigations to be made in Japan, which soon led to the discovery, in an ancient monastery, of a Sanskrit work dating from the sixth century A.D. and at that time (1880) the oldest Sanskrit manuscript known.

The works of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who visited India in the fifth and seventh centuries A.D. mention a large number of geographical and personal Indian names, the identification of which is of great importance to Indian history. The transformations which these words undergo, owing to the widely divergent character of Chinese phonetics, often render their identification purely conjectural in the present state of our knowledge. An important problem here

awaits solution on the part of those who are thorough Chinese as well as Sanskrit scholars. It will consist in ascertaining on scientific principles the phonetic laws according to which, in different centuries and in different dialects, the Chinese language has reproduced the corresponding Sanskrit sounds. Mr. Nanjio, the Buddhist scholar I have already mentioned, and another Japanese who studied Sanskrit for three years at Oxford, and is now Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Tokyo, are at present engaged on investigations of this character. I hope that in the course of two or three years the results of their labors will be published and materially advance our knowledge of the history of India down to about 700 A.D.

We now come to the third period of the languages descended from the earliest form of Sanskrit, the beginning of which about synchronizes with the Muhammadan invasion of India and with the conquest of England by the Normans in the eleventh century. Down to the end of the second period the Prakrits, though phonetically and inflectionally much worn down, were still synthetic languages. But from the eleventh century onwards we find that the tertiary Prakrits, the literatures of which date from the thirteenth and later centuries, have assumed an analytic character, or in other words, replace inflection by the use of prepositions and periphrastic forms, much as modern English has done in comparison with Anglo-Saxon.

At the present day these Indo-Aryan tongues, spoken, as I have already said, by 220,000,000 of people, consist of nine main languages. The most numerously spoken is Hindi, with 63,000,000; then comes Bengali with 45,000,000; Bihari with 35,000,000; Oriya, Rajasthani, Gujarati, with about 10,000,000 each; Marathi with 18,000,000; Panjabi with 17,000,000; and the group of which Sindhi is the principal tongue, with 8,000,000.

A comparative grammar of the chief languages was written as much as thirty years ago, and has proved a useful pioneering work; but it is no longer up to the knowledge or scientific standard of the present day. One of the main problems in the study of modern Aryan languages of India is the production of a thoroughly scientific comparative grammar based on a more scholarly investigation of the individual languages than has hitherto been made. Grammars and dictionaries of all the principal languages have been compiled, but most of them, though often of much practical value, are the work of untrained scholars and therefore leave a good deal to be desired as a basis of research. They deal, moreover, for the most part, only with the literary form of the language. The non-literary dialects of the uneducated, which are linguistically of great importance, have been hitherto almost entirely neglected, and thus offer practically a virgin field to the philologist. They are all the more important owing to the extreme lengths to which the introduction of Sanskrit

words has been carried in some of the literary vernaculars, notably Bengali. Among these vernaculars, Hindustani, which came into literary use in the sixteenth century and is also the *lingua franca* of India, is perhaps of least importance from a linguistic point of view, since it is a form of the Sanskritic Western Hindi which has been artificially filled with Persian words. The unadulterated natural vernaculars often present features of great interest to the philologist. Thus in the speech of Kashmir we see a language which is caught in the act of transforming itself from the analytic into the synthetic stage, and thus reëntering the linguistic cycle through which it has already passed. The chief problems which these vernaculars present to the philologist are the accurate demarcation of the main languages, as well as of their numerous dialects, and the influence which has been exercised by foreign languages on their phonetics, vocabulary, grammar, and syntax. Thus not only have many Persian words been adopted by Hindustani, but several have found their way even into the non-literary vernaculars. Again, we already know that the Dravidian languages have affected the phonology not only of Sanskrit and the old Prakrits, but also of the modern vernaculars. It has also, for instance, been shown with probability that contact with the Tibeto-Burmese languages has introduced a certain form of passive construction into the Aryan vernaculars.

By the side of the Sanskritic tongues, the language spoken by the aborigines of India who were conquered by the invading Aryans still survives in various forms. Spoken by about sixty millions of the inhabitants of India, it is represented by two main branches, the Dravidian and the Munda, which have the common characteristics of being agglutinative in formation and of possessing only two genders, the one designating animate and the other inanimate objects. The four main Dravidian languages are Telugu, with a population of about 21,000,000, Tamil with 16,500,000, Canarese with over 10,000,000, and Malayālam with 6,000,000. These four languages have already been the subject of considerable study, almost entirely on the part of missionaries, who have often acquired a thorough practical and literary knowledge of them. But the linguistic value of the work, in other respects often important, published by these scholars is considerably diminished by the absence of philological training. The dangers arising from the lack of such a qualification may be illustrated by the following example. An acquaintance of mine, who possesses a very extensive linguistic and literary knowledge of one of the non-Aryan tongues of India, one day remarked to me: "What a strange thing it is that the Sanskrit word for horse and the English for donkey should be the same" [meaning *aśva* and *ass*]. A remark like that throws a flood of light on a man's

philological equipment. These Dravidian languages are full of Sanskrit or Prakrit words borrowed at different periods; those adopted at late date are easily recognizable; but others, which go back to the time of early contact with Aryan civilization, have been so worn down and assimilated as to be indistinguishable, except to the trained scholar, from ordinary Dravidian words. A leading problem in connection with these languages will be the ascertainment of the phonetic laws by which the Sanskritic elements may be detected, as well as the mutual influences of Sanskrit and Dravidian determined. Singhalese, the very interesting vernacular of Ceylon, presents a cognate problem. Here we have a language which has been shown to have an Aryan basis due to the introduction of Pali, as the sacred language of Buddhism, in the third century B.C. The Tamil elements are, however, so considerable, that Singhalese was long regarded as a Dravidian tongue. The scientific disentangling of the various strands of this language will furnish much material of historical interest. How much historical information a single word may convey, the following instance will show. The word *was* is used in Ceylon to designate the holiday-time in the summer months when the weather is settled, and, during the bright moonlight nights, the people listen for hours to the recitation of edifying works like the Jātakas, or tales of the incarnations of Buddha. This word is ultimately derived from the Sanskrit *varṣa*, meaning the rainy season, the time when the mendicants in the plains of northern India returned to their monasteries and devoted themselves to the study of religious books. The term thus preserves an historical connection with the original practice by indicating the cause which led to it, though in the modern survival of that practice in Ceylon the cause is altogether non-existent.

On the northeast and the east of India the Tibeto-Burman family of speech forms a non-Aryan linguistic fringe. Here we have a peculiarly interesting field for research in Nepal, a country in which some thirty different dialects are spoken and which has been Hinduized by an admixture of Rajputs, but at the same time is one of the richest repositories of Buddhist antiquities. It was within the borders of this state that only a few years ago the site of Buddha's birthplace, Kapilavastu, was discovered, a site which when excavated is likely to yield material of almost unrivaled interest to the Indian archaeologist. Then there is Burma, which, like Siam, has experienced both a Sanskrit influence through Hinduism and a Pali influence through Buddhism. Hence the scientific investigation of Burmese, as well as Siamese, which is still a task of the future, should, with the aid of archaeology, furnish results throwing much light on the linguistic, religious, and social history of those countries.

The labors of the Linguistic Survey of India, which have been carried on during recent years under the auspices of the Indian Government and under the able direction of Dr. G. A. Grierson, will vastly advance our knowledge of the classification, the relationships, and the general linguistic character of all the languages of India and of their almost innumerable dialects. Six of the sixteen parts which will embody the work of the Survey have already appeared. The results of the Survey as a whole have also been summarized and form a part of the Indian Census Report for 1901, which has been published in three volumes (1903). This report, which contains a vast amount of valuable information regarding the present condition of the population of India in its various aspects, well deserves to be studied by all who are interested in Indian affairs.

In conclusion, I should like to make some observations regarding Indian languages from an educational point of view. The main problem here seems to me to be, how Sanskrit, which, together with its literature, is the key to the languages and civilization of modern India, is to be made the instrument of mental training in the schools and universities of India, as Latin and Greek are in Europe and America. At present it is by no means such an instrument, either under the native traditional system or the European method of teaching Sanskrit in India. The native system consists in learning certain books by an abnormal exercise of memory, to the great detriment of the reasoning powers. It is bound to die out with the spread of Western educational methods, which must take its place. Western methods, however, as at present applied in the Government colleges, to the teaching of Sanskrit, are even more unsatisfactory. For memory is still the main faculty relied on, and that in a much less disinterested way. A certain number of books, prescribed in a somewhat haphazard way, are got up, generally with the aid of inadequate editions, not with a view to knowing them, but solely to passing the examinations necessary for the attainment of a degree. The evil is aggravated by the fact that the Indian Government has of late years adopted the policy of appointing only native scholars to chairs of Sanskrit. The consequence is that there is no longer any means of teaching native students Sanskrit scientifically or of training them in methods of research. Under these conditions there will before long not be a Sanskrit scholar in the true sense of the word left in India. The sort of scholarship to be expected in future will be of the type indicated by the following anecdote. According to a rule of the *Bibliotheca Indica*, no text was allowed to be edited in that series except from three independent manuscripts. A certain native scholar wished to edit here a text of which he possessed one manuscript only. The difficulty would have appeared insurmountable to the Occidental. But the Indian mind is nothing if not ingenious.

Our Sanskrit friend handed his manuscript to his Pandit copyists, and then there were three! I have little doubt that there was now a plentiful crop of various readings for collation which in footnotes would give an edition quite a critical appearance.

The remedy for this deplorable state of things appears to me to be in the first place the nomination of a few trained European scholars to Sanskrit chairs in each presidency to insure the spread and continuity of scientific methods of teaching and research in India. In the second place, a committee of experts might be appointed to examine the whole question of the teaching of Sanskrit in Indian schools and colleges, and to make recommendations with a view to securing an adequate curriculum and the publication of suitable text-books in connection with it. I believe that by such means Sanskrit, the classical language of the Hindus, could be made a potent agency not only in stimulating and training the intellectual faculties, but also, by enabling the Hindus to understand their own civilization historically, in spreading that enlightenment which will be the surest means of delivering the Indian people from the bondage of caste which has held them enthralled for more than 2000 years. Before the advance of such knowledge the mass of irrational prejudice which so cruelly divides class from class must gradually disappear, as the mists of night melt away before the rising sun. Sanskrit learning might thus be made to contribute to that elevation of the human race which is the ultimate aim of all the arts and sciences represented and coördinated at this great and unique Congress.

SECTION D — GREEK LANGUAGE

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(Hall 3, September 22, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MARTIN L. D'OOGHE, University of Michigan.
SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HERBERT WEIR SMYTH, Harvard University.
 PROFESSOR MILTON W. HUMPHREYS, University of Virginia.
SECRETARY: PROFESSOR J. E. HARRY, University of Cincinnati.

THE Chairman of the Section of Greek Language was Professor Martin L. D'Ooge, of the University of Michigan, who congratulated the members of the Section upon the abundant evidence that is at hand to show that Greek is a vital study and an educational force of no small power. The speaker said in part:

"As one reviews the work done by the scholars of Europe and America in this field of learning for the last thirty years, the conviction is borne in upon him that never before in the history of scholarship has so much fruitful activity been shown in this department of learning. Greek has certainly shared to the full in the intellectual quickening so characteristic of the modern age.

"With the increase of material for study, due to the explorations of archaeologists and to the discovery of new inscriptions and manuscripts, many old theories have been exploded, many new views have been gained, and fresh light has been thrown upon problems that vexed our forefathers.

"There is another matter that calls for congratulation. I refer to the changed spirit in which Greek is learned and taught nowadays. The ancient Greek is no longer a dead mummy, but simply an older contemporary, whose thought and life are part of our own. Thanks in part to the influence of our American School of Classical Studies at Athens, the old Greek life has been made a reality, and the meaning of Greek literature has become understood and appreciated as never before. To read Homer in the light of the discoveries at Hissarlik and Mycenæ; to feel the thrill of the magnificent odes of the Theban poet on the plain of Olympia in sight of the stadium; to catch the music of the beautiful chorals of Sophocles in the theatre of Dionysos at Athens, — how the old Greek life with all its fascinations throbs anew within the scholar's veins; and how infectious it becomes to those who sit at the feet of a teacher thus inspired.

"It is not my task to review in connection with the event commemorated by this Exposition, under whose auspices this Congress is held, the contributions made by the scholars of Europe to Hellenic learning during the century that has elapsed since the Louisiana Purchase.

It is, however, my duty and privilege, on behalf of my compatriots and associates to express to our brethren across the sea our profound gratitude for the great service they have rendered us of this newer world in quickening our torch of learning in order that here on this western continent may be kindled many an altar of Athena and that this western civilization may be saved from crass commercialism and vulgarity by the spirit of Hellenic Culture."

THE GREEK LANGUAGE IN ITS RELATION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS

BY HERBERT WEIR SMYTH

[Herbert Weir Smyth, Eliot Professor of Greek Literature, Harvard University. b. 1857, Wilmington, Delaware. A.B. Swarthmore College, 1876; A.B. Harvard University, 1878; A.M. and Ph.D. University of Göttingen, 1884. Instructor in Latin and Sanskrit, Williams College, 1883-85; Reader in Greek Literature, Johns Hopkins University, 1885-88; Professor of Greek, Bryn Mawr College, 1888-1901; Professor of Greek, Harvard University, 1901-02; since 1902 Eliot Professor of Greek Literature; Professor of the Greek Language and Literature, American School of Classical Studies, Athens, 1899-1900. Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; President of the American Philological Association, 1904-05.]

BEFORE the battle of Plataea, when the Spartan ambassadors urged Athens to reject the proposals made by the envoys of the Medes, the Athenians responded that they could never betray the cause of Greece, allied as it was by blood and language, the common sanctuaries and sacrifices to the gods, and the community of Hellenic customs (Herodotus 8, 144).

This is the earliest conscious formulation of the conception of nationality extant in the history of Europe; though the impulses making for a national Hellenic unity must have been dimly felt long before the fifth century B.C., perhaps when the separate immigrant tribes from the north first came into contact with "Carian" civilization. If we add to the definition (what is latent in the utterance of the Athenians), the will of the different members of a people to regard descent, language, religion, and customs as common ties, we have the mint-marks of ancient nationality, in effect the consciousness of the same past that carries with it the prospect of the same future. Nationality is not identical with patriotism, nor yet with racial affinity. Nor is it as objective elements, but as the conscious expression of Hellenic feeling, that language and descent derive their significance as factors of national sentiment. Despite the variations in speech of almost every state or canton, the Greeks recognized that a common language marked their individuality as a people; though it was not till the third century A.D. that, with but one notable exception, the last of the local dialects had given way before the Koinè, which, after Alexander, first attained the position of a "high" Greek, and finally, together with Aramaic and Latin, became one of the so-called world-languages of ancient times.

Doubtless Wilhelm von Humboldt and Schelling went too far in maintaining that the individuality of a people is *created* by its language. The speech of the Hellenes, we should rather say, is one of the products of their national mind, a product in which their national

mind most readily, and perhaps first, gave expression to its individuality. Though national differences are marked by language rather than created by it, language more than any other expression of national life displays the native endowments of a people and discloses the innermost physiognomy of its nationality.¹

It is to certain aspects of this general theme, the language of the Greeks as the most complete expression of their national psychology, that I especially invite your attention. An adequate treatment of this theme carries with it an attempt to characterize the language from certain psychological points of view and to discuss certain qualities of national character. By singling out some departments of the investigation of Greek that deserve ampler attention than they receive at present, I shall endeavor to open up here and there certain avenues of approach to that ideal which we all have in mind, — a history of the Greek tongue in its relations to the other factors of Greek life. We have, indeed, many Greek grammars, but no history of Greek speech as an index of Greek nationality.

A thesis that has as its basis the determination of the national mind of any people is of course open to the objection that the conception of national mind is elusive. Nor need one have any hesitation in admitting that the science of national psychology, as set forth by its adherents, is liable to error on every hand, and nowhere more fatally than when it descends to arguments drawn from the rigid insistence on the details of national character and soul. Terms denoting the characteristics of nationality may be easily extended in their application beyond their legitimate scope. Phenomena of language may be interpreted in different ways. The necessities of one language may be the luxuries of another; thus the relations of time may be much more strictly expressed in one language than in another, which is therefore not obscure in this regard; error is possible in ascribing to one people a conservative character, to another a progressive spirit, because of the retention or abandonment of inherited sounds (as the vowels and especially the diphthongs, the aspirates, the spirants, final consonants), cases (the locative, instrumental, ablative), or the tenses and moods (the aorist, the optative), and in many other particulars, such as the dual number. Then there is the danger of seeking to discover marks of capacity for emotion or of individuality in the attribution of gender to senseless things. But more than all, as the individual in his totality resists final psychological analysis, so, *a fortiori*, the nation. Especially in the case of ancient peoples we lack the means to arrive at even a partial conception of the national soul; the total outcome of our investiga-

¹ F. A. Wolf maintained the unique hypothesis that Greek mirrored the life of the nation without distortion because it was not till late that the language fell under the control of the grammarians.

tion is the mere moraine cast upon the surface by the movement of the glacier forces of national existence.

The national type furthermore seems to vanish in the presence of the individual. The student of national types, like the traveler, constantly meets with individuals whose anomalies apparently resist his classification under the hypothetical type; as was long ago recognized by Apuleius of Madaura in his *Apology* (24): "quando non in omnibus gentibus varia ingenia provenere? quanquam videantur quaedam stultitia vel sollertia insigniores, apud socor-dissimos Scythas Anacharsis sapiens natus est, apud Athenienses catos Meletides fatuus." In Greece the mass and the individual stand in a certain opposition. The mass-type may be predominant, as among the Romans; whereas the forces making for individuality among the Greeks are far more marked than among the Latin peoples, who have few men of the distinct individuality of a Cato. So striking is the centrifugal tendency in Greece that in certain respects not a few of the greatest writers present characteristics that seem unhellenic; for example, Thucydides and Aristotle; Polybius is largely Romanized. National character is the result of the clashing of the mass-type and the individual-type: the insubordination of the individual is compelled to moderation (as the national phonetic laws restrict the tendency of the dialects to deflect from the norm); the mass receives in exchange an indeterminate impress from the individual. The national mind of the Greeks, then, while it differs from the mind of each of the individuals composing the nation, nevertheless exercises a controlling influence over all. Notwithstanding the tendencies of Greek particularism, so pervasive are the dominant qualities of the mass-type that the sum of the differences between any two poets or prose writers is less than the sum of their points of resemblance to two writers not Hellenes. Or possibly (despite the opposition of Ionian and Dorian), we may even go so far as to make this statement of any two individuals.

The national mind of the Greeks is a product of ethnological, sociological, and historical factors. Scientific proof of relative degrees of national capacity is not afforded by arguments based on ethnological considerations of the descent and racial characteristics of the members of the Indo-European group, all of which we may assume inherited a certain common endowment of potential capacity; yet that native endowment has manifested itself in the most diverse creations of literature, art, religion, language, architecture (the language of form), and other products of civilization. Nations alike in one respect, as intellectual character, often differ in other respects and find points of resemblance with nations of a different type. We may conjecture that by some subtle alchemy the fusion of the

Hellenic element with another stock yielded, as so often in the case of the union of alien races, the peculiar quality of genius that gives the Hellenes their separateness; yet after all comes the inevitable admission that the processes of nature which create diversity among nations, as among children of the same parents, defy all ultimate analysis. Certainly all theories of the comparative æsthetics of the structure of language fail to penetrate into the secrets of national ability. Whatever the embryonic mind of the Greeks was, their physical environment merely modified it or gave it opportunity to express itself in different terms. The Greeks brought with them from their inland home no memories of the sea; ¹ nor did they inherit from their Aryan progenitors names for the marine divinities; it was their contact with the Ægean that made them a seafaring folk, as it was their inherent qualities as a people that made Poseidon the god of the "on-swelling" waters and populated the deep with the creations of their poetic fancy. We cannot penetrate beyond this fact: that it was the unique prerogative of the Greeks that their language possessed in its earliest known stages the power of expressing delicate relations of thought and feeling; while from the dawn of Hellenic history the sovereignty of their greatest poet was imposed on intellect and heart alike.

It is in form rather than in content that the individuality of the Greek mind is expressed most inwardly. The religion, the customs of the Greeks mark rather the expression of individuality as regards content: their language sets forth not merely the content of thought; it sets forth the form, the movement of thought; it best voices the Hellenic conception of the world. But it is not merely that the Hellenic language expresses the mode of Hellenic thought: the language reacts on the mode of thought. "Human reason," as Eduard Meyer says, "grows *with* and *in* language." From the first day that Greek speech consciously obeyed the will of the Greeks, it continually adjusted itself to the enrichment of their mind; until reflection, reacting on thought and aiming to idealize feeling, created the language of the subtlest dramatic poetry and of philosophy.

Assuming by a broad generalization a division among different peoples on the lines of a predominance of the intellect or of the emotions, the Romans are a people whose language in its literary and "popular" expression is marked by the intellectual quality. In most uncivilized peoples feeling predominates, as is apparent in part from their abundant use of simile and metaphor. Among all languages that unite the qualities of intellect and emotion, Greek stands supreme.

Will, too, enters into the question as an element of language. Though the part it plays in the structure of national character is

¹ Pictet thought the Indo-European peoples were familiar with the Caspian.

strongly marked (witness the difference between Greece and Rome), its function in the differentiation of languages is less well known; nor can I have the hardihood to attempt to set apart the activity of the will from that of the intellect and feelings in this brief study of the relation of the physiognomy of the Greek mind to Greek speech.

To this study there are two methods of approach, each of which has its proper advantages. We may contrast the Greeks with themselves at different periods of their history, — *tempora mutantur nos et mutamur in illis*. Or we may seek to discover the characteristics of Greek speech by comparison with Latin or with the modern languages. For my present purpose it is this method to which I shall give special prominence.

For the study of the qualities of the Hellenic mind we have the direct evidence of the peoples with which the ancient Greeks came into contact. To this secondary source of information the moderns must have recourse, but a surer guide is afforded by their own examination of the expression of mind and character that is contained in the records of the Greeks themselves.

The Roman characterization of the Greeks presents no exception to the rule that the estimation of one people by another is colored by the national traits of the observer. Roman analysis is in the main deduced from contemporary observation.¹ The Roman writers were not impelled to search for the psychological causes that produced Hellenic superiority when Hellenic intellect or Hellenic arms achieved their highest preëminence.

On the social side the Romans did not fail of appreciation of the Greek *comitas* (Tacitus, *Agr.* 4), *liberalitas*, *facilitas* and *elegantia*. Capitolinus, *Maximinus* (29, 3), says: *soror mea (i. e. of Alexander Aurelius) Graecis munditiis erudita*.

To the keenness of the Greek, particularly the Attic, intellect, the Roman pays tribute. *Graeca facundia* is echoed from Sallust to Ausonius. Quintilian (12, 10, 36) opposes the strength of his countrymen to the mental agility of the Greek: *non possumus esse tam graciles, simus fortiores; subtilitate vincimur, valeamus pondere*. Greek sales, lepor, subtilitas, salsi eloquii venustas, the *nasus Atticus*, are commonplaces of Roman criticism, but not infrequently the sensitiveness of the Greek intellect appears as *ingenium molle* to the rugged and less delicate Roman. But it is the *levitas propria Graecorum* (Cicero, *pro Flacco*, 57) that is the dominant note. Lactantius says: *quorum levitas . . . incredibile est quantas mendaciorum nebulas excitaverit (Div. Inst. 1, 15)*. Akin to this *levitas* is the *negligentia* of the Greek (Cicero, *Epist.* 16, 4, 2); the Greek is *otiosus et loquax (de Orat. 1, 102)*. Cicero says: *hoc vitio (ineptum esse) cumula-*

¹ The evidence is collected by Wölflin in *Archiv für Latein. Lexicographie und Grammatik*, 7 (1890-92), 140f.

est eruditissima Graecorum natio (*de Orat.* 2, 18). Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, 2, 14) speaks of the lascivia Graecorum in the same breath with which he brands their levitas. The accusation of luxury is brought against them by Trebellius Pollio (*xxx tyr.* 16, 1), and by Paulus (*Festus*, p. 215). Greek arts of flattery are reprehended in the Graeca adulatio of Tacitus (*Ann.* 6, 18) and the Graecia blanda of Ennodius (344, 18); their vainglory prompts the remark of Pliny (*N. H.* 3, 42), Grai, genus in gloriam suam effusissimum; and that of the scholiast on Juvenal 3, 121, Graeci enim soli volunt maioribus amici esse. The "dregs of Achaea" disgust Juvenal because of the effrontery of Greek versatility. But it is above all the mala fides that stamps the Hellene. Graecia mendax is echoed again and again. Greek calliditas is emphasized by Livy and Silius Italicus. St. Jerome, *Epist.* 38, 5, says outright: impostor et Graecus est. In the famous passage in the oration *pro Flacco*, 9, Cicero has given, together with his verdict on Greek superiority, his condemnation of the vital defect in Greek character: hoc dico de toto genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras, do multarum artium disciplinam, non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam . . . testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit. Even where it was not a question of a superiority of the national sense of public honor, the Greek failed to satisfy the Roman censor: the exquisite aroma of his mythology, which the Latins assimilated only in its crude externalities, was the basis for the criticism of Claudius Marius Victor, *Aleth.* 3, 194, mendax Graecia . . . veris falsa insinuare laborat, and of a writer in the *Mythogr. Vat.* 3, 9, 12: pulchre mendax Graecia.

To the Roman, then, the Greek was keen-witted, eloquent, refined in speech and generally in manners, but marked by levity, bad faith, untruthfulness, vainglory, and the arts of insinuation. The national ideal of the Romans — their gravitas, continentia, and animi magnitudo (*Cic. Tusc.* 1, 1, 2) — was the antithesis of the Hellenic ideal. Deeds rather than words marked the vir fortis atque strenuus; and Sallust voices an essential part of Roman character in saying (*Cat.* 8, 5): optimus quisque facere quam dicere malebat; whereas the greatest of the statesmen of Greece was λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατότατος (Thuc. 1, 139). The modern estimate of the essential qualities of the Greek mind and character does not deny the justice of the Roman verdict. Indeed the Roman arraignment of the defects of the Greeks is not so severe as that which Polybius, no mere courtier of success, levels against his own countrymen (cf. 6, 56, 13; 37, 9; 38, 5). But in their analysis the moderns penetrate deeper into the springs of intellect, feeling, and will; and they select as the best field for the evaluation of Hellenic genius that period when the vital qualities of the race had met with no impairment through

the surrender of that individual liberty in and through which Hellenic nationality found its completest expression.

To us the Hellene is a unique combination of psychic forces; gifted with the rare endowment of a high spirit united with an intellect agile yet profound; gifted with the power to see things as they are and in the light of their essential characteristics, with a sense of proportion and of hostility to extravagance; inimical to all formulas;¹ animated by joyous self-confidence, a proud reliance upon his own powers, and a consciousness of his own superiority that divided the world into Greek and barbarian; possessed of an unerring taste and sensitiveness to form (which plays in the refinements of expression a larger rôle than does the intellect); progressive and a creator wherever he worked, yet conservative and bound to the past not only through the sanctities of his faith (which found fixed form in the earliest and the best of his books), but also by a realization of the continuity of the development of the arts; a lover of knowledge, not a lover of wealth; shaping his large curiosity to the purposes of the scientific spirit, and thus impelled to discover the causes of things and to fathom the mysteries of the world in which he lived; an apostle of intellectual freedom, not of mere utilitarianism; endowed with a genius for clear thinking in forms of beauty; a lover of truth in the veil of beauty; his ideal of human nature the harmonious development of man's faculties, a combination of the beautiful in outward form with inner worth.

Equally mobile with his intellect was his emotion. His emotional qualities were not repressed by insistence on the virtues of impassiveness. To lament was not unworthy of a manly nature, and sympathy was not unattended by tears. Susceptibility to feeling vitiated the course of justice, as it damned Phrynichus' play. When art depicted the agony of the body, it did not fail to hold the mirror up to nature: Philoctetes' screams filled the theatre. But at his highest, in literature as in life, the Greek submits his emotion to the control of his intellect; he argues while he feels; his dialectic is discerned through the veil of his emotion. As no other people, the Hellenes enjoy that rare possession — the union of keenness of feeling with the sacred passion for science. By temperament (which is constituted by emotion and will in their mutual relations) the Greeks were excitable and impulsive, and thus stand nearer to those peoples which live in and for the world about them than to those which withdraw into themselves; yet in a higher degree than other nations they combined the qualities resulting from the surrender to the world and the abnegation of the world.

The intellect of the Hellene is stronger than his moral energy.

¹ But in the later development of philosophy disloyalty to the letter of Epicurean tenets was the equivalent of impiety in the opinion of the faithful.

The diabolical ingenuity of Iago would have awakened less repulsion in him than the *ἄνοια* of Othello. The conception of virtue as a mean shows that at bottom the Greek is hostile to, or incredulous of, absolute moral truth. Metaphysics rather than ethics is the Greek sphere. It was a half-Oriental who made moral good everything, the rest nothing.

Greek character is marked by lack of stability, of sustained endeavor, of indomitable will, of seriousness, of gravity, of patience under discipline.¹ Romanus (not Graecus) *sedendo vincit*. Gusts of passion sweep the Athenian from the moorings of reason; and he returns to his better self only when he sees the shipwreck he has wrought. The possession of the empire of the intellect did not confer upon the Hellene that power to withstand the blows of fortune which in the Roman moved the admiration of Polybius. In the crises of character he often reverts to the elemental creature whose veneer was his delight in the art of Sophocles. The complacent Ionian was the victim of the palsied will; indeed defective will-power lies at the root of much of the defect of Greek character. If the senses of the Greek gave buoyancy to the movement of his intellect and rarely descended to the baser uses of appetite, his mobility often degenerated into loquacity, his acumen to quibbling and disputatiousness, his love of rhetoric to pretentious frivolity. Markedly individual in his personality, his self-love made him belittle the success of others and made him a stranger to the finer forms of sympathy.

Such is the normal type of the Greek. But the race is not homogeneous. The Dorian is almost an alien intrusion, and between him and the other Greeks there is a discrepancy of kind (not merely of culture) that I would explain on the ground of ethnological difference. In the northwest originally dwelt only half-Hellenic tribes that were to become factors in the later life of the nation. The Dorian is the Roman on Greek soil, and, like the language of the Romans, Doric is marked by parsimony and inability to form compounds.

Diversity and individuality, a wide range of capacity, a just balance of faculties, characterize the Hellene. Such as he was he remained the same in his intellectual physiognomy from first to last. If resistance to centralization stimulated his energies, it worked his political ruin. A world-empire was indeed secured at the price of national independence and of national ideals, the loss of which destroyed the national consciousness of the possession by the Hellenic stock of a common language, religion, and customs. Yet the essential

¹ Contrast the relatively few words in Greek with the many words in Latin that indicate the quality of persistence in effort: *sedulus, assiduus, industrius, diligens, laboriosus, strenuus*. There are comparatively few words in Greek for earnest, grave, dignified; many for insolent (to the Latin the "unusual" man), shameless; e. g. *θρασύς, ἀσελγής, βδελυρός, ἰταμός, αἰθόδης, ὑβριστής*. The difference between the two peoples is seen in the frequent use of *virtus, consilium, ratio*.

Hellenic qualities remain essentially unimpaired even in later periods of Greek life, when Hellenism, in its excessive individualism, displayed an increasing detachment between the mass and the few who still preserved the old ideals.

But the lineaments of a national type, be they never so well defined, must of necessity lose the precision of their outlines when the phenomena of language are to serve as the material of illustration. The minuter differentiae of racial psychology resist transference to vocabulary, syntax, and style. It is only the larger lines of Greek speech that mark the general psychological qualities of the Greeks. Like the people that used it, the language is characterized by elegance and delicacy. It is marked by an indescribable air of distinction; by facility of resource and suppleness; by transparency and lucidity of structure; by a reconciliation of intellectual vigor and emotion. Inexhaustible in its native power, it reproduces Greek naturalness, vividness, mobility of temperament, plasticity of mind. Its exuberance is tempered by continence; form and matter are welded to harmony by a sense of proportion. The genius of logic is native to it; as the mirror of the reflective processes of the mind it is both subtle and precise; as an artistic product it combines freedom with strength and grace. Direct and concrete, it lends itself to the happy inventions of fancy and follows the shifting mood with dramatic liveliness. Like the national hero, it is marked by ποικιλία. It wears the folds of a royal mantle (as Lamartine said of another language); and with all its alterations it retained a certain youthful vigor and creative energy; it did not become senile by crystallizing into rigidity. The language of Homer remained a national possession to the last.

An analysis of the distinctive qualities of the language in relation to the national psychology demands a detailed study of phonetics, word-form, vocabulary, word-meaning, syntax, and the general aspects of style. Such a study can at best only note the preponderance of this or that psychological factor, and in the survey of the few points that I can attempt here it is impossible to disengage the operation of the intellectual from the emotional faculties: thought and feeling are closely woven in forming the web of the inner life of language.

Sounds

The study of sounds as an index of the difference between Greek and other peoples is a province of investigation much neglected, not merely by reason of the elusiveness in the doctrine of phonetic symbolism as first enunciated by Humboldt, but also because of absolute and inevitable gaps in our knowledge; furthermore research

in the modern languages has not been carried far with the help of scientific instruments, such as Rousselot's.

The euphonic quality of language is not to be measured solely by the proportion of vowels and consonants. It is the character of the initial and final sounds, or rather the character and the position of the sounds in *all* the parts of a word (as studied by Pott), that marks the phonetic differentiation of one language from another.

In comparison with Latin, Greek is richer, more harmonious, but less majestic. It has *v*, and *ζ*, and the aspirates, but is unfriendly to the spirants.¹ It is rich in vocalic color, the wealth of which is due in large measure to the retention of the original sounds and, in the case of the diphthongs, in part to the disappearance of intervocalic spirants. The relative frequency of vowels and consonants in Greek, as contrasted with other tongues, has not been studied with any completeness. An examination of six consecutive hexameters from the Iliad shows 94 vowels, 106 consonants; from the Odyssey, 96 vowels and 105 consonants; from Virgil the figures are 99 and 107; from Horace 98 and 114; from Platen 92 and 174.²

It will be observed that while Greek has a greater variety of vowel sounds, the absolute number necessary to carry the consonants is not materially different in Greek and in Latin. The dialects differ, and Ionic shows greater variety in vowel sounds than Aeolic or Doric.

Consonantal alliteration is a mark of strength rather than of beauty, and Latin affects such alliteration much more than does Greek; Greek has, too, few stereotyped alliterative phrases such as ῥᾶον μωμείσθαι ἢ μιμείσθαι, ἦτοι κρίνον ἢ κολοκύντην, κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ψόν, whereas these are common in Latin (*salvus sanus, si sis sanus aut sapias satis, purus putus*), though the speech of the Romans is much inferior to that of the moderns in the abundance of alliterative expressions.

Studious as Greek is of euphony, it is noticeable the language manages with ease such initial sounds as πν, γν, τμ, δμ, βδ, γδ, στλ, σκν and some others forbidden to Classical Latin. Initial γμ, χμ, σχλ, σχν, σφ it does not allow. On the other hand the os rotundum of the Greeks is most exclusive as regards final consonants; yet it does not shrink from σφίγξ, φάλαγξ, ἰνγξ. (ἄλς and μάκαρς have no parallels.)

The modern languages, particularly those of Germanic stock, largely through the breakdown of the suffixal elements, are incomparably richer and incomparably more cacophonous as regards final sounds. One effect of the limited range of Greek in this respect is

¹ The loss of the spirants, says Bergk, gives to Greek an impression of stammering in comparison to other languages.

² The consonants normally exceed the vowels in frequency. But in archaic inscriptions (as those of Elis), a single consonant is often written for two consonants.

the almost utter absence of pregnant rhyming phrases such as sing-song, pell-mell, last not least, haste and waste, songe mensonge, lug und trug, träume schäume. We find παθήματα μαθήματα and a few other phrases. At best Greek could rhyme with two consonants only in combinations of sigma; for example with ψ in $\alpha\psi$, $\mu\alpha\psi$, or with ξ .

Clashing of consonants, which marked the austere style, was gradually avoided in literature; while the dialect inscriptions showing phonetic spelling record an attention to euphony which is surprising to the student of the literature. Apart from Elean and Late Spartan with their rhotacism the dialects display no fondness for the *littera canina* that is so common in Latin. Nu is a favorite consonant, yet the Greek equivalents of septem and densus avoid the dental nasal. Sonant r is avoided as is also sonant l . The sound of s had its detractors, such as Lasus; but his asigmatic ode was a mere *tour de force*. The Marathonian oath in the Oration on the Crown shows 50 sigmas in 67 words, and sigma is the commonest consonant. The sound of iota (ι σχάρον δὲ πάντων τὸ ι says Dionysius of Halicarnassus) was much more frequent in Latin than in Greek; and Hermogenes, who remarks that the diphthongs lend solemnity,¹ adds that this is not the case with $\epsilon\iota$ (that is $\bar{\iota}$) and ι .

To get an approximate idea of the relative frequency of the sounds of the language I have taken about 1000 consecutive sounds from 38 verses of the *Prometheus* (631–667), and from a part of Thuc. 2, 4. These sounds are distributed as follows (η is placed under η , ω under ω ; α includes $\bar{\alpha}$ and $\bar{\alpha}$).

Aesch.	Thuc.	Aesch.	Thuc.	Aesch.	Thuc.
1 σ 129	ν 99	11 λ 37	ω 38	21 γ 19	$\epsilon\iota$ 14
2 α 77	ϵ 89	12 ω 33	ι 33	22 $\epsilon\iota$ 19	θ 13
3 ν 73	τ 87	13 δ 31	μ 32	23 χ 17	χ 11
4 ϵ 70	σ 82	14 ι 31	$\alpha\iota$ 30	24 ϕ 10	$\alpha\nu$ 8
5 o 66	o 72	15 θ 28	ρ 30	25 $\epsilon\nu$ 6	8
6 τ 62	α 71	16 ν 26	ou 24	26 ξ 6	8
7 ρ 52	λ 65	17 $\alpha\iota$ 25	δ 22	27 β 5	ξ 5
8 π 48	π 40	18 κ 24	oi 22	28 $\alpha\nu$ 3	$\epsilon\nu$ 2
9 η 42	η 39	19 ou 24	ν 19	29 ζ 3	ψ 2
10 μ 39	κ 38	20 oi 21	γ 16	30 ψ 1	ζ 0

Aeschylus: vowel sounds, 443, consonants, 584. Thucydides: vowel sounds, 461, consonants, 558. The order of frequency of the vowels is e (ϵ and η), o (o and ω), α , ι , ν ; of the consonants, the dentals greatly exceed either the palatals or the labials; the mutes are thrice as numerous as the mediae or the aspiratae. Further investigation is of course necessary to arrive at greater certainty. A rough tabulation of the frequency of initial letters by the pages

¹ The sound of ω had a certain solemnity (Plato, *Phædrus*, 244 D).

of Liddell and Scott's Lexicon shows the following approximate results:

1 α	269	9 τ	71	17 ν	26
2 π	249	10 υ	58	18 γ	22
3 ε	231	11 φ	54	19 η	19
4 σ	152	12 χ	45	20 ρ	16
5 κ	150	13 λ	43	21 ω	12
6 ο	83	14 θ	31	22 ψ	11
7 δ	79	15 ι	28	23 ζ	6
8 μ	77	16 β	27	24 ξ	5

Summing up we may say that the phonetical apparatus of the Greeks seems to stand midway between the consonantal languages of Europe, such as Germanic and Slavic (especially Polish and Russian), and the essentially vocalic tongues, such as Italian, the musical character of which, due largely to its vocalic endings, has been gained at the cost, as Pott has remarked, of the intellectual character of the language. The point to which I desire to call attention in connection with the question I have in hand is that in general the vocalic languages are spoken by peoples which attach more importance to form than to matter, and are sanguine and nervous, whereas the consonantal languages are the property of those peoples that emphasize matter over form and are melancholic or phlegmatic.

Accent

Accent, too, has its psychological value. Between the free play of the accent of the Veda and the rigidity of Latin, Greek here again has a middle range. The range of Indo-European accent has, indeed, been restricted, but the restriction has been to the advantage of euphony and symmetry. Thus, for bhāramāṇas, bhāramāṇasya and ādikṣamahi, ādikṣadhvam, Greek has φερόμενος, *φερομένοιο and ἐδειξάμεθα, ἐδείξασθε. The freedom of Greek accentuation goes hand in hand with its rich vowel system and its power of semasiological differentiation through difference of form. Cf. φόρος, φορός; τέρπεισθαι, ταρπῆναι; φερεσакής, σакесφόρος; τιμή, ἄτιμος; ἦθος, εὐθες. It may not be an unjustified deduction to infer that peoples whose language is chromatic in its accent are often those which attach greater importance to form; while matter is more emphasized by those which, like Latin, stress the penult or antepenult; or the radical syllable, as the Germanic tongues, which thereby obliterate the suffixal elements.

The act of speaking is both physical and psychological. Only the professional psychologist can answer the inquiry of the philologist whether energy of emphasis is due to predominance of emotion or of will. Certainly temperament must largely determine emphasis and

speed of utterance. The rate of pronunciation must be an unknown quantity: certainly it cannot necessarily be inferred from speed of thought; even if it is true, as Steinthal maintained, that the moderns think quicker than the ancients, this is not a sure guide to the rate of speed of Greek speech.¹ Certain inferences point, however, to the probability of a quick tempo: the abundance of short vowels, the large number of short monosyllables and dissyllables, especially particles (contrast γέ with *quidem*, δέ with *autem, vero*),² the avoidance of hiatus, of which Latin, unlike its descendant French, is careless. We may not err in thinking Attic as spoken with ease and rapidity. Nonnus, 37, 319, says ταχύμυθος Ἀτθίς φωνή. Latin may have been uttered more slowly but with greater energy than Attic, though the law of iambic shortening points to some rapidity. The Dorians spoke with deliberation.

Form

The varied gifts of the Greeks are reflected by the varied formal means of expression at their command. The abundance of formative suffixes, the extent of the verbal system,³ the limitless possibilities of composition, mark the exceeding richness of Greek on the purely formal side. The elasticity of the language gives play to the subtler affinities of personality. Sanskrit is equally rich, if not richer, in form; but it stiffened into rigidity: both language and literature are deficient in dramatic quality, in personality. A unity to which everything is sacrificed is a dead uniformity. In Greek ossification was prevented in part by the vigorous life of the dialects, many of which, not one merely, were irradiated by the genius of poetry. The formal resources of Greek are applied with a distinctness that is widely at variance with the indiscriminateness of uninflected languages, such as English, which may use the same word as noun, verb, and interjection, as in the case of *hollo*. Regularity in Greek coexists with wealth of form, with freedom of differentiation and of analogy. The larger use of writing, the development of literature, restricted to

¹ Rapidity of Greek thought is indicated by syntactical attraction and assimilation which compress the separate members of a sentence; by the swift transition from direct to indirect discourse and the reverse; by the frequency of ellipsis, as of the substantive verb, or when a sentence begins with the impetuous ἀλλά; by the frequent omission of either the protasis or the apodosis; by the use of brachylogy; by the construction πρὸς τὸ σημαίνόμενον; by the innumerable forms of anacoluthon; by the use of various figures of speech such as aposiopesis; by diverse locutions, such as οἷός τ' ἢ δρᾶσον.

² Cf. Demosth. 18, 179, οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ, οὐδ' ἔγραψα μὲν οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ, οὐδ' ἐπρέσβευσα μὲν οὐκ ἔπεισα δέ Θηβαίους, with Quint. 9, 3, 55, non enim dixi quidem sed non scripsi, nec scripsi quidem sed non obii legationem, nec obii quidem sed non persuasi Thebanis.

³ In Greek 507 verbal forms are possible, in Latin 143, in Sanskrit 891; though as regards the number of forms actually in constant use Sanskrit is not superior to Greek.

some extent the manifold variety of the earlier language; but that restriction too gave regularity and normality, which are apt to be absent in languages which, like Latin, live for centuries without the restraining and corrective influence of literary art, and thus degenerate into anomaly and irregularity. Some part, too, of the formal riches of Greek were abandoned by the action of the law of least effort and by the conscious operation of the intellect.

Allusion can be made to only a few points of interest. The multiplicity of the so-called irregular verbs proceeds from a nice sense of distinction between various kinds of action ('point'-action, continuative, terminative, perfective, etc.), which is due to the difference of the formative elements and to the meaning of the several roots which combine into a system. Lucidity marks the formation of derivative words, especially the compound abstracts, which, as a rule, show at once their connection with the primitives; whereas in English and the "dead Romance languages," as Fichte called them in contrast to German, abstract words are frequently borrowed and thus stand in no living relation with common speech.

Greek, as German, shows more color in making neuters of its diminutives, whereas in Latin difference in size is not marked by difference in gender. So, too, in other forms: Latin contents itself with *amans* for *φιλῶν, φιλοῦσα, φιλοῦν*. Many words form plurals that are impossible in the modern languages: in Greek such plurals often manifest the operation of an intellectual activity, in Latin they usually display strength of feeling.

But the originality of the language is nowhere more patent externally than in its ability to form compounds. Here appears the flexibility of the Greek mind, its fertility of resource, its innate artistic capacity, its power of welding with pregnant force the various characteristics of an object; here the distinctive virtues of individuality have free room to make themselves felt. Take, for example, such compounds as *ἐξελευθεροστομέω, καταστερισμός, τελέομηνος*, and the elastic *αὐτόχειρ*. In lucidity and precision Greek may vie with Sanskrit, but its sense of proportion rejects the *sesquipedalia verba* of that tongue.¹ In plasticity Greek has a possible rival in German alone.²

¹ Examples of long words are *ἀπογνωσιμαχήσαντες, στωμυλιοσυλλεκτᾶδης*.

² Aristophanes may for the moment rear towering compounds, but normal Greek rarely can vie with German herein. German, too, excels in the construction of such words as "Anundfürsichsein"; and outdoes even itself in "Auchnichtseindauchhandersseinkönnen." English reaches its maximum in "transubstantiation-ability" and "proantitransubstantiationist." Grimm's *Wörterbuch* gives 617 words compounded with "kunst" and almost as many with "krieg" and "hand." It should be observed that, though German is like Greek as regards the freedom with which it forms compounds, the quality of German compounds is in many respects different from that of Greek, and especially as regards sensuous epithets. The influence of Greek in the eighteenth century is seen in the increased frequency of such compounds as "neidgetroffen" (Goethe), "donnergesplittert" (Klopstock). Compounds with the past participle are rare in O. H. G. and M. H. G. German admits also the present participle, as in "liebeglühendes Herz" (Körner) and "völkerwimmelnde Stadt" (Schiller).

Latin¹ and the Romance² languages are immeasurably inferior in every respect. Doric alone of the dialects lacks the power to form compounds readily.

Like German, Greek has the power of giving a peculiar shading of expression by its substantival compounds, which have a different value than the analytical disposition of the members of the thought.

The relative brevity of the compounds of Greek enables the poet to view concretely an object or a quality from more points of vision than is possible to most other Indo-European languages: extension of the thought is not purchased by undue extension of mere word-form. The images are, so to speak, phonetically condensed. Cf. *ἀστυνόμοι ὄργαι*, "disposition for ordered life in cities."

No term-stone can be set to the possibility of shaping new compounds in Greek, or, indeed, to the character of their formation. Innovations, such as *φιλαπεχθήμων*, are continually coming to view. The poets display the same delight in the delicately chiseled workmanship of their *τορευτὰ ἐπη* as Cellini took in each new creation of his art. The lately discovered lyrics of Bacchylides showed nearly one hundred compounds either used for the first time or unattested in any other writer.

The study of Greek compounds has been unduly neglected from at least one point of view. Since sense-epithets are preëminently a mark of personality, we have need of an investigation, especially of the compounds of a sensuous character. Such a study should include an examination of the range of each poet from Homer on, together with the determination of the sensuous sphere from which

¹ Confessions by the Romans of the poverty of their speech in the formation of compounds is frequent. Cf. Lucr. 1, 830, Livy 27, 11, 5, Cic. *De Fin.* 3, 4, 15, Gellius, N. A. 11, 16, 1. Latin has very few compounds with two prepositions (cf. *ἐναπολαμβάνω*, *ἐπικαταβάλλω*), and the constitution of such compounds is evident only after scrutiny (*abscondo*, *consurgo*).

² The inability of the Romance languages to grapple with the compounds of Greek may be illustrated by the following translations, by Desrousseaux and Da Festa respectively, of Bacchylides, 11, 37-46:

νῦν δ' Ἀρτεμις ἄγροτέρα | χρυσάλατος λιπαρὰν | ἡμέρα τοξόκλυτος νίκαν ἔδωκε. | τᾷ ποτ' Ἀβαντιάδᾳ | βωμὸν κατένασσε πολὺλ- | λιστον εὐπεπλοῖ τε κοῦραι. | τὰς δ' ἔξ ἐρατῶν ἐφόβησε | παγκρατῆς Ἥρα μελάρων | Προίτου, παραπλήγι φρένας | καρτερᾷ ζεύξας ἀνάγκῃ.

Mais Artémis aujourd'hui, chasseresse au sceptre d'or, calme déesse, illustre par son arc, lui donne une victoire éclatante. A Artémis jadis un autel où s'empres- sent les prières fut bâti par le fils d'Abas et ses filles au beau péplos, que la toute-puissante Héra chassa de l'aimable palais de Proitos, l'esprit subjugué par la dure nécessité de l'égarément.

Ma ecco che ora gli ha dato una splendida vittoria la cacciatrice Artemis dall' aurea conocchia, la mite inclita arciera. A cui un giorno eresse un molto sup- plicato altare l'Abantiade e le sue vergini figlie vestite di bei peppli; poichè fuori dalle amabili case di Proitos le aveva tratte spaventate la possente Hera, con le menti avvinte da una fiera, fatale insania.

The translation of the passage by Jurenka does less violence to the native quality of German: Doch jetzt hat die Jägerin Artemis, die goldspindlige, kundige Schützin, die Sänftigerin, den glänzenden Sieg dir verliehen. Ihr siedelte einst der Abantiade an einen vielumflehten Altar mit seinen schöngewandigen Töchtern, die aus den anmuthigen Hallen die hochmächtige Hera gescheucht des Proitos, da den Geist in des Wahnsinns schreckliche Noth sie geschirret.

each epithet is drawn, and a separation of the imitations from the fresh and living picture. Research work of this sort would prove a valuable contribution to the study of the psychology of the Greek people.

Word-Meaning

Words are the shorthand of thoughts. We pack into them the total impression of the thing or the quality they denote. The etymological signification is merely the seed from which is developed the full-grown plant. The Greeks, like other Indo-European peoples, put their national subjective impressions into words derived from roots equally the possession of other members of the same linguistic family; and with results that display their individual attitude towards the world of things and of ideas.

For the elucidation of the mind of a people semasiology is far more significant than the study of external form. For the psychologist the investigation of Greek word-meaning offers, with all the limitations incidental to an ancient language, the advantage of materials of a literature enormous in extent ¹ and admitting of a more definite limitation than any modern literature.

Yet it is surprising how little has been done in this field of research. Buttmann we have, and his unequal successor, Goebel. Here and there we find work of a special character, like Bechtel's *Ueber die Bezeichnungen der sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen in den indogermanischen Sprachen*, Schrader's *Die Psychologie des älteren griechischen Epos*; or discussions of the subject from the general point of view, such as Hecht's *Die griechische Bedeutungslehre*. Pezzi's *Espressione metaforica di concetti psicologici* stands alone in its kind, and it does not profess to be more than a register. Synonyms deal with only a single aspect of semasiology, and of modern books there is but one. There has been no gleaner in Greek fields like the incomparable Grimm.

Comparative semasiology is the surest guide to national distinctions of thought. φίλος is rendered by friend, ami, Freund; ἀρετή by virtue, vertu, virtue, Tugend: and yet on closer inspection that which seems nearest akin is separated by wide gulfs of difference. φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν differ from "diligere," a word that well indicates the cautious and prudent Roman (cf. Catullus, 72, 1), to whom "loving" was a process of wise selection. Each tongue has its own voice, and here Danish outdoes all other languages with its distinction between "kjaerlighed," man's love for woman, and "elskov," the ideal inspiration for all that is lovely which is awakened in man by his love for woman. (See Abel, "Ueber den Begriff der Liebe in

¹ If we take the period ending with the birth of Christ, there are extant about 125,000 verses and over 22, 000 (Teubner) pages of prose.

einigen alten und neuen Sprachen," in his *Sprachwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, p. 47.)

Degrees of national social development are likewise indicated by the contrast between "guest," ξένος, and "hostis," in Old Latin "stranger," in Classical Latin "foreigner."

The shifting of signification within the limits of the same language reflects many aspects of national life, and especially national morals; as when foul thoughts are glossed by fair words and fair words lose thereby their innocency.

The unequalled resources at his command enabled the Greek at will to employ synonyms at every hand; and this is nowhere more noticeable than in the expressions for "good" and "bad."

The astonishing wealth of synonyms in Homer, one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of any language, denotes the concentration of the linguistic sense upon the things of prime interest to the Homeric man.¹ With the destruction of national sentiment synonyms are used without distinction, abstract and vague expressions grow apace, the finer shading of thought is blurred in its outline through the adoption of general terms, or words properly expressive of delicate relations of ideas dissipate their vitality as they enlarge the range of their signification, adjectives are "applied to everything because they are applicable to nothing in particular" (ὀλοσχερής in Polybius); inanimate things and animate persons are persecuted by the poets, who worry them with epithets.

Greek semasiology has a twofold task: to set forth, on a psychological basis, the history of words according to their content, from Homer to the end of Greek literature; to discover the processes of thought by which words pass from one signification to another. The determination of the etymology and the chronology is the duty of the philologist; the determination of the laws that operate in the movement of signification from age to age is the task of the empirical psychologist.

To illustrate the psychological and the chronological determination, I select a few examples, first of the development of words from a primitive sensuous sphere to an intellectual or non-sensuous sphere, and, secondly, of the transference of words from one kind of sensuous meaning to another. Thus, πρέπειν, originally applied to the sense of sight (though it is also used of smell and sound), passes through the delimitation which restricts it to that which appeals favorably to the sense of sight, and yields the common Attic meaning. πράττειν, originally "to voyage through," "to pass over a space," acquires the force of "complete" in Homer (who retains also the primitive

¹ For "battle" Homer has 6 words; for "helmet" 5; for "hunter" 4; for "sea" 7; for "beggar" 7. He has seven words to mark different kinds of herdsmen, besides four words of a general character.

meaning), and finally that of "act," "do" without regard to the attainment of the goal (first in Xenophanes). *συνβάλλειν* in Homer still means "to bring together," in Heraclitus it means "to compare," in Pindar "to recognize." *τέρπειν* shows a tendency to differentiate the forms with *α* (*ταρπῆναι*) with the meaning "satisfy," "sate" (a meaning which disappears with the *α*-forms) from the forms with *ε*, which have the force of "rejoice."

The range of a many-sided language like Greek is enlarged by those ideas that appeal to the wider commonalty of the consciousness of the entire race. So it is with the sense of sight and the appearance of light which awakens a train of associative images. Image reacts upon image. *ὄμμα* is not only the eye but that which is seen by the eye, the capacity of insight, the effluence of the thing seen (cf. Plato, *Meno*, 76 D). Various aspects of thought are presented by many words of like character, such as *αὐγή*, *αὐγάζειν*, *λάμπειν*, *λαμπρός*, *φῶς*, *φέγγος*, and their opposites. So with *δεδορκέναι* = *ζῆν*. In the language of Greek poetry concrete sensuous images, as *φοιτὰς νόσος*, "intermittent pain," may be subtilized by the reflective process.

An inviting field of investigation is a study of certain forms of comparison as the expression of the mental habits of the Greeks. How far does Greek apply a quantitative standard where the modern languages employ other expressions of degree? *πολύς* and *μέγας* have a wide range, like *multus* and *magnus*. The Greek used *πολύς* of *γέλως*, *ὑπνος*, *αἰδώς*, *ἀνάγκη*, *νύξ*; *μέγας*, of *φίλος*, *φωνή*, *λόγος*, *καιροί*. The animal world offers the standard of comparison in *ἵπποστέλινον*, *ἱππόκρημνος*, *βούγλωσσος*. Diminutives are common where emotion is readily or strongly expressed. Italian has many, English few, diminutives; South German has more than North German. Very common in Latin, they evince the tendency of the Romans to express their feelings strongly when they express them at all. In Greek they play an important rôle in popular speech and in those forms of literary art which are nearest akin to the language of the people. Thus Aristophanes has *βαλλάντιον*, *γαστρίδιον*, *ἱματίδιον*, *μελίττιον*, *ὀφθαλμίδιον*. Epic poetry, choral lyric, and tragedy avoid the diminutive, though in some words occurring in these classes of literature the diminutive force has been lost, as in *μηρίον*, *τειχίον*; whereas *ἡνία* seems to be a primitive. The elective affinities of literature show that there was a difference between the speech of the cultivated classes and that of the common people, though that difference was probably less than that which distinguishes German and French dialects from the coyer literature.

But the investigation we desiderate has much more to do than to open up the polarities of comparison. Above all is needed a study of expressions for love, admiration, tenderness, hate, anger, sternness,

coldness, astonishment, etc., and of the utilization or rejection of opportunities to set forth these emotions. How far is the Greek naïve, how far does he restrain himself from baring his soul, how far does he express gradations of his psychic state?

The emotional faculties of the Greeks were keenly sensitive. Excitability, intensity, passion, mark their personality. The driving impulses of pleasure and pain express themselves in a surprising wealth of interjections. The Roman, whose boast is "*et facere et pati fortia*" (Mucius Scaevola in Livy 2, 12, 10), borrows most of his exclamations of joy from the Greek (io, evoe, eu, euge, eia), while his exclamations of sorrow are his own. Greek abounds in words for joy; witness only *χαίρειν* (with the incomparable salutation *χαῖρε*), *τέρπεσθαι*, *εὐφραίνεσθαι*, *ἡδεσθαι*.

In common with the Roman, the Greek refuses in general to delineate his mental state with the nicety of discrimination and accuracy of psychological detail characterizing all languages that bear the impress of romanticism; and in restricting the delineation of emotion to the larger outlines of human feelings, the classical languages seem pallid in contrast to the many-colored richness of modern literature. It can be shown, I believe, that the Greeks affect a certain undifferentiated intensity of expression: thus *στένειν* is less than "groan," *δακρύειν* is "to be moved to tears"; *αἵματόεν ῥέθος* is Deianeira's "flushed cheek." But this stress of emotional effect is much less pervasive among the Greeks than the Latins, who employ expressions indicative of great strength of feeling, expressions which do not admit (without qualification) of alternatives of lesser pathos. The Roman constantly says "*flentes*," "*lacrimantes*," "*multis cum lacrimis*." When once moved, he had no hesitation in using the strongest words at his command. Hence the vogue of the superlative in Latin is more marked than in Greek. Pliny (*Epist.* 2, 9, 3) uses four superlatives in immediate succession.

I have singled out a study of the expression of the emotions as an approach to the characteristics of the national mind of the Hellenes. But there are innumerable others of the same sort. Take, for example, the expressions of the idea of duty: duty to God, to one's self, to our neighbors, to our friends and foes. Only by these and similar studies can we gain an approach to the psychology of that people whose combination of intellect, imagination, fancy, and artistic sense we rank so high; and this, methinks, is infinite riches, in comparison to which much of the output of our dissertation-factories is poverty indeed.

The student of Hellenic thought has here stretched out before him fresh fields that are well-nigh untrodden: the olives of Athens have not yet all been gleaned.

Vocabulary

It is possible to exaggerate the significance of national vocabulary. Some, indeed, have said that were every external manifestation of national achievement in the mechanical and other arts to be destroyed, it would yet be possible to restore the entire state of a nation's civilization by the aid of its vocabulary alone. But vocabulary, though it may be called the mirror of national mind, the pulse of national life, cannot alone reproduce the inner coloring of thought, the subtle play of light and shadow, that resides in the combination of words; and it is in the combination of words that the national soul most subtly expresses itself. Vocabulary is then, after all, a sketch, not an exact reproduction of nationality. Its wealth is regulated by the intensity of interests that a people brings to bear upon the outer world of things and the inner world of thought. The national capacity of the Greeks for expression is not to be measured along the periphery by mere wealth of words marking sensuous or even intellectual ideas; abundance of concrete words is not a gauge of intellectual vitality (the fourteen words for the parts of the Homeric ship do not in themselves differentiate the Hellene from the Phœnician); it must be measured at the centre too, by the definiteness with which intellectual and sensuous ideas are expressed, by the inner significance attributed to these ideas.

The Greeks were impelled by a propensity to create, and their language responded to this impulse without hesitation. New words were born at inventive crises. Each new thought found for itself adequate expression in a speech of marvelous copiousness and plasticity. Every advance of civilization enriched the language with new conceptions and infused new life into words already in use. *οὐσία* acquires the meaning of "substance" from that of "property," "possession"; *ρίζωμα*, "root," in Empedocles becomes "element"; *κατηγορία*, "accusation," becomes "category"; *φύσις*, "natural constitution," is used for "nature"; *γύαλα* the "convex swelling of the cuirass," for the "vault of heaven." On the formal side the vitality of the language is seen in the construction of new compounds rather than in the formation of derivatives from single stems. It is but seldom that two words have the same form but different meanings.

I cannot attempt to set forth the achievements of the Greeks in the construction of technical terminology. From the chaos of mere words Aristotle and the Stoics brought forth order and laid the foundations of the language of grammar. The Hindus, indeed, possessed a like degree of acumen in this field, but it was the fortune of Dionysius the Thracian and not of Pāṇini, to compose the book which, next to the Bible, has had (as Delbrück says) a larger influence on the thought of Europe than any other single volume.

Every language is defective from the angle of vision of those of its users whose range extends over other languages, and who, therefore, borrow to supply their own deficiencies. Vocabulary has to follow trade and an increasing acquaintance with nature. The national debt of Greek presents a most instructive commentary on the character of Greek thought and national consciousness, especially when compared with other languages. Latin was an enormous borrower; when the language was saturated with Hellenisms it was a mere affectation of purism on the part of Tiberius to apologize for his use of "monopolium." A Chinese emperor in 1771 displaced over 5000 Chinese words in favor of a like number of Manchu origin. Of all the tongues of Europe, which have the past as well as their contemporaries to draw from, French is the coyest to adopt new words. English is said to show 13,230 Teutonic, 29,853 "classical" words; but as English is a composite language, the preponderance of non-Teutonic words is not altogether due to mere borrowing. Russian is said to form new words readily from its own resources.

The pronounced hostility of Greek to borrowed words is one of the most remarkable features of that language, and the more remarkable because it was spoken from the Black Sea to the Pillars of Hercules, and because Greece itself was the home of thousands of barbarian slaves. Chauvinism in a language may seem venial when a language like Greek is possessed of a practically inexhaustible mine from which to quarry the materials of thought. "*Lingua mater*," we may say, "*nova miracula suis ex visceribus numquam emittere cessabit.*" But the ability of a language to meet all demands upon it for the expression of its ideas is not an index of national resistance to acquisitions from abroad. German, with all its splendid capacity for compounding new words, would not repudiate many of the loan-words (said to be at least 14,000) that were acquired during the peculiar phases of its history.

Apart from proper names, the number of borrowed words in Greek for appellatives (for these only are borrowed) is much disputed, but is, on any theory, small. The trend of opinion at present is that A. Müller, Muss-Arnolt, and Lewy have exaggerated the amount of the debt to the Semitic languages. I hold no brief for Leo Meyer's *Wörterbuch*, which in many respects is a most unsatisfactory work; but at all events it is not inclined to dogmatism about the words in doubt. Down to the time of Aristotle, if my reading of the book is accurate, Meyer accepts as certainly foreign only about 100 words, while the origin of perhaps as many more which wear a foreign look he cautiously classes as obscure. As the domain of natural science was enlarged there was a constant increase in the vocabulary, chiefly through the activity of the Peripatetics; and Aristotle and Theophrastus (and later Dioscorides) show a considerable number of

foreign words for animals, minerals, and plants. Most of the loan-words of Greek are taken from the animal, the mineral, and (chiefly) the vegetable kingdom; besides these, there are, especially, names for materials of wearing apparel, woven goods, arms, measures, and musical instruments. Scientific terms and words for the arts the Greeks created for themselves.

But I do not so much wish to call attention to the refusal of the Greeks to adopt words of other languages as to emphasize their attitude towards certain objects seen by them for the first time. When an unknown object with a strange name becomes known to most peoples the name is usually transferred mechanically (sometimes with a certain amount of resistance) into their own speech. Sometimes the foreign word is retained for a time and later a designation of native manufacture is substituted for it. Of this latter process there is no sure example in Greek.

It is hard to discover the source of importations because more than any other people the Greeks regarded a new object from the point of view of its essential characteristic and found a name for it by recourse to their own tongue.¹ Thus in many instances they expanded or modified the current conception of a word already existing; as in the case of *δορκάς*, gazelle, *τροχός*, potter's wheel, *Διὸς βάλανος*, the sweet chestnut, *μέγας στρουθός*, ostrich, *Περσικόν (μῆλον)*, peach, *Κυδώνιον (μῆλον)*, quince, *φασιανός (ὄρνις)* pheasant. Sometimes derivatives were formed, as *ῥαινα*, hyena (for which *γλάνος* was another name), *ιχνεύμων*, ichneumon (because it seeks out the eggs of the crocodile), *κράνεια*, cornel-tree, *κεράτια*, St. John's bread. Finally it was common to construct compounds, such as *ῥινόκερος*, *στρεψίκερος*, *πύγαργος*, *κατωβλέπων*, *κερκοπίθηκος*, and *ῥοδόδειδρον*.² Even the Phœnician names of the letters of the alphabet have been transformed and often made to end in alpha. This capacity of the Greeks to create names would seem to hold true in the case of objects which they themselves saw in foreign countries; and the process thus described may well have coexisted with the adoption of foreign names for things actually imported, or the knowledge of which (notably of animals, plants, and minerals) was imported by the Phœnicians before the Greeks displaced that people as the traders of the Mediterranean. Examples are *πάνθηρ* from Sanskrit *pundīkaras*, *πάρδος* from *prḍākus*; *μύρρον*, *νάρδος*, *πέπερι*, *ἀλόη*; *σάπφειρος*, *ἱάσπις*, *σμάραγδος*.

The cases of folk-etymology are perhaps less common than in other languages; as *Μεῖλιχος*, "the mild (Zeus)" is Phœnician Melech or

¹ This occurs of course in other languages; cf. French *sanglier* from *singularis* instead of a name derived from *verres* or *aper*.

² See Weise, *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, 13 (1881-82), 233 ff. To this article (and the same author's *Charakteristik der lateinischen Sprache*) I am much indebted.

Moloch; the date, δάκτυλος, is Aramaic dikela, palm; in συκόμορος, sycamore, we seem to hear σῦκον and μόρος, though the word is derived from Hebrew schikmim.

A marked feature of the language, even its later history, is its proud refusal to adopt Latinisms. Strabo finds Greek equivalents for procurator, legatus, aquaeductus, sinus. Literature seems only then to have adopted Latin words when they had been enfranchised in the language of the people, which was not often the case. Plutarch was weak in Latin; Libanius was ignorant of it. Not till the fourth century was Latin better known because of the Latin rhetors in the Eastern Empire. Cestius and Argentarius seem to have been the first to make addresses in Latin. The influence of Latin syntax is indeed seen in Philodemus to a considerable extent, but Philodemus was himself Latinized.

Various other aspects of Greek vocabulary open up interesting points of approach. The play of fancy, the poetical envisagement of an object are seen in many of the names for animals, fishes, plants, etc. Thus, κερδῶ, fox, φερέοικος, snail, ψυχρή, butterfly, ἡχέτης, cicada, βασιλίσκος, golden-crested wren; βάκχος, κύβιον, are names of fishes; νυμφαία is the water-lily. It is noteworthy that the same word often designates a plant and a fish, a bird and a fish. Sometimes the same animal has many names, which are due to popular recognition of diverse qualities.

Greek names for persons are one of the finest achievements of the genius of the Indo-European languages; and the principle of name-giving inherited by all the Indo-European peoples nowhere attained such splendid results as in Greece. The common names of the Greeks have an element of distinction, an idealistic and poetic tone that echoes the national spirit as the names of no other land. κλέος is the most prolific single element, and its frequency recalls the remark of Pliny (*N. H.* 3, 42): *Grai, genus in gloriam suam effusissimum*. The stateliness and dignity of the names in εὖ-, ἀριστο-, καλλι-, καλο-, ἀγορα-, δημο-, -μαχο-, ἵππο-, θεο-, κρατο-, etc., evince at once the national ideals and the contrast to the lowliness and poverty of the Roman names, which often express intellectual or physical defects (Cato, Verres, Cicero, Catilina; Brutus; Flaccus, Plancus, Sulla, Naso). In Latin there are at most only thirty prænomena. Success in war was not to the Greeks a proper source of name-giving, and not till the Macedonian age do we meet with such names as Demetrius Poliorcetes, Seleucus Nicator; whereas the addition of designations like Africanus and Numidicus is proper to the genius of the Roman people. The Greek found in names for persons the *nomen et omen*, a religious significance rather than an opportunity for mere word-play or jest such as marks the attitude of Cicero in his correspondence and even in his speeches. But the well-nigh universal refusal of the

Romans to name their children after their gods evinces a deeper religious feeling than the Greek custom, which, with few exceptions, draws on the entire pantheon (for example, Ἀπολλώνιος, Ποσειδώνιος). In fact, while the names of the Greeks mirror the high spirit of the cavalier, the Roman names utterly fail to reflect the dignity of Roman national life.

Another difference between Greek and Latin is the individualization by the Greek of his mountains, springs, and other features of natural scenery. All of these bear definite names, and some are relics of the primitive "Carian" civilization, such as Ἐρύμανθος, Ἀράκυνθος.¹ So rich is the vocabulary of Greek places that we may almost use the words of Lucan in speaking of the district about Troy: "nullum sine nomine saxum."

Conscious of the wealth of the vocabulary at his command, the Greek does not scruple to repeat a word already used; while the anxiety of the Roman to vary his words is an effort to hide by artifice the poverty of his resources. Poetry has its own vocabulary, but the proprieties of prose demand a limitation of the material used by the poet; yet no such strict bounds were set by the Greeks as by the Latins. Under the impulse of a controlling emotion the writer of prose in Greece feels free to rise to the region of poetry and to borrow from the loftier language of his fellow craftsmen the means to awaken emotion in others.

The deficiencies of Greek vocabulary are also instructive. Words for color are more numerous than in Latin; the poverty of which in contrast to the abundance of Greek is lamented by Favorinus (Gellius, N. A. 2, 26, 5). Their infrequency in Greek, however, in comparison to modern languages is an indication of indifference, not to the charm of color, but to the minutiae of shading. French is said to have five times as many color-words as English, but we are not therefore insensible to the play of color effects; and English differentiates *auburn*, *hazel* and *bay*, *rose* and *pink* where German has only *braun* and *rosa*. Greek words for color often suggest more than they mean, as in the case of χλωραύχην used of a woman.

Both Greek and Latin have a highly developed system of names for family relationship, but a point of difference between the two languages may be noticed in the "conjuges liberique" of the Roman in contrast to the παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες of the Greek. The relation of the slave to his master in Greece (παῖς, οἰκέτης, ἀνδράποδον, and the colorless δοῦλος) is much less individualized than in Rome, where an ampler system of names indicates a wider aspect of the position occupied by the slave in regard to the family and the state (puer, famulus, verna, minister, ancilla, servus, mancipium).

¹ Probably "Carian" are also ἀσάμυνθος, τερέβινθος.

Syntax

To syntax so much attention is devoted to-day that we almost lose sight of other aspects of the study of language. Greek syntax, too, displays the obvious and the subtler operations of the national mind. The Roman loves concinnity, subordination; the Greek loves variation, independence, the largest amount of freedom under the sovereignty of law. To fixed forms of thought, to rigidity and uniformity of expression, the Greek mind is hostile. The acuteness of his logical faculty loves to unbend; — an entasis disturbs the level line of thought only to yield a higher beauty than that of mere evenness. Greek speech is acutely sensitive to the psychological processes of assimilation, attraction, and the varied forms of analogy; all of which give evidence of liveliness and rapidity of comprehension. A passion for precision of outline is voiced in the delight in antithesis. Antithesis is sometimes developed within antithesis; and readily finds expression even when it does not point a contrast in the thought. Greek is the language of “buts”: we might almost say of it what Goethe said in another connection: “jedes gesprochene Wort erregt den Widerspruch.” Independence of the members of a sentence is gained by μέν and δέ, even when syntactical subordination is effected by conjunctions. A further testimony to the antithetical form of thought are the many polar expressions, as when one member of a pair is logically insignificant (Ξ 315–316, *Alcman*, 4, 43–44); or where a doublet takes the place of a general expression (*Sophocles, Antig.* 1108–09; cf. ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε); or when opposites are associated the latter of the two is added solely to explain a general idea already expressed (δ 719–20). I cannot pause to remark on the many shades of finesse, on the blending of the intellectual and artistic qualities, on the power to chase the fleeting shadows of the associative analogies of thought, that are apparent to every observer of the syntactical usages of the language. We think of the mental agility demanded by the Greek of his hearers and readers; the sudden shifts of construction, as when an independent clause takes up a relative clause; the striking ellipses, especially in proverbs; the power of minute distinction noticeable in the use of the subjunctive and optative moods with or without ἄν or κέν, or of the future and subjunctive with or without ἄν or κέν; the blending of the active and the middle with the subtle distinctions of the latter voice; the distinction between the active, reflexive, and middle; the articular infinitive, a late addition to the resources of the language, but rich in possibilities; the wide range of the adverb as an attributive (οἱ ἀεὶ ἄρχοντες), a usage forbidden even to German and approached only by English, as in “an out-of-the-way corner.” Greek affects active, personal constructions, is poor in impersonals in comparison with Latin;

Greek prefers the direct reproduction of the words of another, whereas Latin allows greater range to *oratio obliqua*. The *Symposium* of Plato is herein a *tour de force*.

The power of the participle gives variety to the sentence and reduces to a brief compass a thought that otherwise might be expressed in dragging subordinate clauses. (The addition of *ῶν*, *φέρων*, *ἄγων*, etc., that appears to us superfluous, gives vividness by sketching a situation.) Greek, Latin, and English are here nearer akin, though Greek has a far wider range than either Latin or English; while German lacks the use of the transitive participle, as it does that of the Greek verbal adjective. In Greek the participle is readily substantivised, and is sometimes petrified, as in *γέρον*, *θεράπων*. In German this is rarely the case, as in *Wind*, that is, *der wehende*.

Greek emphasizes the character of an action within the free range of the tense-system, but in comparison to some languages, and especially Latin, it is often careless of some of the exact distinctions of time-relation; nor, it may be added, though not as a corollary, did the Greeks, until the time of Timæus and Polybius, that is, long after the period of their most marked individualism, develop the essential virtue of the historian, — the passion for exact chronology.

The double tense-forms are not linguistic luxuries, though an original differentiation may be relaxed, either momentarily, or absolutely, as in a later stage of the language. Ordinary cases, such as *ἔξω* and *σχήσω*, will occur to every one; let me call attention to the differences of the dialects; e. g. *ἀνέγνωσα* alongside of *ἀνέγνων*, the former having in Ionic the meaning "persuaded." From the point of view of other languages Greek does seem to possess several linguistic luxuries, as the future, *βουλήσομαι*, with the infinitive, where *βούλομαι* would suffice. Many such delicacies of expression fell out of use in course of time. But outworn distinctions may well survive in a language that is subtle, as the evanescent distinction between the present and future infinitive in the periphrastic construction with *μέλλω* as a verb of thinking.

One delicate syntactical usage that has heretofore been regarded as the distinct property of Latin has latterly been shown to exist in Greek. The epistolary imperfect indicating the time of the reading of a letter by its recipient is now known to occur in a Greek letter of the fourth century B.C., so that this use in Latin, like the word *epistula*, is in all probability borrowed from Greek. See Wilhelm, *Der älteste griechische Brief*, in the *Jahreshefte d. oester. arch. Inst.*, 1904, pp. 94 ff.

Order of Words

A good arrangement of words marks the organic expression of thought, and pleases the ear. The order of words in Greek illustrates

the spontaneity and mobility of the genius of the Hellenic race. This is not due solely to the fact that, in proportion as the inflections of a language are well developed, the arrangement of the words is freer and the need of emphasis on logical relations is therefore less pronounced. There is, too, the national quality of mind.

Thus it may not be overbold to discover in the rigid arrangement of subject, object, and predicate in French an aspect of the Gallic mind, which here, as elsewhere, is controlled by the centralizing tendency of society, by convention, by linguistic etiquette, and above all by its insistence on absolute perspicuity. "La clarté est la base éternelle de notre langue," says Rivarol; and Condillac remarks that French is perhaps the only language which has no synonyms, signifying thereby words absolutely identical in meaning. Above all other tongues the Gallo-Roman demands elegance, propriety, and mathematical exactness. This absolute precision is indeed foreign to the Greek, who gives freer play to his fancy, to his personality, and thus reproduces the shifting charm of nature. Greek does not recognize such rigid distinctions in meaning as appear in Latin *carmen malum* and *malum carmen*, *partus secundae* and *secundae partus*, *homo urbanus* and *urbanus homo*. Nor does the imperiousness of logic dominate Greek as it dominates Latin.

When Greek prose had attained perfection it fell into a strange captivity that marks the peril of supersensitiveness to form. The moderns can have no adequate understanding of the passion to avoid hiatus in prose and to modify the freer movement of prose by the rhythms of poetry. Held in check, as in Demosthenes, the opposition to hiatus evinces the delicacy of Greek perception; autocratic in its demands, as in Polybius, it reduced art to the bondage of the letter. So long as both tendencies remained under control they indeed limited the free disposition of the members of clauses and sentences; but that limitation the Greek was willing to accept in order to gain a more finished utterance.

Metaphors

Metaphors are the sparks of the mind; metaphors illuminate the recesses of feeling. The attitude of a man to life, his external activity, his innermost thought, the attractions and repulsions of his personality, are embodied in the figurative language he naturally employs. Many metaphors are purely personal; and yet it is possible to discover affinities which pass beyond the sphere of the individual and indicate unconsciously the national mind and character. Change in metaphor is a capital index to change in social conditions and in morals. Every language marks its progress by the creation of new modes of figurative thought. Every age brings its contribution to metaphorical expression: those of the distant past we often find

difficult to understand; those of recent times, drawn mostly from trade, science, art, we comprehend, as a rule, with ease. So rapid, however, is the change in social conditions that a metaphor less than a century old now may need its interpreter. Who grasps at first the meaning of "to burke a parliamentary question"? So the ancients must have been sore distressed to comprehend *τελενικίσαι* "to make empty," from the Seriphian beggar Telenicus.

Greek figurative language is not so ample a record of civilization as are the metaphors of modern times. Invention and discovery are infrequently a source of the metaphorical language of the Greeks, possibly because of a difference of attitude in comparison with any modern people, but more certainly because invention and discovery constituted a mark of civilization less effectively in ancient times than they do at present. Some expressions of the sort do exist, however, as *καινοτομεῖν*, "to make innovations in the state," from opening up a new vein in mining.

It is well-nigh impossible to discover mint-marks of nationality in the "petrified metaphor," which permeates every language and is seen especially in the expression of intellectual conceptions. If we confine our observation to the pure metaphor and the simile, we shall find that they record to no slight degree national activities and especially occupations. Latin shows at every hand the Roman soldier, the agriculturist, the spectator at the gladiatorial games. With the Greeks the sea is the most prolific source of metaphors that bespeak the national thought. The figurative uses of *ἐρέσσω*, *ἀντλέω*, *γαληνίζω*, *ὀκέλλω*, *ἀνακρούω*, *σαλεύω*, *κατονυρίζω*, *ἔρμα* ballast, *ἄρμος* haven, etc., are constant. The Greek says *λιμὴν ἀτυχίας* "a harbor of misery"; *εἰς πέλαγος αὐτὸν ἐμβαλεῖς γὰρ πραγμάτων* is the warning of Menander (65, 6) to a man about to marry. Aristophanes says of the bride *πλευστήον ἐπὶ τὸν νυμφίον*. The sea is the type of animation (*πέλαγος ἡ πόλις ἐστίν*), of peevishness, inconstancy; whereas we speak of the uncertainty of the weather. The audience in the theatre is the *θάλαττα κοίλη*. The palæstra yields an abundance of figurative usages: *αἶρω*, *ἀποστλεγγίζω*, *κλιμακίζω*, *ὑποσκελίζω*, *σκιαμαχία*, *περὶ στάσεως ἀγωνίζομαι*, may serve as common examples. The contests in court recall those in the gymnasium. *ἀγών*, *αἰρέω*, *διώκω*, *φεύγω*, *παρέρχομαι*, *προκαλέομαι*, etc., in their figurative senses are all drawn from the same source. Most metaphors from riding deal with racing.

Music yields *παραπαίω*, *παραχορδίζω*, *πλημμελέω*, etc., and *αὐτὸς αὐτὸν αὐλεῖ*. Roman gravity reprehended dicing: *impudicus et vorax et aleo*, says Catullus, 29, 2. The Greeks had easier consciences on this score. Witness the use of *κυβεῖω* for *κινδυνεύω*. *ἀναρρίπτω κίνδυνον* is borrowed from *ἀναρρίπτω κύβον*. From the occupation of weaving are drawn the figurative uses of *δικορραφέω*, *ἐπικλώθω*, *σπαθάω*, the phrases *ἀμήρντοι λόγοι*, *ῥάπτω ἐπιβουλὰς*; fishing yields *δελεάζω*, *ἐκκαλαμάομαι*; the statu-

ary's art, *πλάττω κακόν, ἀπὸ καναβευμάτων*. The life of the farmer supplied the figurative use of *ἀροῦν*, to "procreate," and *πόντος ἡρόθη δορί*, and of *ἀλοάω* "thresh" and "thrash." Metaphors from war are not so common in Greek as in Latin; hence the range of the figurative uses of *πολεμῶ* and *μάχομαι* is more restricted than is that of the corresponding Latin words. Comedy is far less free than tragedy in its recourse to metaphors from arming. There are of course many differences between Greek and modern metaphors. The ass is not always the stupid beast, and the goose is not foolish to the Greek. The dog is not always the faithful companion of man. If there be virtue in heredity, the character of the modern Greek dog has not changed from that of his classical ancestor which justified the phrase *παλλακὴ κυνῶπις* of *Aspasia*.

Blümner calls attention to one advantage possessed by the form of metaphor in Greek and Latin. We might say, "Each one of you, like the fox, gets his bribe," or "The fox gets his bribe," but we cannot say, "Each one of you, a fox, gets his bribe"; as the Greek does in proverbial sayings with pregnant force, *ὑμῶν εἰς μὲν ἕκαστος ἄλῳπῆς δωροδοκεῖται* (Cratinus, 128).

Proverbs

Metaphors often find a place in proverbs, and a word may be said of the character of the Greek proverb. The Greeks did not sharply distinguish between *παροιμία* and *γνώμη*. They often included under proverbs expressions that are merely metaphorical, as *συνκίνη ἐπικουρία*; famous words of the poets or other writers, as *ἄμμες ποκ' ἡμες*, an abbreviation of *ἄμμες ποκ' ἡμες ἀλκιμοὶ νεανίαι*; word-plays; comparisons, as *ὀργιλώτερος τῶν κυνιδίων*. Many, perhaps most proverbs, disclose no truth that is the specific property of any people. Form, shading of expression, manner of pointing the moral, may vary with different peoples, but the content is usually common property. Proverbs set forth the wisdom of an age rather than of a nation as distinct from any other nation. In Greek, in comparison to the mass of "literary" proverbs in the collections there are relatively few handed down orally and drawn from the mouth of the common people ("ex vulgi faece," as Erasmus has it). Greek literature, even Greek philosophy, stood nearer to the life of the common people than is the case in modern times. The Greek poets and philosophers drew on popular wisdom for their axioms of sound sense and good morals with a frequency that would be indecorous in their fellow craftsmen of to-day. Still much proverbial wit smacks of the soil whence it springs. Goethe has well expressed it:

Sprichwort bezeichnet Nationen
Muss aber erst unter ihnen wohnen.

"Operam et oleum perdidi," says the Roman; "Da ist Hopfen und Malz verloren," says the German. Many Greek proverbs, especially those in Aristophanes, take their point from Attic life or history; others, as those drawn from the sea, epitomize national sentiment. Such are ἐπὶ δνοῖν ἀγκύραιν ὀρμεῖν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς (ἀγκύρας) ὀρμεῖν, δεύτερος πλοῦς, and the less common ἀπὸ κόπης ἐπὶ βῆμα, ἄλας ἄγων καθεύδεις, πρὸς κώρυκον γυμνάζεσθαι, ἄλιεὺς πληγείς νοῦν οἶσει, Ἀττικὸς εἰς λιμένα, κέρδους ἕκατι κἂν ἐπὶ ῥίπος πλέει. The pithy *sententiae* of the Spartan mark his sturdy and homely character; the wit of the keen Sicilian is barbed (ἐκ παντὸς ξύλου κλωδὸς γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ θεός).

So the principles that are a guide to life are set down in the homely language of peasant and merchant. Nor are there indications lacking that in Greece too there were those "whose whole wisdom lies in a collection of proverbs." Innumerable are the proverbs taken from the close intimacy of men with animals and their observation of the life of birds.

Versification

The rhythms in which the poet's thought gains an utterance embody the national genius. Nowhere is this the case with greater certainty than in Greece. The versatility of the Greek mind is expressed in the countless rhythms of their manifold lyric; their subtle sense of the connection between form and content finds opportunity for expression in a wealth of rhythms incomparably superior to that possessed by any other civilized people. If we regard only the dactylic hexameter as the national meter, the spontaneity, grace, and mobility of the Hellenes is mirrored in the movement of the verse; while the Saturnian, as has often been pointed out, reflects the stately and dignified Roman.

National Style

If style is regulated by the movement of thought itself it may not be hazardous to speak of a national style voicing national endowment in poetry or prose or in both. Thus the national style of the Romans is prose, which is suited to the gravity of the national manners and character, to the logical character of the national mind. With all the majesty of Virgil and the vehemence of Juvenal, the Roman character is not essentially poetic. As the Latins came under the influence of the Greeks they lost something of their stiffness, sharpness, and homely hard sense. But in that department of the poet's art which is most individual, in lyric, the Roman failed, with all his dependence on his Greek models, to acquire the power of the wing. The Romans had a distinct genius for prose, as have the French, the creators of modern prose style. (Boccaccio and Cervantes,

I am told, still latinized.) French lyric that is not due to the influence of Provençal or English lacks in power when measured in comparison with German, English, or Greek. The intellectual and emotional qualities of the Hellenic race endowed it equally with a genius for poetry and for prose; though poetry rather than prose is perhaps truly national in its scope. The sovereignty of Greek style exacted submission in the form of imitation among all nations and at every time. The creative quality of the Greek spirit transfused its imitators so that they gained the power of originality, of passing through imitation to creation. Bossuet read Homer whenever he had to compose a funeral oration.

One salient difference between the classic tongues (and especially Greek) in comparison with modern languages is their greater precision and lucidity. We pack such an infinite deal into our words that exactness and clearness of thinking often disappear. The Greeks developed their thought in order to be clear. Their connectives focus attention on the logical evolution of their thought.

Aristotle says that a foreigner could be recognized by his avoidance of certain particles. The particles are logical; but they are also lyric and emotional. They indicate personality, opinion, hope, doubt; though they reproduce the Greek dialectical keenness, they have less of that reflective character that marks our ponderous and meticulous "I believe," "I assume," "I daresay." The intellectual quality of Greek speech does no violence to its poetic quality. Feeling holds its own when the reason is most at work. The language of the Greeks is a diaphanous robe of finely spun texture which allows each delicate contour of the thought to display its just proportions.

THE PROBLEMS OF GREEK

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AN adequate treatment of the problems of Greek would require the prolonged labor of many specialists, and the result would be, not a short essay, but volumes. It is reasonable, therefore, for one man, whose specialty is not suited for elaboration here, to hope for lenience on the part of specialists in other branches of the subject.

Under the perplexing conditions it seems best to give a rough, general survey of the territory, and while doing so to make as it were a few raids through some special parts. These parts will be confined to the language proper, and definite references to modern works will be avoided.

This paper does not deal with the objects and tasks of Greek philology; but a few remarks on the obstacles to the solution of problems seem appropriate. Since many of the problems can be solved only by means of accumulated results, it is obvious that all errors or defects of research are obstacles. Two or three of these will be noted by way of illustration. One is the failure to make discriminations. I do not refer to hair-splitting distinctions, of which we have too many, but to the confusion of wholly different things. We find *δαινὰ ποιεῖν* with its two meanings confounded with *δαινὸν* (or *δαινὰ*) *ποιεῖσθαι*, *ἄρχειν* with *ἄρχεσθαι*, *ἕξεσσι* and the dative with *ἕξεσσι* and the accusative with the infinitive, *δεῖ* and the accusative with *δεῖ* and the dative with the infinitive, and so on; and sometimes we are told that one of the usages is "rare," when it is rare only in the sense in which "broadaxe" is rare in comparison with "hatchet." Sometimes we are told that the perfects of certain verbs are used as presents, and find *τέθνηκα*, "I am dead," cited as an example instead of *τεθνάτω*, "let him die"; and we actually find the supposed confusion of the infinitive with *μή* and the subjunctive or optative after verbs of fearing ridiculed as if the infinitive after such verbs were never used as the equivalent of *μή* with the finite verb. Then there is the

widespread disposition of critics to eliminate the scattering early examples of phenomena which abound in later periods. We are told, for example, that the second aorist passive “ἡγγέλην is frequent in later Greek, and was introduced by copyists into correct writers”; and so it has been “emended” even from Euripides; and yet it occurs in a good Attic inscription. It should be borne in mind that many of the seeming peculiarities of late Greek had their origin at an early period, and sporadic examples should be expected.

One sample of defective method will now be mentioned ; the use made of statistics, or rather the making of statistics that are of no use. What is gained, for instance, by knowing the ratio of the aorists to the imperfects in any given work unless we know in how many of the examples either tense might have been used? In Xenophon's *Hellenica* the ratio of the aorists to the imperfects is much greater for the compounds of πλέω than for the simple verb. Does this show that Xenophon had a predilection for the aorists of the compounds as compared with the simple verb? Of course not. The circumstances under which ἐκπλεῖν, καταπλεῖν, διαπλεῖν, etc., are used more frequently call for the aorist, and the same phenomenon appears in Thucydides. Again, even if statistics have been intelligently made, they should be used with great care. By one of the metrical tests it can be demonstrated that the ninth and the tenth books of the *Æneid* are by different authors.

The problems of Greek relate to every part of the subject: the letters, the history of their forms in inscriptions and manuscripts in different places; the sounds represented by the letters; the accents; words, their forms, meanings, and origins or etymologies; the combination of words into sentences; the modes of speaking or reciting from the ψαλὴ λέξις of conversation up to the singing of lyric poetry; the restoration of texts; the authorship, chronology, sources, and possible revision of works; the origin and mutual relation of dialects; the subject-matter, and so on. These subjects bring us into contact with comparative linguistic, meters and music, textual and higher criticism, and most branches of the so-called sciences. The Hellenist must also deal with the results of research in the fields of archæology, mythology, history, and general antiquities. We can never know when a new fact may throw light on our subject. The antepirrhema of the knights, however much admired by some for its exquisite humor, was sheer nonsense, until we learned from an archæological source that the horses on which the knights entered the theatre, those horses that preferred crabs to clover, were two-legged horses. How far the Hellenist must deal with the subject-matter is a perplexing question. If he must explain mythological and historical allusions, why not also scientific facts or theories? Wherever the line be drawn, Greek scholars must at least aid in the

restoration and interpretation of Greek works of all sorts. The Optics ascribed to Euclid, the treatise of Apollonius on Conic Sections with the use of coördinate axes, the invention of differentiation and integration by Archimedes, and similar works, can be interpreted only by Greek scholars competent to understand the subject-matter, or, less satisfactorily, in collaboration with mathematicians. So the Hellenist must support the investigator on the slippery field of comparative linguistic, and must avail himself of all the light shed from that source and be able to distinguish the light from the darkness.

To begin, then, at the beginning. The letters of the alphabet, including tachygraphy, present too many problems to be so much as named. The digamma alone presents a legion of problems. How was Z pronounced? How the aspirated mutes, especially when two stand together? And the diphthongs: when did the two syllables of *λείπειν* assume the same vowel sound, and what was that sound? Was the future of *πάσχω* identical with that of *πείθομαι* for Pericles? If not, how was it for Demosthenes? When did (Andoc. *Myst.* 147) *οὐδ' ἡμάρτηται οὐδὲν οὔτε ἡμῖν εἰς ὑμᾶς οὔτε ὑμῖν εἰς ἡμᾶς* become *οὐδ' ἡμάρτιτε οὐδὲν οὔτε ἡμῖν εἰς ὑμᾶς οὔτε ὑμῖν εἰς ἡμᾶς*? Such are some of the questions. Then, it being assumed that the sounds represented by the letters are known, numerous questions arise. There is still a question as to the nature of accent, and there is actually a question whether the accent was observed in reading poetry, and on the other hand the much more reasonable question whether there was any metrical stress. The questions relating to *ψιλή λέξις*, *καταλογή*, *παρακαταλογή*, *τὰ ἔπη*, *μέλος*, etc., bring us into contact with metric, music, and dance, and the analysis and performance of plays. All these must be passed over here. The analysis of a tragedy, thanks to Aristotle, is fairly well settled, and that of a comedy has entered upon a new epoch, but still has its problems, I might say, its warfare.

Words present countless problems. The etymology and meaning are in some instances unknown even when these seem as if they ought to be obvious, such, for example, as the much-discussed *ἁμαιμάκετος* and *ἡλίβατος*. And even *γλαυκῶπις*: is it "gray-eyed," or "of the gray water"? Or is it "owl-faced"? (*Ἀπολλὼν ἀποτρόπαιε!*) The Homeric poems alone furnish a considerable vocabulary of unexplained words. Some whole classes of words have their problems. When does *τρεῖς ἡμέραι* mean three actual days and nights, and when does it mean one day and two nights, or can it mean this at all? If *διὰ πεντηρίδος* means "every five years," how is it that a festival celebrated every four years is called a *πεντητηρίς*? (Our lexicon has a serious error on this word.) In short, when do numerals and their compounds, applied to units of time, denote our cardinal numerals and when our ordinal? Also the history of numeral notation is still

to be written. One "specialist" says that for some unknown reason the early Athenians used H instead of E for *ἐκατόν*! The history of the transition to the later system is needed for purposes of textual criticism. The date of the well-known couplet on the *ἐξ ὥραι* of labor would aid in the solution of several problems, fixing the *terminus ante quem* for the new system, the use of *ὥρα* for "hour," and the imperative *ξῆθι*.

The names of animals and plants are troublesome. The *αἰλουρος* and the *γαλῆ*, with the later *κάττα* and *κάττος*, have a literature of their own, and yet the cat problem remains unsolved. Despite volumes on Greek birds, the make-up of the chorus in the *Aves* is not altogether settled. And now, to pass on to plants, we are told that the *ῥάκινθος* could not have been the hyacinth, that *φηγός* was probably not the oak, that the *κόνειον* with its painless death could not have been the *conium maculatum* nor the *cicuta virosa*. But there is scarcely any end to such questions.

The inflection of words still has its problems. It is sufficient to refer to the controversy over the dative plural in Homer, and the question to what extent *ῆν* was plural and *ἐντί* singular. Our grammars change from year to year. Now we have the long delayed *τέθηκα*; shall we ever have *-όσθων* as an alternative for *-έσθων*? There are still questions enough as to forms, and even as to accents, as in the case of the so-called proclitics; but I must hasten on.

Syntax and style are closely bound together. Of style proper I shall say as little as possible. Style relates to different ways of saying the same thing. If a change in a sentence adds to or takes from its sense, it is not a purely stylistic change. Publishers once, to suppress my egotism, changed "I do not know" into "It is not known." We can say either *ἐπλήγην πρότερον ἢ ἐπάταξα* or *πρότερος ἐπλήγην ἢ ἐπάταξα*, but the latter says more than the former, and the difference does not pertain to style. The delicate tints of stylistic coloring are very elusive, and the distinctions drawn, I fear, are sometimes illusory. Much depends on the mental characteristics, natural and acquired, of the individual. Association particularly plays an important part. If the Greek scholars should each write down three brief passages that are respectively most impressive, most touching, and most beautiful to him, the list would be very interesting. Probably only one person here would select as the most impressive *ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἡγήτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμων, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς*. Usually, as in the example cited, the subject-matter is the main factor of impressiveness; but the very sound of words may have a powerful influence, that of some words on some people, that of others on others.

Do not, then, judge me too severely when I confess that on me the *ῆθος* of the Greek cases is to a great extent lost. To my mind the

effect of placing the accusative at the head of a sentence is not due to any vigor of the case itself, but to the fact that its position announces a departure from the every-day arrangement of the parts of the sentence. As "omne ignotum pro mirifico," so "omne inusitatum pro grandiloquo." The subject accusative with the infinitive in oratio obliqua is to me nothing more than a nominative. Analogously, to my mind the difference between the genitive and the dative is purely grammatical. In ὁ πατήρ μοι τέθνηκεν, μοι is not possessive: it means "I have lost my father," just as in Cicero's single mention of his father, "Pater nobis decessit a. d. III. Kal. Decembres," "nobis" instead of "noster" is the one note of feeling. The Pindaric θυγάτηρ οἷ (if οἷ is dative) is due to the predication involved in apposition, a latent predication which may become active. The possessive dative used attributively is a solecism, or rather a Colophonism. When the case is a predicate, the distinction between ownership and possession is purely grammatical. Ἐνταῦθα Κύρῳ βασιλεία ἦν . . . ἔστι δὲ καὶ μεγάλῳ βασιλέω βασιλεία ἐν Κελαιναῖς: here the predicate dative and attributive genitive do not imply different kinds of possession. So τὰ ἐν Κελαιναῖς βασιλεία ἔστι Κύρου would not allow Κύρῳ. The rule, however, that if the subject has the article the genitive is used, if not, the dative, is inadequate and does not get at the root of the matter. A noun with the article may have the predicate dative (Dem. 43, 52), and the genitive may be used when there is no article with the subject. As this paper does not offer solutions of problems, no attempt is made to state what seems to be the correct rule. The ordinary distinction between "possession" and "ownership" is probably due to the fact that ἔστι Κύρῳ may be rendered "Cyrus has."

The problems of the cases have not all been solved. As yet the cases have usually been treated separately, and for individual authors or works, whereas they need to be treated conjointly and comprehensively. To one point attention is directed. The prevailing distinction between the accusative and the dative with the infinitive after ἔξεστι and προσήκει, though sadly muddled in some of our standards, is theoretically plain enough; but what are we to make of examples like Isocr. *Paneg.* 28, where it is said of a λόγος that has become μυθώδης: ὁμῶς αὐτῷ καὶ νῦν ῥηθῆναι προσήκει? Is this semi-personification: "it deserves to be told"? A complete collection of examples would be useful.

With the cases the prepositions are intimately associated. Not to mention the more general problems, the simple question of different cases with the same preposition is often misunderstood, and we find efforts to force the idea of motion into all examples of παρά with the accusative, or the view that παρά of rest must take the dative at least of a person. Here, by the way, style has its effect to the extent that poetry has the greater privilege of being quaint.

The question of the choice of prepositions has its problems. Why, for instance, *ὁμολογεῖται παρά* (or *πρός*) *τινος* rather than *ὑπό τινος*? Even *σύν* still seems to need elucidation. We talk of its use in Attic prose as being restricted to commercial language, and, in another sense, to a few phrases; but when Stratoniceus (who had in his school-room two pupils and ten statues representing Apollo and the Muses) was asked how many pupils he had, and answered, *σύν τοῖς θεοῖς δώδεκα*, he was punning on what I believe to have been two good Attic uses of the preposition, except that one of them is confined to a few phrases ("with the help of," "thanks to"). I do not recall an instance of *μετά* in the sense "inclusive of."

The question of the simple verb with a preposition, *ἐλθεῖν εἰς*, the compound without the preposition, *εἰσελθεῖν*, and the compound with a preposition *εἰσελθεῖν εἰς*, needs elucidation. Here style and meaning are both concerned, and even the latter seems to be misconceived in some instances. In certain translations we read "Epidamnus is a city situated on the right as you sail into the Ionian gulf." Of course it should be, accent it as you will, "There is a city Epidamnus"; but that by the way. The point is this: we are told that this is the only prose example of *ἐσπλεῖν* with the simple accusative. If so, it is the only prose example of *ἐσπλεῖν* with an accusative not depending on *ἐσ-* directly. As you sail by Epidamnus on your right, you are far within the Ionian gulf of Thucydides. There is a similar confusion of *συστρατεύειν τινί* with *συστρατεύειν μετά τινος* (or *σύν τινι*).

The article, with its development, its prose use and its poetical omission, its uses with proper names, and so on, must be reluctantly dismissed with a brief remark on one point: the use of the article with a noun in address. *Μῆτερ Δαρείου ἡ γεραίά, Πάτερ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* and similar examples are familiar to all, and no one would defend *πάτερ Δαρείου ὁ γεραίέ* or *ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς πάτερ*; but some appear not to know that where there is no vocative form there is no vocative case and the article is not excluded; but to what extent the address affects the use of the article I have not seen discussed. The article with a nominative following and qualifying a true vocative, as just cited, is treated by some as an irregularity, as is the predicate vocative as in *ὦ φίλτατε μεταπίπτων*; but on what grounds?

The pronouns still have their problems. When, for instance, "I" is used for "any one," must *ἐγώ* be expressed? Certainly not in late Greek. A study of this subject which I have published does not pretend to be exhaustive or conclusive. Again, what is there specially "Attic" about *τί λέγεις σύ*? Has the pronoun anything to do with it? Why was *σύ* in *ἔλθῃ σύ, τοῦτο ποιήσον σύ*, in the Κοινή equivalent to *ῥακά* or *μῶρε*, and did it have the same effect in the classic Greek? But I cannot take time even to ask the many remaining questions.

In the syntax of the verb only a few isolated points will be touched upon. First, as to tense: the dispute over the fundamental difference between certain tenses is chiefly a battle of words, and I pass it by. All will agree that a question between the imperfect and the aorist is usually a question of the encroachment of the former upon the theoretical domain of the latter. "ἔλεγε," "he was saying," "used to say," or "he said"; but εἶπε only "he said." So from the durative are developed some special tense-relations not derived from the aorist. The ingressive aorist of a verb denoting a *state* is not the same as the imperfect that leaves an *act* in progress. When a purpose is implied we hear of a conative imperfect if the voice is active: ἀπώλλυσάν με; but it is equally conative in the passive: ἀπωλλύμην ὑπ' αὐτῶν, only the grammatical subject does not make the attempt. In ἐσφζόμεν ὑπ' αὐτῶν it would be doubtful who made the attempt. But this so-called conative is the same as we find in Andoc. *Myst.* 114, αὐτὸς μὲν αὐτὸν ἀπώλλουν· τιθεὶς τὴν ἱκετηρίαν, ἐσφζόμεν δὲ τῇ τύχῃ, where there is no attempt. Like this is the imperfect as the future of the past, as Antiph. *Tetr.* A. β. 3, φανερὸς γεγόμενος ἀπωλλύμην. Andoc. *Myst.* 58, φονεὺς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγινόμην ἐγὼ μὴ εἰπὼν ὑμῖν ἃ ἤκουσα. ἔτι δὲ τριακοσίους Ἀθηναίων ἀπώλλουν, καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐν κακοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις ἐγίγνετο. All these uses, the "conative," the "ingressive," the "future from the past," were probably to the Greeks one and the same: at least some convincing proof of the contrary would be welcome. The problematical "conative aorist," the "conatus sine effectu," must be passed by.

Omitting also the problems relating to the present and aorist of the subjunctive, optative, imperative, and infinitive, let us consider the supplementary participle not in oratio obliqua. Two cases only will be mentioned. Verbs of physical perception, practically ὁρᾶν and ἀκούειν, we are told, normally take the present participle, especially so ὁρᾶν. It is true that we can see an act only in progress; but then we can see it through, and in that case we should expect the aorist. In other words, did the Greeks *never* distinguish between "I saw a tree falling" and "I saw a tree fall"? I am reluctant to admit this. When the boy Cyrus saw a deer break cover, he gave chase: ὡς εἶδεν ἔλαφον ἐκπηδήσασαν . . . εἰδῶκεν. The imperfect εἰδῶκεν, as it leaves him in pursuit, we should expect; and I must confess that I should with Xenophon have written ἐκπηδήσασαν rather than ἐκπηδῶσαν. An exhaustive list of examples is desirable.

Analogous to ὁρᾶν is ἀνέχεσθαι. To endure an act properly belongs to the time during which the act is in progress; but as περιορᾶν and ἐφορᾶν may take the aorist as summing up the act, there seems to be no *a priori* reason why ἀνέχεσθαι should not take the aorist, especially since the act may be one which, for some reason, cannot be resisted at the moment. We may refuse to submit to something already done. The examples of the aorist participle with ἀνέχεσθαι are

scarce. Homer's vexatious ἀνιθέντα νέεσθαι, emended, however plausibly, into ἀνιθέντ' ἀνέχεσθαι, cannot be counted. Xenophon (*Cyrop.* vi, 2, 18) makes the characteristic remark that a hundred horses would not be able to stand the sight of one camel: οὐκ ἂν ἀνάσχοιντο ἰδόντες. Lysias (13, 8) says οὐκ ἠνέσχεσθε ἀκούσαντες, though Xenophon (*Hell.* vi, 5, 19) says of a similar situation, οὐκ ἠνείχοντο ἀκούοντες. Demosthenes (41, 1) has an example of the aorist participle with the present ἀνέχεσθαι as in the problematical Homeric example: εἰ μᾶλλον ἡρώμεην δίκας καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν ἢ μικρὰ ἐλαττωθεὶς ἀνέχεσθαι. (The hexameter is only apparent.) I do not recall an example of the aorist with the object of ἀνέχεσθαι, as in ἀνέχεσθαι τὴν γῆν τεμνομένην, though situations can be conceived in which I believe the aorist would be required. An exhaustive list of examples of all sorts is needed.

The mutual relations of aorist and perfect furnish some problems. The fact that with πολλάκις the aorist was as natural to the Greeks as the perfect, and that with πολλάκις ἤδη it was almost the rule, is often ignored, and πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα is cited as an aorist used instead of a wanting perfect. So the aorist subjunctive is spoken of as a less accurate substitute for the more unwieldy perfect, whereas the perfect has a different function, so far as I have observed; but a thorough examination I have never made nor seen. That the aorist indicative in like manner takes the place of the more unwieldy pluperfect in the unreal condition seems equally erroneous. The favorite illustration is οὐδὲν ἂν ὦν νυνὶ πεποίηκεν ἔπραξεν, where the aorist is the proper tense. We might say οὐδὲν ὦν πεποίηκεν δικαίως ἔπραξεν, and so we find (Dem. 23, 178) πάντ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω πεποίηκεν καὶ οὐδὲν . . . δικαίως ἔπραξεν. It is not necessary to state why the aorist in such cases seems to be the proper tense. Among the examples are some in which the circumstances cause the aorist and pluperfect to exchange places as compared with the example just cited. A collection of all the examples would be instructive.

The difference between the aorist and the perfect participles presents some difficulties. "Being justified by faith, let us have peace": δικαιωθέντες . . . ἔχωμεν. *Must* this mean (as of course it does) "let us be justified and have," or might it mean "seeing that we are justified"; or would this latter require the perfect? Not necessarily; for Xenophon (*Hell.* ii, 2, 6) has οὔτοι σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες, κατέιχον τὴν πόλιν, and yet the σφαγαί had occurred long before, and ποιήσαντες is causal.

The moods, the main field of problems, can only be touched upon. Some of these problems, such, for instance, as relate to the ideal general condition and the prohibition, I pass by reluctantly, as some of my published views concerning them have been misunderstood. Attention is directed to only two or three practical cases. It has sometimes

been denied that the pure optative can be used interrogatively; but ἀπολοίμην may have the force of "I wish I may perish" as well as of "may I perish." So the old servant (*Med.* 83) says ὅλοιτο μὲν μή, δεσπότης γάρ ἐστ' ἐμός, where the particle μὲν shows plainly that μή is *not* an afterthought, and the meaning is "Perish, indeed, may he not," that is, "I do not, indeed, invoke a curse upon him." There are other similar examples. This use clearly allows the interrogative form, and so we find (*Med.* 754) τί δ' ὄρκω τῷδε μὴ ῥυμένων πάθοις. The extent of this usage needs investigation.

The question of ἄν with the future (even in Homer) is still a battleground, as is the question about the difference between the subjunctive and the optative in the future condition. Some discussions of this latter question ignore a far-reaching phenomenon of speech, not peculiar to Greek. When a state of affairs is, even theoretically, assumed, it may, in the continuation, be treated as actually existent, "If the laws were to appear before us and say" is theoretical or ideal; but now the laws are here and we can say ἐὰν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι. Analogously, "if a man shall steal (ἐὰν κλέψῃ), he shall return what he stole (ἃ ἔκλεψεν)," not necessarily ἃ ἄν κλέψῃ. Again, in the condition, a very practical case may, from modesty, courtesy, or other cause, be placed in the theoretical form, as in the case of Virtue in the Choice of Hercules, where Vice uses the practical subjunctive.

The circumstances under which the future in protasis is absolutely required in classical Greek I have never seen defined. It helps little to say that it is really a present condition, the future being equivalent to μέλλω with the infinitive (which sometimes is not true). The future is used when the apodosis states something which precedes in time the act of the protasis. But in later Greek the subjunctive is sometimes so used; and I have never seen a history of the origin and development of this usage. The extent of the totally different use of the future in threats and warnings has been investigated for some authors, but much remains to be done. I would here note that the future is employed even with the first person when the apodosis would be a threat or warning if it were in the second person.

In treating final clauses, the distinction between ἵνα as a *pure* final particle and the rest as relatives overlooks the fact that to the Greeks this ἵνα, even if, as some have attempted to prove, it had a different origin, was the same as the relative ἵνα, though ἵνα as a relative was not very familiar. The rule that it never takes the future is certainly wrong, but I have never observed ἵνα ἄν with the subjunctive. How did ἵνα with the future sound to the Greeks, and did they *never* use ἄν with the subjunctive after it?

The historical indicative in final clauses is confined to cases where the unreality extends to and includes the purpose. If it is a wish, for instance, the final clause is part — in fact the main part — of

the wish. But is the construction restricted to the wish impossible of realization, the unreal condition, and the (kindred) unfulfilled duty? Though some statements of the principle imply that this is not the fact, the examples cited can all be reduced to these heads, and, so far as I can recall examples, they are all of this sort from the grammatical point of view, but sometimes their character is veiled, and the wish or duty is expressed *only* by the form of the final clause. To illustrate: Ischomachus (Xen. *Oec.* 8, 2) tells his wife that *he* is to blame for her inability to find some article, "because," says he, "I did not designate a place for each thing in order that you might know where to put it." Should we read *ἵνα εἰδῆς* with the manuscripts, or *ἵνα ᾔδεις* (= *ᾔδεισθα*), as has been proposed? To my mind the historical indicative is necessary. The neglected duty here is like that of (Dem. 36, 47) *ἀντὶ τοῦ κοσμεῖν . . . ἵνα ἐφαίνετο*. The duty is not necessarily a moral obligation; it may be imposed by consistency or appropriateness, as (Plat. *Theaet.* 161 c) where Socrates says, "I am surprised that he did not say the hog was the measure of all things," *ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ᾔρξαιτο ἡμῖν λέγειν*. Here *χρῆν* might have been used in the leading clause. Iphigenia (*I. T.* 357) says that no wind has ever driven Helen and Menelaus to her, *ἵν' ἀντετιμωρησάμην*, where the wish is *expressed* only by the final clause. A full examination of the question whether the historical indicative and the subjunctive or optative are ever interchangeable without change of sense seems desirable.

The problems of the infinitive can receive here only a few illustrations. The seeming prepositional use of *πρίν* with the infinitive, originating and enjoying its most flourishing period long before prepositions could be construed with the infinitive, is to me a mystery. The use of mood after *πρίν* in the classical period still seems to be a little clouded, and we find *πρίν δῆ* or *πρίν γε δῆ* spoken of as exceptional, with the finite verb after an affirmative clause, though, like our "until at last," it is regularly used to introduce something that puts an end to a situation, whether a negative, expressed or implied, precedes or not. It is practically one word, like *νῦν δῆ*, "just now," and *μὲν δῆ* in *καὶ μὲν δῆ, ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ, οὐ μὲν δῆ*.

The use of *πλήν* with the simple infinitive is taught in some of our best works, and yet I have never observed a clear example. Those cited in the books are no examples at all. One is *τί ἄλλο πλήν ψευδῆ λέγειν*; but the whole sentence is *τί οὖν μ' ἀνωγας ἄλλο πλήν ψευδῆ λέγειν*, where *πλήν* is simply *ἤ*. When *πλήν* is construed with the infinitive, as far as I have observed, it requires *τοῦ*; but a thorough search is needed.

The simple infinitive of so-called purpose, whatever it was with Homer, as in *δὸς ἄγειν*, is in classic prose not a purpose in the great majority of cases, but a permission, or commission, or something analogous. There is no more purpose in *οὖς ὑμεῖς εἰλεσθε ἄρχειν μου*

than in (Xen. *Hell.* II, 3, 35) *προέμενοι αὐτοὺς ἀπολίσσθαι*. The limitations of this use of the infinitive I have never seen satisfactorily stated.

The construction of *δοκεῖν*, "to seem," cannot be called a problem. I mention it only because of the surprising misstatements in some of the best grammars. "It seems to me that they came" can never be *δοκεῖ μοι αὐτοὺς ἐλθεῖν*, but must be *δοκοῦσί μοι ἐλθεῖν*. The seeming examples and their true nature are too familiar to mention. If there are any real examples of the accusative with the infinitive after *δοκεῖ*, "it seems," they should be collected.

The negative presents a mass of problems. I have already published something on the defects of our knowledge here, and have not space to add anything now. I will only say that recent authors of text-books still go on using *οὐπω* and *οὐποτε* for "yet" and "ever" in negative sentences.

There remain several departments of Greek grammar which I must entirely omit. Indirect discourse, sometimes strangely treated as a special department of syntax, involves all the departments, and any treatment of the subject is defective that fails to provide for every construction of direct discourse, even if such provision is to say that it cannot be expressed in indirect discourse. Such a treatment I have never seen, nor anything remotely approximating it. The special problems here are many and cannot even be enumerated.

Problems of textual criticism I must also omit. Once I had occasion to read a lengthy paper on the subject, pointing out what seemed to me radical defects. Further study of the subject has strengthened my views and I am convinced that great improvement of method is still possible. The individual problems are of course well-nigh endless.

Higher criticism needs only to be mentioned, and Greek scholars see before them a wilderness to be cleared and made ready for cultivation, and it would be absurd to offer any remarks here.

[NOTE.—The above paper was prepared under the impression that the author had no choice, but was expected to treat in forty-five minutes the subject prescribed,—"The Problems of Greek." He would have much preferred to discuss some special topic, such, for instance, as meters, which he supposed was even excluded as belonging to some other Section of the Congress. The paper is printed exactly as it was read.—M. W. H.]

SHORT PAPERS

PROFESSOR WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL, of Iowa College, presented a paper on "The Significance of the *δρασιον* in the Eleatic Philosophy." The speaker's arguments and conclusions were based upon the statement that that which distinguishes the Eleatics alike from their predecessors and their successors is the fact that they identified unity and homogeneity, the *ἐν* and the *δρασιον*, and deduced from their identity, interpreted with all strictness, the ultimate logical conclusions to which the assumption must lead.

PROFESSOR MAURICE HUTTON, of the University of Toronto, presented a short paper to the Section on "Hellenism," in which he said in part:

"It has been a familiar experience in my own life that my virtues — or what I have been pleased to call my virtues — have been due to ignorance.

"All the more interest I find in the Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge. Paradox though it be, that maxim I think expresses the inner idea of Hellenism, the inner idea of the Greek mind; and to it I add the kindred paradox that virtue is an art, the paradox of the first book of the *Republic*. These paradoxes I find in the life, the literature, and the language of the Greeks.

"In their life they are expressed in the worship of intellect, to whatever ends addressed. The unscrupulous Antiphon is 'second to no one in virtue,' that is, in intellectual force and astuteness. The typical heroes of Hellas are Odysseus and Themistocles; conspicuous each for his adroitness, 'slimness,' and finesse. Another political hero — selected by Aristotle as one of three great statesmen of Athens — is Theramenes; the academic statesman or 'mugwump'; the fastidious 'independent' who tried all parties and was satisfied with none, for none realized his ideal of a 'scientific republic.' He also was generally considered merely an adroit schemer; but his quest of perfection in politics was probably disinterested enough; he was the doctrinaire in politics. These 'intellectuals,' as the French call them, appear at their best in the great days of Athens; at their worst in the days of Roman domination when the Greek became the facile, astute, domestic chaplain of his brutal, strong-willed Roman employer; when he presented that most melancholy of spectacles, the spectacle of a man of genius without character and self-respect; evil days are not good for men merely intellectual; such men are birds of paradise, or butterflies needing the sunshine of prosperity, if they are to discharge well their ornamental functions in the economy of nature.

"'Hellenism' in literature conveys the same suggestion of the cult of knowledge. Their literature is over-intellectual; there is the attempt to base everything, even the deepest and therefore least known instincts of human nature, upon knowledge. Patriotism is laboriously justified alike by poets and historians as enlightened self-interest; the citizen must be a patriot, since his life and his success depend upon the life and success of his state; so too he must be pious, since by piety he will earn the support of his god, who can be trusted, if fairly treated, to support him, since he has no other natural votaries; there is a solidarity of interest between god and worshiper; honesty again is recommended as the best policy; a man does not serve either god or fellow men for naught; whence we find without surprise, since no one was ever honest on these grounds (and if he was he was not), that Greek honesty was less robust than Roman, in proportion as it was more intellectual and less instinctive.

"The second paradox of Greece, that virtue is an art, cannot obviously be disen-

tangled from the first; but it may to some extent be treated separately. Many people in all ages treat life as an art; and make the end of life a dexterous opportunism; but this is especially Athenian; 'connoisseurs of life, ever hankering after novelties and contemptuous of the trite,' as Cleon calls them (Thucydides, 3, 30); impressionists, in a word. In many dialogues of Plato — in the *Ion*, e.g., or in the last book of the *Republic* — this assumption is so radical that it is an axiom that the poet, if he is to be any good, must be able to throw some light on some art or science; on medicine or government or war; and it is triumphantly shown that he cannot do this, and therefore is an impostor; unless indeed he be an inspired idiot; for sometimes the poet can throw light even on these things, but he does not understand the light he throws; he is a mouthpiece only for the truth which utters itself by him; he is inspired, but he does not understand the truths with which he is inspired; but the highest knowledge is conscious knowledge, not unconscious instinct, or inspiration, or whatever we call that sort of knowledge. The secret of virtue and life lies in knowledge and conscious art; the poet is therefore on this, as on other grounds, inferior even to the carpenter.

"This comparison of life to an art is surely striking and characteristic, and involves consequences already noticed. The artist works, at least largely, for his own hand and for some definite and brilliant result associated with his own name; the soldier, on the contrary, so far as he is a good soldier, does not fight for his own hand; he is only a small part of a large machine, and though the result depends partly on his fidelity, it is not conducive necessarily to his glory or promotion; he may easily die, as he has fought, unknown and unrewarded.

"It follows from the proposition that virtue is knowledge and is art, that Hellenism represents broadly reflection and thought versus action; the life of the student versus the man of affairs; the theorist against the practical man. And this can be illustrated by the language of Hellas and Hellenism; the third head of my subject; *πρᾶγμα* is action, it is also a weariness of the flesh, a bore and a nuisance; *πόνος* is labor and sorrow; conversely, *ποίητής*, the creator, maker, and man of action, is the poet; *σκαίος* is left-handed figuratively, that is, in the sphere of the intellect and of art; the stupid man or the awkward man, the "gauche" man, as the modern Greeks of France say; with races less artistic and less intellectual, "sinister" means morally rather than intellectually left-handed.

"Hellenism in language shows a deficiency in the Hellenic mind on the side of personal character, of the emotional and moral nature, and of will: *θυμός* is used for spirit, courage, the whole element of will and character; apparently it really means 'anger' rather; and the inference is legitimate that Greek courage is apt to be of this illegitimate kind; this inference is supported by Aristotle's analysis of courage in the *Ethics*; the ordinary courage of high spirits and love of adventure seems absent; in the same way this *θυμοειδής*, or element of anger, or moral element of the soul, though it appears to cover for Plato all that we mean by personal character, is at bottom, it seems, provisional and temporary; it may survive this life and may animate a god even, such as Ares, but it is not the true soul, and it is not immortal."

SECTION E — LATIN LANGUAGE

SECTION E—LATIN LANGUAGE

(Hall 9, September 23, 10 a. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MAURICE HUTTON, University of Toronto.
SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR E. A. SONNENSCHN, University of Birmingham.
PROFESSOR WILLIAM G. HALE, University of Chicago.
SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. W. SHIPLEY, Washington University.

THE RELATIONS OF LATIN

BY EDWARD ADOLF SONNENSCHN

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I HAVE decided to treat the subject entrusted to me to-day not from the purely linguistic point of view,—though this would have supplied me with a fruitful theme,—but rather from a point of view which would, I suppose, in Germany be called “kulturhistorisch.” What I propose to discuss is not the relation of Latin to other languages as languages, but rather the place of Latin in the history of civilization, and the work that it has done in the world as a vehicle of culture. The subject thus opened up is of course far too great to be embraced in a brief paper; nor do I pretend to be able to deal competently with all its aspects: but it is, perhaps, not inappropriate in scope and magnitude to the present occasion.

The history of the Latin language, regarded as an organ of culture, may be divided into three great periods: (1) the period in which it is the organ of a culture moulded mainly by Greece; this period extends from long before the third century B.C. to the latter part of the second century A.D.: (2) the period in which Latin becomes the organ of the Christian Church, from the end of the second century to the end of the fifth century A.D.: (3) the period vaguely spoken of as the “Middle Ages,” from the sixth to the end of the thirteenth century of our era.

It was a favorite idea of ancient writers to represent the course of history as a succession of cycles, each of which was more or less coincident with its predecessor. That history repeats itself,—even

that the atoms of which the universe is composed return after the completion of some *magnus annus* into the precise position which they occupied at its commencement, — this is the common assumption of ancient philosophers and poets:

Magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo.

If we compare this theory with modern philosophies of history, the broad distinction is that, whereas we proceed on the postulate or working hypothesis that the world is progressive, the belief in progress was in ancient times conspicuous by its absence. Development, indeed, they knew; but only development in the downward direction, — degeneration, — and that only within the limits of one cycle. Thus at bottom their philosophy of history was static. The Eleatic conception of "Being" as against "Becoming" expresses the deeply rooted conviction of antiquity. If Plato had been sketching the history of modern Europe he would probably have seen in the period which followed the decline and fall of the Roman Empire the commencement of a new cycle; he would have compared the inroads of the barbarians to the migrations which changed the face of Eastern Europe at the commencement of the Hellenic period; and he would have ended by predicting a decline and fall of the civilization of the West, including, perhaps, that of the great Atlantis, whose existence he seems to have divined some nineteen centuries before the time of Columbus. Yet such a conception would have ignored a cardinal fact in the case. It was not in utter nakedness that modern Europe entered on her career. Much, no doubt, of the spiritual wealth of ancient Hellas had been lost, many a "cloud of glory" had been dispelled, at any rate for a time, but much of it lived on in other forms, reborn in the institutions, the art, and the philosophy of Rome. Thus it comes about that so large a part of our spiritual inheritance is Greek. The Renaissance of Greek studies in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries would not have been able to galvanize into life a culture that was utterly dead; it was because part of that culture was alive, albeit in Roman forms, that its second rebirth was possible. And even for this second rebirth we are indebted principally to the genius of Rome working in Italians like Petrarch, Politian, and Poggio. When we think of these things, how to the same Rome which one of her poets of imperialism apostrophized in the words, —

Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam, —

we owe also our connection at two points with the intellectual conquests of Greece, we may well pause before we accept as final the verdict which one of the greatest of living scholars has summed up in the ungrateful phrase "das seelenmordende Rom."

Standing some years ago in Norwich Cathedral, I had the greatness of Rome brought forcibly home to my mind. In the aisles there stretched out a series of groined vaults which carried one straight back to the Colosseum; and at the extreme east end, behind the altar, rose two stately Early English arches, once the entrance to a Lady Chapel of the thirteenth century, but now standing isolated; for the Lady Chapel itself was destroyed in the sixteenth century. The groined vaults are Romanesque, but the Early English arches are also Roman, only one degree further removed. Let two Roman barrel vaults or two Romanesque arches intersect, and you get the arch misnamed Gothic. A clear line of structural descent connects the one with the other, and the genius of Rome may claim them both as her own.

The relations of Rome to the Greek and to the modern world may be also illustrated by the history of verse. From Greece Rome borrowed the system of strictly quantitative meter, and discarded in favor of it the native Saturnian. But gradually she adapted it to the conditions of the Latin language by grafting upon it the Italian principle of accent,¹ the beginning of certain feet being marked by the use of an accented syllable, just as in architecture she introduced the feature of the arch. The effect is prominent in the verse of the *poetae novelli* of the second century A.D.; but it is also visible to some extent in much earlier forms of Latin verse. To quote only one example, the second half of the dactylic pentameter of Ovid is subject to the law that it must be as accentual as possible, provided always that it does not end with a monosyllable. This sounds like a paradox; but I believe I could, if not give it proof, at any rate make it plausible. The dissyllabic ending is simply a necessary sacrifice to secure coincidence of "ictus," as it is called, with accent in the other places. Well, in the course of time this accentual feature transformed the whole character of Latin verse, yet without involving a return to the Saturnian. And just as the pointed Gothic arch developed out of the Romanesque, so the accentual principle received such further development in the modern Teutonic verse based upon Latin models — accent being of course also a Teutonic principle — as to throw the quantitative principle completely in the shade; so that we now employ a kind of verse which seems at first sight comparable to Greek verse only by way of contrast. But only at first sight. This, too, I have no time to discuss fully to-day; but I will merely say that in my opinion the main difference between English and Latinized Greek verse is that English is not based upon any system of *prosody*, — that is, that the quantities of

¹ The *differentia* of Latin verse as compared with Greek is that it is *both* quantitative or semi-quantitative in some cases, *and* at certain points accentual; nor do I accept any purely accentual theory of the Saturnian.

syllables in English verse are not predetermined, as they are in Latin, by rules representing more or less accurately the prose pronunciation. The English poet in building his rime employs expansible and contractible bricks.

Our debt to Greece was finely acknowledged by Shelley, in his preface to *Hellas*, — a poem inspired by sympathy with the cause of Greek independence. "We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have all their root in Greece." The truth which lies in this statement, accompanied by some exaggeration, is becoming clearer to us every day, in proportion as the achievements of ancient *Hellas* in the fields of letters, of art, of science — aye, even of religious thought and political organization — become better known to us and more justly appreciated. Yet it would probably be truer to say that we are all Romans. For in the first place the Greek influence upon the modern world is mainly indirect, coming to us through Rome; and secondly, there are elements in our culture which are not Greek at all: other influences have been at work — these, too, mediated by Rome and the Latin language. As to the former point, no truer word can be spoken than the oft-repeated statement that just as conquered Greece led her conqueror captive, so conquered Rome imposed on the Teutonic barbarians not only her laws but also her culture and her civilization as a whole.

This second mission of Rome, which began with and before the fall of the Western Empire, was continued down to the Renaissance; and that Italy and the Eternal City might continue to hold the position of instructors of the nations was the prayer of Marco-Vida in the sixteenth century:

Artibus emineat semper studiisque Minervae
Italia, et gentes doceat pulcherrima Roma
Quandoquidem armorum penitus fortuna recessit.¹

As to my second point, the existence of non-Greek elements in our civilization, that is a matter for which neither Vida nor Shelley could be expected to have an open eye. But the fact that not only Greece, but also Judæa, and at later date Arabia, stood at the back of Rome, and that the triumph of Latin civilization was a triumph for these also, is written large in history.

Rome was, in fact, the heir of at least two civilizations; her culture was the common stream into which had flowed the two rills of a universalized Hellenism and a Hellenized Judaism. But Latin was the medium of communication; so that we may fairly describe the complex unity of modern civilization as mainly a Latin unity. There have also been *direct* influences of Greece upon the modern world, notably at the time of the Humanistic Renaissance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and during the last hundred years;

¹ Marco Vida (1489-1566), *Poetica*, II, 11, 63-65.

but these have never overthrown, though they have modified, the structure which was erected on a Latin foundation. Just as the political institutions and the law of Rome form a large part of the structure of every modern state, Roman roads playing the part of modern railways in opening up new avenues for civilization, so Roman thought is the predominating partner in the intellectual life of to-day.

The first period in the history of the Latin language, so regarded, is the period of Greek influence; and its most important subdivision falls in the middle of the second century B. C., the time when Greeks like Polybius and Panætius introduced to the "Scipionic circle" at Rome an intenser form of Greek culture than had been known there before. From this time onwards for over three hundred years a new influence dominates Latin literature, — the influence of Greek philosophy and especially of Stoicism. Of all the gifts of Greece to Rome, none was fraught with such far-reaching consequences as the philosophy of the Stoa. The fact that it caught the ear of Rome as no other system of philosophy ever did, that it exercised a profound influence on life and thought from the middle of the second century B. C. till the end of the second century A. D., that it transformed the whole system of Roman jurisprudence through the idea of the Rights of Man (the *Jus Naturae*), that it became nothing less than the religion of the educated classes under the early Empire, — all this is unmistakable testimony to two facts: (1) that there was no absolute breach of continuity between the Greek and the modern world; and (2) that Stoicism was really congenial to the Roman temperament.

But what was Stoicism? Not purely Greek, it would seem: every one of its men of note — such as Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Aratus, and at a later date Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater, Panætius, Poseidonius, Athenodorus (Canaanites) — hailed from the East, and some of them were of Semitic blood: the period at which it sprang into existence was that of the decay of the Greek city-states; the atmosphere it breathed was that of the Greater Greece opened up by the conquests of Alexander; the ideals it expressed were those of an epoch of expansion, — ideals of cosmopolitanism (the very word has a Stoic ring),¹ of the brotherhood of man, of philosophic liberalism and imperialism. Its monism and monotheism stood in marked contrast to the dualistic tendencies of Greek philosophy since Anaxagoras. Altogether, though much be explained as development on purely Greek lines, yet the probability, both external and internal, of an Oriental and indeed a Semitic strain in Stoicism seems too strong to be resisted. Greece, in fact, had *grown into* Stoicism — but

¹ It seems to have come to the Stoics from the Cynic Diogenes; his answer (*κοσμοπολιτης*) to the question *ποδαπὸς εἶ*, is quoted by Diogenes Laertius, vi, 63.

not without contact with Oriental thought. How deep the world's debt to the East is will probably never be fully known.

Stoicism appealed strongly to the Roman character — to its dignity, its piety, its commercial integrity, its *δαιδαμονία*.¹ I am speaking, of course, of the Roman character at its best. It is worth remark that the only department of Latin literature, except the literature of Law, which was distinctly a Roman creation was a special kind of *didactic* literature, precisely the sphere in which these Stoical qualities had a field for their exercise, though it goes by the name of Satire. If we had adhered to the name chosen by Lucilius and Horace, it might, perhaps, have suggested to us as an English equivalent the word "Sermons." What are the *Sermones* of Horace but lay sermons, not without a spice of humor? And though he is fond of drawing caricatures of the Stoics, caricatures which we are too ready to take *au grand sérieux*, he was himself a bit of a Stoic at heart, at any rate when in a moral mood. So were most of the great Roman writers. Virgil seems to have given up his early Epicureanism in favor of a religious view of things in which Stoicism and Platonism were blended, if not indeed one: the doctrine of the world-soul as expressed in the fourth Georgic (219–227) is, I think, Stoic rather than Platonic; the famous passage in the sixth *Æneid* (724–751), with its doctrine of rewards and punishments in the future state, is perhaps Platonic rather than Stoic; for the Stoics believed in absorption in the *πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου* (*spiritus*, or *anima mundi*), rather than any form of personal immortality.² The coryphæi of the Scipionic circle were, as I have said, all Stoics — Lucilius,³ Lælius Furius Philus, Scævola, and the rest; so too, perhaps, even Cato the Censor, in his old age. Terence talks Stoicism in the line:

Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto (*Heaut.* 77).

Varro was half a Stoic; Cicero a good deal more than half. Even Sallust preaches Stoicism when he wishes to be impressive. Under the Empire we find Stoicism professed in Seneca and in Persius, as well as in the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and the Phrygian slave Epictetus. It commanded the respect of Lucan and Juvenal, whose later Satires are practically Stoic tracts,⁴ and it would have made a

¹ Polybius, vi, 56, 10.

² The virtues that Virgil admired most were fortitude (*patientia*) and piety. See the passage in Donatus's *Life*, ch. 18, quoted by Sellar, p. 123, and by Wickham, *Introduction to Horace*, Ode i, 24 (p. 73).

³ In my opinion Lucilius was a Stoic; cf. especially the fragment about *virtus* (=wisdom), preserved by Lactantius. The word *virtus* acquired a technical philosophical sense in Latin, equivalent to the Stoic *ὁρθὸς λόγος*; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* iv, 15, 34 (=recta ratio), *De Leg.* i, 8, 25, *De Fin.* iii, 4, 12; Hor. *Ode* ii, 2, 18, iii, 2, 17; *Sat.* ii, 1, 70, 72; *Epist.* i, 1, 17.

⁴ I have not forgotten the passage (13, 121) in which the Stoic is spoken of as differing from the Cynic only in his *tunic*. The Stoics and the Cynics were really akin.

convert of Tacitus, had he not had other axes to grind. The younger Pliny too shows Stoic leanings. Nor was its influence confined to letters: it showed itself under the Republic in the humanistic and socialistic radicalism of the Gracchi — pupils of C. Blossius — and in the assassination of Julius Cæsar; and under the early Empire in the political martyrdoms of men like Musonius Rufus, Rubellius Plautus, Thræsea Pætus, and many others, who formed the "Stoic opposition."

This vogue of Stoicism goes, indeed, so far as to suggest a doubt as to whether the Stoicism of Rome was not merely an expression of the Roman character itself. And no doubt the Romans were Stoics by nature as well as by nurture. Yet Stoicism must have helped to *develop* those elements in the Roman character to which it appealed so strongly. The old Roman *virtus* (manliness) came to have a wider sense (wisdom). Nor is it easy to say how much of the later form which Stoicism assumed in the hands of men of affairs like Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius is due to contact with the Roman genius for simplification and adaptation and practical life, and how much to later developments of Stoicism itself, as taught by men like Panætius and Poseidonius. One thing is certain, — that neo-Stoicism, if I may so call it, put off something of its arrogance, its dogmatism, its pedantry, and its paradoxes, and became a more human thing than early Stoicism had been. And this gain more than compensated for the losses which it suffered on the purely speculative side. Neo-Stoicism as developed at Rome became a power in the world.

There is probably no school of philosophy which has been so hardly judged as Stoicism. Its influence upon the world has been incalculable. The main *differentiæ* of modern society, as compared with ancient, are, I suppose, broadly speaking, three: the passage from the city-state to the empire-state, the abolition of slavery, and the creation of the church as distinct from the state. All these were voiced, or at least anticipated in principle, by Stoicism. As to the third point, Stoicism, like some other Greek schools of philosophy, linked men together in a unity which was independent of the state and in which therefore lay the germs of a church.

Again the Stoic theology led to an attitude towards nature which was a new thing in literature, a sense of the *mystery* of nature, as the dwelling-place and vesture of deity, the *templum deorum immortalium* (Seneca, *De Benef.* vii, 7, 3). It was something like the old Greek nature-worship minus its polytheism. To the formation of our modern attitude towards nature no doubt other elements have contributed, notably the Celtic, as Matthew Arnold held. But Stoicism was the beginning of it.

The world at large is little conscious of the debt which it owes

to Stoicism as a religious philosophy. The high seriousness and lofty morality taught by this school the world has passed by with a shrug of indifference; its charities, extended to slaves and even to the lower animals, —

ὅσα ζῶει τε καὶ ἔρπει θνήτ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν,¹ —

have been put down to "rhetoric" or inconsistency; and men have been contented merely to "shiver at its apathy." But its apathy was, after all, only meant as a protest against emotion in the wrong place. The Stoics objected to basing mercy (*clementia*) upon mere emotion (*miser cordia*). May not the reason for this indifference of the world at large towards a noble school of thought be found partly in the fact that Stoicism stands too near to ourselves to be seen clearly? It is said that if you show a man his own likeness in a mirror he will sometimes turn from it in disgust. Stoicism is essentially a philosophy not of despair, but of confidence and almost defiant optimism. Many of the fundamental ethical principles which are generally regarded as specifically Christian had been developed independently by the Porch. The idea of the fatherhood of God and its corollaries, the brotherhood of man and the law of love, in a word, the whole idea of basing morality directly upon a religious theory of the universe, is Stoic.

The striking phrase, τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, quoted by St. Paul, and the use of the word πατήρ in addressing the Deity are common to the Hymn of Cleanthes and the prologue to the Φαινόμενα of Aratus.

And this is a new note in literature; there is nothing quite like it in Plato or Aristotle, though Greek literature of the classical age has some analogies.²

In view of these facts it is no matter of surprise that Stoicism has contributed to Christianity some of its cardinal terms: πνεῦμα (*spiritus*), συνείδησις (*conscientia*), αὐτάρκεια (*sufficentia*), in their special religious senses, have come to us through the Stoics. Even λόγος is ultimately due to them.

The phrase πολιτεία τοῦ κόσμου, *civitas communis hominum et deorum*, "city of God," is only one of many links that connect the early Greek Stoics with Cicero and Marcus Aurelius, and Marcus Aurelius with St. Augustine. Nor did some of the chief of the early fathers of the church, notably St. Augustine, fail to recognize the affinities of Christianity to earlier religious systems. *Seneca saepe noster*, says Tertullian, *Seneca noster*, says Jerome: and the recognition went so far as to lead some zealot to manufacture a correspondence between Seneca and St. Paul, which was intended to

¹ Hymn of Cleanthes, third century B. C.

² Plato speaks of God as πατήρ in the *Timaeus*, but rather in the sense of the creator — the δημιουργός — than as standing in an intimate relation to the soul of man.

account for their resemblance. Some passages in Seneca are indeed startling enough to awaken a suspicion of some contact. He several times speaks of God as *parens noster*, and as "within us" (*prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est*); he calls him *sacer spiritus* (*Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet* — the same idea as I Corinthians III, 16, and VI, 19, "your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost in you"). Whether Seneca may not have come into contact with some refined form of Judaism at Rome, it is indeed hard to say. Yet these terms are Stoical property: the "God within" of Seneca is the same as the *dominans ille in nobis deus* of Cicero, and the *divinae particula aurae* of Horace. And if Seneca has some striking parallels to the ethical teaching of the Sermon on the Mount, these are only deductions from that fundamental ethical principle of Stoicism by which it is linked not less with Aristotle than with Christianity: *hominem sociale animal, communi bono genitum*.¹ "Nur allein der Mensch vermag das Unmögliche." The Stoics had seized the grand conception that Reason, man's prerogative, is an emanation from, or part of, the Deity. I know of no better general exposition of this doctrine of the "Indwelling Supreme Spirit" than Emerson's Divinity School Address of 1838.

Let us now turn to the second period in the history of the Latin language, the period in which Latin becomes the organ of the Christian Church. In this period, which extends from the latter part of the second century to the latter part of the fifth century A.D., from Marcus Aurelius to the fall of the Western Empire, Christianity was taking shape: and it brings us to the second great element out of which the composite unity of Latin civilization was developed. The official conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity in the fourth century has been called "the miracle of history";² but there is no need to appeal to miracles in this case. The Græco-Roman world was prepared for the reception of Christianity through that shifting of the ancient landmarks which finds expression in Stoicism. And there is also another order of facts to which I have now to allude, avoiding as far as possible controversial matter. For if Stoicism was a composite thing, Christianity, as it entered the stream of Roman history, was not a simple one.

Iam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes,

says Juvenal (3, 62) in his indiscriminate manner. But before the Orontes flowed into the Tiber it had admitted a Greek tributary. Of the social and intellectual life of Syria proper during the centuries that followed Alexander's conquest, we know, alas, too little. What would we not give to be present in one of those old lecture-rooms of

¹ Seneca, *De Clem.* I, 3, 2.

² Freeman.

Tarsus or Soli or some other centre of Stoic teaching! But of the Hellenization of Palestine we know more: how from Alexandria, as a centre of influence, the process went on quietly during the third century B.C. until the violent attempt of Antiochus — Ἐπιφανής or Ἐπιμανής — to force the gods of Greece upon Judæa, and his insults to the Temple and the Torah, led to a violent reaction, and Judaism asserted itself again under the Maccabees. But not till Hellenism had left a deep mark upon Jewish thought and Jewish literature. All this is fully recognized by Jewish as well as by Christian historians. The Greek cities to the east of the Jordan, alluded to by Josephus, cannot have been without their influence. But even if Hellenism was at a low ebb in Palestine between Antiochus and the birth of Christ, the labors of the learned in the flourishing Jewish colony at Alexandria, though directed primarily to spreading a knowledge of the Jewish scriptures among the heathen and reconciling the teachings of the Law with Greek philosophy, were not without their reaction on Judaism itself. A knowledge of this Hellenized and humanized Judaism must have been spread over the world by the dispersions and settlements of the Jews which followed the overthrow of Jewish independence by Pompey in B.C. 63. At Rome the Jews formed a regular colony on the west of the Tiber, and we hear of them in Cicero and Horace.

The converging streams of thought from Greece and from Judæa were bound to meet; and the phraseology of St. Paul can hardly be explained except on the supposition that Christianity and Hellenism had already met in him. But at Rome the effective union came later. The old religion maintained its ground for centuries, side by side with the new; and when Christianity triumphed, it triumphed rather by taking its rival up into itself than by destroying it. Thus if Stoicism prepared the way for Christianity, Christianity made Stoicism for the first time a force capable of appealing to all sorts and conditions of men. The earliest extant product in the Latin language of this fusion of elements is the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix, in which Christianity and Stoicism are so blended that it is sometimes difficult to say whether the argument adduced is Christian or Stoic. Its date is not certain; but its latest editor, Waltzing, places it at the end of the second century. The latter part of that century had witnessed the production of the first Latin translation of the Bible, — the Itala, — and the beginning of the fifth century saw the completion of Jerome's Vulgate. Boethius, "the last of the Romans whom Cato or Tully would have recognized for their countryman," as Gibbon calls him, closes our second period, — a period, no doubt, of decadence in literature, as literature; but a period of full vitality and efficiency in the history of the Latin language. By the close of the fifth century Latin Christianity had taken definite shape, a body of

doctrine formulated on the principles of Roman law and a church organized on the lines of Roman administration.

Is it not the history of architecture and of verse over again, even though we are not able to point to any feature quite so definitely Roman as the arch in architecture or the accentual principle in verse? The products of Greater Greece and of Judæa were not merely adopted and transmitted by Rome; she made them her own; and sent them forth, stamped by her own genius, to shape the religious sentiment of the modern world. It was not the intention of this paper to vindicate the originality of the Romans, but it seems to vindicate itself.

Historians of Latin literature generally put up a notice-board at the end of the fifth century to the effect that the "Dark Ages" have commenced, or warning us that to the age of gold, silver, **Third** and the baser metals has succeeded an age for which **Period** no metal is base enough. But the reign of the Latin language was far from coming to an end with Boethius. Nor can the attempt to set up an entity called Modern History, as distinct from Ancient History, be congratulated on its success. Historians are so little agreed as to where it begins that their dates range from the first inroad of the barbarians to the seventeenth or even the eighteenth century.

There was no real breach of continuity; and the Latin language of the eight centuries that lie between Boethius and Roger Bacon, whether it be called "Dog Latin" or "Lion Latin," remained a language which was both living and national, the organ of that greater Roman nation or Christian commonwealth which included the Teutons and which about the middle of this period assumed a new form in the Holy Roman Empire. The idea that nationality depends on unity of race does not appeal to a Briton, and must seem still more eccentric to an American. The proper name for the Latin language from the sixth to the end of the thirteenth century is not *lingua Latina*, but *lingua Romana*. In this capacity it achieves an even greater universality than it enjoyed before. And it is fully alive, though there spring up side by side with it a number of daughter languages which are completely developed before the close of this period. Moreover, this Latin, if grammatically decadent, is capable of serving its age well as an instrument of thought. The rule of Augustine, "*Melius est reprehendunt nos grammatici quam non intellegant populi*," expresses the very sensible point of view adopted by his successors in their handling of the *lingua Romana*.

During the first three centuries of this long period the work done by Latin is necessarily limited; for all intellectual life had perished except in favored places like Ireland, and among exceptional men

like Priscian, Bede, and Alcuin. The relations of Latin were mainly with the monasteries; and to these centuries, if to any, may be fitly applied the term "The Dark Age." The three centuries that follow (A.D. 800-1100) are a period of transition to a brighter period, and are marked by a reform of schools. But Latin is still mainly confined to the clergy, though the works of men like Scotus Erigena and Eginhard must not be forgotten. It is not till the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that Latin once more becomes a great force in the world. During this last stage of its existence as a living language it puts off its ecclesiastical character and enters on new paths as an organ of secular life, in philosophy, in law, and in science, especially the science of medicine. It becomes the language of the universities which were then springing into existence, and finds a wide field of activity open to it in the service of that movement which has been rightly called the Early or Scholastic Renaissance, as distinct from that greater Humanistic Renaissance of which Petrarch was the "morning star." The stimulus to all this new life came partly from the Saracens. Arabic works on philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and other branches of science and pseudo-science were translated into Latin, and Europe was thus brought for a third time into contact with Semitic thought. But it must be remembered that the light of Arabia was in large measure a light borrowed from Greece and the remoter East; conspicuously so in the case of the Arabic Aristotle, which made its way in a Latin dress from Spain into Northern Europe at the beginning of the thirteenth century.

After the fourteenth century Latin is no longer the universal language of Europe, no longer a national language in the sense in which the term has been used above, though it continued to live in works like the *Imitatio Christi* of Thomas à Kempis. The reason is that it was no longer alone in the field. And the Renaissance, from the very fact that it was a revival of purer standards of taste and diction, necessarily turned its back upon that well of living speech which had supplied the needs of the preceding centuries. But what killed Latin as a living tongue was not only purism but also the growth of its rivals in literary capacity. English had blossomed into literature as early as the seventh century (Cædmon, to say nothing of *Beowulf*). German had produced a truly national literature in the twelfth and thirteenth. The reign of Latin thus overlaps that of the modern tongues as an organ of literature and science; and as their influence waxed, hers waned.

But I have yet to ask your attention to one more phase in the life of Latin. For if Latin died as a universal language when the new literatures were born, yet it died only to rise again, together with Greek, in a new form.

For the revival of classical literature in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries turned its face in reality, not so much to the past as to the future. And perhaps the most important fact in the history of modern literatures is this, that all the names of first importance are post-Renaissance.¹ Chaucer had caught its spirit; and among its most prominent representatives are to be numbered a Rabelais, a Cervantes, a Shakespeare, and later on a Goethe and a Schiller. Herein, I take it, lies the ultimate reason why we study the Greek and Latin classics at all; their study is in reality a study of our own past, — our very own, — divorced from which all that is most characteristic in the present is only half-intelligible. Were it not for this, — were it true that the world would be exactly what it is if the Greeks and Romans had never existed, as the late Mr. Herbert Spencer thought and said,² — then, I confess, I should feel that the classical studies could be justified only as a disciplinary study — and for the light that Latin throws upon the vocabulary and syntax of the mother tongue. It is because the precise opposite is true, because modern life is soaked with Greek and still more with Latin influences, that it will always depend for its complete interpretation on a study of the classics — that is, so long as the landmarks of our present culture remain unshifted. And even at the present day the Latin language is to the Latinized classes what it was to our Teutonic ancestors, a second tongue, to which we can apply in a more real sense than to Greek the old saying of Cassiodorus: "Dulcius suscipitur quod patrio sermone narratur."³ Hence it is that we like to speak of Plato rather than of Platon, and that the Germans, going one step further, convert Bacon into Baco. It is, indeed, a noteworthy phenomenon that the tongue of old Latium should have conquered for itself the New as well as the Old World, and should find now in America a land which not only maintains Latin as an integral part of the school curriculum, but has also given to the Old World some of its most scientific grammars and dictionaries.

Let me illustrate the influence of Latin upon English literature by one fact which I discovered only the other day. One of the most famous speeches of Shakespeare is, I think, based upon what would seem *a priori* a very unlikely source — the treatise of Seneca "On Mercy," an appeal to the reigning Emperor Nero.⁴ The leading

¹ Dante is one of the witnesses to the dawn which preceded the day.

² See his *Autobiography*, vol. II, p. 237.

³ Preface to his *De Orthographia*, quoted by Sandys, *History of Classical Scholarship*, p. 254.

⁴ Parallels between Seneca's tragedies and Shakespeare have been quoted by J. Churton Collins in his recent *Studies in Shakspeare*; but I am not aware that any one has hitherto adduced evidence that any *prose* work of Seneca was known to Shakespeare. In the light of the *De Clementia* I am inclined to think that the passage of Titus Andronicus which Mr. Collins regards as based on Cicero *Pro Ligario*, XII, 32, may also come from Seneca.

ideas of Portia's speech are all there; it is only the inimitable form of expression that is Shakespeare's.

Nullum clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem decet (1, 3, 3; again 1, 19, 1).

"It becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown."

Eo scilicet formosius id esse magnificentiusque fatebimur quo in maiore prae-
stabitur potestate (1, 19, 1).

"'Tis mightiest in the mightiest."

Quod si di placabiles et aequi delicta potentium non statim fulminibus per-
sequuntur, quanto aequius est hominem hominibus praepositum miti animo
exercere imperium? (1, 7, 2.)

"But mercy is above this sceptred sway.
It is enthroned in the heart of kings;
It is an attribute of God himself."

Quid autem? Non proximum eis (dis) locum tenet is qui se ex deorum natura
gerit beneficus et largus et in melius potens? (1, 19, 9.)

"And earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice."

Cogitato quanta solitudo et vastitas futura sit si nihil relinquitur
nisi quod iudex severus absolverit (1, 6, 1).

"Consider this
That in the course of justice none of us
Should see salvation."

Compare *Hamlet*, II, 2: "Use every man after his desert, and
who shall 'scape whipping?"

And the story of Augustus pardoning Cinna (1, 9) probably
suggested:

"It is twice blessed;
It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes."

Lodge's translation was not published till some twenty years after
the *Merchant of Venice*. But that is no difficulty to those who
believe that Shakespeare had not forgotten the Latin which he had
learnt at Stratford Grammar School. And Seneca was more read in
those days than he is now: witness the enormous influence which
his tragedies exercised on the predecessors of Shakespeare. I venture
to commend the study of Seneca's prose works to Shakespearian
scholars.

A CENTURY OF METAPHYSICAL SYNTAX

BY WILLIAM GARDNER HALE

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WHEN the invitation to take part in this Congress came to me, the difficulty of surveying, in the allotted forty-five minutes, all the problems presented by the Latin language — problems in fields so varied as those of the critical treatment of the contents of the various authors, paleography in its more general aspects, epigraphy, grammar on the side of forms, grammar on the side of syntax, grammar on the side of meter, and the rest — seemed insuperable. I was thereupon assured that I might deal with all the problems, or with any of them. But my doubts were not at an end. I felt that the situation demanded that your speakers should discuss some phase of the subjects in which they were most practiced, and in which they had, accordingly, the largest measure of faith in their own judgment. This meant that, if I were to speak at all, it must be upon conceptions and methods in the study of Latin syntax. But it was one of the essential articles of my creed that no man can deal successfully with problems of Latin syntax, if, as the plan of the committee seemed to contemplate, he sedulously confined his eyes to the ground covered by the Latin reservation. Again I was assured that I was at liberty to say what I chose. I plan, therefore, without regard to barriers of language, to discuss the way in which most writers to-day look at questions of the origins of mood-uses.

We are not aware, in general, where our conceptions of mood-forces came from. We do not even know whether they properly belong together. What we have is an eclectic system. But the choices made have for a long time not been made by a conscious process. Each writer has in general accepted whatever seemed to him to commend itself. I shall later show you a single sentence of three lines, in which four radically different and mutually contradictory schemes are combined.

A satisfactory treatment of the subject would demand a discussion of every phase of opinion from the beginnings of syntactical studies

to the present day. It is obvious that I cannot present even a hundredth part of this. I must, however, necessarily run briefly over the centuries that preceded the one covered by the title of my paper.

The first recorded thinking about the syntax of any language of our family took place among the Greeks. The moods received names. In the best Greek writing on the subject, that of Apollonius the Cross (an unhappy epithet for one engaged in so charming a work), Greek mood-syntax reached its culmination. Apollonius defined the moods as expressing a *διάθεσις ψυχική*, which I like to translate by the phrase, "an attitude of mind." We have not got beyond this yet, nor ever shall. We have strayed far from it in the last century, and to it we must return.

Apollonius uses for the moods the names inherited from his predecessors. They are: *ὁριστική*, the Mood of Indicating or Defining, the Latin *Indicativus*; *προστακτική*, the Mood of Commanding, the Latin *Imperativus*; *εὐκτική*, the Mood of Wishing, the Latin *Optativus*; and *ὑποτακτική*, the Subjoined Mood, the Latin *Subiunctivus*. In giving the first three names, the Greeks were unconsciously thinking of the moods as Apollonius did in his definition. They were recognizing the *attitudes of mind* conveyed by them, the representation respectively of a fact, of a command, of a wish. The list of forces is imperfect, but it is sound so far as it goes. Examples in which the three moods convey precisely the attitudes of mind described by the names occur in abundance.

In hitting upon the last name, the Subjoined Mood, the Greeks committed a great error. They had named the other moods from their forces; this mood, on the other hand, they named simply from its relation, *in subordinate clauses*, to other parts of the sentence. It was to them simply the mood of attachment. The mischief accomplished by this purely superficial treatment is not yet undone.

We have already seen, then, two entirely different ways of looking at uses of the moods. For the second I know no apposite name, unless it be "mechanical." For the first, the conception which looks upon moods as expressing attitudes of mind, the proper name is "psychological." We mean more to-day by the word psychological than Apollonius meant by his definition. But, so far as Apollonius went, we mean the same thing.

The Roman grammarians accepted the Greek conceptions of the moods, and translated the names, as above. Naturally, then, they applied the names Subjunctive and Optative to the same set of forms used under different circumstances. The mood in *utinam amarer* they called the Optative. The mood in the second verb of *prodest ut eas* they called the Subjunctive.

The scholastic grammarians did not interest themselves in the

moods. Interest was revived when the Renaissance grammarians took up the task. I hope some time to tell the story in detail. It is an exceedingly interesting and instructive one; and it has not yet been told in a way that seems to me wholly satisfactory, — admirable as is Golling's sketch in his recently published Introduction in vol. III of the great German Historical Latin Grammar.

We pass at once to the eighteenth century, and to the first influences of modern philosophy. Delbrück, in his *Comparative Syntax*, has called attention to the influence of Wolff on certain parts of grammar, but no one, so far as I know, has called attention to what seems to be his influence on the doctrine of the moods. Wolff finds three notions to be fundamental in his scheme of ontology, namely those of Possibility, of Necessity, of Contingency. Here and there in the eighteenth century one finds a grammatical treatment corresponding to this. Thus in Meiner's *Philosophische und Allgemeine Sprachlehre*, Leipzig, 1781, the Indicative is made to fill the category of Necessity, the Subjunctive the two categories of Possibility and Contingency. A less thorough-going use of the same scheme is to be found in Harris's *Hermes*, London, 1751. Harris identifies the Potential Mood, the Subjoined Mood, and the Mood of Contingency, and explains the Latin Subjunctive of Purpose on the ground that an act purposed is in human life "always a contingent, and may never, perhaps, happen, despite all our forethought."

The philosophical system of Wolff was destined to be succeeded by the system of Kant; and the system of Kant was destined to be applied to the syntax of the verb. The fact that Kant influenced mood-syntax has been pointed out frequently enough. But it has been done by no one in detail except Koppin, in his two *Beiträge*, 1877 and 1880; and Koppin seems to me not clearly to have unraveled the tangled threads, nor to have recognized sufficiently the modifying influence of Matthiä, Dissen, and Thiersch. Further, by quoting Matthiä in an edition published in 1825-27 instead of the original edition of 1807 and 1808 (distinct books), and Thiersch in an edition of 1824 instead of the original one of 1812, Koppin makes these men to be followers, rather than shapers, of the opinion of others. Again, no one has pointed out clearly the extraordinary manner in which ideas laid down first for Greek were taken up for other languages of our family, or the extraordinary fact that under this or that disguise they or their descendants rule the greater part of the grammatical world to-day. It is these things which I shall myself try to do, in altogether too brief fashion, within the short time allowed me.

In 1781, Kant published the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the first working-out of his complete system. In this he places all judgments under one or another of four categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation,

¹ I wish to thank Professor John Dewey for assistance in placing this influence.

and Modality. Each of these categories is again divided into three. We are concerned to-day only with the use made of the categories of Modality. The sub-categories of this are: Existence, Possibility, and Necessity. Every recognition or conception of an act or state possible to the human mind must fall under one of these three categories. These three conceptions, native to the mind, are the frames, so to speak, through which the mind looks at whatever occurs in the external world.

Eleven years after the publication of the *Critique*, namely in 1792, J. G. Hasse, a schoolmaster in Kant's own town of Königsberg, published a *Grammatology of Greek and Latin, for academic instruction and the upper classes Gymnasien*. In his general treatment, he adapted Kant's scheme to grammar, the moods being made to express *Existence, Possibility, and Necessity*. In the details of his treatment, however, strangely enough, Hasse did not apply these conceptions.

Nine years later, in 1801, Professor Gottfried Hermann of Leipzig published a book on the reform of the theory of Greek grammar, *De emendanda ratione grammaticae Graecae*. He upbraids Hasse, in the most general terms, for having misunderstood Kant. As for himself, he says that he shall hold himself free from taking sides in metaphysics, but that he shall avail himself of the categories of Kant. This is precisely what Hasse had done; and, so far as the verb is concerned, the adaptation made by Hermann is the same as the adaptation made by Hasse. On the whole, Hasse seems to have been the saner and better grammarian. He is to-day, however, almost forgotten,¹ while Hermann, dogmatic, severe, strenuous, and triumphant, fills a great place in the history of classical studies.

The moods, says Hermann, indicate whether the act referred to *actually* takes place, or *can* take place, or *must* take place (the three categories of Existence, Possibility, and Necessity). The first idea is expressed by the Indicative. For the second, the subtle observation of the Greeks recognized two conceptions of Possibility, namely, Objective Possibility (*possibilitas obiectiva*), and Subjective Possibility (*possibilitas subiectiva*). The introduction of the terms "Subjective" and "Objective," which played so large a part in philosophy, will be noticed. These two conceptions are expressed by two distinct moods, the Subjunctive and the Optative. The Subjunctive mood, or the mood of Objectivity, expresses that which in the nature of the case in the given instance is capable of taking place. The Optative mood, or the mood of Subjectivity, expresses that which is capable of being thought. The third modal force, that of Necessity, is expressed by the Imperative if the Necessity is Subjective, by the verbal adjective *-τέος* if Objective.

¹ Hasse's name is not even mentioned in either of the two well-known lexicons by Pökel and Eckstein.

The Subjunctive is necessarily a dependent mood. For since it expresses that which in the nature of things in the given instance is capable of taking place, there must always be something to give the reason *why* the act can take place. But this can be furnished only in a main sentence. Hence the Subjunctive must always be dependent. Where it seems independent, this appearance is due to ellipsis. Thus ἴωμεν, "let us go," was originally ἄγε ἵνα ἴωμεν, "come, in order that we may go." Τί ποιῶ stands for σήμαινον τί ποιῶ, "tell me what I shall do," or οὐκ οἶδα τί ποιῶ, "I don't know what to do," etc.

Here we find a mixture of two influences. The one was the old Greek error by which the Subjunctive had been made the mood of dependency. The other was the error with regard to ellipsis, developed especially in the period of Renaissance grammar. The actual interpretation would be recognized by everybody to-day as impossible. Yet a great deal of our prevailing syntax of the present time historically goes back to precisely this reasoning of Hermann's.

The uses of the Optative are, in Hermann's treatment, all to be deduced from the idea of the Subjectively Possible, that is, of that which may be *thought as possible*. Thus the mood used in expressing wish is the Optative, because a wish is the thought of something as possible.

Hermann's book marked the firm establishment of a new method in syntax, which we may call the *metaphysical*; and it made syntax of the Kantian type.

We have now to trace the modifications of this first scheme. Matthiä, in two Greek grammars, 1807 and 1808, appears to have desired to deal with his problems without a metaphysical leaning. Nevertheless he did not escape the influence of Hermann. For the Imperative, he followed the older treatment, and made it the Mood of Command, not of Necessity. For the Optative he accepted Hermann's theory, with a modification. Hermann had made this the mood of Subjective Possibility, of an act *thought as possible*. Matthiä threw the emphasis on the side of thought rather than on the side of possibility, and accordingly defined the Optative as the *Mood of Thought*.

For the Subjunctive also he departed somewhat from Hermann's interpretation. Hermann had made the Subjunctive express Objective Possibility, in contrast with the Optative, the mood of Subjective Possibility. Matthiä held that both moods expressed the thought of an act as against reality, the difference being that the Subjunctive expressed the act more definitely, as depending on external circumstances, while the Optative expressed it less definitely.

Matthiä also remarks in the book of 1807 that, the terminations of the Subjunctive being primary, and those of the Optative second-

ary, the former are regularly used with tenses of the present or future, the latter with tenses of the past. The next step naturally would be to make the difference between the two merely one of tense, the mood being the same in both. This step was actually and fully taken by Kühner, in his Greek grammar, in 1833.

The effect of Matthiä's hint that the Optative was only a secondary Subjunctive has passed away in the last quarter of a century. The effect of his shifting of the supposed ground of the Optative to make it that of Thought, and putting the Subjunctive likewise under this category, has not passed away. It is, as we shall presently see, the system under which we are mostly living.

In the year 1808, Dissen, in a *Habilitationsschrift*, *De temporibus et modis verbi Graeci*, gave another twist to the doctrine of the moods. He made the Imperative the mood of Will, — the old conception, with a new name. The Optative he made to express a *conscious* thought, that is, the *recognition* of something as the thought of some one else, or of one's self at an earlier time. This was a modification of Matthiä's view. For the Subjunctive, he constructed a modification of Hermann's view. Hermann had made the Subjunctive the mood of Objective Possibility, of that which in the very nature and condition of things (*per ipsarum rerum condicionem*) is capable of taking place. In order that this should be shown, there had to be a main sentence, on which the other depended. Dissen, throwing emphasis on the side of "the very nature and condition of things," made the Subjunctive the mood of that which *hung upon* something else, in other words, the Mood of Conditionality. Naturally, then, the Indicative became, in his system, the Mood of Unconditionality.

The particle *ἄν*, according to Dissen, in itself expresses Conditionality. This is the reason why all connectives compounded with *ἄν* (as *ἐπὶ ἄν*,¹ *ἐπειδὴ ἄν*, *ἐὰν*, *ὅταν*, *ὅπόταν*, *εἰτ' ἄν*) take the Subjunctive. The same holds for the conjunctions meaning "before," "so long as," or "until" (as *πρὶν ἄν*, *ἕως ἄν*, *ὅφρα ἄν*, *ἕσ' ἄν*). The same holds, further, for all relative words with *ἄν* (as *ὅς*, *ὅστις*, *ὅλος*, *ὅπου*, *ὅθεν*); for the sense is the same as if, instead of the relative, one were to use an *ἐὰν* or *ὅπόταν* ("if" or "when") with a demonstrative.

This combination, made by Dissen in his working-out of his metaphysical material, remains in full force to-day, having been taken up later by Thiersch, by Reisig, and by Hermann himself, and then passed down from one German worker to another. In the English-speaking world, it is to be found in the grammars of Goodwin, Allen-Hadley, Goodell, Babbitt, Bevier's *Brief Greek Syntax*, Monro's *Homeric Grammar*, and even Thompson's *Greek Grammar*. We are learning and teaching the doctrine, nearly a century after it was

¹ I give these forms as Dissen writes them.

spun as a thread of a metaphysical web. It is wholly indefensible. It is, of course, true that there are relative and temporal clauses which are in effect conditions; but the great mass of these clauses, as of the others referred to, are not conditions. They are mere, and wholly simple, *determinative* clauses (to employ a term from my *Cum-Constructions* and my *Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin*). They simply answer the question, "What man, what time, what thing, etc., do you mean?" Thus in the sentence "happy he at heart above all others who shall lead you home in marriage," κείνος δ' αὖ περὶ κῆρι μακάριστος ἔσχον ἄλλων ὃς κέ σ' οἰκόνδ' ἀγάγηται, *Od.* 6, 159, the relative clause simply makes known to Nausicaa *who it is* that the speaker pronounces happy. It is no more conditional than the preterite Indicative in the corresponding "thrice and four times happy the Danaans who perished then in broad Troyland," τρισμάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις, οἳ τότε δλοντο Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ, said by the same speaker in *Od.* 5, 306. Again in *Il.* 2, 33, "but keep this in thy mind, nor let forgetfulness lay hold of thee when sweet sleep shall leave thee," εἴτ' ἂν σε μελίφρων ὕπνος ἀνήῃ, it is nothing short of grotesque to explain the last clause as conditional. It is merely a time-fixing clause, — an *anticipatory determinative clause*, the thing determined being here *a time*.

Four years after the appearance of Dissen's dissertation, in 1812, Thiersch published two Greek grammars. His mood-system is a composite of those of his immediate predecessors. For the Optative, he accepted Matthiä's view. This mood expresses an act as merely *thought* ("als blos gedacht"), as an *idea* ("Vorstellung"). A wish is expressed by the Optative because it conveys a mere thought. A clause of repeated action in the past takes the Optative, because the putting together of many acts into one group is not an affair of the things in themselves (which, as such, would be expressed by the Indicative), but an act of the mind, and so a "Vorstellung," etc., etc.

For the Subjunctive, Thiersch adopts the view of Dissen, combining all the phrases used about it in Dissen's dissertation. The Subjunctive is the mood of the *dependent*, the *conditioned*, the *uncertain*. Whatever involves Dependency, Conditionality, or Uncertainty must accordingly go into the Subjunctive. Thus in ἴωμεν "let us go," the Subjunctive is used because there is no real going. The going *depends upon* the will of the person addressed, is conditioned by that will. Hence it must be expressed by the Subjunctive. Similarly, the Subjunctive has to be used in clauses of purpose, because a purpose presupposes a main act, and is dependent upon it.

In spite of the wildness of these fancies, Thiersch reached several helpful conceptions. Thus he recognized the rise of the relative pronoun out of the demonstrative in Greek, and so established,

though still in a very incomplete way, the existence of an earlier stage of parataxis, out of which the later stage of hypotaxis grew. Thiersch also saw the *facts* of mood-usage more justly than his metaphysical schematizing suggests. He recognizes Will as the force of the Subjunctive in what he calls its earliest seat, namely exhortation and prohibition, and derives the Future force of the mood, as seen in many Homeric examples, from this earlier force, on the ground that acts lying in the future depend either upon the Will of some one or upon the later course of things ("dem weitem Erfolg"). In the same connection, he uses the phrase "wo dieser noch zu erwarten," "where this is still to be expected." Out of this has grown the use of the technical name Erwartung, now generally used in Germany for one of the families of meanings of the Subjunctive. We have thus already seen, as early as 1812, the suggestion that the uses of the Greek Subjunctive may be divided into two classes, Will and Expectation, and the suggestion of the descent of the second from the first. This is psychological syntax, beclouded though it is by the veil of metaphysical syntax thrown over it.

The opposite method, that which makes Expectation (Futurity) the oldest force of the Greek Subjunctive, was adopted by Aken, in 1861.

Both these conceptions, it may be said in passing, have been adopted for Latin. Thus in 1827, Wüllner, *Bedeutung der Sprachlichen Casus und Modi*, endeavored to explain all the forces of the Latin Subjunctive as containing the idea of Will, and in 1870, Greenough, *The Latin Subjunctive*, endeavored to explain all the forces of the same mood as expressing Futurity. Both these men had broken away from the tenets of the metaphysical school; yet both continued to hold the doctrine, which had arisen through the thinking of that school, that every use of a given mood contained in it the original force of that mood.

The general view of the Optative suffered no further development in the teachings of the metaphysical school, though a variety of names came into use. The mood was that of "Vorstellung," "des rein Vorgestellten," "des bloss Gedachten," "der reinen Subjectivität." It expressed a *thought*, an *idea*, something *abstracted from reality*. Yet various attempts, quite in the modern method, were made to trace the evolution of one use out of another. Thus Baümlin, *Untersuchungen über die griechischen Modi*, 1846, says that the Optative is the mood of the Subjective, and that, as such, it has two functions, one to express what is merely thought, the other to express what is wished; but he adds, "If this seems too vague, then it is better to start with the idea of Wish as the older, since it is easier to think that the idea of Vorstellung arose out of the idea of Wish than vice versa." The connecting link, he adds, may be formed by the Opta-

tive of Concession. He does not illustrate, but probably has in mind such a series as "may it be so," "grant that it be so," "it may be so." Here is already the conception of the growth of one force out of another, and of a third force out of the second. This is *evolution*, a conception very different from that of the presence of some one force in all the uses of a given mood.

So much for Greek. But the story does not end here. These same ideas were accepted as valid for the syntax of all languages. Often the same man wrote on both Greek and Latin, treating both in the same way. Thus Reisig, adopting Hermann's views in substance, wrote a monograph on *äv* in 1820, and then, in lectures on Latin syntax, given finally in 1826-27, and published by Hasse in 1839, reproduced the same scheme for Latin, — three forms of being, Reality, Possibility, and Necessity, and three corresponding moods, Indicative, Subjunctive, and Imperative. Possibility is thought of either objectively, as resting on the relation of things, or subjectively, as in the mind of the speaker.

This is the Hermannian scheme, pure and simple. The majority of Latin grammarians, on the other hand, following the modified scheme devised by Matthiä, made the Subjunctive the mood of thought ("Vorstellung"), and the Imperative the mood of command. Thus Zumpt, second edition, 1820 (probably also in the first, which I have not been able to see¹), explains the Subjunctive in a clause of Purpose as expressing a thought ("Vorstellung"), the Subjunctive with *cum* causal as expressing the idea of inner dependence, which is a matter of thought ("Vorstellung"), and the Subjunctive with *cum* temporal as *involving* the same conception of inner dependence. Here we recognize the greater part of our ordinary syntactical armory of to-day. The story is henceforth largely the same. Schulz's Latin grammar, 1825, says that the Indicative is the mood of reality, while the Subjunctive expresses the contents of a sentence not as a fact, but merely as an *idea*, a *conception*. Thus in indirect questions, expressions of purpose or result, wishes, concessions, conclusions, one is dealing, not with facts, but with conceptions, as in "I told him that I had gone to church" ("dass ich in der Kirche gewesen sei"), in which for the moment I regard my being in church not as a fact ("Thatsache"), but as the object of a mental activity, and so as a conception. The treatment is the same, again, in Etzler's *Erörterungen*, 1826, Kühner's Latin grammar, 1840, Madvig's Latin grammar, 1844, etc. Madvig says, for example, that in *Titius currit ut sudet*, "Titius runs to get into a sweat," the Subjunctive is used because the sweating is a mere conception. Holtze, in 1861-62, says the Indicative, Subjunctive, and Imperative, as everybody knows (*notum est*), express things respectively as Actuality, as dependent

¹ Golling states that he has not been able to see either of the first two editions.

on Thought alone, or as Command. The same doctrine is the prevailing one to-day in Germany. Thus Waldeck, in his *Practical Guide to Instruction in Latin Grammar*, 1892, says, pp. 146, 147: "Hierin nun liegt ein sehr wichtiger Unterschied des Lateinischen; diese Sprache fasst alles, was als von irgend jemandem, also auch dem Redenden selbst gesagt, gefragt, geglaubt, empfunden, wahrgenommen, also gleichsam aus seiner Seele gesprochen wird, nicht als Thatsache auf, auch wenn es an sich eine solche ist, sondern nur als die Behauptung, Frage, Meinung, Empfindung, Wahrnehmung desselben, also als Vorstellung." And Methner's *Investigation in the Theory of the Latin Moods and Tenses, with especial regard to use in Instruction*, makes that which the Subjunctive expresses to be everywhere "eine gedachte, vorgestellte Handlung" (p. 152), "ein Gedanke" (p. 149), "ein vorgestelltes Geschehen" (p. 146). Hoffmann, in his doctrine of absolute and relative time as determining the mood of the *cum*-clause, carried the doctrine to its natural conclusion by making the Subjunctive the mood of the non-existent, and did not even see the humor of this *reductio ad absurdum*.

American Latin grammar followed German Latin grammar. The Andrews and Stoddard's grammar, upon which most people of my generation were brought up, taught that "the Subjunctive mood is used to express an action or state simply as conceived by the mind"; and again, that "relatives require the Subjunctive, when the clauses connected by them express merely a conception; as, for example, a consequence, an innate quality, a cause, motive, or purpose." Two of our well-known grammars of the present day base the treatment of the moods upon the same thing, — grammars made by two men who have rendered distinguished service to classical studies. One of them, that of Professor Gildersleeve, says: "The Subjunctive mood represents the predicate as an idea, as something merely conceived in the mind (abstractions from reality)." The other, that of Professor West, says, "Mood is the manner of stating the action of the verb. The action may be stated: (1) As really happening. The Mood of Fact (Indicative). (2) As Thought of. The Mood of Will, Desire, Possibility (Subjunctive). (3) As Demanded. The Mood of Command (Imperative)." Here is the same scheme, — Fact, Thought, Command. Thus the metaphysical Matthiä-Hermann-Kantian scheme of 1801–1807 is being taught in America in 1904. Even the extremest product of the methods of the metaphysical school, of which I have just spoken, namely Hoffmann's doctrine of absolute and relative time as determining the mood in the *cum*-clause, was imported into America in the Allen and Greenough grammar, and, passing over into the Harkness grammar, stood in both until I attacked it.

French Latin grammar has largely followed the same course.

Thus a very important French syntacticist, Ferdinand Antoine, whose recent death all workers in classics must deplore, wrote in his *Syntaxe de la Langue Latine*, Paris, 1885, p. 163, "Le subjonctif exprime une simple conception de l'esprit."¹

Thus far I have been following out, for Latin, the Matthiä-Hermann-Kant theory. Another form, the Thiersch-Dissen-Hermann-Kant theory, is to be found in Ramshorn's Latin grammar, 1824. Ramshorn makes the Indicative the mood of Reality, the Subjunctive the mood of the Conditioned, and the Imperative the mood of Necessity. It will be seen that I do not agree with Golling's statement that the grammars of Zumpt and Ramshorn rest upon no philosophical theorems, but upon grammatically scientific foundations.

Many combinations and interadjustments of these systems have of course appeared. Thus Schmalz, in his Latin syntax of 1885, started with Subjectivity, and from this got Dependency, Inner Connection, etc. In the third edition, 1900, he starts with a *fictive* power (which is simply, of course, our too familiar "Vorstellung"), and from this gets Subjectivity, which he then makes to account for the various dependent uses of the Subjunctive. The oldest theory of the Subjunctive, namely, that it is essentially a subjoined mood, has also been revived by Kruciewicz, in the *Zeitschrift für österreichischen Gymnasien*, 1894, and in a printed lecture by Professor West in the *Latin Leaflet* for January 18, 1904.

This must suffice for Greek and Latin grammar. It would seem now as if my story might be at an end. But the most extraordinary part of it still remains to tell. Metaphysical and wholly unpsychological ways of looking at mood-syntax did not stop with the grammars of two languages, but spread to grammars of all languages of the family.

The Indicative, says Becker in his *Organismus*, 1827, expresses an act as "ein wirkliches," while the Subjunctive represents it as "ein vorgestelltes," whether it be in itself real or conceived ("sei es an sich wirklich oder vorgestellt"). Grimm adopted the system in his German grammar, Mätzner in his English grammar, etc. It is to-day the dominant creed. Every teacher of English, German, or French will recognize it as the system in almost universal vogue. I need give but a couple of illustrations, one for English, and one for French.

One of the latest and best American grammars of English, that of Professor Carpenter, says "Verbs are said to be in the Indicative, Subjunctive, or Imperative moods, according as they represent statements as actual facts, as thoughts, or as commands"; and again, "the Subjunctive mood represents statements as thoughts or con-

¹ Antoine did not remain satisfied with this view, as is shown both by private letters to me, and by the fact that he has in print accepted and expounded my views upon the constructions with *antequam*, *priusquam*, *dum*, *donec*, and the like.

ceptions, which may or may not have a basis in reality, or which are obviously not conceivable as facts."

In Macmillan's French Course, Third Year, by G. Eugène Fasnacht, we read on p. 62 the statement, "The Subjunctive Mood (is used) if the Principal Sentence implies that the action expressed in the dependent clause is merely conceived in the mind of the speaker." And in a single sentence of three lines, referred to earlier in this address, we have a mixture of four systems. It reads as follows: "In the sentence 'son père veut qu'il vienne,' 'his father wishes that he should come,' the contingency (eventual fact) of his coming is in the speaker's mind, subjoined to the will of another (his father)." The word "contingency" belongs to the Wolfian school, the phrase "in the speaker's mind" to the Hermannian-Kantian school, the phrase "subjoined to" to the old Greek error about the Subjunctive, and the word "Will" to true psychological syntax, in its simplest form.

But, it may be said, "the English Subjunctive and the German Subjunctive, at any rate, *do* express ideas, and not facts. Why not so explain them, then, in class-room work?" The most conclusive single answer is as follows: "If you do this for the English Subjunctive, *e. g.*, you should also explain in the same way the more common *equivalents*, namely, the forms with the modal auxiliaries *will* (1st person), *shall, should, may, might, can, could, would*." When you ask, "Why does the writer here say *shall*, why does he here say *can*, why does he here say *would*?" the student should be taught to answer, in every case, "Mood of idea." But there could not be a class so blind that some one in it would not ask the question, "Do all these words express the *same* idea, and may any one of them be substituted in any sentence for any other?"

The truth is, that our first task to-day is to get rid of all this metaphysical inheritance, which belongs to an unscientific age, and to study language directly by and for itself.

SHORT PAPERS

PROFESSOR H. C. ELMER, of Cornell University, presented a paper to this Section on "Some Questionable Tendencies of Modern Textual Criticism."

PROFESSOR SIDNEY G. ASHMORE, of Union College, presented a short paper on the subject of "The Classics in Our Schools."

SECTION F — ENGLISH LANGUAGE

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(Hall 3, September 23, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES M. GAYLEY, University of California.
SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OTTO JESPERSEN, University of Copenhagen.
PROFESSOR GEORGE L. KITTRIDGE, Harvard University.

THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO OTHER SUBJECTS

BY OTTO JESPERSEN

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No single human individual ever lived completely isolated from his fellow beings; no nation was ever entirely cut off from other nations; and no contact between individuals and nations ever took place without leaving traces in their coming lives. Language is inconceivable without such contact, and nothing is more contagious than modes of speech. From the manner in which a man talks, one can always tell what sort of people he has had most intercourse with and what sort of influences, intellectual and moral, he has been chiefly subject to in the whole of his life. This is true of nations too; a complete survey of the English language would, therefore, show to the initiated the whole of the life of the English nation from the oldest times till the present day.

Let us for a moment imagine that all human records, all books, documents, inscriptions, letters, etc., were lost, with the single exception of a number of texts written in English at various dates, and let us imagine a body of men buckling down to the task of writing the history of the English language with that material only. They would be able, of course, to find out a great many things, but however highly gifted we imagine them to be, there would always remain to them an immense number of riddles which no amount of sagacity would enable them to solve, and which now, to us, are no riddles at all. In the old texts they would encounter a great many words whose meanings could be gathered with more or less certainty from the context; but a vast number of other words would remain unintellig-

ible to them, which are now made perfectly clear to us by their similarity with words in cognate languages. How much should we understand now of *Beowulf*, if we had not Gothic, German, Norse, etc., to compare the words with? And then the forms of the words, their inflections and modifications: our supposed philologists would be at a loss to explain such phenomena as vowel-mutation (umlaut) or to understand the use and formation of the different cases, etc. Similarly, when they saw a great many of the old words disappear and give way to others that were hitherto totally unknown, they would not be in possession of the key we now have in Scandinavian, in French, in Latin and Greek: much of what is now self-evident would under these circumstances strike everybody with amazement, as falling down from heaven without any apparent reason.

A scientific treatment of the English language must, then, presuppose the scientific treatment of a great many other languages as well, and the linguistic historian cannot possibly fulfill his task without a wide outlook to other fields. Not only must he have some acquaintance with the cognate languages, the Arian (or Indo-European) family and more especially the Germanic (or Teutonic) branch of it, but the English have in course of time come into contact with so many other nations and have been so willing to learn foreign words from people of every clime, that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that whoever would really and thoroughly fathom the English language would have to study half the languages spoken on the earth.

More than to any other branch of science the investigators of English are indebted to Arian and Germanic philology. They have continually to consult such works as Brugmann's and Delbrück's *Vergleichende Grammatik und Syntax*, Streitberg's *Urgermanische Grammatik*, Kluge's, Uhlenbeck's, and Franck's etymological dictionaries, not to mention the other dictionaries of German, Dutch, etc., in which etymology plays only a subordinate part; further periodicals like *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, *Journal of Germanic Philology*, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*,—it would be an easy thing to lengthen the list. In classes of Old English recourse must continually be had to Verner's law in order to explain the relation between *wæs* (Mod. E. *was*) and *wæron* (Mod. *were*), or between *risan* (Mod. *rise*) and *ræran* (Mod. *rear*). To understand the rudimentary passive in *hatte* ("is called," cf. Spenser's *hight*), we must go to Gothic, Sanskrit, and Greek, as indeed we must to comprehend the whole of the inflectional system. The force of the prefix *ge-* in *gehieran*, *gewinnan*, *gedon*, and innumerable other verbs is made intelligible by a reference to Latin *con-* in *conficio*, etc., and to the different tense aspects (*aktionsarten*) of Slavonic and other cognate languages. All this is too obvious to call for further comment or illustration.

I must, however, mention here especially one language of paramount importance for the study of Oldest English, namely Frisian. The Frisians were the neighbors on the Continent of the tribes that invaded Britannia; so much the more must we regret that no very old monuments exist to show us the state of the Frisian language at the time of the invasion or shortly afterwards. But even those monuments we have, from the thirteenth century on, have not been studied by philologists with the care we might expect, considering their importance for the history of English. In fact, Frisian has been the stepchild among Germanic tongues. Now, however, this seems to be in a fair way of becoming otherwise, and Anglists — to borrow that very convenient name for "students of English" — should heartily welcome the endeavors of Dr. Wilhelm Heuser, who has in a very handy little volume made the Old Frisian language readily accessible to everybody, and who has there and elsewhere called attention to some very important conclusions that can be drawn from Frisian phonology with regard to Old English dialects.¹ It is to be hoped that this line of research will in future receive all the attention it deserves.

As already hinted above, English philology has to deal very largely with loan-words from various sources. Celtic philology, however, is not so important to the Anglist as might appear likely at first, because there are really very few Celtic words in English, a fact which is easily accounted for by the theory of speech-mixtures put forward lately by the eminent Celtologist Windisch.² This question is largely mixed up with another question which has been much discussed of late years, namely, what language did the Angles and Saxons find generally spoken on their arrival in England? Had Latin supplanted Celtic, totally or partially? This, however, need not occupy us long here, as it really falls outside of the history of English proper.³

In whatever direction it may be finally settled, the fact remains that Latin loan-words are extremely numerous and important in the English language. All educated people are well acquainted with those innumerable scientific, technical, and other Latin words which have been adopted during the last five centuries and which have stamped the English vocabulary in so peculiar a way. But this class of words, together with the Greek words, which are inseparable from them, offer no serious difficulties to the philologist. They are book-words, taken over through the medium of writing in the form corresponding with that of the golden age of classical literature, and

¹ Wilhelm Heuser, *Altfriesisches Lesebuch*. Heidelberg, 1903. — *Indo-germanische Forschungen*, Anzeiger xiv, p. 29.

² E. Windisch, *Zur theorie der mischsprachen und lehnwörter*. *Berichte über die verhandlungen der sächs. gesellschaft der wissenschaften*, XLIX (1897), p. 101 ff.

³ A. Pogatscher, *Zur lautehre der griechischen, lateinischen und romanischen lehnwörter im Altenglischen*. Strassburg, 1888. — J. Loth, *Les mots latins dans les langues brittoniques*. Paris, 1892. — Pogatscher, *Angelsachsen und Romanen*, *Englische Studien*, xix (1894), p. 329 ff.

only a minority of them have in English cast off the literary imprint.

Much more philological interest is attached to the older strata of Latin loan-words, the oldest of which were adopted before the Angles and Saxons left the Continent. Here we have to do with an oral influence, and the forms of these words therefore reflect the pronunciation of the Latin-speaking communities with which the various Germanic tribes came into contact. The deviations from the classical forms found in the English shapes of these early loans must therefore be due partly to changes in the language from which they were borrowed, partly to the subsequent alterations they have undergone in the borrowing language. Rightly interpreted, they consequently shed light on the development of Latin into Romance as well as on that of Germanic into English, and inversely, in order to be rightly interpreted, they require familiarity with both languages on the part of the investigator. As contemporary monuments are totally wanting, at any rate for the borrowing language, the subject is extremely difficult of treatment; but most of the phonological difficulties have been surmounted in an important work by A. Pogatscher.¹ The cultural side of these early loans as well as of the somewhat younger loans due chiefly to the conversion to Christianity has been treated of by Kluge and others, especially MacGillivray.²

The Danish and Norwegian vikings and especially those Scandinavians who settled in England for good, left a deeper mark on the English language than is very often supposed. It is evident, therefore, that the student of English should not neglect the Scandinavian languages, the less so as their close relationship with English and the early development in them of a literary style enable the scholar to clear up a great many points in English, even apart from those points where the protracted contact between the two nations has left its marks on either nation's language and civilization generally. Hitherto it has chiefly been Scandinavian scholars who have grappled with the numerous problems connected with this contact. The Dane Johannes Steenstrup has traced much of juridical importance back to Scandinavian institutions, his chief criterion being the loan-word test.³ The Swede Erik Brate gave us the first account of the fates of Scandinavian sounds in Early Middle English,⁴ and lately his countryman Erik Björkman has given us a very full and extremely

¹ Pogatscher, *Zur lautlehre der griechischen, etc., lehnworte im Allenglischen*. Strassburg, 1888.

² F. Kluge, in Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen philologie*, I, 2d ed. Strassburg, 1899. — MacGillivray, *The Influence of Christianity on the Vocabulary of Old English*. Halle, 1902.

³ Joh. Steenstrup, *Danelag. Normannerne*, vol. IV. Copenhagen, 1882.

⁴ Erik Brate, *Nordische lehnwörter im Ormulum*. Paul und Braune's *Beiträge zur geschichte der deutschen sprache*, x (1884).

able treatment of the whole of the subject, in which both lexical and phonological points of view are done full justice to.¹

The Scandinavians had scarcely had time to establish themselves, still less to complete their social and linguistic fusion with the native race, when the Norman Conquest brought in another element, which was to play a still greater part in the development of English life and English language—at any rate as far as outward appearance is concerned, for if we were able to look beneath the surface and to take everything into consideration, it is not improbable that the Scandinavian influence would turn out to be the more important one of the two. As it is, French loan-words are more conspicuous than Scandinavian ones, just as the political revolution brought about by the Conquest is more in view than the subtler modifications of the social structure that may be due to the Danes and Norwegians. Among the historians who have written of the Conquest and its consequences and who have incidentally paid attention to linguistic facts and unearthed documents illustrative of the conflict of languages, Freeman deserves of course the foremost place, although he is perhaps a little apt to underrate the rôle played by French. Some of his assertions have been put right in Johan Vising's excellent survey of the history of the French language in England.²

As for the French loan-words themselves, more attention has been paid by English scholars to their place in the economy of the language, their intellectual power or emotional value as compared with the native synonyms, than to the relation to their French originals, although that side too offers no small interest. Their phonology is rather complicated on account of their coming from various dialects and being taken over at various dates, so that sometimes the same French word appears in English in two widely different forms, for instance *catch* and *chase*. The first scholar who treated French loans in English from this point of view with perfect knowledge of French as well as of English sound-history was Henry Nichol, whose article on the French language in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* gives much attention to English and is still well worth reading. Since then, the question has been treated in various places by that indefatigable veteran worker in all branches of English etymology, Walter William Skeat,³ and in Germany by Dietrich Behrens.⁴

With regard to the other languages, from which English has borrowed freely at various times, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, etc., it is

¹ Erik Björkman, *Scandinavian Loan-Words in Middle English*, I-II. Halle, 1900-1902.

² Johan Vising, *Franska språket i England*, I-III. Göteborg, 1900-1902.

³ W. W. Skeat, *Principles of English Etymology*. Second series. Oxford, 1891. — *Notes on English Etymology*. Oxford, 1901.

⁴ Dietrich Behrens, *Beiträge zur geschichte der französischen sprache in England*. (*Französische Studien*, v, Band 2. heft.) Heilbronn, 1886. — *Französische elemente im Englischen*, in Paul's *Grundriss*, as above.

to be regretted that no specialists have made these several influences subjects of monographs, as the very able chapters devoted to them in Skeat's *Principles of English Etymology* cannot be said to have exhausted the subject.

I have spoken hitherto of the direct use obtainable from the study of other languages for the history of English. But it is clear that indirectly, too, the scientific study of any subject, and more especially the scientific study of any language, may be of value for the student of English. The wider his outlook and the greater the number of languages he is able to compare with English, the more light will he be able to throw on his special study. His ideas ought not to be narrowed down to one particular type of linguistic structure. A broad horizon is the more necessary because the development of the English idiom has in a great many respects diverged very widely from the structural type characteristic of the older languages of the same family. The grammarian should be on his guard against applying indiscriminately the same categories and the same points of view to all languages, for no language can be rightly measured by the yard of any other language. This, however, is just what has been done to a very great extent, not only with regard to English, but more or less in describing and in judging all languages. Latin grammar was studied earlier than, and more extensively than, any other grammar; Latin was considered *the* language, and any deviation in other languages from its rules was considered a deterioration. Even if this manner of looking at things grammatical has now been largely superseded, because an ever-increasing number of different languages have been scientifically investigated, there still remain not a few survivals of the Latin superstition, which it will be the work of future grammarians to root out completely. Grammatical terminology is still in the main based on Latin grammar. The student of English will find in his grammatical vocabulary expressions for whatever English has in common with Latin, but those grammatical categories and phenomena which are not found in Latin have either no names at all or else each author has his own names. The combination found in "he is reading" is by some called simply the periphrastic conjugation, by others the progressive form, or the present continuous, or the descriptive present, or the definite present. Now, of course, names are not everything, and we may have very definite notions without definite names, or, at any rate, without definite names accepted by everybody. Still, the want of a fixed technical nomenclature is decidedly a drawback.

But there is another, and much more serious, drawback derived from the preponderance of Latin grammar. It is, in fact, a very difficult thing for anybody that has been from his earliest youth thoroughly drilled in that particular set of grammatical ideas, to

liberate his mind from their vitiating influence when dealing with another language. His grammatical vision is too apt to be colored by the Latin spectacles he has worn so long. He will look in English for the same cases, the same tenses and moods as he is familiar with in Latin, and it is surprising how often he finds them in places where a man coming fresh to a grammatical investigation of English without a previous training in Latin would probably have described the actual phenomena in a totally different manner. I open one of the best-known English grammars and find the following statement, namely, "The name of Cases is given to different forms which a noun (or pronoun) assumes to denote its relations to other words in a sentence. Five Cases may be distinguished in English, the Nominative, Objective, Dative, Possessive, Vocative." The author does not appear to have seen his own want of logic in making *form* the distinguishing feature of cases and yet establishing five cases in English, for in a note he goes on to add, quite unconcernedly, that "with the exception of the Possessive all these have long since lost their characteristic endings, but the use of the Case-names serves to mark the relations formerly indicated by them." In the grammar I quote, as well as in some other modern ones, such distinctions are referred not to Latin, but to Old English, but I think I am right when maintaining that they are really made in deference to Latin syntax rather than to Old English, as shown by the inclusion of the vocative on the one hand and by the exclusion of the instrumental on the other. Such grammars also classify as accusatives of description or of time, space, measure, or manner, a great many instances where Old English and other cognate languages have the dative or some other case. We should accustom ourselves in dealing with such questions to take each language, and each stage of each language — Modern English for instance — entirely on its own merits and look the real facts in the face, without any regard to how other languages express the same meanings. In a very able book on the absolute participle in English, the author says that it is right to parse the so-called nominative absolute as "a dative absolute in disguise." Now this amounts to very much the same thing as saying that a locomotive is a horse in disguise or — to remain within the sphere of language — to say that in "he likes pears" *he* is a dative in disguise, *likes* a plural in disguise, and *pears* the subject in disguise, because in Old English the sentence would run "him liciaþ peran." It is unhistorical to treat Modern English as Latin or Old English or any other language in disguise.

It is often urged that we should in English distinguish a dative from an accusative on the strength of meaning only, but then we might with equal right say that the adjective is in three different cases in the sentences "my father is old; my father has grown old;

my father is sick," for there is really a logical foundation for the distinction made here by Finnish: *isäni on vanha* (nominative); *isäni on jo tullut vanhaksi* (translative, indicating the state into which any one or anything passes); *isäni on sairaana* (essive, indicating the state in which anybody or anything is). The distinction is a real one in Finnish, because it is shown externally; but it is not a real one in English. In the same manner we should be justified in speaking of a dative case in English, if it had either a distinct form or manifested itself outwardly in some other manner, for example, by a fixed position. If the dative preceded invariably the accusative, we might recognize a positional dative, but it does not. In "I gave it him" there is nothing grammatical to show us which of the two words is the indirect object. It is true that when the direct object is a noun (not a pronoun) the indirect object is always placed before the direct object; but that is not enough to establish a separate case, unless, indeed, we should be willing to apply the same designation of "dative case" to all the nouns placed first in each one of the following sentences:

- I told the boy some stories.
- I asked the boy a few questions.
- I heard the boy his lessons.
- I took the boy long walks.
- I kissed the boy good-night.
- [I painted the wall a different color.]
- I called the boy bad names.
- I called the boy a scoundrel.¹

If we are to speak of separate datives and accusatives in English, I for one do not know where in this list the dative goes out and the accusative comes in. (Note that in the second sentence Old English would have had two accusatives.) In the same manner I think it perfectly idle to inquire what case is employed in "he was tied *hand and foot*," "they were now *face to face*," "we shall go down *Harrow way this day week*," "I saw a man the *age* of my grandmother," etc. We have here various employments of the "kernel" or "crude form" of a noun, and nothing else. It is even more wrong to speak of phrases with *to* and *of* as datives and genitives, as is done, for instance, in articles on "Die Trennung eines Genitivs von seinem regierenden Worte durch andere Satztheile." What is meant is the order of two prepositional (or adverbial) adjuncts, as in "the arrival at Cowes of the German Emperor." *Of the Emperor* is no more a genitive than *at Cowes* is an accusative or *from Cowes* an ablative. Whoever takes an interest in the purification of English grammar from such sham classifications as I have here instanced, will find great help in an

¹ Some of these combinations may not be very frequent, but they all occur and all have to be analyzed.

excellent book by H. G. Wiwel,¹ in which the same kind of work has been done with regard to Danish and in which the growth of the traditional grammatical system is, moreover, elucidated in a masterly manner. As Danish resembles English more than any other language in grammatical structure we have here another instance of a research in one language being useful to students of a cognate tongue. But it should not be forgotten that in England one of the foremost scholars of our day has done excellent work in this respect, for Henry Sweet's ingenious essay *Words, Logic, and Grammar* of 1873² really not only anticipates such works as Wiwel's, but on some points even goes further in doing away radically with traditional notions and grammatical prejudices.

The exaggerated importance attached to Latin is also injurious to the study of English if it causes forms and constructions to be *valued* according to a Latin standard. Some authors, Milton and Dryden among them, have impaired their English prose by thinking too much of Latin syntax instead of trusting to their natural linguistic instinct, and similarly some grammarians are apt to despise such English idioms as are contrary to Latin rules. The omission of relative pronouns, a preposition placed at the end of a question or of a relative clause, the passive construction with a so-called dative turned into the subject, all these eminently English idioms have not been valued according to their merits. That the ordinary schoolmaster should persecute these things is perhaps only what might be expected so long as a rational course of modern linguistic science as applied to English does not enter into the ordinary school curriculum, but what concerns us more here is that the same underrating of a great number of pithy and expressive constructions is found even in works dealing with historical English grammar. In the same manner, instead of examining impartially the rise and spreading of the past indicative in conditional clauses ("if he was caught, he would be punished") and after such a verb as *wish* ("I wish he was dead"), many grammarians dispose of the use by simply branding it as careless or slipshod English, precluding themselves from the correct point of view by considering *came* in "if he came" as necessarily subjunctive. If people would not blink the fact that in modern English "if he came" and "if we were" and "if I do" and a thousand other sentences are no longer either in the indicative or in the subjunctive, they would see how natural it is that the indicative should come to be used in the comparatively very rare instances in which the indicative and subjunctive forms are still distinct, and then we should, probably, soon see an investigation, which is now nowhere found, of the ques-

¹ H. G. Wiwel, *Synspunkter for dansk sproglære*. Copenhagen, 1901.

² Henry Sweet, *Words, Logic, and Grammar*, in *Transactions of the Philological Society*. London, 1873.

tion, where does unsophisticated usage retain the subjunctive and where is the indicative employed naturally by everybody in England and America?

This leads up to another consideration. Up to quite recent times, the history of any language was chiefly studied through the means of written literature. But now it is more and more recognized that, indispensable as are written documents for the study of the older periods, they can never give everything, and that they will remain dead until vivified by the help of the study of the language as actually spoken nowadays by living men, women, and children. The study of language should always begin, like charity, at home; everybody should be trained in the investigation of his own, his family's, and his friend's every-day speech, before going on to deal with dead languages — and I take here the word "dead" in its strictest sense, including the language of Carlyle and of Emerson just as well as that of Chaucer or of Cynewulf, for they are all accessible to us through written and printed books only. The tendency towards a living language-study is strong everywhere, and the student of English should keep thoroughly abreast of the best work done in that direction with regard to other languages, German, French, Scandinavian, and so on. This is true of all branches of philology, not only of phonetics, where it has been recognized by everybody in theory if not always in practice, but also of such branches as syntax and semantics, where there is now in many countries a growing tendency to take as a basis the observation of the actually spoken language.

The study of other languages will assist the Anglist in more ways than those enumerated hitherto. Let me finish this lecture by drawing attention to one of the most fundamental problems in the evolution of language. English is characterized by its large admixture of foreign words, and the history of the English-speaking race is in a large measure the history of its mixture with alien races. Now, English has gone farther than most cognate languages in simplifying its hereditary flexional system and wearing off most of the old endings. The problem naturally arises: what is the relation, or is there any relation, between these two things, race- or speech-mixture and simplification of structure?

The general assumption seems to be that foreign influence is the cause of that simplification, and this assumption is always stated in a purely dogmatic manner, no attempt being ever made to prove the assertion. Nor is it possible, so far as I see, either to prove or to disprove it on the strength of English alone, as the direct evidence afforded by contemporary documents is so scarce. The foreign influence to which the breaking down of the old grammatical system is ascribed is nearly always taken to be that due to the Norman

Conquest. But as I have shown elsewhere ¹ it is probable that the Scandinavian immigration exercised a much stronger influence on English grammar than the French. Both the mutual relations of the two languages, Scandinavian and English, and the greater rapidity of the structural change in the North, where Scandinavians settled in the greatest number, point decidedly in that direction, if we are to think of foreign influence at all. On the other hand, the chronology of some changes, for instance the early confusion of the old system of genders in some Northern monuments, as well as the gradual manner in which the leveling took place on many points, where we seem able to account phonologically and morphologically for each little step in a development which it took centuries to accomplish — all this makes it not unwarrantable to speak of the whole process as one which would have taken place in the same, or nearly the same manner, even had no foreign mixture entered into play.

As we are thus left unable to answer the question decidedly one way or the other from what we know about English itself, the idea naturally presents itself that an examination of parallel processes in other languages might perhaps assist us materially. For if we find everywhere else in other languages the two things, mixture of speech or of race and simplification of grammatical structure, going together, and if, on the other hand, pure languages are always conservative in their structure, the conclusion apparently is a safe one that the two phenomena are interdependent. The limited time at my disposal, and still more my limited knowledge, prevent me from doing here more than throwing out a few hints.

Among the Germanic languages, Danish is one of the simplest, as far as flecational structure is concerned, — and Danish has undergone a very strong foreign influence, a considerable part of its vocabulary being made up of Low German words. If we compare the different Danish dialects with one another, we see some differences in regard to the degree in which the simplification has been carried out, the dialect of West Jutland going farthest in that respect. There, for instance, the three grammatical genders have been merged together, final *-e* has disappeared, the definite article is one invariable prefixed *æ*, while in other dialects it is postfixed and varies according to number and according to the two or, in other places, three genders still distinguished. Now, there does not seem to be a scrap of evidence to show that this part of the country has witnessed any stronger race-mixture than the others. It is worth noting that in the district nearest to German-speaking communities two genders are preserved. It is my impression that the most simplified dialect has no greater admixture of loan-words than the more conservative ones, and this impression has been endorsed by the greatest authority on Jutland

¹ Otto Jespersen, *Progress in Language*, p. 173. London, 1894.

dialects, the Rev. Dr. H. F. Feilberg. The structural contrast to West Jutlandish among the Scandinavian languages is Icelandic, which has preserved the old endings and inflections with wonderful fidelity; this conservatism is combined with an extremely small number of loan-words, and no race-mixture has ever taken place.

We proceed to South Africa, where we find a language which has perhaps thrown off more of the old flecional complexity than any other Germanic language, English not even excepted, namely Cape Dutch or "Afrikaansch," "de Taal." The total absence of distinction of gender, the dropping of a great many endings, an extremely simple declension and conjugation, which has given up, for instance, any marks of different persons and numbers in the verbs, and other similar traits, distinguish this extremely interesting language from European Dutch. As for loan-words, the number of English words, which is now very considerable, can have nothing to do with the simplification, for the English did not come to the Cape till after the grammatical structure had undergone most of its changes. French loan-words are not so plentiful as might be expected from the number of Huguenots among the original stock of immigrants, but Malayo-Portuguese has contributed quite a considerable number of words. In the latest book on Cape Dutch the simplification is attributed, not to any particular foreign tongue, but to the fact that the language has been largely spoken by people having originally had a different mother tongue, no matter what that tongue was in each individual case.¹

Among the Romance languages, Roumanian evidently is the one which has undergone the strongest foreign influence; it has a great many loan-words from various sources, and the people also is largely mixed with alien populations. But here, the structure of the language is rather less simple than that of the sister tongues; Roumanian has, for instance, preserved more of the old declension than other Romance languages. Its neighbor, Bulgarian, has in some respects the same position among Slavonic languages as Roumanian among Romance. The same causes have been at work among both populations and have produced race-mixture as well as a large proportion of loan-words from Turkish and other languages. But with regard to simplification, Bulgarian stands on a different footing from Roumanian, as it has given up very much of the old Slavonic complexity; the case-system has nearly disappeared, and prepositions are used very extensively instead of the old endings.

In the Balkans we meet with still another language which has to be considered here, namely, Modern Greek. The extremely artificial form in which this language is written does not concern us here,

¹ H. Meyer, *Die sprache der Buren*. Göttingen, 1901. — Compare also D. C. Hesseling, *Het Afrikaansch*. Leiden, 1899.

as it is an outcome of an entirely unnatural tendency to conceal the history and development of some two thousand years. Spoken Modern Greek presents a combination of the two phenomena, simplification of grammar and a great influx of foreign words.¹ So does Modern Persian too; its accident is extremely simple and in so many respects resembles English that Misteli consecrates the last sections of his great work to a comparison of the two languages in their present shapes.² Persian also in that respect resembles English, that it is full of loan-words, nearly all expressions for philosophical, abstract, and technical ideas being Arabic words. But just as most of the philosophical, abstract, and technical Latin and Greek words were adopted into English after the process of grammatical simplification had been carried very far, in the same manner Arabic influence in Persian follows, instead of preceding, the doing away with most of the old complexity of grammar. Pehlevi, or the language of the Sassanid period, before the Arabic conquest, is far simpler than Old Persian. If, then, the Persian simplicity is a consequence of speech-mixture, it must be one of earlier date, and perhaps the Aramaic influence on Pehlevi is strong enough to account for everything; that, however, must be left for specialists to decide.

In India, the old system of inflections has broken down in the modern languages, which are all more or less analytic in their structure. Hindi seems to have gained much in simplicity as early as the thirteenth century, although the modern system of auxiliary verbs and of postpositions was not then fully established, but the strong influx of Persian (with Arabic and Turkish) words did not begin till some centuries later. Hindustani is practically the same language as Hindi with still more foreignisms in it. Gujarati has preserved more of the old inflections than Hindi, but the Persian elements are rather more numerous here than in Hindi.

We should not leave the Arian (Indo-European) languages without mentioning the numerous varieties of Creole languages that have sprung up in all those parts of the globe where Europeans have been in constant communication with native populations of different races. Grammatical simplicity has in all these languages been carried extremely far, and though the actual admixture of exotic words is very unequal and inconstant, varying as it does, according to circumstances and individuals, still it is always pretty considerable.³

Outside the Indo-European languages, the nearest in kin are probably the Finno-Ugrian group. The absence of old documents

¹ See on the relation between the two things especially K. Krumbacher, *Das problem der neugriechischen schriftsprache*. Festschrift in der kgl. bayr. akademie der wissenschaften in München. 1902.

² F. Misteli, *Charakteristik der hauptsächlichsten typen des sprachbaues*. Berlin, 1893.

³ See H. Schuchardt, *Kreolische studien*, Wiener akademie, 1883 ff.

makes it a difficult matter to speak of the history of these languages; still, we may say that Esthonian, which has undergone a strong German influence, shows a more worn-down state of the old grammar than Finnish, and that the same is the case with Livonian, which has been so strongly influenced by Lettic that nearly half of the vocabulary is borrowed from that language. As for Magyar, or Hungarian, its vocabulary presents a highly variegated appearance: Persian, Turkish, Slavonic, Latin, and German elements are freely mixed with the original stock. Phonetic development has worn down the forms of the words to a considerable extent, and many of the old grammatical forms have disappeared. The case-endings now used are quite modern developments and are joined to the words in a much looser way and also much more regularly than those of Finnish, for example; in fact, they can hardly be termed anything but postpositions. On the whole its grammatical structure seems to be really simpler than that of the other languages of the same group.¹

In the Semitic group, Hebrew even in the oldest period known to us is much simpler in its grammatical structure than Arabic. Whether this is due to speech-mixture or not is a question which I must leave to others to decide; but I am told that scholars are now beginning to recognize more and more Assyrian loan-words in Hebrew. Aramaic is still simpler, and here foreign influences seem to be much easier to trace.

Outside the three great families of languages which I have here spoken about, very little is known to me that might serve to clear up our question. Malayan has a very simple grammatical structure and a very great number of foreign words. Chinese is still less complicated in its structure, but is its vocabulary to any great extent made up of loan-words? On the other hand, are the American Indian languages, with their intricacies of grammar, completely free from foreign mixtures? It is surely permissible to entertain some doubt on both of these heads.

I am painfully conscious that what I have been able to do here is only a very imperfect sketch. I dare draw no definite conclusion from the somewhat conflicting evidence I have been able to adduce, but I have thought it might be well to throw out a few suggestions for a future work, which ought certainly to be done by some one possessed of a deeper knowledge of the languages I have mentioned, and, if possible, of all the other languages that might throw light on the subject. This scholar of a, let us hope, not too remote future, I should venture to recommend to pay especial attention to chronology, — for it is not enough to state mixture and simplicity, but it

¹ With regard to the Finno-Ugric languages, I am largely indebted to the lectures and writings of Vilhelm Thomsen.

must be shown also for each individual case that the latter is subsequent in time to the former, if we are to believe in a cause and effect relation between them. And then he must, wherever possible, distinguish between speech-mixture and race-mixture and determine in each case whether one or the other or both have taken place. He will find some very useful generalizations on the relation between the two kinds of mixture in a paper by the American scholar George Hempl,¹ whom I am happy to quote here at the close of my paper, for it would scarcely be possible to find a more apposite place than America in which to investigate the question I have alluded to. Here in America you have race-mixtures and speech-mixtures of every kind going on and readily accessible to observation every day. Here you see the greatest amalgamation that the world has ever witnessed of human beings into one great nation. The future of the English language is to a great extent in the hands of the Americans. It is gratifying, therefore, to see that the study of its past and of its present is taken up with such zeal and such energy by a great number of extremely able American scholars that we cannot fail to entertain the very best hopes for the future of English philology.

¹ G. Hempl, *Language-Rivalry and Speech-Differentiation in the case of Race-Mixture*. *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, xxix (1898), p. 35.

PRESENT PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

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My theme is Present Problems with regard to the English Language. I did not choose this theme myself, nor was it, I suppose, assigned me by a committee of philologists or linguistic students. Indeed, it is manifestly not altogether appropriate to the nature of the general subject, to the character of the material with which one deals in linguistic investigations, or to the present state of science in the department of learning which we are met to discuss. In natural science, in philosophy, in social questions, the specialist may no doubt survey the field at any given moment and pronounce categorically that this or that question (or group of questions) presses with peculiar insistence for solution, and that when the solution is arrived at, it will point the way to large discoveries, or to momentous advances in knowledge or enlightenment. In the investigation of a particular language, however, the case is different. There are problems enough, no doubt, and difficult problems; but who shall venture to say that we are now grappling with principles or theories on which depends either the whole future of our science or the amelioration of the human race?

Pray do not misunderstand me. It is by no means my purpose to criticise adversely the managers of this intellectual enterprise. Nor do I intend to belittle the subject which calls us together, and to the study of which we are, each in his own way, so ardently devoted. Least of all would I be taken to mean that there is nothing to talk about. As I have already suggested, we have problems in abundance, — an abundance, indeed, which is fairly embarrassing. All I desire is to account for the omissions which you will severally detect in my discussion this afternoon. It is not to be expected that any brief treatment of so complicated a business should not overlook or ignore the pet puzzle of many an individual among this audience. For we are very multifarious in our interests. Look into your hearts, gentlemen, and judge. Some of us are worrying over “*u-umlaut*”; others pass sleepless nights in meditating on the Kenticisms in Chaucer; to not a few the dog’s letter, the snarling *littera canina* of the old grammarians, is a perpetual stimulus or an ever-puncturing thorn in the flesh. A select number find their refreshment (or dissipation) in unriddling runic puzzles. Others the Middle English dative charms

elusively, — fleeing to the woods, but desirous first to be seen. For myself, I must confess that I give much thought to certain idioms containing (as I think) *for* and an adjective, but reducible, in the opinion of many, to compounds with the "intensive prefix," — and that I should die happier if I felt sure of ever knowing the whole truth about the *kankedort* in which Troilus found himself when he heard Pandarus and Cressida whispering at the door.

These, then, and thousands like them, are all *present problems with regard to the English language*, and I might easily fill my allotted five and forty minutes by cataloguing them, and still leave the most immediate interests of some of you untouched. Because these are little things, the scoffer talks of pedantry, and the mousing philologist is ridiculed as an operose trifler — a cavalier of empty thoughts. But we may leave the scoffer out of account. Our revenge on him is lordly and complete. As a learned friend of mine once said to some of his fellow students who were inclined to think that literary criticism was the whole of life, — it is exhilarating to observe the hungry eagerness with which the supercilious outsider picks up the crumbs that fall from the philologist's table. A correct analysis of *if you please*, or *you are welcome*, or *willy nilly*, or a demonstration of the common trick of substituting a glottal catch for a guttural, will hold an audience of literary enthusiasts as surely as the finest analysis of the aesthetician or the boldest flight of the critical aeronaut.

The minuter questions of English philology, such as those to which I have already adverted, are of course being settled one by one, and their solutions are gradually, though very slowly, finding their place in collective treatises. One of the larger problems that confronts us is the difficulty of getting collective treatises written in a competent way. To be sure, there is no reason for discouragement. As we compare the array of trustworthy manuals that the tyro now has at his disposal with the scanty and incorrect apparatus of the greatest scholars fifty years ago, we have much to be thankful for; but no one can deny that there is still an enormous amount of sifting and codification to be done, even in those departments of our subject which have received the most earnest and fruitful attention from philologists.

The earliest period of our language (call it Anglo-Saxon or Old English as you please; for this petty question of mere nomenclature I refuse to regard as a problem, though much ink has been shed in debating it) has been more minutely and successfully studied than any other. The reasons are obvious, and need not be recapitulated. One of the most potent has been, of course, the fact that Anglo-Saxon is of vital importance to every Germanic philologist, to a degree that is not true of any later period of English. Hence we have enjoyed, in this field, the active coöperation of scholars of different nationalities

well trained in philological method, some of whom have only a slight interest in the English language in its later, and much more significant, developments.

Yet our shelf of Anglo-Saxon works of reference is far from full, and some of the gaps occur in places to which we should oftenest have recourse if we did not know they were empty. The state of Anglo-Saxon lexicography, for example, is a disgrace to English-speaking scholars. Who will give us a halfway satisfactory Anglo-Saxon dictionary and free us from the thralldom of Bosworth-Toller? Grein's *Poetical Lexicon* is so marvelous a piece of work that, old as it is, one hesitates to suggest its revision. Yet everybody knows that a new Grein is a need that is sorely felt. A distinguished American scholar has long been giving his leisure hours to making collectanea for an exhaustive Anglo-Saxon dictionary; but I doubt if he has much expectation of finding a publisher. There are understood to be large materials at Oxford; but one despairs of ever seeing them put forth. Is there any hope except in international coöperation among a large number of scholars, financed by some institution of inexhaustible resources that feels no regard for profits, and directed by a specialist characterized by equal breadth and fineness of knowledge and by exceptional skill in the organization of materials and the management of collaborators? Instances of similar lexicographical enterprises now proceeding to a successful issue will at once occur to you. I need not mention them by name. Should we not all keep in mind as one of our first duties the furtherance of this great undertaking in every way in our power?

I will not dwell on the other deficiencies in our Anglo-Saxon equipment. On the whole, the material is so compact and manageable, the various desiderata are so well defined, and the number of trained workers is so great, that, without being unduly sanguine, we may hope to see most of our needs supplied as time goes on, — the great task of the dictionary excepted. There is still much to do in Anglo-Saxon dialectology; but the main lines of distinction are well recognized, and there are a number of distinguished monographs. Syntax, to be sure, is an almost untilled field; but to that subject we must recur in a moment. As to meter, there are still wide differences of opinion, and of late there has been manifested a tendency to question the soundness of some of the best-accredited results, or, at all events, to deny their utility for purposes of textual criticism. One thing, however, is clear: There are a large number of facts about the structure and movement of Anglo-Saxon verse that have been ascertained beyond the possibility of a doubt and that have been shown to admit of orderly classification. In all our discussions on points of theory, it is well to remember that these facts are *facts*, not *opinions*. *The verses do actually contain such and such syllables, arranged thus*

and *so*, and with certain quantities and accents in reasonably fixed positions. All of these facts *may* be significant with regard to the meter; many of them must be significant. How far all or any part of them suffice to pluck out the heart of the mystery is a debatable question. The objection that an ancient *scop* cannot have had all these types and sub-types in his head when he took harp in hand is merely ludicrous. It is much as if one were to contend that the musician's crotchets and semiquavers are perverse nonentities because a boy can whistle a tune without ever having heard of them. It is about on a level with the child's inquiry as to how Adam found out the animals' names. There may be — there probably is — a good deal about Anglo-Saxon meter that is not yet discovered; but that is no reason for rejecting the information which we have already acquired.

While this particular subject is under our eyes, and before you have had time to describe me in your own minds as either a philistine, or a partisan, or a shuffler, it may be well to say a word on the history of English meter in general, — of what we may call Modern English meter in distinction from that of pre-Conquest times. Here there are certainly problems enough. The whole matter is one enormous puzzle. We do not really know how far English meter is Germanic, how far it is Latin, and how far it is French. Individuals know: there are theorists in plenty who feel certain about the influence exerted on the native versification by the hymns of the church and the secular poetry of the foreign invader. But I am not speaking of the views of those who know because they have made up their minds, but of what can actually be proved to the satisfaction of an unbiased scholar. Again, the whole subject of quantity in modern English meter is as good as *terra incognita*. Of course quantity plays its part as well as accent. Our ears tell us that, and our common sense. Besides, we have the testimony of the poets themselves. But how great is the quantitative function, and what are its relations to accentual rhythm? Further, we are in no sort of agreement as to pauses in metrical writing. Most metricians tell us, for instance, that in Shakespeare's blank verse a pause may take the place of an unaccented syllable, — some even assert that it may stand for one that is accented. To me, however, such statements appear to have no meaning. They seem to belong to mathematics, not to poetry.

Again, we are at sword's points about *ictus* and rhetorical accent. Everybody knows that the same verse may often be *singsonged* with five accents and *read* with three or four, and that it satisfies the ear when uttered in either way, though it appeals to the intellect in only one of its two renditions. What are we to make of this phenomenon? And what of pitch-accent and stress-accent? What of feet or measures? How far are they real divisions and how far mere fetches of scansion?

These are elementary questions. But no scholar in the world has yet answered them to anything like general assent. Heaven knows there are answers enough before the public! About once a year somebody puts forth a brand-new system of English meter, with novel symbols and a fresh nomenclature; and it is impossible even to conjecture the number of eager young spirits in our universities who are at this moment beginning to glow with the hope that they have at last put their fingers on the strings in the long-sought way. For my own part, I am not sanguine. We know the rough facts, and we can feel the finer ones as we read or chant the verses of the great poets. But whether we shall ever do much more is a question. The phoneticians are active, and if help comes from any quarter it must come from them. But — if one dare say it — some of the most advanced phoneticians have become so subtle and hair-splitting, and seem to have so little notion of what is worth doing and what is not, that they appear to an outsider (as well as to not a few of their more conservative brethren) to be doing little more than piling up rubbish. Some day there may be born a great psychologist with an innate feeling for verse as verse. When he has exhausted the subject of psychology, he may apply himself to literature, and when he is sufficiently at home in that field, he may perhaps find time to become an expert phonetician. He may then solace his declining years by explaining for good and all the intricacies of English meter. I hardly expect to live to see the man. Let me add, by the way, two more qualifications: he should be modest, and a person of unusual common sense.

There are problems in plenty with regard to the history of English as a literary language, this side of the Anglo-Saxon period, — and many of them are of great moment to students of literature as well as to the special devotees of linguistic science. To some of the questions there is a generally accepted answer, — generally accepted, but not quite amply demonstrated. As to others, scholars take sides (and hold them) with commendable stiffness. Nearly all of the questions are pretty generally misconceived, in this or that way, by the educated public, including most writers of literary histories.

First among the problems that I have now in mind is the general question of French influence upon English. In its main outlines this matter is pretty well settled. We know (though it seems impossible for historians of literature to find out the facts) that the Norman dialect was familiar at the English court before the Conquest, so that it is conceivable that, even without the Battle of Hastings, it might have come to occupy a position similar to that of French at the Prussian court in the reign of Frederick the Great, or German at the Danish court in the eighteenth century. We know also that the prevalence of Norman French as a court dialect after the Conquest

had very little direct influence on English; that the dialect from which most of the Old French words came that made their way into the language of the island was Central French; that most of these words came in after 1300 (say between 1300 and 1400), and that many of them were in the first instance literary or society borrowings, like *prestige* or *fiancée* in modern times. But nobody has yet grappled victoriously with the details. The complicated linguistic situation in England in the early fourteenth century — the critical moment in this concern — is, in fact, appreciated by very few persons, if one may judge from what one hears or reads. One of the best of Middle English scholars — one of the small number to whom the English of that period is a living language — has gone so far as to declare that the French of Stratford-atte-Bowe was the language of the English court in Chaucer's time, and that that great poet and accomplished courtier thought as highly of it as of the French of Paris. Another good scholar appears to believe that the French of Gower came straight down from Anglo-Norman times. It is seldom recognized that there were in the fourteenth century, as there are now, great differences among the gentry and nobility of England in the purity with which they spoke the language of the polite nation, and that a Parisian accent was then, as now, a highly valued accomplishment. We shall never get these tangles straightened out until some Romance scholar whose native language is English and who has a philological as well as a practical command of it, gives us an authoritative book in which all the needed distinctions are made and the evidence that establishes them is marshaled. At present it cannot be denied that everything that has been written on the subject is superficial, or fragmentary, or honeycombed with error. I know — you all know — a philologist of the first rank, equally versed in Romance and in Germanic philology, who has such a book as we want in his head at this moment, and who merely needs to overcome his modesty, to lay aside the self-sacrificing work which he is constantly doing for others, and to abandon for the moment a modicum of his commendable caution, to perform an inestimable service to the history of the English language.

Another point of great importance is the rôle which is to be ascribed to Chaucer in the development of our standard idiom. Here one would think there might be agreement; but there is none. The old view that Chaucer made literary English by mixing French with corrupt Anglo-Saxon, throwing in final *e*'s at will, and polishing the conglomerate, was so absurd (though it is far from being exploded in outside circles) that it has, by a revulsion of feeling, prompted some to reduce his services to an infinitesimal quantity. These revolutionists seem to believe that Chaucer found the literary language ready made in the dialect of educated Londoners, and that

the history of that literary language would have been the same if he had never lived. Between these extremes it is not hard to find the truth; but it is hard to prove it, hard even to get it accepted as a working hypothesis. What we should be careful to remember is that there is a vast amount of work still to be done before we can know exactly what happened in England, linguistically speaking, between 1350 and 1450. That work, too, does not consist merely in writing dissertations of the statutory length on the basis of a conventionally orthodox scheme of Middle English dialectology. For (may one dare to whisper it?) Middle English dialectology is not by any means reducible, in the present state of our knowledge, to any such hard and fast scheme as one might think from the confident little treatises that appear from time to time from aspirants for academic honors. There has been too much cocksureness in assigning this, that, or the other document to the southwest corner of the northeast Midland district, or in declaring that a writer must have been born five or six miles from Lichfield and passed some of his maturer years in the outskirts of Warwick, occasionally passing through Coleshill as he returned to his native town on a visit to his kinsfolk. Here again I would not be misunderstood. Far be it from me to refuse recognition to the painstaking labors of those (great scholars and small) who have toiled in this field, whether in gathering materials or in ordering them and drawing inferences. What is meant is merely that there is a fictitious air of completeness and scientific certainty about the dialectology of Middle English as at present understood which will not stand the test of scrutiny on the part of one who asks for evidence and requires sometimes more than a medieval subservience to authority. What is purely an inductive inquiry has come to be too much a matter of deduction. It is incumbent on the younger generation of English scholars to reopen the case, — not in a hostile spirit, but with a determination to prove all things and hold fast only that which is good.

Hitherto, study of the Middle English dialects has been too much confined to their phonology, — partly, no doubt, because of its importance as a criterion, but partly also because of the somewhat disproportionate attention which this branch of linguistic science has received for so many years, and partly (alas!) from inertia. Here were certain schemes already drawn to fill up; here was a diagram; here was the line of least resistance. Many an American, in recent years, has become intensely interested in his own ancestors because he had come into possession of a genealogical chart and took a fancy for filling the blanks. Now, though admittedly there can be no investigation of dialects that is not based on sound phonology, it ought to be equally evident (though it seems not to have been found so) that, when the sound-chart of a dialect has been properly drawn up,

our study is not at an end. We know very little about any dialect when all we know is its vocalic and consonantal behavior, and, indeed, when we add to that an acquaintance with some of its inflectional habits. With reference to the great Middle English dialects, — each of which has an abundant literature and may lay claim to have been at some time a literary language of some pretensions, — we need to know its characteristic vocabulary, the special idiomatic phrases which distinguish it, its metrical system, and its syntax. If we are asked how far our present codified knowledge of the dialects in question meets these requirements, we shall have to hang our heads. This is a matter of some concern to the literary historian as well as to the linguist. It has been much the fashion to talk about "schools" or "groups" of Middle English poetry. The terms may be misleading, but we will not pause to quarrel with them. In the present state of our ignorance about some of the things just mentioned, there is constant danger of our confusing what belongs to a dialect with what belongs to a school. Nor is that all. Different works are not infrequently ascribed to the same writer on the ground of resemblances in style and language which, if they prove anything, prove only that the documents are written in the same dialect and employ a common stock of catchwords and catchphrases. The abuse of the argument from so-called parallel passages is largely due to our ignorance or neglect of all dialectic phenomena except those of sounds and forms. It is safe to say that arguments for identity of authorship in the Middle English field are every day based on collections of parallel passages of a kind that would call down Homeric laughter on the heads of their accumulators if they were dealing with documents and writers of our own day. Now much of this abuse comes from pure neglect of logic; but by far the larger part of it must be charged to ignorance, excusable and even unavoidable ignorance, perhaps, but still ignorance, pure and simple. The investigator simply does not know that the phrase or sentence or verse that he copies down on his card is not the property of A or B or C, but of everybody who spoke or wrote that dialect, and that, accordingly, it was the inevitable form of words when that idea (itself a commonplace of experience or reflection) had to be expressed.

The "vocabulary test" is pretty nearly discredited by this time, so fantastic are the pranks which it has been forced to play in the face of an astonished world. But the "parallel passage test" is still in high favor. Yet we all know, it is to be presumed, that, for some purposes, the unit of expression is not the word, but the set group of words, — the phrase or sentence; and that consequently the test from parallel passages is often in no way distinguishable from that from community of vocabulary.

All this suggests one of the most serious desiderata of our science.

We need to pass from the study and collection of *words* to the study and collection of *phrases*. Lexicographers deserve all honor. In the Middle English field, to be sure, we are still pretty badly off, but we ought to be thankful for what we have. Yet how little has been done towards the history of idioms and phrases in comparison with the labor that has been devoted to tracing the history of individual words! What I say applies as well to Modern as to Middle English. We need investigations of phraseology. There is no more fascinating pursuit for the linguist, none that will repay him more immediately or more abundantly for his time and trouble. The bearings of the subject are multifarious. Take the purely historical point of view. We know that a certain poem contains twenty per cent. of French and Latin words. Are we to infer that this measures the Romance element in its language? By no means. How far are the phrases French or Latin in their relations, even when the words are Germanic? Our habit of translating foreign phrases literally and making them a part of our speech is well known and of very long standing. Many of our commonest idioms are naturalized citizens that have adopted the speech of their new country. It is notorious that the genealogist has much trouble when he gets into a region where immigrants have been in the way of translating their family names. We must remember, too, that there are what may be called literary idioms as well as popular idioms, and in these Middle English writers reveled with all the unrestraint of authors who wished to produce largely and rapidly and who had never conceived that it is a virtue to be original.

For some time we have been trembling on the verge of another huge group of problems, which I have mentioned two or three times, but without dwelling upon them. I refer, of course, to syntax.

The study of English syntax is in its infancy. The neglect of this department of philology has, indeed, been often commented on with reference to all the modern languages. It stands in the most startling contrast to the minute and almost passionate attention which has been devoted to the history of sounds and forms. Yet English syntax has the bad eminence of being perhaps more neglected than that of any other great language. A few brilliant scholars have coquetted with the subject. Several heavy and unilluminated persons have made unwieldy collections of material, usually overlooking the vital matters or stopping short as soon as they had reached a point at which they were in sight of something either difficult or significant. There are two or three manuals of substantial worth, and a number of distinguished monographs. But in general it must be admitted that English syntax has hardly been studied at all, except for practical purposes. I have learned, since these sessions began, that a thoroughly equipped and uncommonly keen-sighted scholar has in hand a large

work on this subject, from which we are justified in expecting the happiest results.

Perhaps it is worth while to survey the field for a moment, — to specify what one would like to have if wishes were horses, — to sketch, however tentatively, a kind of programme.

In the first place we desire to know thoroughly the Germanic foundations. For this, of course, a complete Anglo-Saxon syntax is necessary: not a mere list of verbs with the cases they govern, or an array of the different ways in which the numerals may be arranged, or a set of statistics comprehending the relative frequency of the weak adjective and the strong. These things are well enough, and we cannot get along without them. But what we must look forward to is something far less mechanical, a system of Anglo-Saxon constructions such as we already have for the classical tongues, discriminated as finely as the nature of the idiom will admit, arranged both logically and historically, complete both for the poetry and the prose, and supported at every point by exhaustive material. This, of course, is not the task of one man, or perhaps of one generation; but we are not talking about what can be accomplished to-morrow or next day. We are trying to face the problem of English syntax as it stands, probably the most stupendous problem of all those with which it is our business to grapple.

This ideal system of Anglo-Saxon syntax is needed, as we have seen, as a foundation for our whole structure. We must know how the syntax of our language stood when English was a purely Germanic speech, before we can reason with certainty as to what took place when our idiom was subjected to those extraordinarily complex forces which have made it unique among the languages of articulate-speaking men.

Here, at the very threshold, we are confronted by a difficulty of no small proportions. Since most of our Anglo-Saxon prose is translated from the Latin, we cannot trust its syntactic evidence without careful scrutiny. At every step, therefore, the possibility of foreign literary influence must be borne in mind. We must compare the constructions of poetry, and we must appeal constantly to the testimony of the other Germanic languages. Nor must we forget, in examining the poetical texts, the archaizing tendency of all expression in verse. Finally, we must bear in mind the probability of syntactic differences coincident with differences of dialect, and we must remember the special complications that have resulted from the partial transference of a large body of Anglo-Saxon poetry from one dialect, more or less completely, into another.

If we can do all this, — and we shall be forced to do it somehow and sometime, — we shall be in a position to study with intelligence the bewildering syntax of the Middle English period.

The most obvious question about Middle English syntax is: What did French do to it? This is not the only question; but it is so insistent that to many persons it plays the part of Aaron's rod with the other serpents: it swallows up all the rest. Very little has been accomplished in the investigation of Middle English syntax, and in part for this very reason. Some scholars appear to think that all one has to do is to discover a French construction (or a French phrase) that is identical with one in the English of this period, and then to infer that we have an example of the gradual Gallicizing of our language. The inference is far too easy. Take for example, the matter of prepositions and cases. One often hears that the substitution of prepositional phrases for the inflected cases of nouns comes from unconscious imitation of the French. But we must be cautious. As inflections decay, what is to replace them but prepositions? Imagine for the moment that there had been no Norman Conquest, but that inflectional decay had taken place in English as it has in Dutch and Danish, for example. Would not the spread of prepositional phrases have taken place then? There were already constructions enough of this kind in Anglo-Saxon to give the impulse to any number of analogies, — to any amount of growth. I am not taking sides. I am merely asking for a suspension of judgment until we have more facts in order; and this suggests a second article in our programme: We need to study carefully and exhaustively the syntax of the Transition Period, comparing it on the one hand with Anglo-Saxon and on the other with contemporary French, and checking all our conclusions by means of the development of the Germanic languages in general. Such a study, devoted to a period of English during which the direct influence of French in other respects (on the vocabulary, for instance) was almost *nil*, ought to give us some idea of the native tendencies which our language was bound to follow. *A priori*, it might reasonably be maintained that foreign syntax is not likely to be intensely operative so long as a language shows such an independence of outside influences as to keep its vocabulary pure. May it not be that, after all, the direct effect of French in modifying our syntax has been greatly exaggerated? We must all admit the possibility, but there is not a living scholar who has the right to dogmatize on the subject. For myself, I am inclined to think that we shall find out some day that in syntax, as in other respects, the chief linguistic result of the Norman Conquest for a couple of centuries was indirect, and came from breaking down the literary tradition of Anglo-Saxon, and so allowing our language to disintegrate (let us say rather, to advance) with more rapidity than would otherwise have been the case. At all events, we must have a study of Transition syntax, and it must take especial heed of Late West Saxon, and in particular of those texts which are

admittedly written in an artificial literary dialect, maintained with an effort long after it had ceased to accord with the speech of common life.

For the period of fully established Middle English, — in particular the fourteenth century, — we must *a priori* admit a great deal of French influence on our syntax. Here, however, the amount of work to be done is so great that it may well stagger the most sanguine. We must give steady heed to the great dialects, for what is true of one is not necessarily true of another. The poets of the so-called Chaucerian School — say from 1350 to 1450 — will require and repay most careful scrutiny, since they are in the direct line which leads down to the standard syntax of our own day.

Next come the dark ages — dark, that is to say, to the philologist because scandalously neglected, with two or three brilliant exceptions. It is not in the matter of syntax alone that the long stretch from 1450 to 1550 is a No Man's Land. In almost every respect this vastly important lapse of time has been ignored by the linguistic scholar. The ordinary outfit of the Anglicist may be described as consisting of a knowledge of Anglo-Saxon, of the language of Chaucer, of Elizabethan English, and of the speech of the present day; and too often, especially in the case of foreigners, the last two items are omitted from the account. We take a leap from Chaucer to Queen Elizabeth. Yet the dark period from 1450 to 1550 is full of instruction. Many a phrase or idiom that one thinks of as Middle English turns up in the obscure writers of the sixteenth century, and we have also, in this period, the privilege of inspecting the beginnings of that great outburst of linguistic splendor which characterizes the Elizabethan Age. And the middle period presents phenomena of its own. We see the French influence giving way to a tendency to that excessive Latinization which crowded the vocabulary of England with barbarous sesquipedalian words, not destined to maintain themselves. The neatness and simplicity of Chaucerian diction disappear, and the gorgeous licenses of Elizabethanism do not yet exist. In some writers, too, there is a good fund of colloquialisms, — of incalculable value to the investigator of our modern syntax. A forbidding period this to the æsthetician, — but full of lessons for the historical student of letters, as well as for the philologist. For the syntactician it abounds in prizes; some day he may awake to their whereabouts; at present, he seems hardly aware that they exist at all. Let it be added that a knowledge of Middle English by no means fits a man to read the works of this period intelligently. There is, unfortunately, a prevalent misconception on this point.

Of Elizabethan syntax — the next article in our programme — something has already been said by anticipation. We need not dwell upon it; for everybody knows the significance of the period.

More or less work has been done here, but mostly on Shakespeare, and none of it in any way final.

We have now reached the Modern Period, in which, if we have few scientific investigations, we have at all events our own knowledge of the rules. Our programme, however, will be heinously incomplete if we pass over the eighteenth century — the age of prose and reason. For this time there are, of course, no treatises whatever (I mean, by modern investigators); for it has been tacitly assumed that there is nothing to treat. Since, however, there must be some means of getting from the license of the Elizabethans to the prim positiveness of the lore that our children learn at school, it behooves us to trace the establishment of the somewhat rigid dogmas that hold sway nowadays, and we may expect to find what we are after in the age whose shibboleths were correctness and urbanity. Once more we shall recognize the potency of French and Latin, this time as regulating forces rather than as temptations to innovate.

Thus I have drawn up, roughly, to be sure, but with exactness enough for our purpose, a programme for that series of Syntactical Studies the lack of which is the greatest desideratum in the whole circle of English linguistics.

I forewarned you that three quarters of an hour would not be long enough even to enumerate all the problems with regard to the English language which we and our philological progeny may hope to settle within the next hundred years, and all the desiderata which we and they may undertake to supply. I have said nothing, for example, of the modern dialects, which, after serving as a parade-ground for harmless and sometimes useful amateurishness for a century or two, have just begun to attract scientific attention. Few of us have had the fortitude to spend our days and nights over the masterpiece of the chalcatheric Ellis, but everybody can consult the Dialect Dictionary, and there is hope for the years to come. It is, to be sure, a bit depressing to find that the author of a very recent article in a journal of the highest class has apparently never heard of this conspicuous and indispensable book, and depends for his English material on the flimsy complications of Wright and Halliwell. But we are used to this kind of thing, and must not let our hearts be troubled overmuch. The dialects of our own country, too, are receiving some notice, and light is gradually being shed on the interesting and delicate subject of the English language in America. Unfortunately much energy is still wasted in polemics with regard to alleged Americanisms and counter-irritating Britishisms. But the fray is less noisy than it used to be.

To phonetics pure and simple I have referred only by the way —

since the subject is apart, and presents its own set of problems, not specifically confined to the English language.

Word-order, formal stylistics, the limits of prose rhythm, the æsthetic value of vowel and consonant combinations, minor foreign influences, slang and technical jargon, the comparative vocabularies of different writers or schools or periods, sexual and social distinctions in phraseology, the complicated and delicate syntax of vulgar English as opposed to the idiom of the polite, artificial influences of every kind, the speech of children, the rise and spread of individualisms, brogues and broken English of all sorts, — such are some of the problems on which one would like to dwell, but which I must pass by with a bare mention.

It is impossible, however, to close without adverting to one or two questions of immediate practical interest. We are always tempted to regard philology as a thing apart, and we are of course quite justified in taking this attitude among ourselves. Linguistics as an independent discipline — philology for philology's sake — needs no defense or assertion in an assembly like the present. But we must not forget that, in one of its aspects, linguistic study may — nay must — be pursued as ancillary to the study and practice of literature and artistic expression. Applied Philology is not, strictly speaking, a part of my theme. Still, the interests of Pure Philology are too closely bound up with this to allow us to shut our eyes to the facts. If the student of literature, or the student of style, or the aspirant to the honors of writing or speaking, cannot command the services of good philology, he will have recourse to bad, — and the world is full of false brethren and redolent of science falsely so called. The study of language and the study of literature must go hand in hand. No doubt every one of us will lean more or less in this or that direction; but it is vitally necessary that every linguist should cultivate the study of literature, and equally essential that the professional literary scholar should build upon a sound and stable foundation of philology. To divorce the two disciplines, and still more to set one up in opposition to the other, will be disastrous to both. These are commonplaces, no doubt, but, in this country at all events, they are truisms which it is our duty to proclaim till the rising generation in our universities shall cease to regard them as paradoxes.

SECTION G — ROMANCE LANGUAGES

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(Hall 5, September 24, 10 a. m.)

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PAUL MEYER, Collège de France, Paris.
PROFESSOR HENRY A. TODD, Columbia University.
SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. E. BRANDON, Miami University.

BEGINNINGS AND PROGRESS OF ROMANCE PHILOLOGY

BY PAUL MEYER

(Translated from the French by Prof. T. Atkinson Jenkins, University of Chicago)

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THE first Universal Exposition of which I have any recollection is that of Paris, in 1855. It was called an *Exposition universelle de l'Industrie et des Beaux Arts*, and the building constructed for it in the Champs-Élysées was named the *Palais de l'Industrie*. In those days only tangible and visible things were exhibited. As the products of the mind could not be set forth in material forms, no opportunity was given them of appearing among the exhibits.

In 1878, at the third universal exposition at Paris, the idea of providing for purely intellectual productions was carried out. The method, commonly adopted since, was that of congresses and conferences, and those of 1878, while not including all branches of knowledge, comprised some widely different fields of thought. This innovation was at first not very successful: the congresses of 1878 were few in number and poorly attended. I confess that I for one did not even know of their existence. But in 1889 the germ had developed. At the exposition of that year there were no less than sixty-nine congresses; at that of 1900 they numbered one hundred and twenty-seven. Among these, however, there was none for philology nor for the history of literatures. I remember that several persons expressed to me their surprise that no one at Paris had thought of forming a congress which should bring together the many scholars of all nations who were pursuing the scientific study of the Romance languages. I can hardly claim to have offered these

persons a very satisfactory explanation. The real reason was that the congresses were to be held, as at St. Louis, during the vacation period, and the gentlemen upon whom the duty would have fallen of planning a meeting of "Romanists" had the weakness to prefer, at that time of year, the country or the seaside to all the congresses in the world. Now, however, I cannot help regretting our indolence. A congress for Romance philology in all probability would have been presided over by the man who was then rightly looked upon as the foremost of French Romance scholars, Gaston Paris, and we should have expected from him an address full of ideas and facts concerning the history and the future of the science to whose advancement he had so liberally contributed.

Forty years ago, when G. Paris and I were merely hopeful young men, it was still possible for a single person to cover the whole range of Romance studies, but to-day the field has become so extended that such an achievement is no longer a possibility. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to sketch in outline the progress of a science whose limits seem to recede in proportion as one attempts to attain them.

If I were asked who was the first in the Latin world to take an interest in the languages of Latin origin, I should not hesitate to reply, Dante. The great Florentine in fact possessed a fairly correct knowledge of French and of Provençal — of the *Langue d'Oïl* and the *Langue d'Oc*, to use his own expressions. He had carefully considered the linguistic variety of Italy, and had proposed for the dialects of the peninsula a system of classification which is yet in a large measure acceptable. But the object he had in view, which was the creation of a general language which should receive contributions from all the Italian dialects, was chimerical, and several centuries were to elapse before linguists began to study languages as they are, with no other idea than to describe them accurately and to write the history of their inevitable changes.

The Italian philologists, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, devoted a good deal of labor to the study of their language. Among these, a few had enough of the historical sense to be curious as to its origins, and some of them by intuition even reached the truth on some important points. Maffei, for example, saw in Italian the continuation of the Vulgar Latin of the Romans. But none of them embraced in one view all the Latin idioms, or made any effort to point out the relations which connect them with each other and with their common source. Still more remote in the minds of these scholars was the idea that it would be interesting to include in their researches idioms which had not been made illustrious by literary achievements.

A somewhat wider conception of the science of language appeared in 1821, when Raynouard published his *Grammaire comparée des*

langues de l'Europe latine dans leurs rapports avec la langue des troubadours. But the very title of this book shows that the work was intended to be the demonstration of a preconceived idea; all its conclusions were necessarily vitiated because they were subordinated to an erroneous theory. In fact, Raynouard's leading idea was that between Latin and the various Neo-Latin tongues there had existed an intermediate stage; this he called, using the term in a special sense, the *langue romane*. According to his theory, this language had developed in close succession to Latin all over Latin Europe; but, while it was preserved by a miraculous exception in the south of France, everywhere else it had undergone the special modifications which led to the formation of French, Italian, Spanish, etc.

The point of departure for this conception, which after all is not so radically false as it may seem, is an unfortunate interpretation of the expression *Romana lingua*, which, in Latin writings of the ninth and tenth centuries and even later, is used to designate a language quite different from the Classic Latin, but one whose relationship to the ancient Roman idiom was clearly understood at the time. By *lingua romana*, or *lingua rustica romana*, people understood in every Romance country nothing more nor less than the vulgar speech as opposed to literary or grammatical Latin. The use of the same expression in different countries did not in the least imply that the *lingua romana* was everywhere the same. People of that time cared little for such a question. Raynouard, finding that the poets of the south of France often gave the name *romanz*, or *lenga romana*, to the language they employed, argued that the name being the same, the language must be the same, and persuaded himself that during a period of some length the people of the Latin West had spoken the language of Provence, his native region.

Herein lay his error. On the other hand, we cannot doubt that there was a stage between the Classic Latin and the Romance languages: this is a fact long since recognized. But the intermediate stage, generally designated as Vulgar Latin, had no closer connection with the Romance of South France than with that of other regions. A good many years were to elapse before the study of Vulgar Latin — I mean of that small part of it that we can ever really know — was undertaken in a methodical way.

Nevertheless, Raynouard's work, in spite of its fundamental error and in spite of a thousand mistakes and confusions in matters of detail, was by no means useless, for its author may be termed in a certain sense the precursor of Diez, and to Diez belongs incontestably the honor of having founded the comparative grammar of the Romance languages.

Diez, as one may conclude from his writings, and as he appeared to me forty years ago when I visited him in Bonn, was a modest and

cautious man not given to generalities, a sagacious observer attentive to details, a linguist skilled in grouping facts and in deducing their consequences, carefully avoiding hazardous theories, and preferring to treat only those problems whose solution he believed he had found. His *Grammatik der Romanischen Sprachen*, first published in 1836-43, thoroughly revised in the second edition (1856-60), and again improved in the third (1869-72), has been the foundation both of the general and of the special study of the Romance languages. Standing at the entrance of the main avenues of Romance philology, this work has been, to all those who have aimed to deal thoroughly with any part of this science, the reliable guide who starts you upon the right path, and who, if he does not accompany you to the end of your journey, at least travels long enough at your side to prevent you from going astray. Of course one cannot say that Diez found a guide of this sort in Raynouard, but it is not a bold supposition that the idea of a grammar of the Romance languages was suggested to Diez by the essay — imperfect as it is — of his predecessor. This conjecture finds additional support in the fact that Diez's earlier works dealt chiefly with Provençal literature, and, in those days, the almost unique source of Provençal studies was the *Choix des poésies originales des troubadours*, the sixth and last volume of which contained the *Grammaire comparée des langues de l'Europe latine*. Moreover, Diez took pleasure in saying that he considered himself the pupil of Raynouard. This was putting it rather strongly, for to write successfully a grammar of the Romance languages, as Diez understood the task, the author must needs be familiar with ideas and methods which as yet were unknown outside of the small circle of German philologists in which they had originated. In this case other influences than those of Raynouard were needed, and, although the subject was of special interest to the Latin peoples, it was only in Germany that a work of this kind could have been planned and executed. Comparative grammar is a science of German origin, and one which remained for a long time the property of German scholars. It was in 1816 that Bopp had given us the first sketch of a work of this kind in his treatise on the Sanskrit conjugation system as compared with that of the Greek, Latin, Persian and Germanic languages. The first edition of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European languages, upon which in a way Diez's work depended, had begun to appear in 1833. Grimm's German grammar, in which, for the first time, the phonology of a group of related idioms was treated, dates from 1819.

These works were little known outside of Germany. In France there had been created in 1852, at the Paris Faculty of Letters, a course in comparative grammar which was placed in charge of an elderly Hellenist of German extraction. This course, which I myself

followed in 1858 and 1859, was indeed wretchedly poor. It consisted in a treatment of general grammar as the subject was understood in the eighteenth century. It was only in 1865 that comparative grammar was properly taught at Paris. In that year, Minister Duruy transferred to the Collège de France the chair which had existed, more in name than in fact, at the Sorbonne, and intrusted it to Mr. Bréal, who had studied in Germany under Bopp and under Albrecht Weber, and who still occupies this chair.¹ In England and in Italy, the teaching of comparative grammar dates from about the same time, being inaugurated in those countries by two men equally eminent, but widely different in qualities and methods, — Max Müller and Prof. Ascoli.

Diez seems to have felt Bopp's influence only indirectly, but Grimm's grammar acted upon his ideas in a decisive way. He was in fact a "Germanist" before becoming a "Romanist." At the University of Bonn he taught mostly Germanic philology. His courses in Romance philology were slimly attended and were subordinate. The general principles which he was to apply to the comparative study of the Latin tongues were ready to hand in the grammar of the Germanic languages, which was already founded upon a scientific basis. The statement of this fact in no way operates to diminish Diez's merit. The difficulties which he had to overcome were enormous. The laws of phonology and of inflections are much more complicated and less apparent in the Romance languages than in the Germanic languages, and, on the other hand, the materials which Diez had to make use of in his work were far more defective and less reliable than those upon which Jakob Grimm had worked. In the case of Old French and Old Provençal, whose monuments go back to the ninth and tenth centuries, he was compelled to compose his grammar from texts few in number and in a majority of cases poorly edited. For the popular idioms, the *patois*, texts were in most cases not to be had. It need occasion no surprise, therefore, if at this distance we discover numerous gaps in his work; we must rather admire the sagacity which enabled him to use to such wonderful advantage the defective materials with which he was forced to be satisfied.

The first edition of Diez's grammar was little known outside of Germany. In France, a man of keen intelligence and unusual breadth of view, but a man of letters rather than a linguist, J. J. Ampère, was the first to use it, in 1841. In writing a rather superficial book on the history of the formation of the French language,² he condensed

¹ He has just resigned. His successor is Prof. Meillet, well known for his various essays on Slavonian and Armenian languages. (Dec. 1905.)

² *Histoire de la formation de la langue française*, 8vo, 1 vol. In 1869 appeared a second edition, to which I was persuaded to add a number of footnotes in which I endeavored to correct the more obvious mistakes.

into one chapter all that he found concerning the French language in the first volume of Diez's grammar. The result was far from satisfactory. Ampère knew very little about Old French, and took no pains to assimilate the rigorous method of his model. The personal observations which he inserted here and there in his often inaccurate abridgment of Diez's doctrine were well calculated to deter his readers from referring to the original. Under such circumstances we can hardly be surprised that the value of the grammar was underestimated in France. French scholars continued, therefore, to publish books on the origins and history of the French language in which the same general questions were brought up time after time, — no one apparently having an inkling of the right way to approach such questions, — and works in which a learning, in some cases very sound but ill directed, exerted its energies without leading to any definite results. Among these were the *Essai philosophique sur la formation de la langue française* by Edélestand du Méril (1852), and the three volumes on the *Origines et formation de la langue française* (1853-57) by Albin de Chevallet, books which were still-born, little read in their day, and without influence. At the same time the only two chairs of French philology that existed in France — those of the Collège de France (founded 1852) and of the Ecole des Chartes (1847) — were held by professors who knew no German. Littré himself, who contributed so much by his articles in the *Journal des Savants* and by his dictionary to the progress of French philology, and who had not the excuse of not knowing German, as he translated several German books into French, — even Littré seems never to have used Diez's grammar. He had some acquaintance with the *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Romanischen Sprachen*, which he drew upon liberally for his dictionary, as the Belgian scholar, Auguste Scheler, had done before him in a *Dictionnaire étymologique du français* (first edition, 1862). The methodical study of the Romance languages in France was destined not to begin until after the publication of the second edition of Diez's grammar, about 1860. The appearance in 1862 of Gaston Paris's book, *Sur le rôle de l'accent latin dans la langue française* (his thesis at the Ecole des Chartes), marks the beginning of a new epoch.

In Italy, the application of the methods received from Germany was made a little later than in France; the first works of Professor Ascoli employed them with signal success. In Portugal, F. A. Coelho introduced the same methods in the study of his native tongue (1872). Spain also entered the same path, only much later.

We must not imagine that even in Germany the movement toward the scientific study of the Romance languages, so brilliantly begun by Diez, made rapid progress immediately. For many years Diez was the sole representative not only of Romance philology as a whole but

also of that branch of it which he had specially studied, — Provençal philology. One by one, however, professors of Germanic languages — Adalbert von Keller, W. L. Holland, Konrad Hofmann, Karl Bartseh — offered courses in Old French and Old Provençal. On the other hand, the teaching of English philology was often coupled with that of Romance philology, with the result that in 1859 a magazine was founded by Ferdinand Wolf and Adolf Ebert “für englische und romanische Litteratur.”

It may be noted further that in Germany the study of literature was decidedly more popular than the study of language. The example of Diez was followed rather slowly. As regards Old French literature, for example, an influential initiative was that of L. Uhland, who, in 1812, in an essay now famous, directed attention to the French epic poems (*chansons de geste*).¹ Acquaintance with the Old French epics and with the romances of the Round Table was soon recognized as indispensable to any one who intended to study thoroughly German medieval poetry.

The second edition of Diez's grammar showed that great progress had been made since the first, but it owed little to works published after the date of this edition. The various changes and additions made by the author were the fruits of his own researches: what others had discovered was comparatively little. The third edition, which appeared from 1869 to 1872, is less personal. In the period between 1860 and 1870, centres for Romance studies had been formed in Germany and elsewhere; works of value had appeared, and the utmost the master could do, enfeebled as he was by age, was to introduce into this third edition a portion of the results obtained by his successors, all of whom might have called themselves his pupils, although few of them had been actually present at his lectures.

If, in the year 1904, nearly half a century after the second edition and thirty-five years after the third, we examine Diez's grammar from the heights now reached in our knowledge of the Romance languages, there are two facts which will strike every impartial observer. The first is that the rules established by Diez are still for the most part valid; his doctrine remains practically whole and sound. The second is that there are serious deficiencies in the work. Certain very important questions of a general character are not dealt with at all; various Romance territories are incompletely explored; the geographical extension of linguistic phenomena is not indicated with precision; the notation of sounds is often too vague, and the history of their changes is at times neglected.

To pass these deficiencies in review is to realize the fact that the greater part of them could hardly have been avoided half a century

¹ In Fouqué's *Musen*, first year.

ago, and also to appreciate the immense progress which has been accomplished in the last thirty or forty years in working the domain which the master had so brilliantly explored.

The Romance languages are nothing else than Latin modified differently according to times and places. But to what Latin do we refer? To the Vulgar Latin, assuredly, to Raynouard's *langue romane*, which was at first almost homogeneous throughout the Roman Empire. Diez was convinced of this fact, and all that he says on the subject in the first part of his grammar is very sensible; it is evident, however, that he had the lexicographical elements more in view than matters of grammatical structure. But he deliberately refrained from any attempt to tell us how and under what circumstances the local changes occurred which have transformed Vulgar Latin into the infinite variety of the Romance idioms. Here was a question which had been much debated, and one to which various solutions had already been proposed. Some believed that Latin had undergone profound changes through contact with Germanic or Slavic languages at the period of the invasions in the fifth century, and comparisons with chemical compounds were made which conveniently veiled the weakness of the historical and linguistic arguments invoked. This was the opinion put forward by Muratori and upheld by Littré, forty or fifty years ago. Others held, with greater probability, that the local variations of Latin must have existed in an even more remote period, and that we must attribute the first changes to the linguistic habits of the Celts, Iberians, Ligurians, etc., of Gaul, Spain, and Italy,—habits of which these populations had not been able to rid themselves in learning to speak Latin. This is the theory once defended, with more energy than weight of proof, by Fauriel. It has since been revived and supported with more definite arguments by eminent linguists, among whom it is sufficient to name Prof. Ascoli. But Diez was concerned with facts that could be proved; he had no great liking for questions whose answers involved too large a proportion of the hypothetical. Rather than to continue debating these doubtful questions, what was needed, if the historical method was to be employed, was to reduce as much as possible the space still vacant between Latin as it was known in the classic authors—that is, written Latin, which had not greatly changed since the first century—and the Romance languages, which did not make their appearance before the ninth or tenth centuries. In this vacant space there was the Vulgar Latin, about which very little was known.

On still other subjects Diez had left work for his successors. History and geography touch philology on several sides; these sciences mutually aid and support one another. At first this was not well understood. To what boundaries did the Roman conquest

carry with it the use of Latin as the every-day speech? And, within these limits, in which countries was the language of the conquerors the only language in use at the fall of the Empire? In what regions did the aboriginal language persist, and to what extent?

Again, taking our stand at the present day, let us draw a map of the Romance world of Europe. Let us determine the frontiers which separate it from Germanic, Slavic, and other languages. This can certainly be done, as we are working with living idioms. But when these limits are once drawn, in which countries may we say that Latin has developed there *in situ*? In which territories has Romance gained ground, and what circumstances have determined this gain? What ground outside of these boundaries has been lost? For certain territories, notably for those of the Roumanian language, these investigations meet with serious difficulties; thanks to recent works, however, these obstacles are in process of removal.

These are some of the questions which Diez's grammar left unsettled and which have been studied during the last forty years, usually with success. We shall now take up these problems and see what has been accomplished toward their solution.

A knowledge of Vulgar Latin, the common source of the Romance idioms, is of the greatest importance for Romance studies. But how difficult it is to get together any certain facts about this unsettled language, which differed less according to locality than according to the persons speaking it! We are compelled to scrutinize the testimony — often obscure — of the Latin grammarians, of the inscriptions, and of the writings of the early Middle Ages — public and private records, written laws of the Germanic invaders, formularies, etc. There is no doubt that these texts contain numerous traces of the vulgar tongue, but it is not an easy task to disentangle them. Among the frequent barbarisms and solecisms met with, there are many which are due only to the ignorance or inattention of the copyists, and from which we can conclude nothing as to the vulgar tongue of the period. The criterion by which we distinguish among these errors those which are to be attributed to vulgar usage is of course furnished us, on the one hand, by our knowledge of Classic Latin, and, on the other, by what we know of Romance from the early texts (and they are few!) of the ninth and tenth centuries. But when we have assembled all that such documents can tell us about Vulgar Latin, we note many gaps (for example, as to the conjugation system), and these we are powerless to fill with anything but more or less probable conjectures.

This difficult study was first prosecuted with signal success by a scholar then very young, but who more than any one else was qualified to undertake it both by his scientific training (he was a pupil of Diez and of Ritschl) and by the rare sagacity with which

he was endowed. The work of Hugo Schuchardt on the *Vokalismus des Vulgärlateins* (1866-68) is perhaps the work most original in plan and most fruitful in results that has appeared since Diez's grammar. The extent of the author's researches was far greater than the title promises, for one may find in these three volumes not a few facts and views which deal not only with the vowels but also with the consonants, and even with certain general characteristics of the Romance languages. This is not apparent at first, for the work is extremely rich in content and the exposition is at times intricate. The result is that more than once ideas have been put forward as new that one may find presented at some length in this work. The necessity of referring constantly to the third volume, which is the complement of the first two, is burdensome. These unimportant defects might easily be removed in a second edition, a revision which has been awaited for a long time, but which the author, absorbed in linguistic explorations of the widest range, seems very little inclined to give us. Since the publication of the *Vokalismus*, various essays on Vulgar Latin have appeared, and the materials which enable us to study this intermediate phase between Classic Latin and the Romance languages have accumulated. It is a question, however, whether many well-demonstrated facts have been added to those which Prof. Schuchardt collected some forty years ago.

Our present knowledge enables us to be clear on at least one point, namely, that we find in rudiment in Vulgar Latin most of the main features which distinguish the Romance languages from the Classic Latin: the simplification of the declensions and conjugations, the almost complete suppression of the neuter gender, the tendency to drop the first post-tonic vowel in certain proparoxytones, the extension of various forms by analogy, the generalization of several suffixes, various new combinations of words, the simplification of the syntax, the impoverishment of the vocabulary, the development of new sounds, etc. One result of these facts is that the hypothesis according to which the greatest changes occurred at the time of the invasions of the fifth century falls to the ground. We may readily concede that changes are oftenest observable at that period, but they were in existence long before. In fact, many years before Schuchardt, August Fuchs, a philologist who died prematurely in 1867, had demonstrated in the clearest manner that the formation of the Romance languages was in no way the result of accident, but that between them and Latin there was no solution of continuity, and that the transition was supplied by the Vulgar Latin of which they are the continuation. These ideas are now of course commonplace. It has been known for a long time that while the barbarian invasion introduced into the Romance vocabulary a large number of foreign terms, it exercised no appreciable influence on Romance grammar.

It was only by notably weakening classic culture that the invasions hastened the arrival of the vulgar idioms to the dignity of written languages.

The question as to within what limits and to what degree the Roman Empire was Latinized probably will never be answered in a complete and entirely satisfactory way. The fact itself, which we must needs accept as certain, is apparently paradoxical. Peoples who were by no means uncivilized, the Celts, for example, and especially the Etruscans, were brought in three or four centuries to the point of giving up their own language and adopting that of their conquerors. How is this to be explained? In our day, the substitution of one language for another seems not to take place so rapidly. But the fact is undeniable nevertheless. The problem attracted the attention of various scholars, among whom we may note Budinszky¹ and Jung,² who examined and arranged the all too scanty evidence handed down to us by the ancient authors. But another question immediately arises. It is beyond doubt that the barbarian invasions greatly reduced the Latin-speaking territory, notably in northern Africa, on the eastern and northern shores of the Adriatic, in Switzerland, along the Rhine, and perhaps in England. But in other directions Romance — for it would no longer be correct to say Latin — recovered a part of the lost territory, and even spread over regions where Latin had never before penetrated. During this period of propagation and differentiation of the Romance idioms, numerous events occurred, both in medieval and in modern times, whose investigation offers many difficulties to the philologist and to the historian.

On the other hand, it is relatively easy to determine the boundaries of the present Romance-speaking world. For the past thirty years, various scholars have devoted themselves to this task, and, thanks to the researches of Messrs. Kurth,³ Kiepert,⁴ This,⁵ Horning,⁶ Zimmerli,⁷ and Ascoli,⁸ the boundaries of the large Romance group of Western Europe have been accurately fixed. In some cases, these investigators have discovered varieties of Romance speech in process of extinction, and even some which are but recently extinct. An

¹ *Die Ausbreitung der lateinischen Sprache über Italien und die Provinzen des römischen Reiches.* Berlin, 1881.

² *Die romanischen Landschaften des römischen Reiches.* Innsbruck, 1881. See G. Paris's review of Budinszky's and Jung's books, in *Romania*, xi, 599.

³ *La frontière linguistique en Belgique et dans le nord de la France.* Bruxelles, 1895.

⁴ *Völker-und-Sprachenkarte von Deutschland und den Nachbarländern im Jahre 1866.* Berlin, 1866. (Reprinted several times.) *Special-Karte der deutsch-französischen Sprachgrenze.* Berlin, 1871.

⁵ *Die Deutsch-französische Sprachgrenze in Lothringen.* Strassburg, 1887-88.

⁶ *Die ostfranzösischen Grenzdialekte zwischen Metz und Belfort, in Französische Studien*, vol. v.

⁷ *Die Deutsch-Französische Sprachgrenze in der Schweiz.* Bâle, 1891-99.

⁸ *Archivio glottologico italiano*, vol. 1. 1873.

instance in point is the Ladin, or Friulan, a former prolongation of which has been noted in Istria and the neighboring territory, in localities where at present the vernacular is Italian or a Slavic dialect.¹ A few years ago, M. Bartoli, an Austrian subject, revealed the former existence in northern Dalmatia of an idiom, now quite extinct, which seems to have been the connecting link between the Friulan and the Roumanian.² For the Roumanian groups north and south of the Danube, the search for linguistic boundaries, like that for ethnic origins, is complicated and obstructed by political prejudice. But even in this case precise information is accumulating, thanks to the zeal of learned explorers, among whom we should mention in the first rank G. Weigand, editor of the *Jahresbericht des Instituts für rumänische Sprache*.

Thus on various subjects relating to the history if not to the formation of the Romance languages — subjects which Diez had scarcely touched upon — the works of scholars continue to multiply. The time has come now to ask how and in what spirit the labors of the master have been taken up and continued. But the laborers have been so numerous that it is hardly possible in this place to give each one his proper mention.

It was during the period from 1860 to 1870 that were formed the principal university centres where the new doctrine was to be sifted and completed. Germany, with its elastic university organization, soon took the lead as to the number of chairs. In 1870 Romance philology was taught in Germany by perhaps a dozen professors or *privat-docenten*. Quite a number of these, to be sure, were required to give a part of their time to teaching English or Germanic languages and literatures. Since then, all the universities one by one have been provided with special professors for the Romance group. In France, the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, founded in 1867 by Minister Duruy, had from the beginning a chair of Romance philology, which was entrusted to Gaston Paris. Soon after this (1869), G. Paris, at first temporarily and then permanently (1872), replaced his father in the chair of Early French language and literature at the Collège de France. The teaching of G. Paris in these two institutions attained from the start a high degree of efficiency, and exercised a most favorable influence on the progress of Romance studies. Many teachers of Romance languages and literatures in France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Roumania, and even in the United States, are proud to be counted among his pupils. G. Paris, while guiding the history of literature into new channels, had at the same time assigned himself the task of rewriting, in the

¹ See Ascoli, in *Archivio glottologico*, x, 447; Cavalli, *ibid.* xii, 255.

² *Ueber eine Studienreise zur Erforschung des Altromanischen Dalmatiens*. Wien, 1899.

greatest detail, the historical phonology of the French language. The edition of the French versions of the *Vie de Saint-Alexis* (1872), the essential parts of which are his personal work, shows how far he was then in advance of his contemporaries in his knowledge of Old French. But he was never satisfied with this work of his youth. For many years he treated in great detail the subject of French phonology at the Collège de France. The fragments of these lectures which he published in *Romania* and elsewhere (on the "close" *o* in French, on the development of Latin *c*, etc.), are sufficient evidence as to the depth of his researches on this difficult subject. I know that certain portions of the great work that he planned on Old French grammar were ready to print at the time of his death (1903); perhaps it will be possible some day to publish them. We recognize the impress of the master's method in the works of several of his pupils. I shall only cite, because they are among the earliest, the book of Charles Joret on Latin *c* in the Romance languages (1874), and that of Arsène Darmesteter, a scholar prematurely lost to science, on the formation of compound words in the French language (1875). These are works which completely replace the corresponding chapters of Diez's grammar, but which nevertheless cannot be considered definitive, so abundant is the material ready to the hand of him who has eyes to see it. When M. Joret's book appeared, with more than four hundred pages of close print devoted to a subject which in Diez's work occupies a few pages, it might have been supposed that the material was exhausted. Not so; more recent researches have developed and completed in various directions the work of M. Joret.

In Italy, the establishment of Romance studies on a scientific basis dates from the foundation of Prof. Ascoli's *Archivio glottologico italiano* (1873). It was a rare piece of good fortune that these studies were then undertaken by a scholar who was a veteran in linguistic research, who was entirely at home in the various fields of Indo-European philology, and who moreover was endowed with a breadth of view and a power of expression which would have placed him in the first rank in any other field of human knowledge. Prof. Ascoli's *Saggi ladini*, which occupy the first volume of the *Archivio glottologico* and overflow into later volumes, are a model description of an idiom whose infinite varieties cover a considerable territory and which has left traces in regions where to-day it is extinct. It may be said that in this section of Romance philology, aside from a few useful remarks by Diez, nothing had been done. The limits of the language spoken to-day by the populations of the southern parts of the Grisons, of the Tyrol, and of northeastern Italy, had not been determined; still less was there any suspicion of the existence of a former wider extension of these dialects, whose territory is now greatly

contracted by the pressure of German from the north and of Italian from the south. Printed texts exist for only a part of this Ladin territory; for other regions it was necessary to obtain specimens and to outline the grammar of each valley, so to speak, before proceeding to a general account. This great work was the starting-point for a whole series of special studies of smaller scope, local grammars, texts, etc., with the result that the Ladin dialects are now among the best known in the whole field of the Romance languages. In Prof. Ascoli's severe school have been trained a Pleiades of philologists, among whom it is enough to name Count Nigra, Messrs. D' Ovidio, Rajna, Ive, De Lollis, Guarnerio, Parodi, Salvioni, and Pieri, scholars who will soon complete for us the work of describing in detail the various spoken dialects of Italy.

If time permitted, I might show how the study of the literary language of Italy, the Tuscan, has been revived and renewed by the introduction of the new methods. But as I am forced to confine myself to indicating the salient features of the successive phases in the history of Romance philology, I shall now review in a few words what the generation which followed Diez has accomplished for the study of the folk-idioms, the *patois*. What I have just said about the *Archivio glottologico* brings me naturally to this subject.

The first philologists who made the Romance languages their study gave their attention almost exclusively to the languages which we may term official, to those which now serve as the organs of literature and of government. Raynouard, for example, treated only Old Provençal, the language of the troubadours. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the folk-speech of southern France, or, in particular, the *patois* of Provence, which was the every-day language of his youth, might be worthy of study. Even in Diez's grammar the treatment of the *patois* is superficial and incomplete. And yet there is no reason why the grammatical peculiarities of a literary language should possess more interest than those of an unwritten one. Time brought a change of attitude on this subject, as was to be expected, and for some thirty years past several experienced linguists have turned their attention to the once-neglected *patois*. The study of a living tongue has one notable advantage over that of a written language—the possibility of a greater degree of precision. Only in a living tongue is it possible to distinguish those fine shades of sounds of which writing gives us no hint. We are all aware that the Latin alphabet, even when improved by additional signs, is powerless to represent the vast variety of sounds used in Romance speech. We know that most of the letters of the alphabet have, as we say, several pronunciations—they often express very different sounds. As long ago as the thirteenth century, a Provençal grammarian attributed to the *e*, *a*, and *o* two distinct

sounds, for which he used the terms "wide," or "open" (*large*) and "narrow," or "close" (*estreit*). The same differences are found in nearly all the Romance idioms; they are distinguished with more or less uniformity in modern orthography, but not so in the ancient documents. Diez, who had studied phonology from the written texts, paid little attention to these differences. He always speaks of the letters as if the signs which we employ to represent pronunciation, unsatisfactory as they are, oftener than not, had a constant and well-determined value. The study of *patois* has accustomed philologists to trust to the ear more than to the eye, and to note variations which formerly were passed over. To this new method of investigation and to the study of the *patois* themselves we owe an immense progress in the study of languages in their early periods. We have become more exacting in the definition of phonological facts. We are no longer satisfied with the often vague and uncertain information furnished by the spelling, but try to determine as accurately as possible the sounds that the spelling aimed to represent. Very frequently the answers to such inquiries are to be found in the *patois*, while as to the vocabulary, it is the *patois* alone which enable us to fix the meaning of a great many words. Moreover, we have gained from this method a more correct estimate of the enormous variety of Romance speech. In many regions the local idiom has never been written down, or, at least, it is inaccessible in its earlier forms because of lack of documents. This statement applies to a large part of Romance Switzerland and to important regions in Italy, France, and the Spanish peninsula, without mentioning the Roumanians of Macedonia. In a word, the specimens of ancient Romance supplied us by the texts are few and far between. The stages intermediate between different varieties are missing, and, as a whole, the older forms of Romance are accessible to us in only a fragmentary way. The *patois* alone enable us to fill these gaps. Of course some discretion is needed here, and we must not imagine, as some philologists of our day have fancied, that all the phonetic facts observed in the *patois* are of equally ancient date. Quite to the contrary, a large number of these phenomena are modern: new facts appear with each generation, and it is the function of criticism to distinguish the old from the new. Here is a great field of research in need of exploration, and the need is all the more urgent in the case of the *patois* because they are subject to rapid change and are gradually disappearing under the pressure of the official languages.

In Italy this branch of study has been pushed farther than elsewhere, not only because, for historical reasons, the Italian *patois* have shown a remarkable vitality, and hence lend themselves more readily to investigation, but also because there was at Milan a scholar who gave this kind of linguistic research a vigorous impulse

— I mean Prof. Ascoli. I need not repeat what I have already said of him. In Switzerland — that is, in Romance Switzerland, for in German Switzerland the work is already nearly completed — the exploration of the local dialects is going on methodically and persistently under the direction of competent men.¹ In Belgium the same labor is well under way.² In Spain, and especially in Portugal, there are some active workers, but they are few in number.³ In France laborers are not wanting: it has been a long time since we began to collect information on the folk-dialects. The earliest *patois* dictionaries date from the eighteenth century, but many of these works exhibit more zeal than method. Too much time was lost in etymological researches which were premature, and in the pursuit of imaginary dialectic boundaries, instead of concentrating effort upon the collection and exact notation of linguistic facts. However, progress has been made in the last twelve years. Some excellent works have been published, among which it will be sufficient to cite those of M. Joret on the Norman *patois*, of Abbé Devaux on those of northern Dauphiné, of Abbé Rousselot on a *patois* of the Charente, of M. Gilliéron on the *patois* of France in general.⁴ This branch of Romance studies has grown some offshoots even beyond the Atlantic: we have not forgotten the work of Prof. A. Marshall Elliott, of Johns Hopkins University, on Canadian French. Only recently a society was founded at Quebec to promote the same studies.

Sciences originally foreign to each other often have unforeseen points of contact, and may at times exercise a mutually favorable influence by lending each other their particular methods. Thus it is that the branch of Romance philology which deals with the *patois* has greatly profited, and will profit still more in the future, by the progress made in a science somewhat new, — general phonology or general phonetics, — a science which in America as well as in Europe has zealous advocates. Here it will be enough to mention the names of A. Melville Bell in America, Prof. Sweet in England, Profs. Sievers and Viëtor in Germany, Abbé Rousselot and M. Paul Passy in France. The phonologist or phonetician differs from the linguist in that he does not concern himself either with the origin of languages or with their history: he works with the idiom spoken at the present

¹ See the annual reports (1899 and following years) of the committee appointed to compile a glossary of the *patois* of Romance-speaking Switzerland, and the *Bulletin du glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande*, edited by the members (Messrs. Gauchat, Jeanjaquet, Tappolet) of that committee.

² The *Société liégeoise de littérature wallonne* is preparing a dictionary of the Wallonian dialect.

³ Gonçalves Vianna, author of several essays on Portuguese phonetics, and Leite de Vasconcellos, the editor of the *Revista Lusitana*, deserve special mention.

⁴ See the *Bibliographie des patois gallo-romans*, by D. Behrens, 2d ed. Berlin, 1893.

day. He borrows processes of investigation from physiology and from acoustics and examines closely the mechanism of the voice; he analyzes sounds and determines the conditions under which they are produced; also, he inquires into the best ways of denoting these sounds to the eye. Wherever it proves useful, he takes advantage of the phonograph, and he will use this instrument more and more as it is brought nearer perfection. Thanks to the researches of the phoneticians, we may learn how one sound passes over into another, changes which the linguist observes but does not explain. In particular, we see that in the transmission of language from one individual to another — for example, from parents to children — the likelihood of change is very great, for we know that it is only after innumerable corrections that children finally are taught to speak like those with whom they are in daily contact; and this observation throws a clear light upon the origin of the present variety in Romance speech. More and more, linguists must train themselves to utilize the delicate and ingenious methods of the phonetician.

Real scholars are disinterested persons. As a rule, they pursue no purely practical ends, and consider themselves sufficiently paid for their pains when they have succeeded in increasing the sum of acquired knowledge. They act upon the axiom which is found at the beginning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: "All men have a natural desire for knowledge." I am quite sure that most of those who carried Romance philology to the heights it has now attained never thought that their discoveries would have practical applications for the modern languages; and yet there is no doubt that many of the results obtained through the efforts of the philologists will not remain mere scientific curiosities, but will have some influence on the teaching of the Romance languages and upon the way these languages are written. As to teaching, we can easily understand that the introduction of historical matter into grammars, even those of elementary grade, will supply the explanation of many an apparent anomaly, and will make the subject less dry. Grammar will become more interesting, because an appeal will be made to the intelligence rather than to the memory. As to orthography, the benefit will be no less real. Everybody has been struck by the irregularities which are so numerous in the most widespread languages, in French as well as in English. The fact is that the official spelling is a mixture of notations introduced at very different periods and in an absolutely unsystematic way. Some spellings aim to represent the prevailing pronunciation; others — and these are in the majority — reproduce an antiquated pronunciation; finally, some pretend to indicate the etymology. Many propositions have been made to do away with these inconsistencies, or, at least, to reduce their number by means of a general revision, but the advocates of change have always encountered the

same time-honored objections from those who held sway, or thought they held sway, over these matters of language. But the opposition is weakening, and will weaken more and more in proportion as sane ideas on the relations of the spoken tongue to the written language shall become familiar to the public, and it is to be hoped that some day each of what we may call the national languages will be provided with an improved system of spelling. I do not say that these systems need be strictly phonetic, like that proposed for English by A. Melville Bell, in which each sound, simple or compound, is denoted by a single symbol: this is neither practicable nor really useful. But the improved spelling should be logical, the same sound should not be expressed in three or four different ways, and the same symbol should not be applied to different sounds. When that time comes it will be possible, thanks to a branch of teaching which at present does not exist,—orthoëpy,—it will then be possible I do not say to fix the language once for all, but at least to retard its tendencies to change. Philologists have in fact ceased to look upon language as a living being which develops according to its own laws. We must not be deceived by metaphors which at times may be used to clothe an idea with an outward form. It is now perceived that the will of man often interferes, intentionally and arbitrarily, with the transmission of language, especially in those countries and periods where literary culture has become a common possession. The complete knowledge of a language, whether we are speaking of the vocabulary, the forms, the syntax, or the sound-system, is no longer gained solely by unconscious imitation of others speaking, as is true in the case of languages which are not cultivated: this knowledge is obtained through the instruction given in the schools, and as regards the sound-system (that is, the pronunciation) this instruction up to this time has not had a solid foundation, because an irregular and inconsistent notation of sounds cannot serve as a guide for pronunciation. I might cite a large number of French words in which the pronunciation has been vitiated by the ambiguity of the spelling. For example, some pronounce *anguille*, *camomille*, and often *oscille*, *scintille*, *vocille*, with the palatal *l* as in *fil*le, while the true pronunciation is *anguile*, *camomile*, *oscile*, *scintile*, *vocile*, with the ordinary *l* as in *file*. These are mistakes due to the double value of the group *ille* in the French official spelling: not having been corrected by school-teachers, they have become, or threaten to become general. This is one example out of a thousand which show that the teaching of pronunciation is possible only in countries which possess a perfectly regular and definite system of orthography.

Nothing is born from nothing, *nihil ex nihilo*, said the ancient sage. The sciences fructify each other and furnish the elements of

new sciences which in this age of world-wide activities come into existence, one may almost say, every day. Romance philology came into being under the influence of the works of Bopp and of Grimm, who gave comparatively little thought to the Romance languages; in its turn, Romance philology aids in the formation of new branches of science and helps to satisfy new needs.

PRESENT PROBLEMS OF ROMANCE PHILOLOGY

BY HENRY ALFRED TODD

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IN undertaking to discuss, in accordance with the programme of the Congress of Arts and Science, the present problems of the Romance languages in their linguistic as distinguished from their literary aspects, it will be proper to consider briefly at the outset the province of philology in its relations on the one hand to linguistics and on the other to literature.

It is well understood that the term philology is commonly used on the continent of Europe with a wider application than among speakers of English. Like the history of all the other disciplines, the process of adjustment between the development of the science of philology and its corresponding nomenclature has been a slow and somewhat tardy one. Without delaying to pass in review the various learned endeavors that have been made to define the place and function of philology in the domain of the humanities,—some have even argued that the range of philology is coextensive with this broad domain,—it will be sufficient here to emphasize the existence of a tendency at the present time which, so far as I am aware, has not before been specifically pointed out—to understand and deal with philology as the mediatory science which, being concerned at once with speech as the vehicle of human thought and with literature as the embodiment of human speech, applies the data of linguistics to the elucidation of literature. Thus the philologist is interested in the phenomena of human speech only incidentally as natural phenomena; primarily and ultimately he is concerned with these phenomena as manifestations, either linguistic or literary, of human thought. The scholar who investigates the sounds of the human voice as physical and physiological products is a phonetician; he becomes a philologist only when, as phonologist, he applies the data of phonetics to the study of the historical development of the sounds of human speech. Similarly, in the prosecution of distinctively literary study, the work of the philologist begins precisely where the process of linguistic elucidation, in its broadest sense, becomes

requisite. Provided no such elucidation is required, as is the case for the most part in the study of modern literature, the work of investigation and appreciation may safely be relegated to the literary historian; while, on the other hand, a discussion of the literary origins and relations of an Old French epic poem, for example, is so conditioned by the inherent and antecedent problems and obscurities of its linguistic form, and depends so largely upon the correct apprehension and solution of such difficulties, that a literary investigation of this order is rightly regarded as belonging, to a large extent, in the domain of philology proper. Thus it may be seen how it happens that no practical difficulty arises in the delimitation of the functions of a chair of Romance Philology from those of a chair of Romance literatures, where both are so fortunate as to exist side by side in the same university; and how it comes about that the line of demarcation is substantially the chronological line that divides the literature requiring, by reason of its archaism, linguistic interpretation and elucidation, from that embodied in forms current and familiar, and that this chronological line of demarcation will vary from literature to literature with the varying stage of archaism exhibited in the respective languages concerned. The poetry of Dante, to use a conspicuous illustration, will thus belong predominatingly to the chair of literature, while the authors of the corresponding period of French literature will as naturally fall distinctly to the province of philology. If so much may serve to suggest the mutual relations of philology and literature, a few words will suffice to indicate the nature of the service it is incumbent on philology to render in the practical teaching of language. Here it is interesting to observe that the function of philology is far more constant and pervasive than in the literary field, inasmuch as it concerns itself with the entire doctrine of language as the vehicle of thought. On the side of language as what may be called an artificial acquisition, the philologist finds himself at every point the coadjutor of the *Sprachmeister* or language-master. In the popular mind, indeed, there exists no very clear distinction between philologist and language-master, while even in the curriculum of the higher education there is sometimes found an unfortunate confusion of ideas as to the proper function of *sprachmeisterschaft* and philology, each in its relation to the other; especially when, as often happens, both orders of instruction must be united in the person of one and the same professor. Let us use an illustration. Given the problem of explaining the French construction *Il fait cher vivre à Paris*. The language-master will proceed by expounding this locution as equivalent to *Vivre à Paris fait cher*, while the philologist will maintain that, so far as construction is concerned, *Il fait cher vivre à Paris*, historically considered, is the precise analogue of *Il fait beau temps à Paris*, *cher vivre* being, like

beau temps, the object of the transitive verb *fait*. As between language-master and philologist, where lies, pedagogically, the truth? Primarily with the language-master, and only remotely with the philologist, whose complicated and unpractical business it will be to explain the psychological process by which the historical truth ceases to be the grammatical truth and an illogical transformation occurs by which things *are* (instead of *are not*) what they seem; or, otherwise expressed, it is not pedagogically sound for the philologist to expect the language-master to begin his doctrine of the French negation, for example, by setting forth the historic fact that *je n'irai pas* means *I shall not go a step*. It is, on the contrary, no unimportant task of the philologist to warn his incipient doctors of philosophy against confusing the legitimate functions of language-teaching with the historical elucidations of philology.

Passing to the specific subject of the present paper — the present problems of Romance philology — it is proper to premise that the word *problems* used to indicate the objects still to be accomplished by Romance scholarship, after the extensive progress that has just been so ably set forth by our honored guest, Professor Meyer, will here be understood not so much in its philosophical as in its current meaning. The philosophical problems of the study of language — the ultimate problem of the origin of human speech, together with the various subsidiary problems affecting, for example, the relations of language to thought or the burning question whether the laws of speech-development are irrefragable — the question of the *Junggrammatiker* — belong to the domain of general linguistic science, while the problems pertaining distinctively to the domain of Romance studies, and still remaining to be solved, are rather of the nature of what the Germans call *Aufgaben* — tasks to be accomplished by patient research and skilled investigation. Such a view of the situation naturally takes for granted that the fundamental problem of Romance linguistics, that of the origin of the Romance languages, has already been conclusively resolved. However persistent and elaborate may be the endeavors of sciologists — continued down even to our own days — to prove that, in their origin and make-up the Romance languages are predominately Celtic, or Greek, or Basque, or Heaven-knows-what, and however skeptical, antecedently, may be the natural attitude of the serious beginner in Romance philology whose preliminary studies have been conducted by over-credulous and incredible etymologizers, no demonstration of linguistic origins has ever been more complete and beautiful than that of the unbroken development of the Romance idioms from the Latin folk-speech.

From this starting-point of the Latin folk-speech it is natural to begin the survey of those practical problems of Romance philology

which it is our object to consider. Without making the fruitless attempt to define with precision the point at which Latin philology ends and Romance philology begins, and without stopping to emphasize the exceeding importance to the Romance scholar of keeping in touch with the methods and results of the older science and of bearing constantly in mind the unity and continuity of the Roman tradition, it must be said that notwithstanding the great amount of careful work bestowed on it alike by Latinists and Romance investigators, the underlying question of *quantity and quality* in the folk-Latin vowel-system still presents a number of baffling enigmas. It is true that the prevailing belief at present is that differences of quantity in the Latin vowels were primitive and inherent, and that only later did qualitative differences so develop in the folk-speech that the long vowels became close and the short vowels open. But various modifications of this conservative opinion are conceivably correct, such for example as that the vowels of the Latin system had become very anciently open and close without appreciable or characteristic quantitative distinction, and that the Latin poets and prosodists, in order to conform their versification to the quantitative system of their Greek models and masters, conventionally treated and came to regard their close vowels as long and their open vowels as short; while the folk-speech, being unaffected by the tenets and practice of the grammarians, continued the previous conditions of the Latin vocalism. At least a curious sidelight on such a possibility, as exhibited in the influence of the Greek on the Latin grammarians, is thrown by the fact, which has long been known to the initiated, that the practice of the Latin grammarians of calling a vowel followed by two consonants "long by position," was due to their misapprehension of the Greek nomenclature, which, inasmuch as the *syllable* was long in which stood a vowel so situated, naturally designated its doubtful vowel as long *θεσεῖ*, that is, "by hypothesis," or, in the equivalent Latin phraseology, "by supposition." Thus the early Roman grammarians, by their misunderstanding and mistranslation of a Greek technical term, introduced an erroneous conception of Latin quantity, for the correction of which the Latin grammarians of the present generation are chiefly indebted to the new science of Romance philology, — a science which, by demonstrating that the number of consonants following a Latin vowel affected not its actual but only its "supposititious" quantity, effected for Latin scholarship the signal service of setting on its feet the highly important and zealously cultivated doctrine of "hidden quantities."

Whether or not it will be possible for the future to establish with certainty the chronology and the mutual relations of quantity and quality in early Romanic speech, may be doubted. Indeed, our

entire knowledge of the Latin folk-speech rests on facts so meagrely forthcoming or on inferences so subject to revision that it is no wonder the contingent of scholars who are active in their investigation of it are divided into opposing camps, — those who minimize and those who tend to magnify the degree of difference between what it is convenient to call book-Latin and the language of the unlettered people; — those, on the one hand, who are ready in general to accept as sufficiently established well-nigh the entire series of forms and phenomena deduced inferentially from the testimony of the Romance languages, and those, on the other, who strenuously object to this somewhat presumptuous procedure, alleging that the only trustworthy data are those afforded by documentary evidence of Latin origin. As to the degree of divergence between book-Latin and folk-Latin, it would appear that thus far the point of view has been too prevalingly that of the investigator who would fain discover, boldly confronting one another, two strongly characterized idioms; whereas the truer view, to be made more clear, I believe, by scholars of the future, is manifestly that of a fundamental and substantial unity underlying a diversity of phenomena characteristic, not of two opposing modes of speech, but of a multiplicity of influences interacting with varying intensity among all classes of the people.

By the side of the problems of the Latin folk-speech should be placed the question of the survival in the Romance languages of traces of the speech of those pre-Latin races on whom the Latin was imposed by conquest and colonization. Here the interesting task of discovering possible indications of pre-Roman influences is rendered peculiarly difficult by the tenuity of our real knowledge of the languages concerned; so that whether we seek for Oscan and Umbrian traces in central and southern Italy, for Gallic traces in north Italy and France, or for Iberian influences in the Spanish peninsula, we find ourselves thrown back for the most part on scanty inferences and surmises. Accordingly, notwithstanding the profound and ingenious disquisitions on this subject, conducted chiefly by Ascoli and by Meyer-Lübke, it still remains delightfully problematical whether even so generally supposed a Celtic trait as the *ū*-sound for Latin long *u* prevailing throughout north and south France, Piedmont, Genoa, and Lombardy, and in the direction of the Grisons and the Tyrol, is certainly to be attributed to such a source. For the nasal vowels, which appear over approximately the same territory with the addition of Portugal, the probability of primitive Celtic influence is perhaps somewhat more assured. As to the possible traces of Oscan and Umbrian in Italian, two or three consonantal developments are all that in the present state of knowledge can be referred to those dialects; while for the Iberian influence on the

Spanish probably the only plausible instance is the partial disappearance of the labials, as in *humo* < *fumus*, *hembra* < *femina*.

Quite another question than this of the traces of the pre-Latin influences in Romance speech is that of the very obvious infiltration into the Romance languages of stocks of words chiefly from Celtic, Germanic, and Greek sources, in regard to individual examples of which more or less uncertainty prevails. For the somewhat numerous Greek examples the list drawn up by Diez in the first volume of his grammar has long since been subjected to revision and excision. For the identification of the astonishingly few Celtic words that survive in Romance speech the problem consists in determining, if possible, the presumable forms which would theoretically correspond, for the period of their adoption, with the Romance forms deducible for the same period; while for the immense stock of Germanic words naturalized on Romance soil, the task of the present, as admirably begun by Th. Braune in a series of elaborate articles in the *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, and by W. Bruckner, in his *Charakteristik der germanische Elemente im Italienischen*, is to assign these each to its proper Germanic dialect and to the period of its introduction into Romance speech.

Of still more pressing urgency for the student of Romance philology is the question of the origin, delimitation, and influence of the Romance dialects and *patois*. Here it is essential to start from the fundamental notion that the *patois* is not a side degeneration from a central norm, not a corruption of a form of speech more perfect than itself because spoken by compatriots more favorably situated and hence linguistically more fortunate. On the contrary, it is precisely because each *patois* is for the most part the natural and undistorted evolution of its own local antecedents, that the *patois* assumes, at least theoretically, to the philologist the place of primary importance in the scale of speech-development. Not till a comprehension of the natural processes of evolution as exhibited in the local *patois* has enabled the philologist to form a just opinion of the groundwork of the language he would study is he in a position to estimate correctly the effects of the interplay of social and political forces which result in lifting a *patois* to the literary plane of a dialect, and the dialect, in turn, through a gradual, prolonged, and infinitely complex process of development, to the consciously exalted status of a highly cultured and national language of civilization.

If such, expressed in the most general terms, be the process upward of *patois* and dialect, what are the distinctive problems confronting the Romance scholar as to the discrimination and delimitation of *patois*? Within the broad domain of a national speech it must be accepted as true that no indigenous inhabitant is unable to com-

municate by word of mouth with any of the permanent neighbors surrounding him. From this point of view there is no delimitation of *patois*, and accordingly, from this point of view, the only logical method of procedure in determining the characters of a given speech is either to signalize all the phenomena appearing collectively at a certain point of territory, or else to follow out and designate the expansion of a given single phenomenon throughout its territorial extent. But considered in the light of actual conditions the facts are not so certain nor the problem so simple, since, in the domain of dialectology, the question "Who is my neighbor?" exhibits precisely the complexity set forth in the parable, and, as a matter of fact, the existence is discovered of more or less clearly defined speech-barriers, determined by political, social, industrial, and commercial conditions, as well as by topographical conditions, which insist that account be taken of them. However, it is rather the nature than the delimitation of speech-phenomena that signifies in philology, and the problems of the present for the student of Romance dialects have to do with the analysis and coördination of such phenomena more urgently than with their distribution.

In the investigation of the Romance dialects and *patois*, the present march of progress is led by the gigantic undertaking of Gilliéron and Edmont, entitled the *Atlas linguistique de la France*, launched a few years since in response to the programme set forth by Gaston Paris in the following words:

"Il faudrait que chaque commune, d'un côté, chaque forme, chaque mot, de l'autre, eût sa monographie, purement descriptive, faite de première main, et traitée avec toute la rigueur d'observation qu'exigent les sciences naturelles."

To any one unacquainted with the plan of this monumental work a word of explanation here will be welcome. Including in its scope the entire Romance-speaking portion of France, together with the outlying speech-territories properly belonging to it, the promoters of the *Atlas linguistique* have established at approximately equal distances from each other six hundred and thirty-nine stations, at each one of which M. Edmont has collected and recorded phonetically, with the utmost possible accuracy, the linguistic facts, that is to say, the *patois* equivalents of words and phrases, corresponding to a uniform series of questions prepared by M. Gilliéron. These results are systematically exhibited in a succession of charts, of which something less than four hundred have already appeared, while it is estimated that the completed work will require a total of some eighteen hundred charts to set forth the material collected by M. Edmont in an itinerary of four years devoted to this work. To indicate by a single illustration the class of material afforded, we may choose the record of the *patois* equivalents of the word *honey*-

bee. Here we find graphically presented, so as easily to be included at a glance, not only the rare survivals of the Latin *apis*, and the abundant modifications of its regular diminutive *apicula*, but also such other diminutives as *avette* for **apitta*, and such periphrases as *mouche à miel*, with the various diminutives *mouchette*, *mouchatte*, *mouchotte*. The advantage of having such series of facts as these, systematically grouped and presented with so great a degree of richness and fullness, needs no comment. Moreover, it can never be foreseen in what new directions the immense array of material can be judiciously utilized. Who, for example, would be likely to look to such a source as this for light upon the vexed question of the position of the tonic accent in French? Yet, the indications of this atlas would appear to lend support to the theory of some distinguished scholars that in French the tonic accent has been to a large extent transferred to the initial syllable. Apropos of such a problem it may be remarked here, by way of transition to the consideration of phonetics in their relation to Romance philology, that Gaston Paris, in his later years, was accustomed to relegate the question of the French tonic accent to the query-box of the future, when the testimony of the mechanically perfected phonograph and of other scientific appliances may presumably be relied upon to furnish a trustworthy answer. If, perchance, the experimental appliances of the future shall corroborate in this regard the apparent results of the *Atlas linguistique*, then it will remain for the Romance philologist to compare these results with those of Gaston Paris's epoch-marking *Rôle de l'Accent Latin*, with a view to determining the significance of so astonishing a break in the historic continuity of development. In any case, the deference of Paris for the applications of modern physical science in the domain of phonetics, and his recognition of the existing need of the most rigorous accuracy in applying the physical science of phonetics to the historical problems of phonology, is characteristic of the growing consciousness on the part of scholars that the methods of the historical sciences must continue wherever possible to be brought into even closer correlation with those of the experimental sciences, if results worthy of the present period are to be attained. At the same time it gives occasion for emphasizing the fact that, as at present understood, the science of phonetics has already become so highly specialized a department of linguistics, and requires aptitudes, gifts, and training so unusual on the part of its devotees, that the day cannot be far distant when individual chairs and laboratories of phonetics, in emulation of the provision made for the Abbé Rousselot at the Collège de France, will require to be established in our universities in order to maintain the standards of university work on a level with the needs of the situation. Surely the recent brilliant work of Rousselot and his school in throwing light on the

most recondite problems of speech-enunciation by the skillful manipulation of ingenious mechanical appliances, and the interpretation of their data, has abundantly demonstrated the unforeseen practical and theoretical possibilities of development in what was not long since an inconspicuous branch of knowledge. So that it has now become the task of the experimental phonetician not only to register accurately the length, pitch, intensity, and rhythm of speech-sounds, but also to analyze those motions of the organs of speech which are invisible to the eye and to determine scientifically those physiological and phonetic changes which are imperceptible to the ear. It has thus become possible on the one hand to clear up many theoretical uncertainties, and on the other to introduce a remarkably successful corrective treatment for those suffering from peculiar difficulties, defects, and abnormalities of speech, not to mention the aid afforded in the ordinary acquisition of foreign sounds.

The important subject of morphology — which should naturally next engage our attention — must be slighted here, with the remark that its problems, in the last analysis, are in the main to be solved by tracing the effects of the operation of analogy; and that, inasmuch as the verb, with its multifarious forms and categories, affords the richest opportunities for the exercise of this potent and far-reaching influence, it is in the doctrine of the verb-forms that most still remains to be accomplished in the way of morphological investigation in the Romance languages; and that the same statement is likewise largely true of the problems of word-formation may be strikingly illustrated by calling attention to the great number of enigmas that a few years ago were satisfactorily elucidated by Gustav Cohn in his treatise on the *Substitution of Suffixes in Old French*.

In approaching the topic of Romance syntax, — syntax! long accounted the dryest and most forbidding of subjects by reason of the woodenness and artificiality with which it has commonly been treated in the past, — how shall we be able in brief space sufficiently to set forth the wealth and delightsomeness of interest that attaches to the elucidation of the manifold delicate problems of this domain? Just as the field of Greek syntax has been made to blossom as the rose by a Gildersleeve, and that of Latin syntax by a Hale, so that of the Romance languages has been not only most successfully, but also most delightfully, cultivated by a Tobler. Here Diez, to be sure (more truly than in his already antiquated *Phonology and Morphology*), still continues to be the guide, philosopher, and friend of the neophyte in Romance syntax. But for an introduction to the lofty avenues and difficult byways that open invitingly to the more fully initiated, unfailing recourse must be had to the subtle and erudite professor of Berlin. For many years, from the cathedra of his

renowned university, Tobler has continued to give forth a series of contributions to the learned literature of Romance syntax such as have transformed the whole complexion of many of the procedures and methods of this study. From being too often a field for the arbitrary or inherited dicta of observers who delight in the formulation of purely metaphysical distinctions, Tobler has made of Romance syntax a richly cultivated demesne in which the application of the comparative method and the substitution of psychological for metaphysical data, have combined to produce a body of sound doctrine suited to command the admiration and gratitude of the entire race of philologists. Yet such is the boundless extent of the domain included in Romance syntax that, far from exhausting any department of the subject, Tobler's greatest merit, perhaps, consists in having pointed the way to the solution of manifold problems that still await the application of his methods and the utilization of the data so abundantly furnished by him. It cannot, however, be said that the force of his teaching and the stimulus of his example have yet borne the fruit that might have been hoped for, in equipping a body of young disciples for the continuance and spread of his peculiar work. Much less have the results of his investigations found sufficient recognition in the more popular treatises on the subject intended for practical instruction; and there is perhaps no field of philological research in which there is so urgent a call for promising recruits equipped with the historical spirit and fitted by training in historical methods, to carry on the tradition of the highest and best scholarship. Fortunately, the recently completed third volume of Meyer-Lübke's comprehensive grammar of the Romance languages presents in systematic form, in connection with much that is original, the best and most significant results of Tobler's teaching in this field.

When we arrive at the branch of lexicology, with its practical embodiment in the work of lexicography, we find ourselves face to face with an enormous output, the material of which it will be largely the task of the future to correct, to amplify, and to recast. Without adverting to the monumental *Dictionarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis* of Du Cange, dating, like the etymological dictionary of Ménage, from the seventeenth century, it will be interesting to us to see how the great *Etymologisches Wörterbuch* of Diez was virtually recast in the *Lateinisch-romanisches Wörterbuch* of Körting. While the profoundest of scholars, Diez was the most unpractical of men, and this latter fact is strikingly exemplified in the disposition and arrangement of his *Etymological Dictionary*. Nothing, indeed, could well have been more inconvenient and vexatious. The work was divided into two volumes, the first containing the words common to at least two of the three leading groups of the Romance languages, while the second volume was divided into three parts, under which

were ranged respectively the words found in only one of the three groups. The intended method of consulting the dictionary would appear almost ludicrous were it not so cumbrous and exasperating, for in view of the provokingly slow and difficult process of finding what was wanted, the balked and baffled inquirer might well have been reminded, in his extremity, of the famous culinary recipe for preparing jugged hare, which begins, "First catch your hare." Indeed, "First catch your word," might appropriately have been the motto on the title-page of this indispensable thesaurus.

The mode of procedure was as follows: For any Romance word the etymology of which was to be sought, the inquirer must first determine, if possible, the etymological equivalent, in Italian, because the Italian form was the one given preference in the alphabetical arrangement. In case, however, there were no Italian equivalent, the word might perhaps be found ranged under its own proper form. This recourse failing, the word in question must be sought in the second volume, under the group to which it belonged; if, for example, it chanced to be Roumanian, it was to be looked for in the Italian group; if it were Provençal, in the French group; if Portuguese, in the Spanish group. If at this point the quest again failed, recourse was to be had to a very meagre index of words treated out of their alphabetical order in the body of the work. Not until all these resources had failed was the unsophisticated seeker brought face to face with the etymological dilemma which inevitably forced him to determine, as to him seemed best, to which of the two great classes of words systematically omitted by Diez the missing vocable belonged, — whether to the class of words accounted by Diez, in his etymological wisdom, to be of altogether *obvious* etymology and hence not worth the trouble of elucidation, or on the other hand to that very different class of words whose etymology was *unknown* to Diez, and which were accordingly incapable of elucidation. And even so the luckless wight was still left in uncertainty whether the object of his quest was not after all treated by Diez, because the great dictionary was well known to contain, hidden in one or another of its many out-of-the-way corners, a generous store of etymologies that defied all the succession of appliances so uningeniously devised for their discovery. As successive editions of the work were called for, Diez was naturally expostulated with as to the disposition of its material, but to no avail. And it was not until a despairing admirer, Jarník of Prague, produced in a separate volume, and under a single alphabet, an absolutely complete index to the *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, that the incomparable wealth of this great monument was placed adequately at the disposal of scholars.

Only a few years later the true and final solution of the question

as to the best disposition of material for an etymological Romance dictionary was given by Gustav Körting, in his *Lateinisch-romanisches Wörterbuch*, which, considering the fact that no one had ever before utilized such a disposition, was, in spite of, or rather indeed because of, its extreme simplicity and convenience, and notwithstanding the defects of its execution, an innovation of the utmost advantage to etymological scholarship.

This disposition consists in making a *lemma* of the Latin or other etymon, under which are ranged all its Romance representatives, with such discussion of each as circumstances call for. All the etyma, of whatever source, are ranged under a single alphabet, and every word treated, in whatever place and under whatever form, is indexed for immediate reference to its etymon. The first and greatest utility of this arrangement is that it gives the inquirer instantaneous information as to whether the word in question is treated at all in the work, and, if so, gives him immediate reference to its etymon and the accompanying discussion.

The present task, then, of Romance etymology is to evolve and coördinate the material for an immense expansion and extension of the idea of Körting's *Wörterbuch*, with application of the widest and most accurate scholarship to the formidable, nay, inexhaustible task. Instead of being limited to the literary languages, the dialects and the *patois* should be subjected to similar treatment, until, in the course of time and with the progress of scholarship and the accumulation of its results, the foundations may be laid for a *magnum opus*, which may be brought out under auspices in some respects similar to those of the great European academies which coöperate in the production of the stupendous *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*.

But such a work would still represent only one of the phases of Romance lexicography. The time is already ripe for the complete overhauling of the great national defining dictionaries of the various Romance languages, such as Littré's dictionary of the French language, to mention only the one that stands foremost and best. The type of the work here to be done is admirably indicated in the *Dictionnaire général* of Darmesteter, Hatzfeld, and Thomas. Another monumental undertaking necessarily calling for mention here is the Old French dictionary of Godefroy very recently completed in ten quarto volumes under the auspices of the French Government. Notwithstanding its immense value, probably no great dictionary was ever published that fell so far short of the ideals of such a work. This fact constitutes a pressing incentive to the goodly company of Old French scholars throughout the world to labor consciously and constantly for the amelioration of a work to which they are already so deeply indebted and which only the combined efforts of all who are in a position to contribute to it can bring to a

state of approximate perfection. Its counterpart for the Old Provençal, the early *Lexique Roman* of Raynouard, in six octavo volumes, is now undergoing revision and expansion at the hands of a most competent lexicographer, E. Lévy, but here again, it should be the common aim of all Provençal scholars to furnish helpful contributions. Such an appeal as this is all the more appropriate since in connection with the undertakings here enumerated there unfortunately exists no organized corps of readers and helpers such as does such important service for the Oxford Dictionary of English. Particularly should attention be given in all such work to the importance of semantics, to which so great an impulse has been imparted by the stimulating work of Michel Bréal. Probably no note of caution is necessary here against the repetition of the subversive and astonishing procedure of a recent extensive dictionary of the English language which consisted in throwing overboard all recognition of the logical and historical development of meanings for the purpose, I was about to say of establishing, but must rather say of setting up, an arbitrary arrangement of meanings in the presumed or the imagined order of their prevalence in the language at the present moment.

Of the culminating function and office of philology in applying the data of linguistics to the elucidation of literature, it remains to say what may appropriately be said in the few allotted moments. I refer to the crowning application of all the results of philological knowledge to the classification of manuscripts and the constitution of texts in accordance with the approved criteria of scientific criticism, and to the adequate presentation, interpretation, and elucidation in published form of the literary production of the past deemed worthy of preservation. Some conception may be formed of the extent of the field when it is pointed out that in Old French manuscripts alone, not to speak of the wealth of Provençal, Italian, and Spanish, there is preserved a greater amount of material than the entire surviving body of Greek and Latin literature combined. While it is not denied that the intrinsic value of much of this material is scarcely demonstrable, it remains true that a considerable part both of that which has been already published, and of that which still awaits publication, has a very decided significance either as pure literature or as a manifestation of the development of human thought and of human culture. Some of it, indeed, is destined as pure literature — epic, lyric, dramatic, imaginative, narrative — to maintain forever a high place in the records of the race. To Romance philology belongs the custodianship and exploitation of this rich heritage. Much that is of permanent value has already been accomplished. Without the faintest *souçon* of adulation, but only as a simple statement of the fact, it deserves to be said that the work of Paul Meyer in unearthing,

exploring, analyzing, comparing, classifying, describing, abstracting, and appraising the unknown wealth of Romance manuscript literature in the libraries, monasteries, and châteaux of France, Italy, and England, and in publishing the results of his investigations in scientific form for the benefit of scholars, not to speak of much accomplished in other directions, has far surpassed the similar work of any other man. Much of the vast store of data thus made available to the philologist and the literary historian still remains to be utilized, and will furnish the rising generation of Romance scholars with an almost inexhaustible supply of information for the further prosecution of their researches.

Concerning the great body of Italian, French, Provençal, Spanish, Portuguese medieval literature that has already seen the light of day, the point of fact that must here be emphasized is that only a comparatively small part of it, namely, that which has been published in the past twenty-five years or so, has been edited in accordance with the critical standards of modern scholarship, especially as embodied in the canons of textual criticism involved in the classification of manuscripts and the scientific constitution of texts. There is, by way of example, no critically constituted text of so important a poem as the Old French *Roman de la Rose*, and even the preliminary work of paving the way, amid the multiplicity of widely scattered manuscripts, for the preparation of such an edition has, if undertaken, never been carried out. In this direction lies an immense amount of useful work for the scholars of the present and the future.

But still another phase of the work to be done in this direction is becoming one of the most interesting and characteristic manifestations of present-day philological scholarship. This consists of the successive reworkings by the original editor, aided by the critical acumen contributed by the world's best scholars, of texts critically constituted at the outset. The most notable recent examples of this are to be seen in Foerster's successive editions of the works of Chrétien de Troyes, in which through a long series of years the editor has brought to bear, stroke upon stroke, the resources of his almost incomparable critical scholarship upon the problem of perfecting to the utmost possible degree the condition of his chosen texts. Yet so highly developed has become the critical training of a number of his colleagues that the contributions of the latter to these ameliorations, through the learned periodicals, have become scarcely less numerous and important than those of the editor himself. So that what may be called, at least in degree, a new manifestation of critical scholarship — that of the coöperative amelioration of philological work — has become a recognized condition of the times.

Of that domain of philology which covers the investigation of obscure literary sources, and the tracing of literary influences through

channels not directly open to the literary historian as such, this is not the place nor is there now the time, to speak. It remains in conclusion — not because either the students of language or the students of literature need to be reminded of it, but only to satisfy the consuming sense of the fitness of things—to signalize what has been announced as the ruling idea of this entire Congress of Arts and Science, namely, the ultimate unity of knowledge in all fields, and especially, as coming home with peculiar force to the philologist, the underlying unity that binds together in indissoluble significance the phenomena of speech as the vehicle of human thought and of literature as the embodiment of human speech.

SECTION H — GERMANIC LANGUAGES

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(Hall 3, September 24, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GUSTAF E. KARSTEN, Cornell University.
SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EDUARD SIEVERS, University of Leipzig.
PROFESSOR HERMANN COLLITZ, Bryn Mawr College.
SECRETARY: PROFESSOR OTTO HELLER, Washington University.

THE RELATION OF GERMAN LINGUISTICS TO INDO-GERMANIC LINGUISTICS AND TO GERMAN PHILOLOGY

BY EDUARD SIEVERS

(Translated from the German by Rudolph Tombo, Jr., Columbia University)

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IF we wish to understand and estimate properly the present and future problems with which a given scientific discipline may at any time be confronted, it is advisable to turn at the very outset from the present to the past, for a correct estimate of what has been accomplished in a certain field and proper directions for future efforts can be acquired only by means of a critical examination of the historical development of the science in question. Moreover, this historical method seems to be demanded especially where we have to deal with the determination of the reciprocal relations of two or more branches of science, which, in spite of possible differences in problem, viewpoint, and method, are nevertheless in the very nature of things constrained to aid each other, according as one is at any given time in advance of the other.

German linguistic science, which we are to consider to-day, maintains such reciprocal relations more particularly in two directions. In the same way that the German language is a member of the Germanic family and also of the great Indo-Germanic group of languages, so, too, German or Germanic linguistic science constitutes an integral part of comparative Indo-Germanic linguistics. On the other hand, German linguistics is none the less closely interwoven with German

philology,—using the word in the customary German sense,—whether we lay the chief stress upon the criticism of form or that of matter. German linguistics is intimately associated with still other fields of knowledge, but the limited time at my disposal will not allow me to discuss such wider relations.

The sciences of Indo-Germanic linguistics, German philology, and Germanic linguistics arose practically at the same time, leaving out of consideration, of course, early sporadic and uncertain efforts that were more or less amateurish. In the year 1816, Franz Bopp, with his *System of Conjugation in Sanscrit compared with those in Greek, Latin, Persian, and Germanic*, laid the foundation for the science of Indo-Germanic linguistics, which since then has assumed such splendid proportions. In the same year appeared Karl Lachmann's famous treatise on *The Original Form of the Poem of the Fall of the Nibelungs*, which was followed in rapid succession by his editions of the *Nibelungenlied*, of Hartmann's *von Aue Iwein* of the poems of Walther von der Vogelweide and of the works of Wolfram von Eschenbach, editions that were to serve for many years as unexcelled models for the critical treatment of Middle High German works of poetry. And finally, in 1819 and 1822, respectively, there were published the first and second editions of the first volume of Jakob Grimm's immortal German grammar, the monumental work upon which all Germanic linguistics science rests, and whose rich treasures, in spite of the most zealous efforts, have not been exhausted even at the present day.

The intellectual talents of the three scholars mentioned were as dissimilar as the fields in which they labored. Of the three, Jakob Grimm and Franz Bopp possess the greatest similarity. In both we admire an equal wealth of fancy and native intuition, which enabled them to make use of even the most minute details and to discover an intellectual or historical bond for facts apparently unrelated. On the other hand, Lachmann appears as the incarnation of a carefully discriminating critic, and as the master of restrained and methodical thought. These qualities he exhibited in his efforts to reconstruct a poorly preserved text by supplying all the delicate touches of the author, as well as in attempts to establish literary-historical relations or to clear up the historical genesis of the text and its contents.

From both the positive and the negative standpoints, Jakob Grimm's activity and personal position were for a long time representative and authoritative on the question of the relation of German linguistic science to Indo-Germanic linguistics, on one hand, and to German philology on the other. The older grammar of the East in accordance with its "philological" leanings had pursued linguistics only as a means to an end. In the pursuit of semi-anti-

quarian interests it had concerned itself with the collection and publication of linguistic peculiarities and eccentricities, while it endeavored at the same time to establish a standard of usage for literature and the conversation of the educated classes. With the advent of Bopp and Grimm, however, investigations of the linguistic elements were conducted for their own sake. Henceforth the question no longer turned solely on the "Is" and the "Shall," but new and more important questions arose, as for example, "How are we to apprehend existing forms, where are we to seek their origin, and how has the individual element been developed from the original forms which we must establish?" It was this new range of questions that raised the old descriptive "grammar" with its normalizing tendencies to the rank of a "science of language."

This series of questions also contains the germ of the elements which constitute the similarity as well as the dissimilarity between Grimm and Bopp. The latter, from the first, boldly attacked the ultimate questions which linguistic science felt permitted to put. First, he turned his attention to the explanation of Indo-Germanic linguistic forms and sought to establish these by the comparative-speculative method on the basis of the great variety of forms found in individual dialects. Jakob Grimm, however, advanced with greater caution and more distinctly along the lines of historical development. To be sure, he also occasionally grappled with general glottological problems, yet his main interest was directed to the narrower field of Germanic, and accordingly he concerned himself more directly with the accurate determination of linguistic resemblances and differences and their historical development. In Grimm's work, too, considerable prominence is given to the philological element, as is clearly demonstrated by his extensive collection of authentic and historically arranged material taken directly from the preserved linguistic sources. Bopp had turned his attention first to the Indo-Germanic system of conjugation, and when, in 1819, Grimm appeared on the scene with the first part of his German grammar, he also dealt only with inflections, although he approached the question from an essentially different standpoint. Only three years later, however, in 1822, he adopted a new course, which brought in its train far-reaching results, for in the new edition of the first volume of his grammar he prefaced the consideration of Germanic inflections with a complete and systematic investigation of the conditions of Germanic phonetics. This, indeed, was the first systematic attempt in the history of grammar and of the science of language to introduce the new discipline of historical-comparative phonetics, which is now the basis for all formal studies in comparative linguistics, since without its aid a systematic comparison of inflectional forms is impossible.

The science of comparative linguistics has been drawing steadily away from Bopp's goal and from his method of explaining what he termed the "organism of the Indo-Germanic languages," for it has come to recognize in ever-increasing measure the futility of attempting to solve the problem with the insufficient means at its disposal. To be sure, we owe Bopp an everlasting debt of gratitude for having by his comparisons established definitely and for all time the relationship of the individual Indo-Germanic languages, which had previously been only darkly suspected. And yet if we consider the actual mode of comparison, we shall find the historical method as applied by Grimm to be of far greater significance for future research than Bopp's divinatory mode of procedure, which caused him to advance by leaps and bounds. To whatever extent Grimm's method may have been displaced by stricter present-day requirements in individual instances, we must not forget that it was preëminently he who gave the initial impulse in a number of important points. It was Jakob Grimm who first insisted upon the strictest historical control of all related material, and upon the most complete induction as prerequisite for the comparison of less intimately associated linguistic forms and for the consequent reconstruction of primitive Indo-Germanic forms, which is indispensable even at the present day. It is to him we owe the conviction that no material should be compared in a wider circle, unless its history within the individual languages and families of languages has been carefully and unquestionably determined beforehand. It is to him, again, that we are indebted for the gradual development of Indo-Germanic linguistics into a history of the individual families of languages and their subdivisions.

For a long time the influence of Indo-Germanic linguistics upon Germanic linguistics was not so prominent as the impulse given by Jakob Grimm to the development of Indo-Germanic linguistics itself, an impulse that in reality goes back to Bopp. In those days, as in the case of Jakob Grimm, Germanic linguistics contributed more than it received in return. To be sure, Grimm was familiar with the investigations of Bopp and his successors in the general Indo-Germanic field, yet he employed their results with a certain reserve, which ended by isolating Germanic grammar, as it were, from comparative Indo-Germanic linguistics. The first generation of Germanic scholars after Grimm and Lachmann seldom overstepped the narrow bounds of their limited subject. This may be attributed, in part at least, to the circumstance that the structure of Germanic grammar as erected by Jakob Grimm seemed to be so firmly established that no necessity was felt for securing additional support from a great distance. The most important consideration, however, was that the pupils of both Grimm and Lachmann were interested in philology rather than in the

actual science of grammar or linguistics, their attitude being influenced partly by personal inclination and endowment and partly by the strict discipline of Lachmann's school.

The earliest attempt to establish an *entente cordiale* between the fields of linguistics and philology dates from the end of the seventh decade of the nineteenth century. On the literary side the movement was introduced in Germany by Wilhelm Scherer in his *History of the German Language* (*Zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache* — 1868), with its wealth of ideas and imagination. The book was hailed with outspoken admiration by some, and met with determined opposition by others. This latter attitude may be attributed in part to the fact that in the field of comparative linguistics — particularly under the leadership of August Schleicher and Georg Curtius, who, were joined as far as methodology is concerned by William Dwight Whitney — a more sober mode of observation had begun to make itself felt, which left less room for the kind of free speculation to which Scherer was so partial. On the other hand, it was not without significance that the interest in linguistic matters in general, which was spreading rapidly at that time, had attracted a number of rising Germanic scholars, especially at Leipzig, to the school of comparative linguistics, scholars who had not yet fallen under the influence of Scherer's book and his mode of thought, but who, like those of their contemporaries that devoted themselves more exclusively to linguistics, were guided rather by the cool and clear precision of their teacher Curtius.

Through the common labors of this Leipzig group of young linguists and Germanic scholars, there arose during the seventies the school of Young Grammarians (*Junggrammatiker*), so-called from a casual jest made by Zarncke. The most pronounced characteristic of this school is the strong emphasis it lays upon methodology and the doctrine of principles, thus furnishing a striking contrast to the often desultory method adopted by Scherer. It is hardly fair to the Young Grammarians to look upon their efforts, in the light of the many heated controversies into which they were drawn, as being expended mainly in outside disputes. The real characteristics of this circle, on the contrary, must be sought in their attempts to free themselves from a certain narrowness of doctrine represented in their own teacher, Georg Curtius. It was this identical circumstance that led finally to a scientific estrangement between Curtius and his pupils — an estrangement really no less remarkable than the contrast between the tendencies of the Young Grammarians and those of the newly arising linguistic science, which were, almost simultaneously, connected with Johannes Schmidt and August Fick.

If from the generally accepted standpoint of to-day we look back at the linguistic methods of research more or less universally current in the sixties and early seventies, we must admit the existence of

certain pedantry in the field at that time. A considerable number of old doctrines — of which some had been established *a priori* in a period when language-research tended to be philosophical and speculative, and of which others can be traced back to exaggerated conceptions of the antiquity of the Aryan languages, especially of Sanskrit, and to the uncritical acceptance of doctrines of the old Indian grammarians — were accepted at their face-value and transmitted without investigation from generation to generation. (As examples I need only cite the doctrine of the priority of the *a*-sounds over the *e*- and *o*-sounds, or of all explosives over spirants; the doctrine of *guna*; or the theory of the distribution of the Indo-Germanic languages on the basis of a genealogical tree, etc.) Above everything else, however, these investigations were based solely on the written word, which was duly "analyzed" and with the aid of all manner of little strokes divided and subdivided into roots and the most varied forms of derivative and inflectional suffixes, etc. But no attention whatever was paid to the psychology of language, which unites the smaller particles into the finished word, nor to the psychic processes which control the transmission and transformation of human speech. Moreover, no one attempted seriously to throw light on the phonetic aspects of linguistic changes established on paper by calling into requisition an aid of the utmost importance, that is, the comparative study of the phonetic phenomena of living languages.

It was naturally not to be expected that a sudden improvement could be made in these conditions. Long conflicts have been necessary before the new ideas and methods, which have been so widely promulgated, especially since the seventies, could become adjusted and secure more universal recognition. But at the present time scarcely any essential difference in methods exists, and it is probable that all language-investigators to-day employ in practice the methods first adopted by the Young Grammarians, even though a certain antipathy may be felt here and there for the name of the movement and although in theory opposition against certain of their principles still exists.

To this transformation in linguistic conceptions and methods Germanic linguistics, as we should expect, has contributed its due share. While the older science of language had concerned itself primarily with the written forms of the earlier and most ancient language-periods, the Germanists, like the Romanists and Slavists, by reason of the fact that their linguistic sources reach directly into the present, have from the very beginning been concerned also with the study of living languages and dialects. Hence, necessarily, their attention has also been directed to the psychological side of language-structure and language-development, which can be investigated successfully only on the basis of the living language. We

cannot, accordingly, attribute to mere chance the circumstance that the two most important principles in modern linguistics as opposed to the older science were first emphatically announced by those scholars who were investigating living dialects. I refer in the first place to the doctrine of the regularity of sound-correspondence and sound-development in that portion of language the transmission of which is purely mnemonic, in other words, to what has been called — the choice of terms is not a particularly happy one — the doctrine of the absolute constancy of sound-laws. In the second place I refer to the doctrine of the complete equality of those new linguistic forms which are created in the absence of purely mnemonic transmission by means of definite psychological processes of assimilation, that is, what we call formation by analogy, or through association, or explain as form-transferences, leveling, etc. Nor should we forget that the demand for a strictly phonetic treatment of problems of sound-development was first made and carried out in practice by the Germanists. Comparative linguistics is indebted especially to the Germanic and Slavic scholar Karl Verner for his important incorporation of the doctrine of accent in the history of sound-development. And finally, comparative language-study is indebted to Germanic linguistics for the one systematic treatise on the methodology of language-investigation which is recognized as the complete expression of the ideas now generally accepted. I speak of the methods proclaimed by Hermann Paul in his *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*, and it is these methods which, unconscious as the act may be, in practice helped to regulate the research even of those language-investigators, who, opposed to the theoretical discussion of general principles, prefer to base their methods, as it were, on the foundation of individual instances.

From all that has been said, we see that the history of comparative and Germanic linguistics furnishes an excellent illustration of a mutual borrowing of methods and ideas, and the more active this interchange became, the more bountiful was the harvest of the joint intellectual labors.

If we next turn our attention to the relation between Germanic linguistics and critical German philology, we shall find that the conditions are very similar, except that the mutual diffusion of the two sets of ideas has not been so complete and productive as in the case of German linguistics and comparative linguistics. This circumstance is readily explained on general as well as on historical grounds.

The representatives of Germanic and of comparative linguistics are inherently brought into more intimate contact by the common tendency and the common goal of their labors: the only difference lies in the breadth, the number, and the peculiar character of the subjects treated. Both strive to throw light on the history of lan-

language, and both employ the historical-comparative method. Language-history on the whole is really synonymous with language differentiation, and it is furthermore characteristic of this language differentiation that only a limited portion of common language property resting on the older basis of greater unity is ever handed down to the younger, more strongly specialized linguistic divisions.

Again, it is self-evident that conditions possessed in common, even in later periods, are prerequisite for drawing conclusions about earlier forms. The language-investigator conducting his researches along historical lines must from the nature of things begin in every case with the common element and determine its originality. Not until this preliminary investigation has been completed can he turn with the expectation of ultimate reward to the comparative examination of differences in form and structure and their history. The fact that both activities must frequently be combined in practical detail work, the more so the more delicate and detailed the form the problems take, has nothing to do with the matter in hand. Moreover, the student of language seeks to recognize common elements in forms which have been proved not to be original, and to differ from one another, by drawing conclusions from the similarity of changes about the similarity of the processes — mainly psychical — that have produced the changes. Going still another step further, from the similarity of those processes he can draw conclusions as to the normalcy of the changes under consideration — a matter which depends upon the similarity of the psychical organization of the various peoples and speakers. It is this latter similarity, finally, which alone can give to the investigator of linguistic conditions the necessary faith in the correctness of his views and explanations. This much is therefore established, that the scholar who approaches the study of language from the historical-comparative standpoint is compelled to work chiefly with that portion of the language which we may designate as the collective attainment, or, at least, as the collective possession of the speaking masses. It is entirely different with the critical philologist, for whom language represents primarily only that fraction of the general conception of language which has been preserved as literature — literature in the widest sense of the term. In one respect, therefore, he conceives of language as the means of expression for certain thoughts and contents which he investigates. On the other hand, so far as he takes any interest whatever in form, he regards language partly as the foundation upon which the various artistic forms of human speech are erected, partly as a means of differentiation between individuals or between stages of art. Disregarding the question of content, this is equivalent to the statement that the philologist must be attracted in language primarily by the production of the individual, just as the student of

language should be attracted by the collective production of the masses.

Of course the philologist must also occasionally resort to comparisons, at least whenever he wishes to individualize artistically; and if his comparisons are to be correct, he, too, must follow the historical method. But the historical conclusions drawn from his sources and the differences established, no matter whether they be differences of individuals or groups, do not, as in the case of the student of language, serve him primarily in the determination of connections, — even if only in the general psychology of language-change, — but, conversely, they aid him in his separation of elements, and in detaching the individual from the general. Or if he be attracted more directly to the general, he will turn rather to fields of language-æsthetics than to those of language-psychology.

An exaggerated conception of this tendency is of course fraught with manifold dangers. The one-sided philologist, particularly, who does not know how to profit by the viewpoint and the methods of the language-investigator, will neglect a series of methods which would aid him in his researches, and moreover he will be apt to regard observed facts in a false light, because they appear to him as unconnected dots and not as links in a definite chain of development.

The corresponding dangers which confront the one-sided linguist lie in the opposite direction. Without the necessary philological control, he is apt to regard separate elements as too closely related and to see connections and possibilities, the acceptance of which would be absolutely prohibited by philological determinations. Moreover, inasmuch as his whole method of investigation leads him first of all to the search for direct courses of development, such as are furnished in rich measure by the natural speech of every-day life, it will not always be easy for him to follow the zigzag path of development produced by the influence of individual forces and by the intentionally artistic development of the written language.

It has been amply demonstrated that a mutual *rapprochement* and an interchange of ideas and methods is absolutely essential to the satisfactory progress of both philology and linguistics. While the philologist needs the science of language for the broadening of his horizon in general linguistic matters, the linguist, conversely, cannot get along without philological criticism in the arrangement and accurate determination of his material of comparison.

The general recognition of the necessity for this union, evident as it would seem to be in theory, has been slow to gain ground in practice. The linguists have made the earliest and most vigorous efforts in this direction. To be sure many sins may still be committed here by the individual; in principle, however, the modern science of language does demand that all its representatives be philologists

at least to the extent of employing only such material as can endure the test of philological criticism. Philology, the older and prouder sister-science, has on the whole been less eager to comply with the demands which linguistic investigation was forced to establish, and even at this day the number of philologists who, to their own detriment, renounce the employment of linguistic aids, or who on general principles — regarding it as incompatible with their dignity — refuse to come to an agreement with the science of language, is not insignificant. Yet in this respect, also, the last few years have witnessed a decided improvement, especially in the field of German philology.

As we know, German philology rests on the shoulders of Karl Lachmann just as German linguistics rests upon those of Jakob Grimm. For the former, therefore, so far at least as Lachmann's influence reaches, his conceptions of linguistic matters have remained authoritative. This is more particularly true of the estimate of the German language and its development from the Middle High German period to the present day, that is, of those very periods of the German language which by reason of their youth and the secondary character of their idioms were of relatively less interest for linguistics.

Having begun as a disciple of the school of classical philology, Lachmann naturally took it for granted that in the classical works of Middle High German poetry we have an artistic language, which, produced as it was for a definite purpose in a limited circle of the highly cultured, differed essentially from the ordinary language of the common people. Interested in this higher artistic language alone, Lachmann applied the whole force of his incomparable sagacity to its restoration in its original purity and to giving each and every individual Middle High German poet his due. The dialects of the common people had no attraction for him nor for many others: they were regarded as ordinary and crude, and wherever they cropped out occasionally in literature, they were looked upon as disturbing intruders.

It is scarcely astonishing that in the light of such an attitude the scientific study of German dialects of the middle as well as of the modern period should have been neglected so long, in spite of the brilliant labors with which Johann Andreas Schmeller inaugurated this discipline at an early time. The reaction, however, was bound to come, and it did come, even before Lachmann's death, from the philological side. For it was discovered that in the poetic literature from Middle German territory, to which but little attention had formerly been paid, dialectical material plays an entirely different rôle from the one it plays in the classical poetic productions of Upper Germany upon which Lachmann based his theories. His doctrine of the unity of the Middle High German language, at least in its strict inter-

pretation, thereby received its deathblow, and it could be saved only in somewhat modified form for a portion of Middle High German literature, to be sure, however, the most valuable part. But here again contradiction soon set in, plainly influenced by the higher value that linguistics ascribed to the dialects as such, since these very dialects furnished more suitable and accordingly more valuable material for their special purposes of investigation. Thus Hermann Paul taught that in the middle period of German there was no artistic language of poetry differing in principle from the dialects. He stated that no poet hesitated to make use of his own dialect, and claimed that the small number of differentiated dialectical forms to be found in the classical poetry of Upper Germany, or more especially in the rimes of the poets, was due to the fact that the separation into dialects in Upper Germany had not at that time advanced far enough to leave plain traces behind in the technique of rime.

Thus another extreme view was established and occasion furnished for a lively and protracted controversy between the two camps, of which one exaggerated the philological and the other the linguistic elements.

In the end neither of the extreme views was accepted in its entirety, but, as in so many other cases, the truth was found on middle ground. The partial agreement that has been secured in this important question is the happy consummation of the satisfactory settlement reached between philology and linguistics, especially through the model labors of Carl Kraus and Konrad Zwierzina. Both of these investigators proceeded, to be sure, from the strictly philological side, but, on the other hand, in explaining complicated conditions, they have not disdained the aid given by modern dialectology. We may, therefore, now regard it as certain, that the Middle High German poets of the classical period were really no mere naturalists so far as their language was concerned. Their idioms were real artistic dialects, only in a different sense from that of Lachmann. Nor can we any longer speak of a ruling unity, but only of more or less striking resemblances; and the degree of these resemblances depends primarily upon the relationship of those dialects to which the various poets belong. The languages employed by the poets, accordingly, also rest upon the dialects, but the poets do not present these dialects in their entire purity, inasmuch as they are prone to omit all forms that would appear too strange to the auditor speaking another dialect. The artistic character of the languages employed by the various Middle High German poets is therefore mainly negative, consisting rather in the avoidance of what is not regarded as generally accepted than in the inclusion of linguistic forms from another dialect for the sake of unity. It cannot, of course, be denied that there is a certain tendency toward generalization even under these

conditions, which beside the knowledge of neighboring idioms presupposes also a conscious regard for the linguistic sense of foreign individualities. Indeed, in some respects a positive departure from the every-day speech of the home must be admitted especially in the regulation of the vowels of unaccented syllables, upon the study of which sufficient stress has not been laid in the past. At all events, we are dealing not with a definitely established attempt at adjustment, but rather with one that was actively at work in Middle High German times and that has not ceased even in our day, although for centuries, in conscious struggle against the constantly outcropping dialects, unceasing efforts have been directed towards the real unification of the new artistic language, which we have come to call the New High German literary language.

My present task does not call for a more detailed description of this infinitely complicated process. I must content myself with having indicated, by the aid of an example selected at random, how philology and linguistics have had to learn, one from the other, in order to clear up the historical development of a considerable province of the German language, namely, the subsidiary forms employed in literature. On the whole, the philological viewpoint has unquestionably vindicated itself, as is readily understood if we recollect that we are dealing with the history of more or less artificially developed idioms. But there are reasonable grounds for doubting whether without the opposition of German linguistics — which demanded a new and thorough investigation of the entire problem — German philology would have succeeded in freeing itself so quickly and so completely from the ban of the old inherited doctrines that were accepted without the slightest attempt to establish their correctness. In this regard German philology, therefore, owes a debt of gratitude to German linguistics, just as the latter is indebted to the former for the impulse given in the struggle to correct its conceptions about language-development in general.

We may admit that the service which linguistics has rendered philology in the solution of the problem of the literary language has been in part rather indirect or negative in character. Nevertheless, positive assistance has been rendered at this point just as it has in the influence of linguistics in other places, which I cannot discuss here, and we may anticipate a continuation of this attitude in the future. Indeed, unless I am greatly mistaken, linguistics will be called upon to place at the disposal of philology in one of its most special fields of activity, that of critical separation, new aids of fairly sweeping importance.

The assimilation of the ideas which Karl Verner's pioneer investigations of Germanic word-accent had brought to linguistics, has claimed the attention of students of language for a considerable

period, and thereby turned their attention more or less away from a similarly energetic investigation of sentence-accent, which is no less important. Only in recent times have more determined efforts been made to solve the problems of sentence-rhythm and of sentence-melody, or, to be even more general, of language-rhythm and language-melody. Although we may not have advanced beyond the initial stages in this particular field, it at least seems certain that the key to the understanding of these language-phenomena has been discovered.

All this, to be sure, most directly concerns linguistics. Yet these more recent investigations of accent assume added significance when we recall that the individual speaker — especially if he be an author, and no matter whether he be writing in verse or prose — is under the ban of certain rhythmic-melodic conceptions, which unconsciously influence his choice of expressions. This influence is so strong that an author's individual production, often even his entire work, assumes a more or less plain, yet easily recognizable characteristic rhythmic-melodic impress. In language-melody especially, the personal peculiarity of the individual author usually finds clear and definite expression, and it therefore becomes an important factor in the separation of unrelated portions of a preserved text. Personal observation conducted along these lines for several years convinces me that there is no phase of philological criticism which may not receive new light from this source, whether we are dealing with the selection of different versions of a text and the accurate determination of linguistic and metrical forms or with the most complicated problems of higher criticism. The methods to be employed in the investigation and application of the individual rhythmic-melodic standards are difficult indeed and have been determined only in small measure. Years will no doubt pass by before empirical proof of the validity of this thesis can be established in detail. Yet even at this day we may express the fond hope that the evidence will be forthcoming, thus proving anew that philology and linguistics will attain the best results only if they advance faithfully hand in hand towards the solution of common problems.

PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE GERMANIC PHILOLOGY

BY HERMANN COLLITZ

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LIKE other branches of philology, and in fact almost every line of human knowledge, the study of the so-called "Modern Languages" has arisen from humble beginnings, and has originally served purely practical purposes. A characteristic feature, however, of the study of modern languages lies in the fact that it seems to experience greater difficulty than any other branch of philology in outgrowing the elementary stage. It derives its origin from the desire to acquire a living language for the sake of conversation or correspondence, or in order to be able to peruse literary works written in that language. The aim of the study, accordingly, was the practical command of the language in question, and to this very day it seems to be the prevalent opinion in England and the United States that, as regards the study of French and German, our colleges and universities have done their duty, if they convey to their students a practical command of these two languages.

Under these circumstances stress must be laid on the fact that this popular view entirely misses the real object of modern philology. We shall have to say that a modern language, no less than any other language, becomes an object of scientific research only after the practical acquirement of the language has been accomplished, and that, on the other hand, for the purpose of research work in case of a modern language, no greater amount of practical knowledge is required than, for example, in case of Latin, or Greek, or Sanskrit. There is, for instance, no reason why a scholar who has little or no practice in German conversation should not furnish valuable contributions to the history of the German language.

I am making this statement, not in order to recommend a superficial acquisition of German, — for a thorough practical knowledge of the language certainly remains desirable, — but in order to emphasize the necessity not to lose sight of the higher aims of the study of living languages. From this point of view I should say that it is

essential to regard every modern language as a product of historical growth, or, in other words, of evolution; to investigate the relation which exists between the "modern" shape of a language, and its earlier stages, and to trace the connection, if it can be traced, between the development of the language (in its various stages) and the history of the people by whom the language is spoken. From Modern German we have to turn to Middle High German and Old High German and further to the Primitive Germanic and the Indo-European period. We ask what changes the German language has undergone from one epoch to another and try to explain the evolution of the language in connection with the changes which have occurred in the literary, social, and political life of the German people.

Needless to say that from our standpoint the traditional distinction between "modern" and "ancient" languages is of little consequence. For languages like Middle High German, Old High German, Anglo-Saxon, etc., are dead languages, just as much, or even more than Latin and Greek. And yet the study of these languages cannot be separated from that of Modern German, English, or Norse, any more than it is possible to understand (scientifically) the modern Romance languages without reference to Latin. Nor are we justified in calling, for example, Latin as contrasted with German an "ancient" language. German, if traced back to the Indo-European parent speech and regarded as a language gradually transformed from what it was at that early period, is scarcely less ancient than Latin. The customary distinction between ancient and modern languages is simply a remnant from the elementary stage of modern philology. But I am spending perhaps too much time in trying to refute popular misconceptions, which are not shared by representative scholars in philology. Let us, therefore, take up some questions, which cannot be said to lie so much in the beaten path as the preceding remarks.

Historical grammar cannot expect to accomplish its task sufficiently by paying attention to the earlier stages of the present languages, only so far as these stages have been handed down in literary works. In the case, for example, of Modern German it is true that we are able to trace its history back more than one thousand years by the aid of Middle and Old High German. But we must not overlook the fact that our records of Old and Middle High German are incomplete. Not all of the dialects existing at those periods are represented in what remains of Old and Middle High German literature, and it would be erroneous to believe that even in the most favorable instances (say, for example, in the case of Otfried's language in Old High German or that of the Swabian poets in Middle High German) we possessed the vocabulary or the grammar of a single dialect completely. Difficulties increase when we attempt to throw light on the history of the German language in the period preceding the Old

High German time. Here direct tradition abandons us almost entirely. For the Gothic language, the first Germanic language to receive — by the translation of the Bible — a written literature, is obviously not the direct ancestor of Old High German. It is at this point that the comparative study of the Germanic languages has come to our aid.

The close relationship existing between the various Germanic languages and dialects necessarily presupposes an epoch in which there was found, instead of the various dialects, only one more or less uniform language. This is the language which we designate by terms like "Early Germanic" or "Early Teutonic," or "Primitive Teutonic." I have said that this language was "more or less" uniform. It is a well-known fact that dialectical variation is inseparable from the life of languages, and it would be erroneous to imagine that there had ever existed in the history of the Teutonic languages a period of absolute uniformity. But it is also a fact that, the further we follow the development of the Teutonic dialects back into the past, the more we notice the dialectic varieties, on which their difference at present rests, diminishing. We therefore arrive, almost necessarily, at a period when every one of these dialectic varieties is reduced to uniformity. How then can we reconcile this apparent contradiction?

In addition to dialectic variation we find in the life of languages a process which we may call dialectic convergence. We find, in other words, that certain changes, which at first are individual or local, gradually spread over a larger area and finally are universally adopted. It is possible, therefore, that dialectic variations may have existed in cases in which we now find in all of the Germanic languages a uniform transformation of certain Indo-European sounds, while we naturally would ascribe to Early Germanic the uniform sound found at present (or at the beginning of our direct historical tradition).

The fact that dialectic changes always spread gradually must account for another line of differences that we neglect in reconstructing a uniform Germanic period. There are many instances where the Old Germanic dialects differ in this way, that one or some of them preserve a sound in its oldest form, while in others the sound has been altered. We take it for granted that Early Teutonic possessed in most cases the sound in its oldest form, while of course the possibility always exists that the dialectic variation reaches back in its beginnings into the Primitive Teutonic period.

We may have to admit then that the uniform "Early Germanic" period which we reconstruct has probably never existed precisely in this form. Yet we shall maintain that there was in the life of the Germanic languages a period exhibiting very nearly the form of speech which we call Early Germanic, and that our mistake consists at the utmost in ascribing to one and the same age the features which

actually belonged to consecutive periods, periods, however, not far distant in time.

The attempts systematically to restore the Early Germanic period are of rather recent date. However valuable the services are which Jakob Grimm in his *Deutsche Grammatik* (that is, "Germanic" Grammar, not "German" Grammar) has rendered to Germanic philology, there was no attempt on Grimm's part to restore the Early Germanic period or any other of the lost periods in the history of the Germanic languages. He has been satisfied in his great work with giving parallel grammars of the principal Germanic languages, especially those which have served as literary languages. And nothing more could we expect at Grimm's time, since at that period, even in comparative Indo-European philology, no attempt had been made to reconstruct the Indo-European parent speech. It was reserved for August Schleicher to urge for the first time the necessity of reducing the various Indo-European languages to a common basis which he called the "Indogermanische Grundsprache." Now Schleicher might have been expected to apply this point of view to the Germanic languages, and to try to reconstruct in his *Compendium*¹ the Primitive Teutonic grammar. Schleicher indeed mentions here and there the "Deutsche Grundsprache." Actually, however, with him as with his predecessors, the Gothic language has to serve as representative of the earliest period of the Germanic languages.

Yet the course taken by Schleicher for the Indo-European naturally led to attempting the same for the Germanic languages, and when in 1870 in his preface to a reprint of Grimm's grammar,² Wilhelm Scherer stated that to adapt Grimm's work to the needs of our time would mean first to reconstruct the Germanic parent speech, he probably voiced an opinion which was gradually becoming more general among philologists.

There followed, a year afterwards, an attempt to reconstruct the Early Germanic vocabulary, by a scholar whose work in Indo-European lexicology forms a counterpart of Schleicher's work in Indo-European grammar. I am referring to August Fick's *Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-European Languages*, which in the second edition (Göttingen, 1871) contains a comprehensive chapter on the Germanic vocabulary.³ It is not a mere accident that the recon-

¹ Schleicher's *Compendium der Vergleichenden Grammatik der Indogermanischen Sprachen* was first published (in two volumes) in 1861 and 1862.

² *Deutsche Grammatik*, von Jakob Grimm. Erster Teil. Neuer vermehrter Abdruck. Berlin, 1870. The reference is to p. xxvii.

³ *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der indogermanischen Sprachen*, von Aug. Fick. 2 Aufl., Göttingen, 1871. ("Zum Wortschatz der germanischen Spracheinheit," pp. 685-924.) As regards the progress made in Fick's dictionary in the method of reconstruction I may refer to my review of the fourth edition in *American Journal of Philology*, vol. xii (1891), pp. 293-309. This subject as well as similar historical and methodological questions has also been touched upon in my review of Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*, in the *Modern Languages Notes*, vol. viii (1893), nos. 2, 3, and 4.

struction began with the vocabulary. For it is obvious that the vocabulary of the Gothic language, consisting, as it does, almost exclusively of words contained in our fragments of the translation of the Gothic Bible, must contain more gaps than the Gothic grammar, and cannot therefore be regarded as representative of the Early Germanic period. In the third edition of Fick's *Comparative Dictionary* (in 1874), the Germanic vocabulary appeared in enlarged form as a separate volume. The author this time availed himself of the assistance of Adalbert Bezzenberger, who in an appendix to the volume also contributed a discussion of some phonetic problems of the "Germanische Grundsprache." Many other contributions towards restoring this "Grundsprache" have since followed, of which it may suffice to mention here the systematic works by Kluge (in Paul's *Grundriss*),¹ Noreen,² Streitberg,³ and Bethge (in Dieter's *Laut- und Formenlehre*).⁴

While Jakob Grimm and his immediate successors were inclined to judge the Early Germanic period almost exclusively by the standard of Gothic, there has been during the last thirty years an increasing tendency to discredit in this respect the reliability of Gothic and to lay stress on alleged earlier features preserved in Old Norse, Anglo-Saxon, Old High German, and other Old Germanic dialects. No doubt formerly the authority of the Gothic language was in some respects overrated. An obvious instance of this kind is found, for example, in the phonetic changes which go under the name of "Verner's Law." For it has been proved by Verner⁵ that the so-called "grammatical change" between spirant and media was found in the Germanic parent speech and has been preserved in most of the older Germanic dialects, while in Gothic its traces have been, at least in the verb-system, almost entirely obliterated. In other cases, however, the testimony of the Gothic language has been, in my opinion, rejected without sufficient reason. I am referring especially to two phenomena; first, the alleged Early Germanic vowels *e* and *o*, in whose place we find in Gothic (except before *r* and *h*) the vowels *i* and *u*; secondly, the instances in which Old Norse and the West Germanic languages are supposed to have preserved final vowels which are not found in Gothic.

¹ *Vorgeschichte der altgermanischen Dialekte*, von Friedrich Kluge. Sonderabdr. aus der 2. Aufl. von Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*. Strassburg, 1897. The first edition had been published in 1889.

² *Utkast till Föreläsningar i Urgermansk Judlära*, av Adolf Noreen. Upsala, 1890. A German translation (with additional material), entitled *Abriss der Urgermanischen Lautlehre*, has appeared, Strassburg, 1894.

³ *Urgermanische Grammatik*, von W. Streitberg. Heidelberg, 1896.

⁴ *Laut- und Formenlehre der Altgermanischen Dialekte*, herausgegeben von Ferd. Dieter. Leipzig, 1900. (The first half volume, containing the phonology, was issued in 1898.)

⁵ *Zeitschr. f. vergl. Sprachf.* vol. 23, p. 108 (reprinted in Karl Verner, *Afhandlinger og Breve*, Copenhagen, 1903, p. 16).

Since both questions have a bearing on the reconstruction of the Early Teutonic language, and since, as far as I can see, all Germanic philologists at present agree in not admitting the primary claim of the Gothic language, it may be worth our while to enter upon a more detailed investigation.

Let us consider first the case of West Germanic (and Norse) *e* and *o*. We are concerned here with the phenomena which Jakob Grimm designated as "Vokalbrechung" (that is, vowel-fraction), namely, with the fact that the Gothic vowels *i* and *u* are frequently represented by *e* and *o* in the other Germanic languages, as,

Goth. *niman*, *nimip*, *nimam*.

O. H. G. *neman*, *nimit*, *nemam*; or,

Goth. *hulpun*, *hulpans*.

O. H. G. *hulfun*, *gi-holfan*.

Jakob Grimm took it for granted that Gothic in these cases exhibited the older forms and that the vowels *e* and *o*, found in Old High German and the other Germanic dialects, were of a more recent date. He was unable, however, to say why in some cases *i* and *u* were retained and in other cases altered in West Germanic and Old Norse. The credit of furnishing a satisfactory explanation of the "Brechung" belongs to Adolf Holtzmann, who in 1841¹ explained the change as a form of "Umlaut," depending on the vowel of the next syllable. Gothic *i* and *u* remain unchanged before syllables containing the vowel *i* or *u*, but they are changed to *e* and *o* before syllables containing *a* or *o* or one of the diphthongs *ai* and *au*. Therefore Goth. *nimip*, *filu*, *budun*, *hulpun* = O. H. G. *nimit*, *filu*, *butun*, *hulfun*; but Goth. *niman*, *budans*, *hulpans* = O. H. G. *neman*, *gi-botan*, *gi-holfan*. Only before *n* + Cons., the Gothic vowels remain unchanged also in the other Germanic languages, e. g. Goth. *bindan*, *bundun*, *bundans* = O. H. G. *bintan*, *buntun*, *gi-buntan*.

This simple rule explains the change between *i* and *e* and between *u* and *o* in the verb completely, with the exception of one case which I shall mention later on. As regards the declension, the rule cannot be applied without assuming a number of secondary changes due to analogy. Yet the number of exceptions is not greater than with the other theories that have been advanced in order to explain the phenomena of "Brechung."

This "a-Umlaut" is, in Holtzmann's opinion, the oldest kind of "Umlaut" (*i. e.* mutation) found in the Germanic languages. He further remarks that the *a* after liquids in final syllables does not affect the stem-vowel. The *o* in O. H. G. *fogal* is not due to the

¹ Holtzmann's article *Ueber den Umlaut* appeared first in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, and was later on published as a separate pamphlet. His views are more easily accessible in his *Alteutsche Grammatik*, Leipzig, 1870.

following *a* of the O. H. G. word, but it is derived from forms which have also in Gothic the vowel *a* or *o* in the final syllable, *e. g.* Gothic *fuglos* = O. H. G. *fogala*.

Holtzmann's theory had been almost universally accepted when towards the end of the sixties the discovery of the "European *e*"¹ put a sudden stop to it. Holtzmann as well as Grimm — and, in fact, philologists of their time generally — were of the opinion that the Germanic languages possessed originally, like the Sanskrit, only three short vowels *a*, *i*, and *u*, and had remained, as regards their vowel-system, in an earlier stage of development than, *e. g.* Greek and Latin. But now it was shown that, *e. g.* the *i* in Goth. *niman*, was not directly derived from the *a* of Sanskr. *namāmi*, but corresponded more nearly to the *e* in Greek *νέμω*, and that the *i* in Goth. *itan* had passed through the stage of the *e*, as seen in Greek *ἔδω*, Lat. *edo*, etc. Nothing more natural than to assume that the forms to be presupposed for Goth. *niman* or *itan* had been retained in O. H. G. *neman* and *ezzan*.

The latter opinion has remained to the present day the current view in Germanic philology, and hence the Gothic vowel-system is generally believed to be in many respects more recent than that of the other Germanic languages. For we should have to infer that, *e. g.* Modern German words like *nehmen*, *essen*, would still exhibit earlier vowels than the corresponding verbs in Gothic. A theory leading to such consequences could not have attempted to rival Holtzmann's view, were it not that the latter has failed to explain an important exception, in which apparently *i* is found as a regular vowel of "ablaut" before a following *a*. In attempting to prove, therefore, that Holtzmann's hypothesis is correct and preferable to the current view, it will not suffice to show that this hypothesis is not necessarily in conflict with the "European *e*," but we shall have to account also for the exception which Holtzmann has left unexplained.

As regards the European *e*, the inference on our part of course is that forms like Goth. *niman*, *itan*, have passed through the stage of **neman*, **etan*. The transition, however, from *e* to *i* has taken place in the Primitive Teutonic period. Old High German itself, as well as the other Old Germanic languages, presupposes forms like *niman*, *itan*. This is shown by the fact that under favorable conditions, *i. e.* without a following vowel or when followed by one of the two vowels *i* or *u*, the *i* appears also in Old High German (*e. g.* *nimis*, *nimit*). Only in case the next syllable contained an *a* or *o*, or one of the diphthongs *ai* or *au*, this *i* became *e* through *a*-Umlaut.

Parallel to the relation of *i* to *e* is in the Germanic languages that of *u* to *o*. In some respects, however, the matter is somewhat simpler

¹ As regards the discovery of the European *e*, compare especially F. Bechtel, *Die Hauptprobleme der indogermanischen Lautlehre seit Schleicher*, Göttingen, 1892.

in the case of the latter vowels, and I consider it therefore advisable first to examine the relation between *u* and *o* before proceeding further with the *i* and *e*. Germanic *u* is of twofold origin, because it corresponds (1) to Indo-European *u*, *e. g.* in the preterite plural and past participle of the second ablaut-series, *i. e.* in forms like Goth. *budun*, *budans*. Also in words like *juk* "yoke," *ufar* "over," etc. (2) Another *u* is developed before or after syllabic liquids or corresponds to an Indo-European weak vowel. Here belong the *u* found in the third and fourth ablaut-series, *e. g.* Goth. *hulpun*, *hulpans*, O. H. G. *wurtun* (= Mod. Ger. *wurden*), Goth. *numans*; and the *u* of nouns like Goth. *wulfs* "wolf," *hund* "hundred," *guma* "man," and many others.

Both varieties are treated in the Germanic languages in exactly the same manner. In Gothic they both remain *u*, except before *r* and *h*, where they are changed (or "broken" according to Grimm's terminology) to a vowel which was probably pronounced *o*, but, curiously enough, is spelled *au*, *e. g.* Goth. *waurpun* (= Mod. Ger. *wurden*), *tauahun* (= Mod. Ger. *zogen*). In Old High German both are treated in accordance with Holtzmann's rule, *e. g.* *zugun*, *gi-zogan*; *wurtun*, *gi-wortan*.

The twofold origin then of the Germanic *u* stands in no connection with its twofold form (*u* and *o*) in the Germanic languages. And there is no reason why we should not regard the *u* of Goth. *juk* as identical with that of Lat. *jugum*, Greek *ζυγόν*, Sanskr., *yugam*. The *o*, therefore, of O. H. G. *joch* must be regarded as a later substitute for the Gothic vowel.

As regards the relation between *u* and *o* in Germanic, the opinion advocated here is probably the one which is at present shared by the majority of scholars. It is true that here and there we still meet with the doctrine of an Early Germanic *o*, preserved in West Germanic and changed in Gothic to *u*. This doctrine, however, finds no support in the *u*- and *o*-vowels themselves, but is based on the parallelism of the *i*- and *e*-vowels; the supposition being that if O. H. G. *e* is older than Goth. *i*, it would seem rational to regard O. H. G. *o* as older than Goth. *u*. I am for my part willing to admit that the vowels *e* and *o* in West Germanic are strictly parallel. But the conclusion I would draw from this fact is a different one. If it is possible to regard West Germanic *o* as a more recent vowel than the Goth. *u*, the problem may be solved by regarding West Germanic *e* as more recent than the Goth. *i*. Let us return then to the vowels *i* and *e*, in order to see whether the latter theory can be sustained.

Like Goth. *u*, Goth. *i* also has a double origin; for it corresponds (1) to Indo-Eur. *i* in the preterite plural and past participle of the first ablaut-series, *e. g.* Goth. *bitun*, *bitans*, and in words like *i-s* "he" = Lat. *is*, *fisks* = Lat. *piscis*, *widuwo* = Lat. *vidua*; (2) to

Indo-Eur. *e* in the infinitive and present of the third, fourth, and fifth ablaut-series, as well as in the past participle of the fifth ablaut-series, *e. g.* Goth. *bindan*, *niman*, *ga-nisan*, *binda*, *nima*, *ga-nisa*, *ga-nisans*. Also in words like *ik* = Lat. *ego*, *fiuf* = Gr. *πέντε*, and many others.

As far as Gothic alone is concerned, no difference is perceptible between the two varieties. They are treated exactly alike and are, *e. g.* both changed to *ai* (probably a peculiar spelling for *e*, suggested by the later Greek pronunciation of the diphthong *ai*) before *r* and *h*; *e. g.* *taihun*, preterite plural, and *taihans*, past participle of *teihan* "to declare," *bairan* "to bear," *faihu* = Ger. *Vieh*, etc.

So far, then, the vowels *i* and *u* would appear to be parallel. There remains, however, in Old High German and in other Old Germanic dialects one peculiar instance, — the one I have had to mention above as an unexplained exception from Holtzmann's rule, — in which the distinction between Indo-Eur. *i* and *e* appears to have been preserved. We find in Old High German in the past participle of the fifth ablaut-series the vowel *e* instead of Goth. *i*, *e. g.* *ginnesan* = Goth. *ga-nisans*. This *e* is regular and in accordance with Holtzmann's rule. In the past participle of the first ablaut-series, however, Goth. *i* remains unchanged in Old High German, contrary to Holtzmann's rule; *e. g.* *gi-bizzan* = Goth. *bitans*. Since in the former case we find in the cognate Indo-European languages the vowel *e* (= Sanskr. *a*), *e. g.* Greek *ρέουαι*, Sanskr. *nasate*, and in the latter case the vowel *i*, *e. g.* Lat. *findo*, Sanskr. *bhid*, it looks, indeed, as if here an Indo-European distinction had been preserved.

Let us grant for a moment that Old Norse and the West Germanic languages, as whose representative we have selected Old High German, are sensitive enough to distinguish before an *a* of the following syllable between Gothic *i* = Indo-Eur. *e* and Goth. *i* = Indo-Eur. *i*. How shall we account for the fact that the same distinction is in other, and, it would seem, quite similar cases utterly lacking? The preterite present verb O. H. G. *weiz* = Goth. *wait* follows the first ablaut-series in forming the past participle, *gi-wizzan*, and retains the vowel *i* also in the infinitive, *wizzan*, and the present participle, *wizzanti*. The preterite, however, shows in addition to *wissa* (also *wista*) the form *wessa* (and *westa*). Nouns like O. H. G. *nest* = Lat. *nidus* (Indo Eur. *ni-sdo-s*), O. H. G. *wer* = Lat. *vir* (Sansk. *viras*), furnish additional proof that Holtzmann's rule applies to Indo-Eur. *i* no less than to Indo-Eur. *e*.

It follows that the exception from Holtzmann's rule, found in forms like *gi-bizzan*, *gi-wizzan*, etc., must be explained without regard to the Indo-European distinction between *i* and *e*. The line, moreover, on which the explanation is to be sought is clearly indicated by other Old High German forms. Of the preterite present verb *bi-darf* we find in Old High German the infinitive *bi-durfan*, whose irregular

u (instead of *o*) is clearly due to the plural *bi-durfun* and the subjunctive *bi-durfi*. The *i*, therefore, of the infinitive *wizzan* may be explained as due to the plural *wizzun* and the subjunctive *wizzi*, an explanation which we shall naturally also apply to the participles *wizzanti* and *gi-wizzan*. Granted that *gi-wizzan* is due to the analogy of the plural *wizzun* and the subjunctive *wizzi*, the explanation of the participle *gi-bizzan* can no longer be doubtful. Its *i* is due to the analogy of the plural *bizzun* and the subjunctive *bizzi*.

But why should in the first ablaut-series the participle *gi-bizzan* adopt the vowel of the preterite plural *bizzun*, while in the second ablaut-series the participle *gi-wortan* is not influenced by the plural *wurtun*? I believe that I am able to give a satisfactory answer to this question, and I think that the answer, if it be correct, will prove to be of some interest, as it would lead to the result that to a certain extent analogical changes depend on definite laws just as much as phonetic changes.

We are concerned in the case under discussion with a law which regulates the ablaut in West Germanic (or more precisely in Norse and West Germanic) in such a way as to require a harmony or an equal balance between the grade of the infinitive or the present tense and that of the past participle. We may say in a general way that Holtzmann's rule does not affect the past participle, unless it can affect also the infinitive and certain forms of the present tense. To be sure, if we adopt this wording we shall have to except the cases in which the infinitive and present are formed with the suffix *-j-* (e. g. O. H. G. *sitzan*, "to sit"), since these particular presents have no effect on the past participle. We have to remember, however, that the suffix *j* is found only with verbs whose preterite plural has the vowel *e* or *o*, so that an analogical influence of this vowel on that of the past participle would be out of question. But in order to avoid exceptions of this kind it is preferable to restrict our law to those ablaut-series in which we have in Gothic (and in Primitive Teutonic) one and the same vowel in the preterite plural and the past participle, i. e. to the first, second, and third series. The law then may be formulated thus: "Wherever the preterite plural and the past participle had originally one and the same vowel admitting of the application of Holtzmann's rule, this rule has taken effect only when it could also affect the infinitive and the plural of the present tense. If, however, the present tense shows in the plural the same vowel as in the singular and in the infinitive, the past participle will retain the vowel of the preterite plural and not be modified by Holtzmann's rule."

From our point of view, then, we shall divide the first three ablaut-series into two groups, which may be distinguished as *simple* and *complex* forms of ablaut.

To the former belong: (1) the first ablaut-series, *e. g.* O. H. G. infinitive, *bizzan*, present singular, *bizzu*, plural, *bizzum*; preterite singular, *beiz*, plural, *bizzum*, participle, *gi-bizzan*. (2) The verbs with nasal + cons. of the third ablaut series, *e. g.* O. H. G. *bintan*, *bintu*, *bintam*, *bant*, *buntum*, *gibuntan*. The verbs of this class are of course excepted from Holtzmann's rule for the reason that this rule does not apply to vowels followed by nasal cons. They belong, however, in this connection, since they would naturally affect analogical tendencies in the general system of the ablaut.

The second group consists of (1) the second ablaut-series, *e. g.* O. H. G. infinitive, *ziohan*, present singular, *ziuhu*, plural, *zioham*, preterite singular, *zoch*, plural, *zugum*, participle, *gi-zogan*. (2) The verbs with liquid + cons. of the third ablaut-series, *e. g.* O. H. G. *werdan*, *wirdu*, *werdam*, *ward*, *wurtum*, *giwortan*.

If I have succeeded in removing the obstacles which seemed to be in the path of Holtzmann's rule concerning the West Germanic *e*, we are entitled to maintain that in regard to the vowels of radical syllables the Gothic vocalism may on the whole be regarded as representative of the Primitive Teutonic period. I venture to believe that many of my colleagues will share with me a feeling of relief on account of the fact that we are no longer obliged to regard the simple and perspicuous vowel-system of the Gothic language as a secondary outgrowth of the complicated vocalism of the West Germanic languages.

Our attempt to sustain, with regard to radical syllables, the primary claim of the Gothic language, will find an appropriate supplement in the contention that with final syllables matters are similar in that here, too, the Gothic language deserves to be reinstated in the position which it formerly held.

It is little more now than half a century ago that Rudolph Westphal¹ succeeded in discovering the laws on which in Gothic the treatment of vowels and consonants in final syllables depends. As regards the vowels his opinion may briefly be stated thus, that in final syllables original short *a* and short *i* are lost, while short *u* remains. For example, in the *a*-declension Goth. *wulfs* = Sanskr. *vrka-s*, Gr. *λύκο-s*, and in the *i*-declension, Goth. *gasts* = Lat. *hostis*; but in the *u*-declension Goth. *sunus* = Sanskr. *sūnū-s*. It is scarcely necessary to add that, in Westphal's opinion, Gothic was the oldest representative of the Germanic languages, and that the vowels lost in Gothic were lost also in the other Old Germanic dialects. For about twenty years these views remained unchallenged. They were shared, *e. g.* by Wilhelm Scherer in his well known *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*

¹ *Das Auslautgesetz des Gothischen, Zeitschr. für vergl. Sprachforschung*, vol. II (1853), pp. 161-190.

(Berlin, 1869). Soon afterwards, however, we meet with a growing tendency to find the vowels which are lost in Gothic still preserved in other Old Germanic dialects, — especially Old Norse and Anglo-Saxon, — and in the most recent works on Germanic philology the statement is made that the original vowels of final syllables are to a large extent preserved in the oldest Norse inscriptions, and here and there in the old West Germanic dialects, so that Westphal's law would be valid only for Gothic and not for the Primitive Teutonic period.

This modern view may impress us as if it was not intended to be taken seriously. For every one who is accustomed to look at the various Germanic languages from a comparative point of view must recognize that the two languages supposed to have retained most of the original vowels are the ones in which, as a rule, final vowels are treated more recklessly than in the other Old Germanic dialects. For it is especially in Old Norse and in Anglo-Saxon that we observe in final syllables the dropping of Gothic short vowels, the shortening of Gothic long vowels, and the contraction, followed by shortening of Gothic diphthongs. Is it credible, then, that these languages should have retained short vowels which had been dropped in Gothic?

To be sure, the contention is that the alleged pre-Gothic vowels are found not in regular Old Norse, but in the oldest Norse Runic inscriptions, those which are supposed to exhibit the so-called "Primitive Norse" language.¹ But let us not be misled by the term "Primitive Norse" with its suggestion of the Primitive Teutonic language. It is true that in the oldest Runic inscriptions Old Norse appears in a more ancient form than in the regular literary language, and the difference in age may amount to several centuries. Yet it is hardly probable that the language of the oldest inscriptions can be claimed to be as a whole more ancient than, *e. g.* Old High German. The language of the inscriptions points to a period when the Norse languages were no longer in contact with Gothic, but were undergoing or rather had undergone the same phonetic and inflectional alterations which we are accustomed to designate as "West Germanic." We find, *e. g.* that Goth. *i* and *u* have been changed before a following *a* (in accordance with Holtzmann's rule) to *e* and *o*, and that the diphthongs *au* and *ai* have been contracted to *e* and *o* respectively.

The majority of the alleged pre-Gothic vowels in "Primitive Norse" can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, we have the vowels which appear before the final *n* of the nominative, and which are claimed as old thematic vowels. It seems to me that these

¹ The more important ones of these inscriptions are given — with references — in the Appendix of Ad. Noreen's *Altisländische u. Altnorwegische Grammatik*, 2d edition, Halle, 1892. Compare also the articles by Moebius, *Zur Kenntniss der ältesten Runen*, in the *Zeitschr. f. vergl. Sprachf.* vol. xviii (1869), and xix (1870), and F. Burg, *Die ältesten nordischen Runeninschriften*, Berlin, 1885.

vowels, especially the short *a*, which is frequently found, compare with the secondary *a* of O. H. G. forms like *acchar* = Goth. *akrs*, *fogal* = Goth. *fugls*, or *eban* = Goth. *ibns*. The existence, in the Runic inscriptions, of a secondary or pleonastic *a* must be admitted even by the most ardent champions of their antiquity in cases like *warait* (instead of *wrait*) "wrote," or *-wolafa* (instead of *-wolfa*) "wolf." I trust we may be permitted to extend this theory to forms like *Holtingar*, *Dagar*, etc.

A second group of vowels, claimed to represent Early Teutonic conditions, is found in final position without following *z*. We are concerned here partly with a short *a*, supposed to have been lost in Gothic, and partly with a long *o*, supposed to have been shortened in Gothic to *a*. In neither case have I been able to convince myself that the claim is justified. As it would be impossible in this place to discuss the whole question at length, I will at least briefly examine, with regard to final vowels, one of the oldest and most important Runic inscriptions, namely, that of the golden horn of Gallehus or Tondern. This inscription, I trust, will suffice for our purposes, containing, as it does, examples for the various categories indicated above. The inscription reads:

Ek Hlewagastiz Holtingaz horna tawido, i. e. "I Liugast the Holting have made the horns."

In *Holtingaz* "the Holting" (*i. e.* either the son of Holt, or coming from a place called Holt), we have a typical example of the alleged thematic *a*. I prefer, as I have said before, to regard the *a* as a secondary vowel, developed from the voice of the sonant *z*. It would amount to nearly the same if we said that the *a* serves as a glide from the consonant group *ng* to the final *z*.

It is hardly possible to make so definite a statement in regard to the *i* in *Hlewagastiz*. Our first impression, no doubt, is that here and in the form *Saligastiz*, found in another Runic inscription, the form *-gastiz* corresponds exactly to Lat. *hostis*, and preserves in its final syllable the vowel lost in Goth. *gasts*. This naturally was the opinion of the Norse scholars, to whom we are indebted for the theory of pre-Gothic vowels on the Norse Runic inscriptions, a theory which in the first place was based on the form *-gastiz*, of the golden horn. When many years ago, through my late friend, Hoffory, I became first acquainted with the oldest Norse inscriptions, it was again the form *-gastiz* which appeared to me to form the most convincing proof for his contention that the language of some of the Runic inscriptions was more ancient (if not in date, at least in its grammatical condition) than Gothic. In the mean time, I have often had an opportunity to study the Runic inscriptions again, and the more I have become familiar with them, the more I have lost my faith in their alleged pre-Gothic character. One after the other the forms which were claimed

to be remnants from the Primitive Teutonic period appeared to yield more naturally to a different explanation, until *-gastik* remained as the only instance in which there is at least the semblance of greater antiquity than in the corresponding Gothic form. I have no doubt, then, that in this case, too, appearances are deceptive; and whether or not we are able to explain the *-i-* with certainty: we are hardly warranted in ascribing, on account of this form, a Primitive Teutonic character to the language of the Runic inscriptions.

For the present I would suggest the following explanation. It is perhaps not necessary to identify *-gastik* with Goth. *gasts*. We must remember that *-gastik* only occurs as the second member of compounds, and that compounds belonging to *i*-stems sometimes follow the *ja*-declension. To be sure, Gothic has no compounds in *-gasteis*, but it has, e. g. the adjectives *af-haimeis* and *ana-haimeis* belonging to the *i*-stem *haims*. If this explanation be correct, Runic *-gastik* would be in Latin not *hostis*, but * *-hostius*.

The next form to claim our attention is the accusative *horna*, which I have translated by the plural "horns," while it is generally regarded as a singular, corresponding to Gothic *hauru*. But we must remember that near Gallehus not one, but two, golden horns were found. Both were adorned with figures in the same style, and evidently belonged together, but only one of them had an inscription. Hence the inscription was probably meant for both horns. There may have been three horns originally, intended perhaps to decorate the wall of a festival hall in such a way that the larger one — with the inscription — hung in the middle, and a slightly smaller one on each side. But even if the number amounted from the outset to not more than two, the artist might have spoken of them as "the horns." There is no reason, then, to regard *horna* as a pre-Gothic form, since the nominative-accusative plural of *hauru* in Gothic is *haurna*.

Finally we have to examine the preterite *tawido*, a form which in my opinion sheds a clearer light on the language of these inscriptions than any one of the words with which we have concerned ourselves so far. The current interpretation is that the form *tawido*, which finds a parallel in *faihido* and similar Runic preterites, appears as a very old form, not only as compared with the Old Norse weak preterites in *-ða*, but also as compared with the corresponding Gothic forms. As the ending of the first person singular of the Gothic weak preterite is *-ða* (or in other cases *-pa* and *-ta*), this view may seem at the first glance unobjectionable. And yet it betrays clearly its origin from a time when the comparative study of the Germanic languages stood in its first tentative stages. For the ending *-ða* of Literary Old Norse cannot be identified with the Gothic ending *-ða*, because the latter would have to appear in Old Norse as *-ði*. This may not only be inferred from cases like Goth. *hana* = O. N. *hani*, Goth. *ƿadar* = O. N. *ƿasir*,

Gothic. *haitans* = O. N. *heitinn*, but is obviously seen in the third person singular of the weak preterite, which actually has the ending *-ði*, corresponding regularly to the Goth. third person in *-da*.

A better explanation both of the Runic and the literary forms of the Norse preterite has been advanced some thirty-five years ago by the late Professor Konr. Gislason.¹ In his opinion the ending *-ða* of the Old Norse preterite is to be explained from an earlier form *-dau* whose diphthong finds a parallel in that of the Gothic first person subjunctive *-dedjau*. The mutual relation of the vowels is exactly the same as in the case of the numeral 8, O. N. *atta* = Goth. *ahtau*. The ending *-do* of Runic forms like *tawido* stands midway between the Gothic and the regular Old Norse form in that it shows the diphthong *au* contracted to *o*, but not yet shortened to *a*. The ending is in accordance, therefore, with the general character of the language of the "Primitive Norse" inscriptions, which occupies a position intermediate between Gothic and the language of Old Norse literature, but at the same time shares all the characteristic peculiarities of the Norse branch.

I have, for my part, no doubt that Gislason's theory is correct, and have stated this many years ago.² Finding, however, that the authors of Old Norse and Germanic grammars and handbooks continue to disregard Gislason's view, I may be allowed briefly to review the points which seem to me to furnish an almost mathematical proof of his theory.

First. The inflection in Old Norse of the weak præterite is peculiar in that here the first person singular indicative and the third person singular indicative have a different ending, while in Gothic, Old High German, and, in fact, in almost every Germanic dialect (except Old Norse) the ending of the first and third persons is the same.

Secondly. The inflection in Old Norse of the weak preterite is further more peculiar in that the ending of the first person singular indicative agrees with that of the first person singular subjunctive, and the ending of the third person singular indicative with that of the third person singular subjunctive, while in Gothic (and more or less so in the other Germanic languages) the endings of the indicative and the subjunctive differ both in the first and in the third person.

Thirdly. If we compare the endings of the first and third person of the Norse preterite with those of the first and third person (indicative and subjunctive) in Gothic, we experience no difficulty in identifying — in accordance with the laws governing the change of final vowels — these endings in the first person singular subjunctive and in the third person singular indicative and subjunctive.

¹ *Aarbøger for nordisk Oldkyndighed og Historie*, 1869, pp. 126–130.

² Compare my article on the origin of the weak preterite, *American Journal of Philology*, vol ix (1888), p. 56.

If we combine these three points it follows that in the first and third person singular the Old Norse preterite presents a mixture of indicative and subjunctive endings, in such a way that in the third person the two endings have become identical by regular phonetic transformation, while in the first person the ending of the subjunctive has been adopted for both moods.

A word remains to be said about the pre-Gothic vowels supposed to have been retained in Anglo-Saxon. We are concerned here with a theory advanced in an important article in the fifth volume of Paul and Braune's *Beiträge*¹ by a well-known scholar whom we are fortunate enough to have with us at this meeting. His contention is that original *i* in final syllables, which is regularly dropped in Gothic, has been retained in Anglo-Saxon after a short stem-syllable, while it was lost after a long stem-syllable. For example, A. S. *wini*, "friend" = Goth. *ga-wins*, and A. S. *stedi*, "place" = Goth. *staþs*; but A. S. *wyrm* = Goth. *waurms*, and A. S. *giest* = Goth. *gasts*.

I have no objection to the fact that in Anglo-Saxon the appearance of final *i* depends on the quantity of the stem-syllable. But I am not convinced that the *i* contained in forms like *wini*, *stedi*, can be traced back to the Primitive Teutonic and Indo-European periods. I rather believe that we have here a new ending of recent date, due to the analogy of the *ja*-stems. This seems apparent from the fact that the final *i* of the above and of similar forms goes hand in hand with the loss of the old *i*-declension and with the confusion of *i*- and *ja*-stems. Not even to the Gothic language is this confusion entirely unknown; but there the process is seen only in its very beginning and in the inflection of adjectives rather than of nouns. Old High German is less conservative than Gothic, but has kept the *i*- and *ja*-declensions separate, at least in the case of nouns, and has accordingly introduced forms like *wini*, *stedi*, only sparingly. Frequently, however, do forms of this description appear in Old Saxon, where the old *i*-declension is becoming extinct. In Anglo-Saxon, finally, where the last trace of the *i*-declension has disappeared, the apparent preservation of the final *i* has become a definite rule.

We observe in several instances that inflectional differences which at first had nothing to do with quantity are at a later date made to depend on the quantity of the stem-syllable. In Gothic grammar we have, *e. g.* the rule that feminine *ja*-stems with a short stem-syllable (like *sunja*, *halja*) have in the nominative singular the ending *-ja*, while *ja*-stems with a long stem-syllable (like *bandja*) form their nominative in *i*. Yet actually we are in this case concerned with two

¹ Ed. Sievers, *Zur Accent- und Lautlehre der germanischen Sprachen*. III Zum vocalischen Auslautgesetz: *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, vol. v (Halle, 1878), pp. 109-163.

different inflectional classes (the *ya-* and the *i*-declension of Sanskrit grammar), and it is obvious that the difference could not have originally depended on the quantity of the stem-syllable. I am inclined to believe that in the West Germanic languages, especially in Anglo-Saxon, the difference between the old *i*-declension and the old *ja*-declension has been regulated in a similar way.

I cannot help feeling that most of the problems on which I have touched here ought to have been discussed at greater length and with more detail. I shall feel satisfied, however, if my remarks have left the impression that it is worth while to examine further these and similar questions. The comparative grammar of the Germanic languages is still a field in which an earnest and painstaking worker may count on a rich harvest, and I venture to hope that work in this field will be pursued with growing interest and lasting results in the United States.

REFERENCE WORKS ON INDO-EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY

(Prepared through the courtesy of Professor Carl D. Buck of Chicago University)

A brief list of the most important general works for the study of Indo-European Comparative Philology in general and of the historical grammar of the several Indo-European languages. (See also the bibliographies under the other language sections; here are cited mainly historical grammars, etymological dictionaries, etc.) Only the works of a more general character are mentioned, no attempt being made to cite the countless important books and articles dealing with special problems.

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WORKS OF REFERENCE ON ROMANCE PHILOLOGY

(Prepared through courtesy of Professor Henry A. Todd)

For the scholar already well versed in philological methods, the best survey of the present problems of Romance philology is given in W. Meyer-Lübke's *Einführung in das Studium der romanischen Sprachwissenschaft*, Heidelberg, 1901, 12mo, pp. 214. This brief treatise contains classified bibliographical lists of the most important works and periodical publications, and a certain amount of elementary discussion, but, despite its title, is in the main too advanced and abstruse to be used with advantage by the uninitiated. Much the same must be said of G. Gröber's monumental *Grundriss der romanischen Philologie*, Strassburg, 1888, and following years, large 8vo, 2 vols., in parts. (A new and thoroughly revised edition of volume 1 was begun in 1905.) This strictly scientific work is published with the coöperation of some twenty-five of the most competent specialists, and for the trained scholar is the most valuable presentation, at once systematic and collective, of the fundamentals of the subject.

More available for the beginner, though of a different scientific value, is G. Körting's *Encyclopädie und Methodologie der romanischen Philologie*, Heilbronn, 1884-88, 3 vols. 8vo., and the same author's *Handbuch der romanischen Philologie*, Leipzig, 1896, 1 vol. 8vo. Although a "gekürzte Neubearbeitung" of the *Encyclopädie*, the *Handbuch* is largely a distinct work. Apart from its more recent bibliographical information, it is scarcely to be compared with its prototype for general usefulness.

Important as are the bibliographies contained in all the above-mentioned works, they by no means meet the needs of the student who is undertaking to make original contributions to Romance scholarship. The task of discovering what, if anything, has already been published on a given subject of investigation calls for careful and patient search. A brief indication of the mode of procedure may here be given. Without considering the earlier bibliographical sources, it will be sufficient for the present purpose to call the learner's attention to the classified and, as far as possible, complete bibliography, undertaken as a regular annual supplement to the *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, edited by G. Gröber, since 1877. To determine what has been published throughout the world on any specific subject since that date, the student's best recourse is to follow year by year, under the appropriate classified rubric, the list of titles and references, down to the latest published supplement. Unfortunately, owing to the vast labor involved in the compilation, indexing, and publication of these supplements (in recent years the number of entries averages between three and four thousand), the *Zeitschrift* bibliography is several years in arrears. For the most recent period, accordingly, the best recourse is to the very full but unclassified monthly lists of the *Litteraturblatt für germanische und romanische Philologie*, edited by O. Behaghel and F. Neumann, since 1880. Of the numerous other current bibliographical aids the most important is the *Kritischer Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der romanischen Philologie*, edited since 1890, by K. Vollmöller, aided by a large number of special contributors. The *Jahresbericht* is also considerably in arrears.

DEPARTMENT VI
HISTORY OF LITERATURE

HISTORY OF LITERATURE

(Hall 6, September 20, 4.15 p. m.)

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES A. HARRISON, University of Virginia.
PROFESSOR CHARLES M. GAYLEY, University of California.

LITERARY VITALITIES

BY JAMES ALBERT HARRISON

[James Albert Harrison, Professor of Teutonic Languages, University of Virginia, since 1895. b. August 21, 1848, Pass Christian, Mississippi. L.H.D. Columbia University, 1886; LL.D. Washington and Lee University, 1896; LL.D. Tulane University, 1904. Professor of Latin and Modern Languages, Randolph Macon College, Virginia, 1871-76; Professor of English at Washington and Lee University, 1876-95; Associate Editor of the Century Dictionary, Standard Dictionary, and Handy Political Anglo-Saxon Dictionary. Member of the American Philological Association, Modern Language Association, American Historical Association. Author of *A Group of Poets and their Haunts*; *History of Spain*; *The Virginia Edition of Edgar Allan Poe's Works*; *Life and Letters of Edgar Allan Poe*; *Life of George Washington*; and other works.]

Licht, Liebe, Leben.
— HERDER'S Epitaph.

IN the land of Goethe the feet of the pilgrim traveler do not often wander to a more charming spot than Weimar, still, as in Goethe's day, the capital of an intellectual grand-duchy, nestling among the green Gotha hills where the frolicsome Ilm shoots in and out of its bed of silver and makes music in the ears of the poetic traveler; and in this quaint and charming Old German town, redolent of Goethe and Schiller and Wieland and Herder and Liszt, no spot is encircled with pleasanter associations than the ancient Stadt-Kirche where Herder, the teacher, friend, and pastor of Goethe, officiated for forty (?) years and spoke forth his beautiful German to crowds of intelligent citizens, eager to catch light from his illumined lips.

One day the great thinker, speaker, author, the noble friend, the eloquent interpreter of *Die Stimmen der Völker*, the venerable figure beloved of the Weimar school-boys and girls, did not appear as usual in the *Kanzel* at the right-hand end of the church.

All over Weimar it was whispered, "Herder is dead!"

Outside the church, in the modest *Platz* surrounding the house of God, arose in after years a stately figure of the poet-critic holding in his hand a scroll on which three words only were inscribed:

Licht, Liebe, Leben.

When I first saw these words on the slab covering Herder's tomb, inside the church, they seemed to me, like bits of that wondrous chemical, radium, to become positively luminous in the twilight dimness of the old church; and they have shone in my memory as self-luminous bodies ever since.

When I was called upon by the Committee of the International Congress of Arts and Science to prepare a short paper on the vital principles, ideas, and methods underlying modern literature and all literature, I could not get these words out of my mind; they lay phosphorescent there, unquenched by any substitute I could devise to take their place.

LIGHT, LOVE, LIFE, rang in the writer's ear with incessant and insistent murmur as the characteristic, the indispensable, the absolutely essential key-words of the theme.

In the city of Weimar itself "light" had been the last word of the expiring Goethe: may it not have slipped into the august sufferer's memory at this supreme hour from the scroll of Herder, and thence into the heart of the civilized world as its literary bequest and watch-word, gathered from the lips of two of its finest representatives?

The vitality of all literature is supremely dependent upon the mass of light in it. Without *light* it is mere darkness. A moment's contemplation of the great historic literatures — Oriental, Greek, Germanic — will settle this beyond a peradventure: each is a well of light from which, on lonely heights of Himalaya, of Judæa, of Parnassus, of Apennines, of Saxon hills and Anglo-Saxon uplands, the forebears and forerunners of the Indo-Aryan and Semitic races have kindled their fires and lighted their lamps and started on their torch-bearing Panathenaic Procession down the ages.

The light crystallized in a literature may be as manifold as that into which a prism of clear glass dissects the blended ray that pierces the eye-hole of the heliostat — the one indispensable thing being that it be light: moral, intellectual, æsthetic. It is a significant fact that the basic beginnings of all the greater modern literatures go back to some fountain-source of moral light — some Bible — some divine or semi-divine book recognized as the supreme logos of some Divine Being. The Vedas, the cosmic theogonies, St. Jerome, Ulfilas, Cyril, Luther, the King James Version mark moral milestones all along the literary highways; and each is a *milliarium aureum*.

The mass of this moral light permeating the literatures of civilization has been very great and has proved to be the antiseptic, the anti-toxin, that has kept them from rotting. The intense vitality of the Hebrew Scriptures, of the mighty words of Luther, of the creed and catechisms drawn from Christian, Confucian, or Buddhistic sources, reveals a root-principle that has sunk deep into the sub-soil of human nature, and draws from it exhaustless stores of strength and

breath and life laid up in these moral springs. The history of literature teaches that the moral fountain-sources of the mental civilization of the race are the richest, the deepest, the strongest, the most enduring of all — the Albert and Victoria Nyanza of this mighty flood-tide of the Nile that pours its streams in fertilizing currents down through the intellectual Abyssinias and Egypts of the race, and turns them from deserts into gardens of beauty. In the same sense in which, in Herodotean phrase, ancient Egypt was "the gift of the Nile," is the germ, the dawn, the early daylight of the literatures of humanity the "gift" of the moral nature. Nations sloughed up in superstition or in sensualism too dense to transmit the piercing ray of the moral intelligence, have never developed even the beginnings of a literature. Nations on the contrary that slumbered out and through their sensualism, nations in whom the moral sense was active, alert, alive, restless, nations of conscience, of awakened moral intelligence, among whom "Seekers after God" arose early and labored late, whether they labored under the starlit dome of Mesopotamia, among the Judæan hills, in the stoa of Zeno or the Academy of Plato, earliest developed both literary substance and literary form: their crude imaginings and cruder yearnings assumed gradually imperishable forms, and wrought themselves into hymns, dramas, idylls, "wisdom" literature, classically expressed codes or utterances that have come on down from the remotest ages, and remind us of the unquiet search after the Invisible, the Intangible, the Ideal, the wonder-working Blue Flower of the infinite distances.

In the vital trilogy of Herder's epitaph the second word is *Liebe*; out of this word — Love — flashes the second fundamental of all literature. Without fancifully or fantastically twisting the word, it pours its hidden and yet obvious meaning into the ear, as heat, even as the first word signified *light* in all its limitless connotation.

Heat is the condition that renders all animal, all intellectual life possible, enduring, immortal. After the life is withdrawn, after the heat is gone, no embalming process can keep the mummy alive: it is, and remains, a mummy, a mass of bitumenized dust, pulseless, inarticulate, dead.

A literature that has no heat, no heart (only the *r* differentiates the one word from the other), is a literature that has already been reduced to the state of a mummy, motionless, staring, petrified, a bit of bitumen, a handful of salts. Tons of life-symbolizing scarabs hung about its neck would not recall one vital pulsation.

All the literatures that possess this ineffable charm of heat, of Love, live, as the divine Eros lives, in the act of hovering over the lips of the earthly Psyche. Why is it that those chance couplets and stanzas and epigrams of the anonymous Greek Anthology live, when massy epics and long-drawn-out tragedies uncoil their unwieldy

lengths before the literary paleontologist, fossilized, calcareous, dead? It is because these immortal cries of Ancient Hellas glow with inextinguishable fire, gleam like burning coals, are surcharged with human heat and passion and yearning, as the opal is surcharged with radiancy. Instantly such lines, such meters, such epigrams yield up their prismatic glory to the sympathetic soul that feels in them the heat still glowing, the soul still fired with immortal youth, the deathless pang, the eternal music. Sappho, Simonides, the imprisoned Danaë still speak from unperishing palimpsest or papyrus because of the *Love* that was in them, mystic, inexplicable, beyond the definition of philologer or rhetorician, simply *alive*, and just as much so to-day as in that measureless yesterday when Herodotus read his great prose-poem to assembled thousands at the Grecian games.

The essential characteristics indeed of this great literature on which I have just touched are the mass of Light, and the mass of Love, of Heat, of heart in it; it could never have lived these three thousand years and have been *κτῆμα ἐς αἰὲς* which it is, without this supreme central vitalizing principle. And men dip into it again and again as they dip their faces into a clear pool of crystal water, for refreshment, for sustenance, for regeneration, for the divine restfulness that flows from contact with any living thing that has ozone in it.

What living thing can grow without the light? What living thing can grow without heat? What living thing can grow without — Life?

Herder's passionate devotion to his contemporaries, to the young Goethe, to the wide fields of many literatures in which he was versed, to the many-fountained well-springs of young vigor and national strength which he found in the ballad-poetry of the nations, shows that the word *Leben* was even more essential to his trilogy, as expressing the concentrated essence of his creed, than the other two, fundamental as they, too, were.

And of Life what better definition is there than the simple word *Shakespeare*?

At this magic word there springs into being a world shading down from superhuman to infinitesimal, filled with creatures that laugh and sing and breathe and play, so full of life that Life itself might be deceived, creatures breaking spontaneously into smiles or tears, creatures from whom the life's blood starts at the prick of a needle, gay, sad, pungent, witty, argumentative, deathless clowns or dying gladiators, men and women and children torn from palace and hut, from throne and cobbler's stool, from field and Fairyland, chattering, suffering, loving, hating, the incarnate imagery of Life itself. All this busy multitude streaming in endless panorama from the quartos and folios as out of prison-gates, an airy infinitude of souls new-born into the tumultuous century of Tudor and Stuart, but belonging to all time, the children of Shakespeare: how they stream, and dance, and

flash, and live and die before us, men of the twinkling eye, women whimsical as the wind, deep, true, tender, comical as Vanity Fair itself! Shakespeare is Life.

Simplest of biographies is his: lived, wandered, acted, wrote, married, — died; almost anonymous, living and dying only three hundred years ago, almost before our faces, yet little or nothing known of him after all the laborious research of a "Century of Praise"; like all the greater things of nature herself — mountains, oceans, sky; like many of the greater things of the spirit, nameless — the first chapters of Genesis, the Book of Job, Ruth and Esther, the Beowulf, the Nibelungen Lied, the Edda, the Roland Song, the Cid Campeador. More puissant than the magicians of the Pharaoh himself, a waft of Shakespeare's wand evokes the charmed idyll of Rosalind and Arden Wood, Titania and her train, Miranda's fairy isle, the deep things of Hamlet and Macbeth, and the ancient worlds of Cæsar, Coriolanus, and Cleopatra: Lear with his wild hair, or that gorgeous picture of Old Venice rising like an exhalation from the sea fantastically bright: this man, of many men and women and children compact, with much of Homer and Dante in him, with more of Aristophanes and Molière, a bit of Cervantes; here and there, the smile of Chaucer on his lips, the tear of Boccaccio jewelizing his eye — this man Shakespeare, was all this encyclopedically. And yet more: he was *himself*, the unique, "der Einzige." By reason of the life that was in him he lives as that wondrous Panathenaic Procession in its triumphal march around the frieze of the Parthenon lives, as the mighty battle sculptures of Pergamon and Ægina live, as those great splashes of deathless color live that writhe into shape and humanize themselves in the vaulted ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, among the cosmic scenes pictured on the walls of Parma, Florence, the Doge's Palace.

Contrast the definitions of Life and of Existence: the one is found in the vivid ruins of Rome and Athens, so full of life to-day that one can instantly reconstruct out of them great fragments of two remote worlds and fill the spaces of Colosseum and Acropolis with worshipping, or with spectacle-loving multitudes; the other is found in those tragically silent, sad, speechless temples and pyramids and obelisks and sphinxes of hundred-gated Thebes, of Luxor, and Karnak, and Memphis, and Ghizeh.

The one lives even in its death; the other is death, even in its gigantic, in its immeasurable existence.

Herder's watchword therefore covers the third indispensable element in any literature or literary work — Electricity. The Pygmalion myth comes to life in every true literary masterpiece. "Speak!" said Michael Angelo as he stood before Donatello's statue of Saint Mark outside the old church in Florence.

What does not *speak* in literature, and speak from age to age and

from one generation to another, must be mute, still, speechless, dead: there is no life in it.

II

In a recently printed essay, equally characterized by brilliant gifts of exposition and sound common sense, the lamented John Fiske points out suggestively the differences between the old and the new method of writing history. He passes in review a number of celebrated names — Herodotus and Thucydides, Curtius and Mommsen, Hume and Gibbon, John Richard Green and Freeman — and touches graphically on the methods, the environment, the capabilities of each — Herodotus the historian, traveler, geographer, kindled with the poetic sense that an Orientalized Greek could hardly escape, anticipating Gibbon and Freeman in studying on the spot the scenes he was depicting; Thucydides, the historian of institutions, filling the mouths of Pericles and the Athenian generals with golden sentences such as Shakespeare ventured upon in his psychological dramas; Curtius and Mommsen, born and reared in an environment unsympathetic to the perfect mastery of such subjects as Athenian democracy and Roman institutions; Hume, the narrow, though luminous Scotch specialist, viewing history from the heights of Edinburgh Castle; Gibbon, the all-grasping, the all-comprehending, hyphenating together the new and the old method with hooks of steel; Freeman, with his vast sweep yet limited vision, utterly unmindful of anything but geography and politics; Green, the masterful, the many-sided, instinct with life, and viewing History as Life itself in all its phases and mazes and colors and complexities, dwelling as lovingly on a literary or a social episode, a bit of landscape, the discussions of a club, the effects of a great Whig or Tory dinner-party, or the architecture of a quaint old English town, as on a great election, a burning political question, a night in the House of Commons, or the fatal obstinacy of George III: all drawn within his encyclopedic gaze as parts of an organic whole no part of which he could afford to neglect.

Needless to say to which of these men Fiske awards the palm: Gibbon and Green are the men whom he reverences with fondest admiration, the men whom he sets up before the new historical student as his exemplars.

The methods of the New History are those of the New Literature.

Georg Brandes, the Scandinavian critic, in his remarkable work on *Literary Tendencies in the Nineteenth Century*, has philosophically grasped one side of the subject: the angler after "tendencies," fishing in the muddy and obscure waters of many contemporaneous European literatures, finds interesting "drifts," "currents," "eddies," setting in here and there, slowly drawing the intellectual forces of con-

temporary England, France, and Germany in a certain defined direction as astronomers tell us the Milky Way is being drawn across the heavens to some unknown immeasurably distant pole-star or central sun. Streams and currents of Classicism and Romanticism and Euphuism and Symbolism, and what not, criss-cross each other in this many-colored sea; intermingle, blend, separate, start afresh on new voyages of elective affinity, cohere, dissolve, vanish.

All this is wonderfully fertile in suggestiveness: the true student will enter the labyrinth with the proper clue, will seize or select "a tendency," saturate himself with its phenomena, study, analyze, microscopically examine, completely master it if possible.

How interesting, for instance, to collect and study the Prefaces to celebrated works as they lie before us in early and late editions of English masterpieces; revealing the authors' most intimate thoughts about their work. A Preface is the authors' card of introduction to the master of the household. Seen through spectacles of such clear glass, Dryden or Wordsworth take on a new aspect.

Or the study of the Great Odes, the monumental Elegies, the conversational or the psychological Drama, the soul of Shakespeare concrete in his works, this or that movement in Elizabethan literature, the lyric of the Stuarts, the insweep and out-sweep of the complex, mutually interacting currents (which are to the literary historian what Demosthenes' action!—action!—action! is to the orator).

The beginning and the end of the last hundred years have seen a remarkable advance—indeed, a revolution—in the "method" of studying literature. Bits of actual research such as Johnson's *Lives of the Poets* were rare indeed in the eighteenth century, but they exerted a powerful if silent influence in bringing about this revolution. How charmingly original and instrumental in reestablishing cordial relations between France and Germany was Mme. de Staël's *De l'Allemagne!*

One fancies Herodotus talking with the priests of Memphis as the eloquent Frenchwoman stands beside Goethe and Schiller and interrogates them on the mysteries of German transcendentalism.

"Institutions are the lengthened shadows of men," said Emerson. Literatures are the personal expression of nationality. A nation is a musical instrument—a harp, a viol, a pipe-organ—whose musicians are its great writers or speakers. When it has refined itself into some exquisite speaking-tube, into some *vox humana* of a thousand strings and subtleties, it utters itself in Euripides, in Lope or Calderon, in Schiller or Milton, and the quality of its music is as distinguishable as the voice of Jacob.

Therefore it is, that nations must be conceived, from a literary point of view, as huge ethnic documents, to be studied all around, inside and out, intensively and extensively, magnified units as sharply

individualized as crystals of star, or rhomb, or diamond structure. Ignorance of this fundamental fact evoked the absurd sentimentalizing of Châteaubriand over the American Indians, the Voltairean criticism of Shakespeare, the maunderings of Rousseau over "the state of nature," the powdered and periwigged Greeks and Romans of Racine. Knowledge of its essentiality has given us Matthew Arnold, analyzing the delicate spiritualities of French wit and style, Carlyle, Germanized to the finger-tips in the deep sea of Teutonic transcendentalism, poetry, history, Ruskin, a cinque-cento Italian born out of his time, expressing in pigment-like English the radiant thing that Raphael's cherubs see, Sainte-Beuve thrilling with an almost orchestral fullness of knowledge of the literatures he discusses, FitzGerald and his Persians, Max Müller and his multifarious Orientalism.

Contrast these living items of the Newer Criticism snatched from a hasty *résumé* of the nineteenth century, with the dead items, the dead methods, the dark and inarticulate gropings that went before and did duty for literary criticism. It is like comparing crisp sentences out of the *Laokoön*, or the charming interpretations of Winckelmann on Greek art, with the over-emphatic archæology of *The Last Days of Pompeii*. No true lover of either Boccaccio or Longfellow, of either Wagner or Wolfram, would place the *Decamerone* and *The Tales of a Wayside Inn*, or *Parsifal* and his interpreter alongside of each other.

Set in its larger framework of ethnic environment, therefore, each human, each literary document must be studied as the gem in the rough and in the bezel, as well, — on the finger of the wearer, as well as blazing on the outstretched forefinger of Time, one of the world's masterpieces.

The vast psychology of Egypt lies momentarily dreamlike, enchanted, subterranean, entombed — hundreds of feet under the shovel or the scalpel of excavator or psychologist: no plummet has yet reached these frozen depths or unlocked their deep-sea recesses: the 500,000,000 of mummies answer not. But will it remain so forever? The fixed stare of pyramid and sphinx, and obelisk and pylon, monumentally calm, the glazed eyeball of King and Queen and Pharaoh, will one day fill with light and life and love; to these, too, Herder's beautiful words will become applicable and change to three beautiful worlds teeming with motion, radiance, and vitality. Egypt will speak as Greece has spoken and its speech will become a thing of joy.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LITERARY STUDIES DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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THIS inquiry demands a review, in the several countries concerned, of the materials and methods of the science: *first*, of the development of the disciplines contributory to it, viz., the theory of art in general, and the history of art-criticism; the theory of that branch of art called literature, and the history of applied poetics; the advance of philology, material and historical, — especially as affecting the literary expression of individual and society; *second*, of the conceptions successively springing from the development of these disciplines — conceptions to which correspond the successive canons of literary judgment; and *third*, of the efforts after a scientific mode of critical procedure, which have empirically issued in the canons of literary method. The inquiry demands also an historical treatment. The order should preferably be by national divisions, not only because such arrangement is obviously most simple, but because it involves in the process the interrelation of critical tendencies, and leads in the result, at the close of the century, to a discipline both cosmopolitan and comparative, but independent, which subsumes disciplines precedent and canons æsthetic or instrumental, which fortifies itself with materials and methods of approach supplied by other sciences social, biological, and psychological, and which itself may properly be called literary philology. It will, from this order of research, appear that while at the end of the eighteenth century philology was gathered from the ends of the earth and established as encyclopedic; and the criticism of art systematized as historical, — by the middle of the nineteenth century, encyclopedic philology has borne *linguistic*, and by the end *literary* philology, both of them historical in aim after the tendency of Wolf and Winckelmann, but both also comparative in method after the ideal of Herder.

Since it will be impossible for us in the brief time at my disposal to present the whole substance of this inquiry, I shall first outline for you the stages of development which appear to be common to

the nations most significant in the history of literary science, and indicate a few of the leaders of each period of advance; I shall then read in detail some portion of the treatment of individual countries; and finally, I shall attempt to characterize the literary science which they have together assisted to construct.

I. THE GENERAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

While chronological limits can never be definitely assigned to literary movements, and while the movements in cross-section of Germany, England, and France do not exactly jibe (since often one is, in some degree, the resultant of conditions precedent beyond the national border), it appears that in general the Preparatory Period of the present tendency of literary study ended about 1795-1800, and was *reconstructive* of the contributory disciplines; that the Second Period embraced the first thirty years of the nineteenth century, and was *romantic* in theory, *encyclopedic* in method; that the Third Period, the *historico-philosophical*, is still existent; but its representatives have, on the one hand, wandered temporarily into non-social, and therefore unreal by-paths and magic woods, heights Parnassian, hyper-æsthetic, hedonistic; they have, on the other hand, availed themselves more or less of the genetic, dynamic, eidographic methods of modern science, and so developed in all the countries under review a system of *comparative inquiry* by means of which a science of literature, or literary philology, bids fair to be established.

In the *reconstructive* period, Winckelmann, Kant, Herder and Lessing, Goethe and Schiller led in Germany; Bentley (as far back as 1697), Burke, Hogarth, Lord Kaimes, Hume, the Wartons, Hurd, Cowper, Goldsmith, Tyrwhitt and Pye, Macpherson and Percy were among the pioneers in England; in France the prophets were Perrault (1668), Diderot, Rousseau, Buffon.

The *romantic and encyclopedic* period in German criticism was stamped by the genius of Wolf, Boeckh, Solger, the Schlegels, and others of whom I shall speak; the English period was that of Wordsworth and Coleridge, Bowles, Leigh Hunt, Lamb, Hazlitt, and Shelley; the fates of France were in the hands of Mme. de Staël and Châteaubriand, Baour-Lormian, Stendhal, Hugo, Cousin, Michelet, and others.

The *historico-philosophical* period in Germany I shall describe in detail; the Grimms, von Humboldt, and Bopp are in the lead, Hegel, Carrière, and others; in England, there is the age of Henry Hallam, of Carlyle, De Quincey, and Macaulay (later of Morris, Ruskin, and Arnold, from whom by combination and permutation are descended Pater and Symonds); in France we find Villemain, St. Marc Girardin,

the liberal and Saxon-minded Sainte-Beuve, and the reactionary Nisard; also Taine with his entrancing, but no longer convincing, literary biology.

In connection with the present or *comparative* stage of study, names will later be passed in review. Since I have already in certain chapters of a volume entitled *Methods and Materials of Literary Criticism* (Gayley and Scott, Boston, 1899) described the movement of poetics during the earlier part of the century, I may be pardoned if I frequently avail myself of the treatment there accorded to that portion of the subject.

II. IN REPRESENTATIVE COUNTRIES

A. Germany

1. From 1760 to 1795, literary study in Germany was undergoing a process of reconstruction preparatory to the labors of the romantic school. In that country, the art aspect of modern literary criticism proceeds from Winckelmann. He, in his early treatise on the *Imitation of Greek Works of Painting and Sculpture*, shows himself a disciple of the Swiss school of Bodmer and Breitinger, who were themselves influenced by the nature poetry of Thomson (1739) and undoubtedly by the battles between moderns and ancients in France and England (1688-1700). Winckelmann's *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, published in 1764-65, is the earliest of its kind worthy of mention, for such treatises as Winckelmann himself knew of, Monier's *History of Art*, for instance, and Turnbull's *Ancient Painting*, lack breadth of knowledge and artistic acumen. Winckelmann's especial merit is that he was the first to apply the historic method to the study of the fine arts. His revelations concerning the principles of Greek art had an influence that did not stop with Lessing and Goethe; it has extended even to our time. We should, of course, remember that Winckelmann's conclusions are drawn rather from the study of Greek art — and even with that his acquaintance was limited — than from the study of art in general. Still, Hegel is justified in saying of him: "Winckelmann was inspired by the contemplation of the ideals of the ancients to such a degree that he has awakened a new sense for the appreciation of art, has removed such appreciation from the point of view of common aims and a mere imitation of nature, and has set us to seeking the idea of art in the works and history of art. Winckelmann is to be regarded as one of the men who have been able in the realm of art to open for the spirit a new organ and entirely new fashions of contemplation." Upon succeeding conceptions of literature, his doctrines have had a direct bearing. Like our English Bacon one hundred and fifty years before, Winckelmann drew his conclusions from actual contact with the

facts; also like Bacon, who is the founder of literary history, this founder of the history of art calls for the *genetic* method of critical study, — by cause and effect, movement, social or other, external influence, relation, change, decay, and revival. He recognizes, too, as Mr. Bosanquet has pointed out, the various *phases* of expressiveness within the beauty of plastic art, — the conflicting claims of beauty and expression, and their partial reconciliation.

Much that is most practical in the æsthetic theories of Hegel and Schelling, of whom we shall later treat, derives from Winckelmann. What Winckelmann did for the criticism of art during the period of reconstruction, Lessing was doing for German literary criticism. He formulated a system theoretical and historical, and applied it. Even though the first part of *Laocoon* (1766) was written to contest Winckelmann's assertion of the spiritual composure of Greek statuary and of the possibility of making the limits of painting as wide as those of poetry, Lessing himself derives to some extent from Winckelmann. But even more than by him, Lessing was influenced on the one hand by Burke, Hogarth, and Lord Kaimes, on the other by the father of æsthetics himself, Baumgarten. The premises of Lessing's dramatic theory, as well as those of his æsthetics, may be called into question, but for all that, his *Hamburgische Dramaturgie* and his *Laocoon* have influenced succeeding criticism more than any works since that time.

In the year 1764 appeared Kant's first contribution to æsthetics, *Observations on the Feeling of the Sublime and Beautiful*, not at all influenced by Winckelmann's past work of the same year, and, of course, not by the *Laocoon*, which was still on the desk of its writer. Kant, like Lessing, turns here to Burke for his inspiration. So also in his *Critique of Judgment* (1790), a work which is epoch-making in the history of poetics. Three streams of theory converge in this critique: the English and German æsthetico-critical, — Burke, Kaimes, Reynolds, Hogarth, Baumgarten, Lessing, Winckelmann; the English abstract-sensationalist and individualist, — Bacon, Locke, Shaftesbury, Berkeley, Hume; and the continental abstract-rationalist, — Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and the Baron von Wolff. Kant's æsthetic doctrines were made concrete and popularized by Schiller, especially those of the æsthetic semblance, and the relative effects of sublimity and beauty upon the beholder. Bearing the impress of Schiller and Goethe (who also adapted and modified Kant), the Kantian æsthetic has passed not only into popular poetic theory, but into the dialectic of Schelling and Hegel.

Space prohibits more than a passing mention of the sources of Goethe and Schiller. While the first of these in no place systematically develops a theory of poetry, the genesis of his theory and the course of his opinions are not difficult to discover. His æsthetic descent is not, as Mr. Bosanquet thinks, from Lessing, Winckelmann, and Kant,

by way of Schiller, but rather from Lessing and Winckelmann by way of Herder. For though Goethe was profoundly influenced by Schiller's interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the harmony of the moral and the natural orders in the realm of the æsthetic, he was rather confirmed in the course of his own development than converted to any alien way of thinking. As to his utterances on poetics, while his *Deutsche Baukunst* (1773), his contributions to *Die Horen* (1795-96), and his *Der Sammler und die Seinigen* (1798), are in general restricted to the plastic arts, the conclusions there reached concerning the *characteristic* (typical or significant) and the *individual* apply as well to music as to poetry. It is in his *Conversations*, in his *Letters*, his *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, his *Sprüche*, and occasional poems, that the course of his theory and its relation to details are especially to be sought. Schiller's service to poetics is performed in his *Briefe über die Ästhetische Erziehung der Menschheit*, *Anmuth und Würde*, and *Ueber naïve und sentimentale Dichtung* (1795-96). His ordering of the æsthetic feelings, his theory of the play-impulse, his contrast between the poetry of simplicity and that of reflection, while they derive in one way or another from Lessing, Winckelmann, and Kant, possess the color and vitality of their poetic exponent.

The theories of Schiller and Goethe, enriched by reciprocal suggestion and criticism, have a direct bearing not only upon the poetics of the philosophers who succeeded them, — Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, — but upon the poetry of Germany, and indirectly (through Coleridge, Wordsworth, Herbert Spencer, Arnold, and Ruskin) upon the poetics and the poetry of England. Since the appearance of Schiller's *Ueber naïve und sentimentale Dichtung* and Goethe's *Deutsche Baukunst*, the dogmatic strife between ancient and modern poetics has given place to an inquiry into the development of the æsthetic consciousness and its relation to the history of artistic creation.

The part of Herder in this movement toward a broader correlation of literature and art, especially in the way of developing the genetic or historical idea, cannot be overestimated. His writings abound in suggestions of laws of literary growth, as might be expected in the case of one in whom the historical sense was so highly developed, — who was indeed the pioneer, though under the influence of Rousseau, of the doctrine of evolution. He carried the idea into "the regions of poetry, art, religion, and finally into human culture as a whole. . . . By his work on language, *Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache*, he may be said to have laid the first rude foundations of the science of comparative philology and that deeper science of the ultimate nature and origin of language." As for the field of poetics, in 1768 he called for a scientist who should do what Winckelmann had done for classical art. And he himself helped in no insignificant way to found the historical or comparative science of literature,

which is even now reaping the fruition of the long labors of the nineteenth century.

To the dawning period of romantic poetry and poetries, Jean Paul Richter also rendered service. His contribution proceeded from a combination of idealism and naturalism, — the latter an outgrowth of his unaffected love of beauty, color, and radiance in the real world. His *Vorschule der Ästhetik* appeared in 1804, the year after Herder's death.

The period of reconstruction reached its climax during the decade 1790–1800. The theory and history of art had advanced in *content* from the formal to the significant; and in *method* from the provincial and traditional to the inductive. Poetics and literary criticism had abandoned in theory the particular judgment for the universal; and in practice the conventional for the natural and expedient. In linguistic philology and literary history the comparative method had at least found its prophet, Johann Gottfried von Herder.

2. *The Period of Romanticism and Allerleiwissenschaft.* Exactly in the middle of the decade 1790–1800 fell the publication of a work that was to vivify philology with the spirit of science as well as of romance. This was the famous *Prolegomena to Homer*. The author, F. A. Wolf, had earlier still, in 1786, asserted the independence, totality, and relativity of philology, as a study in its own right, covering not alone the languages of the Greeks and Latins, but their literatures, and all else that might serve as the exponent of their human nature, their life, philosophy, and law, their history, religion, and art. But by proving, or trying to prove, in 1795, that Homer was not a single poet, writing according to art and rule, but a name which stood for a golden age of the true spontaneous poetry of genius and nature, Wolf furthered even more vitally the interest of mankind in popular poetry, in the beginnings of art and institutions. In his *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* and his *Prolegomena to Homer*, all histories of literature since his time have their roots of method, *cultur-geschichtlich*, and generic, and interpretative. It is interesting to note here that as the aesthetics of Lessing and Kant drew their inspiration from English sources, so also the philological conception and method of Wolf. They are anticipated and undoubtedly suggested by Bentley's *Dissertation upon the Letters of Phalaris*, 1698. And this, as Professor Jebb has said, is the earliest model of the new criticism which by a scientific method was to bring accurate philological knowledge into relation with historical research.

From 1795 to about 1850 the *Alterthumswissenschaft* of Friedrich August Wolf reigns in philology, and in the literature affected by philology, I mean literary criticism, and literary history as well. In 1807 the Olympian Boeckh began to lecture at Heidelberg, in 1811 he was in Berlin; and from then on proceeded the Spiritual Recon-

struction of the Past, over the shades of which our own Professor Gildersleeve in his *Oscillations and Nutations* sheds a melodious tear. Boeckh lived and lectured until 1867; and not until ten years after his death was his famous *Encyclopædia and Methodology* published. It may be said by the specialists of the later portion of the century that there is no science of antiquity, no unity of studies — but at the bottom of our hearts we still believe that there is such a science, there *is* such unity: we say that they are not, because in the more modest and necessary zeal for a little we have fallen away from the whole ideal. We do not see the forest for the trees. Few may handle the *Encyclopædia* of Boeckh to-day; but no literary historian can traverse the methods of Boeckh, and of his master, Wolf, — can be complacently topographical, or rigidly synchronistic, or garrulously biographical, or flatly magisterial, — without falling foul of every critic — encyclopedic or not — to whom there is a drop of method in the quill.

History by movements, by types, and only then by countries, lives, or schools, — that is our legacy from the science of antiquity and the methodology of all the sciences. Bernhardt, Teuffel, Karl Otfried Müller, Ribbeck, Ebert, Nicolai, Susemihl, Schanz, Christ, Ulrichs, Blass, Krumbacher, — and in more modern literary history, ten Brink, Wackernagel, Carriere, Scherer, Menzel, Diez, Tobler, — they have all followed such strands of the comprehensive method as they could, and in so far as they have followed, have achieved fulfillment.

In poetics and literary criticism the movement which succeeded the reconstruction of Lessing, Herder, and Schiller was in no slight degree indebted for its origin to Solger's *Vorlesungen über Aesthetik*. This philosopher took as his central theme Fichte's principle of *Æsthetic Irony*: the *mood* of the artist, that impels him to represent things eternal in terms of the phenomenal and evanescent. This is the keynote of romanticism in literature — the individual mood, the urgency of impulse, the spirit ideal and universal, — the poem pitifully inadequate, actual, particular, the creation of man's hands, through which spirit escapes, but in escaping endows the mortal with the nimbus of immortality. Construing this principle — the inevitableness and still the irony of the artistic struggle — as dependent upon the caprice of the artist, Wilhelm von Schlegel, in his *Briefe über Poesie*, 1795, in the periodical named *Athenäum*, founded, in company with his brother Friedrich, 1798, and especially in his *Lectures on Dramatic Literature*, 1809–1811, established in Germany the *Romantic School of Poetics*. To this movement, Ludwig Tieck and others contributed; and from France there came by way of Mme. de Staël's intimacy with Wilhelm von Schlegel a confluent stream of Rousseauism and the cosmopolitan ideal. The Oriental studies of

Wilhelm and the publications of his brother, the *Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 1808, and the lectures on the *History of Oriental and Modern Literature*, 1815, enriched not only the romantic character, but the *allerthumswissenschaftlich* method or aspiration of the period. By the æsthetic teachings of the *Romantiker*, Germany was cultivated to a taste for Spanish and English drama as opposed to the formal and so-called classical productions of France and Italy. Hence the admirable Shakespearian criticism which, beginning in the earlier part of the century, continued well into the latter half; the impulse imparted by Tieck and Wilhelm von Schlegel abode in Gervinus, Kreyssig, Elze, Ulrici, and Delius, and still lives in the *Jahrbücher der deutschen Shakspeare-Gesellschaft*.

During this period of scientific expansion, the philosophical æsthetic movement is represented, in addition to Solger, by Schelling and Hegel. Mr. Bosanquet, in his *History of Æsthetic*, tells us that Goethe and Schiller had developed the Kantian æsthetic, "limited by abstraction and subjectivity into an objective, concrete content, which grows with the life and mind of man." Hegel tells us that the true line of succession ran from Schiller to Schelling. "Science," he says, "attained its absolute standpoint in Schelling's philosophy, and although art had previously begun to assert its particular nature and dignity in relation to the highest interests of humanity, yet it was now that the actual notion of *art*, and its place in scientific theory, were discovered." Schelling treats of beauty as the objective and necessarily historical expression of divinity as uttering itself through man. Hegel begins with the human side of this utterance, and shows how in the stages of symbolism, classicism, and romanticism, man's subjectivity tries to express itself in proper content and form, vaguely striving to suggest the thought by crude and uncouth shapes in primitive symbolic art, uniting the thought and the objective form in classical art, and in romantic breaking the bonds of actual necessity and yearning toward a spiritual manifestation. Hegel's æsthetic is subjective-objective, both philosophical and historical. His idealism has influenced, positively or negatively, all æstheticians and critics from his time down. His arraignment of the theory which would limit the scope and aim of art to imitation is of the utmost importance in the history of criticism as well as of art itself. By an utter misapprehension of Aristotle's theory of imitation, which carefully distinguished between the useful arts (or handicrafts) and the fine arts, saying that art imitates the processes of nature in the former, and an idealized or glorified nature in the latter, nearly all writers on æsthetics from Lord Kaimes down, — Batteux, Diderot, Baumgarten, Moritz, — even to the time of Winckelmann, had apprehended art as a more or less exact copy of the face of things: so that nature being considered perfect, art could be but an apologetic

duplicate; or nature being regarded as imperfect, art could but reproduce the imperfection of actuality. From this misconception Winckelmann and Lessing had broken away, — and Herder, by identifying the Beautiful with the True and the Good, had extended the scope of the artist even when imitating natural beauty. Kant, Goethe, Schiller, and Schelling had carried forward the theory of art as a selective and idealizing process; but it remained for Hegel to lift the discussion altogether out of the realm of the dubious, by demonstrating that art is nature, to be sure, but nature carried to a degree where the object of imitation becomes ideal, the imitator an exponent of the spiritual, and the process creative; the material, therefore, though actual, and consequently limited in possibility, supplements by suggestion that which it fails to express. The one-sidedness of the romantic school, the insufficiency of the principle of Artistic Irony or Caprice, became evident under the flood of light poured upon æsthetics by Hegel. Round Hegel's theory of art in general, and of its evolution, discussion still centres. And round his *Die Poesie* most subsequent German writers on poetry, accordant or divergent, revolve. This is true even of such anti-Hegelians as Schopenhauer, who either borrow their ideas from Hegel, or owe their virility to the intensity of their antagonism.

During this romantic and encyclopedic term, æsthetic criticism passes, then, from the view of art as abstractly objective to that of art as both subjective and objective in its nature; not an incidental or capricious but a necessary exponent of nature and of thought, and an indispensable factor in the history of civilization. The critical method derived from philology has passed from the empirical to the scientific; philology itself is no longer instrumental merely to other disciplines, but independent both in material and discipline. Poetics and literary history have passed from the inspirational to the social and national point of view, and from the magisterial to the dynamic and generic or eidographic method of approach and arrangement.

3. The third period may be called the *Historical-Philosophical*: it is characterized by a series of movements corrective of the extremes that had preceded.

With Jakob Grimm in 1829, philology leaves the void of *Allerleiwissenschaft*, and, discovering German grammar, centralizes, then radiates, and last irradiates: becomes, in fact, a comparative science with a definite subject and a well-defined aim. Bopp, likewise, between 1833 and 1852 makes of grammar a comparative science; and is followed by Schleicher in 1862, and others in the comparative study of the Indo-Germanic languages. W. von Humboldt died in 1835, but his researches into the influence of language construction upon intellectual development (published 1836-40) add a wonderful significance to this decade of comparative philology. In the history

of literature, too, the corrective movement finds its leaders. Between 1812 and 1835 the brothers Grimm labor to collect German myths and folk-lore, and by that road to penetrate to the origins of poetry. From their day literary history has been a comparative science, and its methods at least genetic. What Bacon had forecast, and Herder dreamed, was now a fact.

In poetics, the philological and theoretical streams, the former represented by such men as Boeckh, Paul, Elze, Steinthal, and the latter by men like Hegel and F. T. Vischer, unite; and the result in the middle of the century is such a work as Carrière's *Das Wesen und die Formen der Poesie*; in the latter part such works as Gerber's *Die Sprache als Kunst*, and the treatises of Wackernagel, Scherer, von Gottschall, as well as of Gröber, Tobler, Körting, and the lions of later methodology.

In all forms of literary scholarship, the principle of specialization begins to obtain. Hence the revival of Latin studies under Lachmann and Ritschl, the revision of special texts, and the systematization of epigraphy. Hence following in the wake of Boeckh's *Meters of Pindar*, the metrical studies of Rossbach, Westphal, J. H. H. Schmidt, and others to the present day; and in modern versification the investigations of Schaffer, Sievers, Kluge, Köberstein, Diez, Zarncke, and many more. Hence the flood of commentaries on Plato's theory of art and Aristotle's *Poetics*; on the former the well-known treatises of Ed. Müller, and Rüge, Justi, Reber, Raabe, and von Jan; on the latter, the editions and monographs of Ueberweg, Bernays, Biese, Döring, Reinkens, Teichmüller, Bekker, Vahlen, Susemihl, and half a hundred others — each sharpening his teeth, and tantalizing his appetite with the *μίμησις*, and *κάθαρσις* and the *τούτων* or *τοιούτων παθημάτων*. Hence in like manner the seminars, the doctor's dissertations, and the journals of archæology and every kind of philology, — of art and every kind of literary study, — every shade or shadow or shred of substance or of ghost. Hence, too, the schools of archæology at Athens and Rome — living monuments to the prophetic soul of Winckelmann.

In Germany, as in other countries of Europe and in America, the upshot of the literary tendencies and the disciplines so far maintained has been a comparative science of literature, — or, as I have elsewhere called it, literary, as distinguished from linguistic, philology. Of this when I have carried to its threshold, in some such manner as with Germany, the literary provenience of one or two other countries, I shall more especially speak.

B. In England

1. *The Preparatory Period.* To trace the modern movement of literary studies in England we must on the philological side turn

back to Bentley's reply to Boyle concerning the genuineness of the so-called *Letters of Phalaris*. This is the forerunner of all antiquarian and medieval researches contributory to the development of historical method during the last one hundred and fifty years.

On the poetic side we must go back at least as far as 1739. With Thomson's poem, *Edward and Leonora*, in that year, and Joseph Warton's *Enthusiast, or The Love of Nature*, 1740, the romantic movement began to gather strength. Warton called for a return to sincerity of observation and sanity of description. What may be called the literary courage of the emotions received a beneficial impetus from Dodsley's *Collection of Old Plays*, published in 1744, — and again in 1746, from Joseph Warton's Preface to *Odes on Several Subjects*. Poetry was now fairly embarked on the romantic stream. In criticism, too, the Wartons, Goldsmith, Young, Gray, Collins, Cowper, and Hurd are regarded by all as representatives of the eighteenth century transition from the romanticism of Sidney and Bacon to that of Wordsworth. But it must be remembered that not only in these writers, but in Dryden and Dennis, as well, and differently in Addison, were present the germs of our present critical principles and methods. Be that as it may, Hurd's *Letters on Chivalry and Romance*, 1762, Blair's *Critical Dissertation on Ossian*, 1763, Thomas Warton's *History of English Poetry*, 1774–81 (in which he acknowledges the receipt of Gray's outline for the history), in 1781 the second volume of Joseph Warton's *Life and Genius of Pope*, and in 1797 his edition of that poet's works, — these productions completed the preliminaries of the attack upon the school of "correctness." In 1798 followed the brief and telling Preface to the first edition of the *Lyrical Ballads*, and in 1800 the famous Preface to the second edition. In the latter Wordsworth, save where he exploited untenable theories of his own, succeeded in setting clearly before the world the strength and the claims of the romantic return to imagination and nature; a return that was to affect the principles and methods of poetics as emphatically as it had already affected those of poetry.

We must not fail to estimate the reconstructive influence exercised meanwhile by the writers of treatises upon æsthetics. Of these the first was Burke, whose *Sublime and Beautiful*, 1756, told not only directly upon æsthetic speculation in England, but also indirectly through the influence of Lessing and Kant, and their successors in æsthetic criticism: the Schiller of the *Æsthetische Briefe*, and the Goethe of the *Sammler* and the *Deutsche Baukunst*. For to Burke, Lessing was indebted in the *Laocoon*, 1766, and Kant in the *Kritik der Urteilstkraft*, 1790. Other English æstheticians were Kaimes (*Elements of Criticism*, 1762), Hogarth (*Analysis of Beauty*, 1753), Hume (*Later Dissertations*, 1757), and Reynolds (*Papers on the Idler, Discourses on Beauty*, 1758–59); and these likewise influenced Lessing, Kant, Schil-

ler, and Goethe. Also to be considered is the effect of the impetus given to historical and comparative research by Winckelmann's *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, 1764, by Stuart's *Antiquities of Athens* (two years earlier), and by other works on the archæology, literature, and art of the northern as well as the southern nationalities of Europe. Nor should the return wave of romantic interest from Germany be ignored. The outward movement proceeded from the early work of the Wartons, 1740-60, from the revival of Shakespearian scholarship, Gray's interest in northern literature, Macpherson's *Ossian*, 1762, Percy's *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry*, 1765. The movement returned from Germany in Bürger's *Lenore*, in the works of Herder, Jean Paul, Wieland, and, later, of the Schlegels, Tieck, and the Romantiker. That the English romantic revival owes anything to Bodmer (1721) and the German critics of the Swiss school is not probable, for they had no disciples in England; indeed, they themselves drew their inspiration largely from English poetry. Nor did it begin with Rousseau (whose influence shows itself as early as with Goldsmith), for Rousseau's *Nouvelle Héloïse* did not appear till 1760. It would appear not unlikely that most of this romantic inspiration — later carried by France and Germany into sentimentalism — issued in England from Thomson, 1739, Samuel Richardson, 1740, and Lillo (*George Barnwell*, 1731); in France from Marivaux and Prévost, 1731, — but that both schools had in turn derived it from the sentimental comedy of Sir Richard Steele (*The Funeral*, 1702, *The Lying Lover*, 1703, *The Conscious Lovers*, 1722), and of Addison (*The Drummer*, 1715). The creative literature of the century must, therefore, evidently, be regarded as a background to poetic theory. The numerous editions of older authors, collections of early poetry and drama, histories of types and periods of art, biographies of authors, translations of and commentaries upon the ancients, such as Tyrwhitt's and Pye's editions of Aristotle's *Poetics*, — the effect of all these, also, upon critical theory and practice, cannot be ignored though here but mentioned.

Under Johnson criticism had learned to set itself an object and to move toward it. The followers of the Wartons had, on the other side, attempted to deepen the study of theory and to widen the course of method. They had revived the poetic tests of nature, passion, and imagination, and had put into practice the elementary principles of historical method, genetic and comparative.

2. The second stage in this modern development of English poetics, criticism, literary history, is clearly attained by the opening of the nineteenth century. So far as theory is concerned, the dominant movement of the period, the romantic, had been gaining momentum ever since 1739; it had reached its culmination as a movement of revolt in 1798; as a movement of positive and practical

influence it still continues. Divisions into periods are arbitrary. The classical and the romantic movements in one form or another are perennial; they flow through periods. Viewed synthetically, the whole century in English literary history is, indeed, a period of reconstruction. But, more narrowly considered, the period is, as in Germany, encyclopedic and romantic. Its beginning is marked by the organization of criticism which attended the establishment of the *Reviews*, — in 1802 the *Edinburgh*, and in 1809 the *Quarterly*, — soon to be followed by *Blackwood's* and the *London Magazine*. Hitherto criticism had carried the authority of the writer only; and the labor of criticism was generally an avocation, or, at best, secondary to some regular profession. But the judgments of the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly* were known to proceed from one or other of a coterie of acknowledged scholars and men of letters, to represent the opinions and policy of the coterie and the best ability of the writer. Criticism, accordingly, was, at the beginning of the century, organized as a profession by the *Edinburgh*, under the editorship of Jeffrey, with the collaboration of Sydney Smith, Brougham, Scott, Leslie, etc.; by the *Quarterly*, under the editorship of Gifford, with the collaboration of Scott, Southey, Lockhart, etc.; by *Blackwood's Magazine*, under Wilson, Lockhart, Hogg, and Maginn; and by the *London*, under Lamb, Hazlitt, and De Quincey.

The history of criticism in the early part of this century may be considered systematically as follows: (1) *The Enunciation of the Romantic Principle*: Wordsworth, Coleridge's earlier writings, Scott in the *Edinburgh*, etc. It may well be debated whether Coleridge as well as the *Edinburgh* reviewers did not take Wordsworth's apotheosis of rustic passion and speech too literally; but it was the extreme construction placed upon certain of Wordsworth's pronouncements, apparently untenable and really non-essential, that brought into prominence his advocacy of principles indubitably vital — the common principles of romantic poetics. His distinction between imagination and fancy, his search for a psychological basis of poetic principle, and his advocacy of the comparative and genetic methods of literary study are contributions to the science of criticism. (2) *The Classical Reaction*: the *Reviews* — Jeffrey, Gifford, Lockhart, Southey, Wilson, etc. But here we must discriminate between the impressionism and narrow prejudice of a Gifford (the nadir of personal criticism) and the reactionary but altogether more catholic and philosophical traditionalism which, in spite of occasional spleen and error, characterizes Jeffrey. *Blackwood* follows, to some extent, the lead of the older *Reviews*, but Wilson's temper frequently prompts to liberal appreciation; while Lockhart (even if he did commit the diatribe against Keats) deserves credit as a master of critical biography, and displays neither the caprice of

Wilson nor the malignity and retrogressive bigotry of his editor in chief. (3) *The Establishment of Romantic Criticism*. First, Bowles, whose criticism of Pope's poetry, prefixed to his edition of that poet's works, 1806, gave rise to the controversy with Campbell and Byron (Campbell's *Essay on Poetry*, 1819; Byron's *Letter to John Murray*, and *Observations upon Observations*, 1821; Bowles's *Invariable Principles of Poetry*, 1819, and *Letters to Byron and Campbell*, 1822). Second, Coleridge, who, in his treatment of the progress of the English drama, states the comparative method excellently and attempts to put it into practice. Though his criticism was destined to germinate and bear fruit in younger writers, it was in itself a disappointment. Vague, *a priori*, unapplied, it fails because the speculations which inspired him — speculations of Lessing, Kant, Schelling, Schiller, and especially of Jean Paul — were not systematized by him; because, also, the principles were not drawn by him from the practice and history of poetry, nor scientifically tested by the social and poetic practice of the day. (*Lectures on English Poets*, 1808, 1812; *Biographia Literaria*, 1817.) Third, Campbell (*Lectures on Poetry*, 1810; *Specimens of the British Poets*, 1819-48). Fourth, Leigh Hunt, in criticism a direct descendant of the Wartons and Spence, in temperament, of Goldsmith; he in turn influenced his contemporaries Hazlitt and Lamb, and probably both Carlyle and Macaulay, the leaders of criticism in the next generation (*Critical Essays*, 1805; *What is Poetry?* 1844; *Wit and Humor*, etc.). Fifth, Charles Lamb, unique in sympathetic insight, a forerunner of Pater. Sixth, William Hazlitt, the ally of Coleridge in the contention that poetry should be judged not by some standard of the critics, but by the criterion of poetry — poetry universal and in the abstract (*Round Table*, 1817; *Characters of Shakespeare's Plays*, 1817; *English Poets*, 1818; *English Comic Writers*, 1819; *Dramatic Literature of the Reign of Elizabeth*, 1821; *Table Talk*, 1821-22). Seventh, Shelley, whose *Defence of Poetry*, 1821, provoked by T. L. Peacock's *Four Ages of Poetry*, recalls the best of Sidney, Bacon, Wordsworth, and Coleridge and anticipates Carlyle's gospel of poetic significance and Pater's of rational æsthetic delight.

3. The next stage in the development of literary science is marked first by various attempts at an *Historical Method*. These began with Henry Hallam, and were continued by Carlyle, De Quincey, and Macaulay. Of Carlyle it may be said that his services are rather in the theory of criticism than the practice; but both in theory and practice his keynote is "historical": poetry is history vitalized; the poet is the outcome of his own history and the history of the nation. Carlyle taught the significance of poetry, the interpretative function of criticism, and advocated a method of research at once genetic and comparative. His influence in the systematization and limitation of

modern criticism has been immense, and has by no means begun to exhaust itself. It affects rather the matter than the manner, and is more a philosophy than an æsthetic of poetry (see *Miscellanies*, *Goethe*, etc., *Lectures on Heroes*, *History of Literature*). In their recognition of national literary development and in their familiarity with German literature Carlyle and De Quincey were sympathetic; but as regards the appreciation of German literature De Quincey is more insular than Carlyle, and as regards literary history, while Carlyle would discover the bearing of the poet's ethical significance, De Quincey is concerned with that of his literary characteristics. Macaulay, who knew not Germany, and with all his biographical industry never learned the comparative method, represents the "personal" wing of the historical school. He is judge and advocate combined. He derives from Samuel Johnson, Gibbon, Jeffrey, Hallam, and Hazlitt.

These tentative efforts at historical procedure (thwarted, of course, by imperfection of material and of method) are succeeded in the latter half of the century by a movement which has for its purpose the investigation of principles and the establishment of a scientific basis for poetic and artistic appreciation. The leaders, among others, are John Stuart Mill (*System of Logic*, 1843, etc.; *Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties*, etc.), Herbert Spencer (*Social Statics*, 1851; *Psychology*, 1855, etc.; *Philosophy of Style*, 1852; *On Gracefulness*, 1854), G. H. Lewes (*Problems of Life and Mind*, 1874-79, etc.; *Principles of Success in Literature*), and Bain (*The Emotions and the Will*, 1859, etc.). Later still in the century valuable service has been rendered to the cause of scientific æsthetic, and hence to that of literary science, by the researches, psychological, physiological, etc., of Darwin, Grant Allen, Sully, Gurney, and the studies philosophical and historical of Caird in his exposition of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, Bosanquet, whose *History of Æsthetic* stands easily first, Butcher, who has given us the most subtle of modern interpretations of Aristotle's æsthetic theory, Jowett in his introductions to Plato's *Dialogues*, Knight, Baldwin Brown, W. P. Ker, R. P. Hardie, and others.

By the earlier of the scientific teachers Morris, Ruskin, and Arnold were more or less affected. But Morris and Ruskin confined themselves principally to the æsthetics and economics of the plastic arts, while the æsthetics and didactics of poetry were the immediate concern of Matthew Arnold. Arnold did for the comparative method of literary criticism what Ruskin tried to do for art-criticism. A combination and modification of the qualities of Ruskin and Arnold (by omission of the economics of the first and the didactics of the second) appear in the essays of Walter Pater, who, with Symonds, may be regarded as the leader of the hedonistic school. But Pater's

chief characteristic is his desire to interpret and reproduce the author; Symonds's, to show the historical relations of poetry and art.

Among contemporary critics there is evident a right tendency in theoretic criticism to regard poetry both as absolute and relative: to test the absolute æsthetic worth by reference to the laws of nature and thought, the poet's own conception of these and of his poetic function in interpreting them, — the poet's aim; to test the relative worth of a poem by reference not to the standard of some preferred, so-called classical or romantic school, but with reference to the particular movement of which it was part, and to the social, the inherited, the artistic, and the individual conditions of the age that have contributed to that movement and have affected the individual. And in method the tendency has fortunately been, with the best writers, more impartial, comparative, genetic, psychological, sometimes with a view to recording, sometimes interpreting, sometimes to teaching. As a result, something like artistic criticism has occasionally been produced. Credit in this regard is especially due to Arnold, Pater, Symonds, Gurney, Stephen, Saintsbury, Gosse, and Dowden. In the treatment of literary types, the palm for scientific performance must be given to A. W. Ward and E. K. Chambers — both historians of the English drama; and to C. H. Herford for his *Literary Relations of England and Germany in the Sixteenth Century*. In the history of English poetry, unfortunately, little that is methodical has been done by English-speaking writers. Morley's *English Writers* promised well, but comes only halfway down. Courthope's *History of English Poetry* is not yet finished, and has been severely handled by the philologists. Garnett and Gosse's *History* is especially valuable for its social illustrations and its dynamic and biographical methods of treatment.

That I have not in this survey said anything of the contribution to literary science made by the students of linguistic and purely historical science proceeds by no means from oversight, but from the limitations of space. To mention a few like Donaldson and Mure for Greek in the first half of the century, and Mahaffy, Jebb, and Haigh for the latter half; or like Cruttwell, Nettleship, Simcox, Sellar, Munro, Mayor, Conington, Ellis, Mackail, and Tyrrell for the Latin, is simply invidious, therefore I desist. A catalogue, imperfect at that, of scholars in modern philology and literary history would be similarly unavailing. And to attempt, anywhere in this sketch, any estimate of the influence of the methods of political historians such as Stubbs, Freeman, Bryce, *et id omne genus* for England, — Curtius, Mommsen, and Grote for Germany, — though absolutely requisite to a complete investigation of the subject, would be madness.

Of the contribution of England to the present condition of literary

science, I shall speak when we come to consider the common outcome of the movements of the nineteenth century.

C. In France

1. The remote forefather of the modern spirit in French criticism was Perrault, who in his *Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes* (1688-1697) attacked that part of Boileau's doctrine which advocated imitation of the classics as the best imitators of nature. Thus was begun a controversy concerning the relative merits of classic and contemporary literature which not only weakened faith in the infallibility of Boileau's principle, but resulted in a wide extension of the field of criticism. With Perrault there gained currency the poetic canon of naturalism and the critical method of relativity; the first of which took form under the hand of Diderot, while the second culminated on the one hand in the extreme individualism of Rousseau, and on the other in the comparative and historical methods of Mme. de Staël, Villemain, Sainte-Beuve, and Taine.

The immediate predecessors of the literary philology of the nineteenth century in France were Rousseau, Buffon, and the encyclopedists of the eighteenth century. Rousseau's condemnation of civilization in his *Discours* of 1750, on the ground that it corrupted morals and natural freedom, must have awakened critics to the advisability of studying art and poetry in their social relations. Buffon's *Discours de Réception* of 1753 developed an essentially modern and philosophical argument for the intrinsic individuality of style, purely romantic in tendency. Diderot, much of whose critical work first appeared in *Les Feuilles de Grimm*, makes there, and in the prefaces to his plays (*Père de famille* and *Le fils naturel*), an effort toward emancipation from the classical conventionalities. "Everywhere," as Professor Saintsbury has said, "there is to be perceived the cardinal principle of sound criticism; that a book is to be judged, not according to arbitrary rules laid down *ex cathedra* for the class of books to which it is supposed to belong, but according to the scheme of its author in the first place, and in the second to the general laws of æsthetics; a science which, if the Germans named it, Diderot, by their own confession, did much to create." He made the return to nature in his poetics, and attempted to do so in his dramas — giving us not mere types, but actual characters. For the strictly defined tragedy and comedy of the former epoch he substituted the play of the *bourgeoisie* — the *drame* or melodrama. This movement was, of course, assisted by the vogue of Marivaux's *comédie larmoyante*, and by sentimental novels, such as his *Marianne*. And the same movement was further advanced by J. J. Rousseau's advocacy, in his *Lettre à D'Alembert*, in 1758, *Sur les spectacles*, in which he censures the theatre of the day, with its sentimental and imaginative ad-

ventures, and insists upon the cessation of spectacles based upon the afflictions of noble and royal characters, upon the introduction of popular interests and individualities, and the manifestation of a desire to teach, to moralize.

An entirely different movement characterizes the poetics of another precursor of the romantic school, André Chénier (1762-94). His æsthetic was at once imaginative and traditional. Though possessed of a natural idealism, this did not lead him to disregard the models of antiquity. He was a "humanist," but of the natural kind, not the literary, like Ronsard. His principal contribution to poetics proper was the *Poème de l'invention*. It would appear that, all things considered, the romantic movement was not without obligation to him; — but his influence is perhaps most evident in the refined or rational romanticism of the *Parnassiens* of the latter part of the nineteenth century.

2. To the *Romantic Period* of French poetics the transition was made by Madame de Staël and Châteaubriand.

(1) Madame de Staël's *De la littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales* (1800) reminds one of Gibbon's essay on the *History of Literature* and of Shaftesbury's doctrine of cosmopolitan culture. Like the former, the authoress attempts to show that literature is an affair of the spirit and can proceed only from conditions of freedom and progress; and, like the latter, to encourage her fellow countrymen to assimilate the best that is offered by other nations and literatures. By her *De l'Allemagne* (1813) she introduced German literature into France, as De Quincey and Carlyle were soon to introduce it into England. Her influence over Wilhelm von Schlegel, who "became the interpreter of Germany to her eager and apprehensive mind," has been already noticed. Italy and England also were conquered by her; and it was in no slight degree that she prepared the way for the romantic movement. "She advanced criticism," as Professor Dowden has put it, "by her sense that art and literature are relative to ages, races, governments, environments. She dreamed of an European or cosmopolitan literature in which each nation, while retaining its special characteristics, should be in fruitful communication with its fellows." With her contemporary, Châteaubriand, we enter upon a revival of medieval religious and æsthetic sentiment, his most important critical work being the *Génie du christianisme* (1802). In this he calls for a sentimental, romantic, but spontaneous and modern, treatment of life. And with practical result. It may, indeed, be said that together, these two, Madame de Staël and Châteaubriand, effected the overthrow of the skeptical, atheistic, and unscientific interpretation of literature and art; they shattered the autocracy of classical models and abstract rules; they introduced the appeal to the imagination and the senses; they revived

the spontaneous and artistic characteristics of medieval lyricism, and Christianized nature and man for the purposes of literature.

During this season other forces, also, had been working to hasten the advent of a romantic poetics and a comparative criticism. In 1801 Baour-Lormian conveyed to his countrymen by the *Poésies Ossianiques* the flavor of Macpherson; and later (1812) Creuzé de Lesser added to the medievalist revival by the publication of his *Table ronde*. In 1799 Sénancour had produced his melancholy *Réveries*; and after the death of Joubert, 1825, appeared a collection of those lyric rhapsodies in prose, the *Pensées*. In 1811, stirring the very pool of romance, Ginguené published the beginnings of his *Histoire littéraire de l'Italie*, begun in 1802. Historical and philological studies subversive of tradition were meanwhile prosecuted by Fauriel and Raynouard, and minor critics were feeling their way toward a comparative and psychological method. "Foreign life and literature," says Dowden, by whom these phenomena of change are duly noted, "lent their aid to the romantic movement in France — the passion and mystery of the East; the struggle for freedom in Greece; the old ballads of Spain; the mists, the solitudes, the young heroes, the pallid female forms of Ossian; the feudal splendors of Scott; the melancholy Harold; the mysterious Manfred; Goethe's champion of freedom, his victim of sensibility, his seeker for the fountain of living knowledge; Schiller's revolvers against social law, and his adventures of court and camp." There were also changes in language and form, "of which Hugo and Sainte-Beuve were the chief initiators."

The way for the poetics of Hugo was still further prepared by Henri Beyle (Stendhal, 1783-1842), whose chief contributions to criticism were his *Histoire de la peinture en Italie* and the *Racine et Shakespeare*. His method was both comparative and psychological, and in his habit of characterizing the poet by his *milieu* he was the precursor of Taine and Brunetière. "In temperament," as Saintsbury has pointed out, "religious views, and social ideas, he was a belated philosopher of the Diderot school. But in literature he had improved even on Diderot, and very nearly anticipated the full results of the romantic movement. . . . In his *De l'amour* and in his novels he made himself the ancestor of what has been called successively realism and naturalism in France." Stendhal merits the serious attention of the literary historian.

The history of criticism during the rest of the romantic period may be conveniently treated under the following movements, both contributory to the theory of poetics rather than to critical method.

(2) *The Romantic Revolution in the Drama*, effected by Victor Hugo's *Preface to Cromwell*, 1828, and his *Hernani*, 1830. Hugo definitely discards the "unities," declines all artificial limitations,

and asserts that art should represent the whole truth, no matter what kind of æsthetic emotion may result.

(3) *The Philosophical and Comparative Discipline* of Cousin (1792-1868). This thinker's *Du vrai, du beau, et du bien* was the result of a reaction from the sensationalism of the eighteenth century. His studies were first made in the wake of Reid and the Scotch philosophers; but after a visit to Germany in 1817 he became a follower of the German idealists. Though, with Levêque and Jouffroy, a member of the school of *spiritualistes*, and called an eclectic, he was the most enthusiastic advocate in France of German philosophy. His influence upon French poetics is not to be underestimated. Nor is that of Michelet (1798-1874), whose philosophy, like Cousin's, shows the influence of Herder and Hegel; nor that of Edgar Quinet, the bosom friend of Michelet and a sympathizer in his æsthetic views.

3. The movement succeeding the early romantic is the *Scientific-Historical*. This was headed by Villemain, who, in his *Tableau de la littérature au moyen âge*, in the *Tableau de la littérature au XVIII^e siècle*, and in his lectures, applied a method of inquiry which observed the social, biographical, genetic, and comparative aspects of the literary phenomenon. The resulting criticism was characterized by impartiality, sanity, and a scientific decisiveness far in advance of that produced by preceding critics. Villemain was seconded by Saint-Marc Girardin and Sainte-Beuve, the latter probably the greatest critic of the century. Sainte-Beuve incorporates the romantic, historical, social, and psychological attempts of his predecessors and contemporaries under a new method, at once more logical, more scientific, and more imaginative than theirs — a method which has been justly called the naturalistic.

In the double paper on Châteaubriand (*Nouveaux Lundis*, 21, 22 Juillet, 1862), Sainte-Beuve expounds in detail his method of literary criticism. Starting with the author of the work, the critic studies him zoologically, as it were, with reference to his race and habitat. He traces his family history, seeking in the parents (especially the mother), the brothers and sisters, and even the children, the secret of his peculiar individuality. From the family he passes to "le premier milieu," the group of friends and contemporaries who, like a literary family, shared in the author's aims and ambitions. The utterances of the author's enemies and admirers also furnish clues. The result of this method of study, which places the author in his environment of heredity and influence, is the discovery of some characteristic by which, as a label, his peculiar talent may be designated.

Though Sainte-Beuve calls his method naturalistic, he does not claim for it a place among the exact sciences. The day will indeed come, he thinks, when the great families of genius and their principal

divisions shall be accurately determined; but men in their moral nature are so complex that the critic cannot hope ever to treat them just as he would animals or plants. Criticism must forever remain an art, demanding, like the art of medicine, a special tact or talent in those who practice it. The method of Sainte-Beuve is rather English (that of experience and individual circumstance) than French (that of system and abstraction). His mother was English; he was himself brought up on English books; he especially admired Bacon, with whose prophetic enunciation of the scope and function of literary history he was acquainted, and whose comparative method he himself attempted to apply. He has, more than any other foreign critic, affected the course of English literary philology in the nineteenth century — and affected it for good. His special disciple is Matthew Arnold. Of Sainte-Beuve's work an admirable estimate has been given by Dowden. The latter says that, "wandering endlessly from author to author in his *Portraits littéraires* and *Portraits contemporains*, Sainte-Beuve studied in all its details what we may term the physiology of each." His long research in "his most sustained work, *Port-Royal*, led him to recognize certain types or families under which the various minds of men can be grouped and classified." So, also, in his *Causeries du Lundi* and the *Nouveaux Lundis*. "They formed, as it were, a natural history of intellects and temperaments. He did not pretend to reduce criticism to a science; he hoped that at length, as a result of numberless observations, something like a science might come into existence. Meanwhile he would cultivate the relative and distrust the absolute." To estimate a work, he studies the personality of the author, his conditions, his inherited qualities, his education, life, everything that can be ascertained concerning him. Thus he aims to discover the key to the secret of his literary utterances. This is the method, according to Professor Dowden, "which has best served the study of literature in the nineteenth century." It is largely the method of Matthew Arnold, whose success, however, hardly equaled that of Sainte-Beuve, his master.

That a reaction against liberal methods should set in was of course to be expected. In this case the movement was headed by Nisard, who, with his followers, reverted to an abstract, authoritative, and individual standard, attempting to test the literary product in question by that. Nisard applies to each literary product a three-fold test: (1) The ideal of the nation; (2) the ideal of the language; (3) the ideal of humanity. While believing that knowledge and taste are essentially relative, of the individual and the environment, he holds that the critic may contribute to the general onward movement of culture by expressing sincerely and forcibly his opinion as if it were absolute; for the object of criticism is to regulate the

intellectual pleasures of each age in turn, and to deliver works from the tyranny of *chacun son goût*. The criticism of Nisard is tonic, but too intensely, therefore narrowly, national. As a philosophical phenomenon it is the æsthetic outcome of the positivism of Comte.

The present period of criticism in France includes the movement of art for art's sake, whose representatives, de Vigny, Théophile Gautier, Théod. de Banville, Leconte de Lisle, Sully-Prudhomme, etc., are called the *Parnassiens*. This movement is characterized by a revolt against the excesses of the romantic school, and a revival of a more philosophical and rationalistic theory of inspiration. It cultivates accuracy in form, and aims in an æsthetic fashion at sculptural and picturesque effects of style. Its doctrines may, in fact, be compared with the much more refined æstheticism or hedonism of Walter Pater.

The period includes, also, important developments in scientific criticism; the esthopsychological of Hennequin, the naturalistic (historically objective) of Taine, the national and eidographic of Brunetière, the social of Guyau. Taine started out by being frankly and flatly scientific. Literature, he said, is a natural product whose characteristics are to be investigated and recorded, like those of trees and flowers. Criticism is thus a kind of botany applied to human works, and the efforts of the critic are devoted to determining the literary system or organism which is made up of the productions of a given period or nation. Within such a system, when it has been found, will be arranged the authors and their works according to the dominant characteristic of each. The literary activity of any member of such a system is shaped by three influences: (1) The race, or the influence of heredity and temperament; (2) the environment, political, social, and physical; (3) the moment. This threefold formula has vitally affected the literary studies of the nineteenth century. For long it was in everybody's mouth. It is a fact, however, not generally known that the formula did not originate with Taine at all. He derived it beyond a peradventure from Hegel's *Æsthetik*, vol. 1, p. 20: "Sodann gehört jedes Kunstwerk seiner Zeit, seinem Volke, seiner Umgebung an." Brunetière, who adds to the three conditions specified by Taine the element of individuality (*Evolution des Genres dans l'Histoire de la Littérature*, vol. 1, p. 22), was also anticipated by Hegel (*Æsthetik*, vol. 1, p. 45): "Denn das Kunstwerk um seiner zugleich materiellen und individuellen Natur willen, geht wesentlich aus besonderen Bedingungen der mannigfachsten Art, wozu vorzüglich Zeit und Ort der Entstehung, dann *die bestimmte Individualität des Künstlers* und hauptsächlich die technische Ausbildung der Kunst gehören, hervor."

It has been shown by Professors Brunetière and Dowden that while Taine's theory has had enormous influence in shaping the destinies of the materialistic movement — an inevitable reaction

against the over-personal temper of the romantic school, — it was neither sufficient nor capable of securing the adherence in practice of its chief advocate. It exaggerates the local, the temporary, the animal. It pretends to be scientific and impartial, but is in reality deductive and magisterial. Still M. Taine has by his famous *History of English Literature* taught literary historians to regard literature as a social and historical phenomenon, and critics to use the objective method as at least a component part of the system of appreciation.

In his article on *La Critique littéraire*, in *La Grande Encyclopédie*, M. Brunetière states with clearness his view of the function of criticism. It is threefold, (1) to explain, (2) to classify, (3) to judge. By explanation is meant description, analysis, and comment. The critic must explain the author, whose character is not always an analogue of his book, but he must not stop with the author. Others have helped write the book. The author's contemporaries are his collaborators. Other books have influenced him. He lives in a particular moment or phase of the evolution of the *genre* to which his work belongs. A part of the explanation, therefore, consists in placing the work in its *milieu*, national and international. To perform the work of classification criticism needs sound principles of three kinds: (1) *Scientific*, analogous to those of natural history; (2) *Moral*, establishing an ethical hierarchy without identifying morals and art; (3) *Æsthetic*, measuring the work of art by the absolute quantity that it expresses. Furnished with these principles, criticism, as a mode of classifying, would become scientific. Finally, criticism is under obligation to pass judgment; for a work of art, while it is a record to be explained and classified, is also a poem or statue better or worse than some other poem or statue. Distinct from the object of criticism is its function. According to Brunetière the function of criticism is to act on public opinion, on authors, and upon the general direction of literature and art. By maintaining literary traditions criticism perpetuates from age to age the literary consciousness of the nation.

In his *Evolution des Genres dans l'histoire de la littérature* (1890) this admirable scholar sketches the rise and development of the spirit of modern criticism from its beginning in Italy in the period of the Renaissance. It came into existence as the result of two causes: (1) The rediscovery of the classics; (2) (following Burekhardt's *Civilization in Italy*) the growth of the sense of personality. The first led to philological criticism of a pedantic kind, the second to rivalry and envy, and so to criticism in the sense of fault-finding. When criticism passed over into France, laying aside its pedantry and its satire it became at first strictly literary, then in turn æsthetic, philosophical, historical, and scientific. Of Brunetière's view of literary growth as following the biological analogy I shall have

a criticism to offer in the remarks upon comparative literature with which this paper will conclude.

To Brunetière's insistence upon the individual element as contributory to the creation of the literary organism, I have already referred, showing that in Germany he was anticipated by Hegel. But even in France the doctrine was enunciated with great clearness before Brunetière's statement of it. This was one of the services performed for literary philology by Emile Hennequin, a follower of Herbert Spencer, — who in *La Critique scientifique* (1888) attempted to put criticism upon a scientific basis. Hennequin's method, which he terms *Esthopsychologie*, is in some respects similar to that of Taine. It differs from Taine's in attaching less importance to the race, and in throwing emphasis upon the individuality of the author and his power to create an environment for himself. The purpose of criticism, according to Hennequin, is not to evaluate the work of art, nor yet to determine the means by which it is produced, but to show the relation of the work to the social and psychological characteristics of the artist whom it reveals. "His method of criticism," remarked J. A. Symonds, "may be defined as the science of the work of art regarded as a sign."

Of the contributions to theoretical or applied poetics of a notable host, I cannot here speak. Suffice it to acknowledge the manifold genius of the critic, Edward Scherer; the philological and historical contributions of Gaston Paris, Darmesteter, Petit de Julleville; and the excellent researches into literary movements and types conducted by MM. Pellisier, Albert, Ampère, Desnoiresterres, Léon Gautier, Jeanroy, Faguet, Bédier, Lenient, and Jusserand. At the present moment, special attention is directed to the late Joseph Texte's revival of the comparative or cosmopolitan ideal in literary history advocated long ago by Rousseau and adopted by Mme. de Staël, Villemain, and Sainte-Beuve; and to the social æsthetics of Guyau. These will be mentioned when I come to speak of comparative literature.

The reaction against romanticism in dramatic theory and practice instituted by Emile Augier and Alexandre Dumas, I have unfortunately no time to discuss. It is as realistic as that of the *Parnassiens* is æsthetic. The minor French school of poetry, their creeds and affectations, *les décadents*, *les symbolistes*, etc., will have no permanent effect.

Of the development of literary studies in two or three other countries, especially Italy, Russia, and America, I had intended to treat, but this discussion is already longer than it should have been. Let us advance at once to the possibilities of literary study, as scientifically conducted, to-day.

III. THE OUTCOME IN A LITERARY SCIENCE

The movements of which I have spoken merge in what is frequently, with more or less definiteness of meaning, styled comparative literature, or the comparative study of literature. In order to present the significance of these terms, and to decide whether they convey the idea to be expressed, I must be permitted to recapitulate some portions of an inquiry, entitled "What is Comparative Literature?" published by me in the *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1903. Comparative literature, as now cultivated, is, in the first place, understood of a field of investigation, — the literary relations existing between distinct nationalities: the study of international borrowings, imitations, adaptations. And to recognize such relations as incidental to national growth is of the utmost importance — social as well as literary. (Gaston Paris, Texte, Arnold, Goethe.) This attention to literary relations is, of course, the consequent of the study of literatures as national: first the history of each literature; then the historic relations between literatures. That in turn is naturally followed by the synthesis in literature as a unit. "The nineteenth century," says M. Texte, "has seen the national history of literatures develop and establish itself: the task of the twentieth century will undoubtedly be to write the comparative history of those literatures." "The scientific view of literature," says Brandes, "provides us with a telescope of which the one end magnifies, and the other diminishes; it must be so focused as to remedy the illusion of unassisted eyesight. The different nations have hitherto held themselves so distinct, as far as literature is concerned, that each has only to a very limited extent been able to benefit by the productions of the rest." Here, again, the way had been marked out by Arnold, when he advocated the comparison of literary classics in one language, or in many, with a view to determining their relative excellence, that is, to displacing personal or judicial criticism by a method more scientific. I am aware that this conception of the study concerns its method and purpose rather than its field. But I mention it here because it implies a more comprehensive and deeper conception underlying all these statements of the material of comparative study: *the solidarity of literature*. And that is the working premise of the student of comparative literature to-day: literature as a distinct and integral medium of thought, a common institutional expression of humanity; differentiated, to be sure, by the social conditions of the individual, by racial, historical, cultural, and linguistic influences, opportunities, and restrictions, but (irrespective of age or guise), prompted by the common needs and aspirations of man, sprung from common faculties psychological and physiological, and obeying common laws of material and mode, of the individual, and of social humanity.

From this conception of the material as a unit, scholars naturally advance to the consideration of its development, the construction of a *theory*. If a unity, and an existence approximately contemporaneous with that of society, why not a life, a growth? "We no longer have to examine solely the relations of one nation with another," says one, "but to unfold the simultaneous development of all literatures, or, at least, of an important group of literatures." It is the task of comparative literature, according to another, to find whether the same laws of literary development prevail among all peoples or not. The internal and external aspects of literary growth, Mr. Posnett announces to be the objects of comparative inquiry; and accepting as the principle of literary growth the progressive deepening and widening of personality, — in other words, the contraction and expansion of Arnold and Texte, — with the development of the social unit in which the individual is placed, this author finds a corresponding differentiation of the literary medium from the primitive homogeneity of communal art, a gradual individualizing of the literary occasion and an evolution of literary forms. Mr. Posnett's method is perhaps impaired by the fact that he regards the relation of literary history to the political rather than to the broader social development of a people, but he certainly elaborates a theory; and it is the more instructive because he does not treat literature as organic, developing by reason of a life within itself to a determined end, but as secondary and still developing with the evolution of the organism from which it springs. In this theory of institutional growth result also the methods of Buckle and Ernst Grosse, which may be termed physiological and physiographical; and the physio-psychological of Schiller, Spencer, and Karl Groos; and the method of Irjō Hirn, and Guyau, which combines the social and psychological in the inquiry into the art-impulse, its history and its effect; and that of Schlegel and Carrière, who, emphasizing one side of Hegel's theory, rest literary development largely upon the development of religious thought. In M. Brunetière, on the other hand, we have one who boldly announces his intention to trace the evolution of literary species, — not as dependent upon the life of an organism such as society, but in themselves. He frankly proposes to discover the laws of literary development by applying the theory of evolution to the study of literature. When he details the signs of youth, maturity, and decay which the type may exhibit, and the transformation of one type into another — as, for instance, the French pulpit oration into the ode — according to principles analogous in their operation to the Darwinian struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, and natural selection, we become apprehensive lest the parallel be overworked. If M. Brunetière would only complete the national portion of his history, or, at least, try to substantiate his theory, we should

be grateful. He has, however, enunciated one of the problems with which comparative literature must grapple, and is grappling. Does the biological principle apply to literature? If not, in how far may the parallel be scientifically drawn?

That leads us to still a third conception of the term under consideration. Comparative literature, say some, is not a subject-matter nor a theory, but a *method of study*. With the ancients it was the habit of roughly matching authors. The method has existed ever since there were two pieces of literature known to the same man; it has persisted through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance; and it is alive to-day. Its merits and defects are those of the man who uses it. To others the comparative method means the attempt to obtain by *induction* from a sufficient variety of specimens the characteristics, distinguishing marks, principles, even laws of the form, movement, type, or literature under discussion. (Carriere, Freytag, Aristotle.) In the discipline under consideration historical sequence is just as important as comparison by cross-sections. The science is called "comparative literary history" rather than "literature compared," by French, German, and Italian scholars, not for nothing. The historian who searches for origins or stages of development in a single literature may employ the comparative method as much as he who zigzags from literature to literature; and so the student whose aim is to establish relations between literary movement and literary movement, between author and author, period and period, type and type, movement and movement, theme and theme, contemporaneous or successive in any language, nationality, clime, or time. The comparison is not alone between diverse national literatures, but between any elements involved in the history of literature, or any stages in the history of any element. There have been, within my own knowledge, those who would confine the word literature to the written productions of civilized peoples, and consequently would exclude from consideration aboriginal attempts at verbal art. But students nowadays increasingly recognize that the cradle of literary science is anthropology. The comparative method therefore sets civilized literatures side by side with the popular, traces folk-lore to folk-lore, and these so far as possible to the matrix in the undifferentiated art of human expression. Such is "comparative literature" when used of the work of the Grimms, Steinthal, Comparetti, Donovan, Talvj, or Ernst Grosse. The term is also properly used of the method of Taine, which in turn derives from that recommended by Hegel in the first volume of his *Ästhetik* (the appraisal of the literary work in relation to *Zeit, Volk, und Umgebung*), and of the method of Brunetière so far as he has applied it, for it is in theory the same, save that it purports to emphasize the consideration of the element of individuality. But that the method is susceptible of widely varying inter-

pretations is illustrated by the practice of still another advocate thereof, Professor Wetz, who, in his *Shakespeare from the Point of View of Comparative Literary History*, of 1890, and in his essay on the history of literature, insists that comparative literature is neither the literary history of one people, nor investigations in international literary history; neither the study of literary beginnings, nor even the attempt to obtain by induction the characteristics of *Weltliteratur*, its movements and types. While he accepts the analytical critical method of Taine in combination with the historical and psychological of Herder, Goethe, and Schiller, he insists that the function of comparative literature is to determine the peculiarities of an author by comparison with those of some other author sufficiently analogous.

A survey of courses offered in European and American universities and of the practice of our American philological journals and associations shows that the academic conception is as I have stated it: comparative literature works in the history of national as well as of international conditions, it employs, more or less prominently, the comparative method, logical and historical, it presupposes, and results in, a conception of literature as a solidarity, and it seeks to formulate and substantiate a theory of literary development whether by evolution or permutation, in movements, types, and themes. With these main considerations it is but natural that scholars should associate the attempt to verify and systematize the characteristics common to literature in its various manifestations wherever found; to come by induction, for instance, at the *eidographic* or generic qualities of poetry, — the characteristics of the drama, epic, or lyric; at the *dynamic* qualities, those which characterize and differentiate the main literary movements, such as the classical and romantic; and at the *thematic*, the causes of persistence and modification in the history of vital subjects, situations, and plots. As to the growth, or development, of literature, our survey shows that two distinct doctrines contend for acceptance: one, by evolution, which is an attempt to interpret literary processes in accordance with biological laws; the other, by what I prefer to call *permutation*. Since literature, like its material, language, is not an organism, but a resultant medium, both product and expression of the society whence it springs, the former theory must be still in doubt. It can certainly not be available otherwise than metaphorically unless it be substantiated by just such methods — comparative and scientific — as those of which we have spoken.

Much of this comparative method has been anticipated in theory; but not so much in discipline and fact. The solidarity of *literature* was long ago announced by Bacon. And he was not the only forerunner of the present movement. In one way or another the solidarity of literature, the theories of permutation or of evolution, sometimes

crudely, sometimes with keen scientific insight, were anticipated by Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Italians of note all the way from Dante, Scaliger, and Sidney down. If these writers and their main contributions to the science could be cited, it would be seen that they do not discredit, but confirm, the scope and hope of the science of to-day. They testify to the need of a science in the nature of things. They perform their service by anticipations in detail of a discipline that could not be designated a science until the sciences propædæutic thereto had been developed. Advances in historical method, in psychological, sociological, linguistic, and ethnological research have, now, furnished the discipline with an instrument unknown to its forebears in critical procedure; and with fresh and rich materials for illumination from without. The conception of literature as a unit is no longer hypothetical; the comparison of national histories has proved it. The idea of a process by evolution may be unproved; but that some process, as by permutation, must obtain is recognized. We no longer look upon the poet as inspired. Literature develops with the entity which produces it,—the common social need and faculty of expression; and it varies according to *differentiæ* of racial, physiographic, and social conditions, and of the inherited or acquired characteristics of which the individual author is constituted. (The science of its production must analyze its component factors and determine the laws by which they operate.) By a constant factor are fixed the only possible moulds or channels of expression, and, therefore, the integral and primary types, as, for instance, within the realm of poetry, the lyric, narrative, and dramatic. By the presence of other factors, both inconstant, these types are themselves liable to modification. I refer, of course, to environment, that is to say, to the antecedent and contemporary condition of thought, social tendency, and artistic fashion; and to the associational congeries called the author. So far as physiological and psychological modes of expression may be submitted to objective and historical analysis, so far as the surrounding conditions which directly or indirectly affect the art in which the author works, and the work of the author in that art, may be inductively studied, and their nature interpreted and registered in relation to other products of society, such as language, religion, and government, so far is the discipline of which we speak legitimately scientific. And as rapidly as experimental psychology, anthropology, ethnology, or the history of art in general, prove their right to scientific recognition, they become instruments for the comparative investigation of the social phenomenon called literature. It is thus that the literary science, just now called comparative literature, improves upon the efforts of the former stylistic or poetics, largely traditional or speculative, and displaces the capricious

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matching of authors, the static or provincial view of history, and the appraisement lacking atmosphere.

While this science must exclude from the object under consideration the purely subjective element, and the speculative or so-called "judicial" (*me judice*) method from criticism and history, it need not ignore or disregard the unexplained quantity, — the imaginative. Its aim will be to explore the hitherto unexplained in the light of historical sequence and scientific cause and effect, physical, biological, psychological, or anthropological, to reduce the apparently unreasonable or magical element, and so to leave continually less to be treated in the old-fashioned inspirational and ecstatic manner. We shall simply cease to confound the science with the art. The more immediate advantages of the prosecution of literary research in such a way as this are an ever-increasing knowledge of the factors that enter into world-literature and determine its growth, — its reasons, conditions, movements, and tendencies, — in short, its laws; and a poetics capable not only of detecting the historical, but of appreciating the social accent in what is foreign and too often despised, or contemporary and too often overpraised, if not ignored. The new science of literature will in turn throw light upon that which gave it birth; it will prove an index to the evolution of soul in the individual and in society; it will interpret that sphinx, national consciousness or the spirit of the race, or, mayhap, destroy it. It will in one case and in all assist a science of comparative ethics. The new discipline brought to the study of all kinds of writing a scientific objectivity and the historical method. It has taken up into itself what is objective and historical of the older stylistic: it aims to reject or confirm former theories, but on purely scientific grounds. It is the transition from stylistic to a science which shall still find room for æsthetics, but for æsthetics properly so called, developed, checked, and corrected by scientific procedure and by history.

Before the day of modern psychology, anthropology, linguistics, and the comparative sciences of society, religion, and art, literature was not possible to be studied either in relation to its antecedents or to its components. Otherwise our study would long ago have been known as comparative philology, a name improperly usurped by the linguistic branch of the philological discipline. Such indeed is the name by which Professor Whitney would have called the comparative study of the literatures of different countries had the discipline been prosecuted as a science when he wrote. Such was the conception of Wolf and Herder. The modern science of literature is a reaffirmation of that aspect of philology — the literary — which, both because it was dependent upon, and eclipsed by, the development of linguistics, has long ceased to be regarded as philology at all; save in Germany, where philological seminars have dealt not only with the

phonology and history of language as they asserted themselves, but also as of old with whatever concerns the literary side of language as an expression of the national, or more broadly human spirit. Since all study of origins and growth, whether of one phenomenon or more than one, must be *comparative* if scientifically conducted, it is not necessary to characterize the literary science, of which we speak, by that particular adjective. More methods than the comparative enter into it, and it is more than a method; it is a theory of relativity and of growth; and its material is vertically as well as horizontally disposed. The literary study of to-day, based upon the sciences of which I have spoken, and conducted in the scientific method, is literary philology — nothing more nor less: it stands over against linguistic philology or glottology; and it deals genetically, historically, and comparatively with literature as a solidarity and as a product of the social individual, whether the point of view be national or universal. The new discipline is already the property and method of all scientific research in all literatures, ancient or modern, not only in their common but in their individual relations to the social spirit in which they live and move and have their being. The more we develop this discipline, the more rapidly will each literature in turn seek its explanation in literary philology; and of such is the future of literary studies in the twentieth century.

SECTION A — INDO-IRANIAN LITERATURE

SECTION A—INDO-IRANIAN LITERATURE

(Hall 8, September 24, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, Johns Hopkins University.

SPEAKER: PROFESSOR A. V. W. JACKSON, Columbia University.

OUR INTEREST IN PERSIA AND THE STUDY OF HER HISTORY, LANGUAGE, AND LITERATURE

BY A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON

[Abraham Valentine Williams Jackson, Professor of Indo-Iranian Languages, Columbia University, since 1895. b. New York, February 9, 1862. Graduate of Columbia University, 1883; A.M. 1884; L.H.D. 1885; Ph.D. 1886. Instructor in Anglo-Saxon and Iranian Languages, Columbia, 1887-90; University student, Halle, Germany, 1887-89; Adjunct Professor of English Language and Literature, Columbia, 1891-95. Member of American Oriental Society, American Philological Society, Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft. Author of *A Hymn of Zoroaster*, *Yasna*, xxxi; *An Avestan Grammar, in comparison with Sanskrit*; *An Avestan Reader*; *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*; also many articles in *Journal of American Oriental Society*.]

TO-DAY when all eyes are turned toward the East watching the struggle for supremacy between Japan and Russia, the interest in the Orient and its development is greater than ever before. As an Eastern nation, therefore, Persia merits our attention, but she has also peculiar claims upon our interest which it is the purpose of this address to emphasize.

Of all the great historic nations which came into contact with Greece and Rome, Persia alone has maintained her independence to the present time. Her monarchs have been rulers for three thousand years, and her shah, sitting upon the Peacock Throne at Tehran, may boast his claim to sovereign sway as inheritor of Jamshid's kingly rule in the legendary past of Iran and as successor to the sceptre of the Median Deïoces and the crown of Cyrus the Great. The story of the foundation of a mighty empire by the conquering arm of Cyrus and its development by the organizing hand of Darius is rich in historic interest. The struggle with Greece, the first signs of Persian decadence under Xerxes and Artaxerxes, the blow struck by Alexander, which overthrew the Achæmenian throne, furnish fruitful themes for its historian to discuss. If there were time to dilate upon the period of Parthian rule which followed, I might account for the hatred for Persia felt by Rome and summed up in

Horace's *Persicos odi, puer, apparatus* or discuss his graphic image of the Parthian horsemen turning to launch showers of deadly arrows upon the Roman legions; or again, I might picture the fall of the Sasanian power in the seventh century of our era and the rude awakening from their dream of establishing once more a world-empire. This was caused by the Arab conquest of Iran, the most momentous event in Persia's history. I am compelled to pass over the causes which led to this event and the far-reaching effects which it produced, even if I tried to crowd the history of a thousand years into a day, nor is there time more than to call attention to the magnificence of the Persian capital at Isfahan under Shah Abbas, the contemporary of Queen Elizabeth and of Henry IV of France, whose munificent rule and the luxury of his successors are described by the European travelers, Herbert, Olearius, and Chardin, who visited his court. The centuries which followed, and likewise the present, contain lessons for the statesman, historian, and philosopher.

In the realm of religion Persia has played an important rôle — a rôle not wholly laid aside. Her ancient national creed, Zoroastrianism, was one of the great religions of the East, and its remarkable analogies to Judaism and Christianity have long engaged the attention of biblical students. Outside of these two faiths it would be difficult to point to another religion which has a higher ethical code, considering its antiquity, or a clearer grasp of the ideas of right and wrong, than Zoroastrianism; or one which holds before its believers a more exalted image of divinity than Ahura Mazda (Ormazd) or inculcates a firmer doctrine of the responsibility of man to his Maker, or so exalted a hope of the coming of a Saviour, a bodily resurrection, a general judgment, and a future life with rewards and punishments for the immortal soul, as taught in the *Avesta*, the sacred book of ancient Iran.

From the earliest times when King Shalmanesar of Assyria placed colonies of Israelites in certain cities of the Medes, there have been more or less close relations between the Jews and the Persians. The prophet Isaiah calls Cyrus the Great "the anointed of the Lord" and His "Shepherd," and Darius gave orders for the temple at Jerusalem to be rebuilt. Xerxes and Artaxerxes, the former under the name of Ahasuerus, are renowned as kings in the Bible, and the scenes of the apocryphal books Judith and Tobit are laid partly in Persia. No study of the infancy of our Saviour, either in theology or in art, can be complete without a reference to the Magi, for one or all of these Wise Men from the East came from Persia, according to old-time traditions and legends. To-day, moreover, the gospel of Christ is being preached within the borders of Persia by self-sacrificing missionaries, one of whom this very year sealed his faith with his blood.

In the early Christian ages a phase of Zoroastrianism, known as Mithraism, penetrated into the Roman world and spread so widely that in many parts of Europe altars were set up and cave temples built to celebrate the mysteries of the Persian divinity Mithra and to glorify this personification of light, the sun, and truth. Furthermore, the system of Manichæism, which sprang up on Persian soil, was powerful enough for a time to compete with neo-Platonism and Christianity for the religious and intellectual supremacy of the Roman Empire.

Persia to-day is Muhammadan, having accepted Islam in the seventh century, at the time of the Arab conquest, but here again she has played a prominent part, because she is the chief representative of the Shiïte sect which acknowledged Ali as the successor of Muhammad in opposition to the orthodox Sunnites. Within the last seventy years, moreover, a new religious movement, eclectic in character and known as Babism, has sprung up in Persia and assumed such proportions as to menace the progress of Muhammadanism in Iran and to attract attention even in the Occident.

In the domain of art and architecture Persia is thought to have borrowed largely from Assyria and Babylon in ancient times, and later from Greece, Rome, and Byzantium, and in more recent days from China and even the West; nevertheless she has added so much and made the importation so characteristically her own creation as to command attention in all histories of these subjects. Our knowledge of the artistic condition of Iran during the Median period is extremely limited. Regarding architecture at that remote era we have to rely solely on the account which Herodotus gives of the magnificent walls at Ecbatana, colored in rainbow hues, and supplement this by the description in the book of Judith, or again we must reproduce the picture which Polybius gives of the temple of the Persian Artemis at Ecbatana, the walls of which were covered with plates of silver and gold. These structures have all vanished long since, except one or two bases of columns and capitals of pillars, and there remains not a trace of Median sculpture at Hamadan, which was the ancient Ecbatana, save one, and even its claim to so great an antiquity has been questioned. This is the great stone lion outside the city. Although it is broken, battered, and prone on the ground, its outlines are lifelike and artistic, and show what the Persian sculptor could accomplish in ages past.

The art and architecture developed under the Achæmenian kings, between the sixth and the fourth century B.C., can boast of having brought forth some of the grandest monuments produced by the Aryan race. The ruins of ancient Pasargadæ and Persepolis find their superior in grandeur only at Athens and Rome. The remains at the ancient city of Hathra, and perhaps also the huge

foundation stones and fallen columns of the great temple of the Persian Diana at Kangavar,¹ furnish the student with specimens of Parthian architecture; while the sculptured grottoes of Tag-i Bostan, and the bas-reliefs at Hajiabad, Shapur, and Naksh-i Rostam, are the best examples of Sasanian art. If we are interested in Persia's later architectural achievements under Islam, we shall find examples of the Muhammadan style everywhere from Tehran and Meshed to Shiraz, or from the Blue Mosque at Tabriz to the turquoise domes and slender minarets of Isfahan.

In ceramic art Persia has long enjoyed a high renown. Fragments of porcelain with the exquisite *reflet d'or* are dug up among the ruins of ancient Rai near Tehran, and the tiles of Isfahan, with their delicate shades in color, are masterpieces in decorative faïence; while the art of the Persian potter is familiar to every reader of Omar Khayyam. In metalware the graceful shape of the vessels of copper and hammered brass appeals to the eye as one makes a tour through the bazaars, and the filigree work in silver and gold or the traceries on a damascened sword present a delicacy of outline that tells of a high artistic sense. In the weaving of rugs and carpets, with their careful blending of colors and variety in pattern and design, the Persians bear away the palm. The embroidery done by the women is equally attractive, and the delicate meshwork in their veils is often so fine that it must try the eyes that make it, as much as the eyes it hides. Brocaded silks, gay saddle-cloths, lacquered pommels, pen-cases, book-covers, trays, and artistic specimens of antique armor are among the Persian products which have called forth admiration from the time of Jamshid till to-day. In the art of painting Persia has little to show, for the influence of Islam is not favorable to the pictorial arts, but in calligraphy, the art of beautiful handwriting, Persia is unsurpassed. Penmanship is cultivated as a fine art, and some of the specimens of *nastalik* script interlaced into a monogram or of arabesque woven into intricate patterns in carpets or traced about the domes and portals of mosques, are unrivaled in the world. Music cannot be called a Persian art, but it may be mentioned in comparison with Oriental harmony and in contrast to the West.

It may seem surprising to hear that even in science and philosophy the world owes something to Persia. This indebtedness is chiefly to the great philosopher-physician Ibn Sina, better known in Europe under the name of Avicenna, who flourished about A.D. 1000. His medical system was originally adopted from the Greek, but was Orientalized, and it spread then over the East, finding its way to Europe through

¹ Modern Kangavar is the same as the classical Konkobar, and kindred to a presumable Avestan form *Kanha-vara, "Enclosure of Kanha." Isidorus of Charax, *Mansiones Parthicae*, § 7, mentions the temple at Konkobar. I visited the ruins on my journey from Hamadan to Kermanshah.

the Moors of Spain. So well was Avicenna's *Canon* known in the fourteenth century that Chaucer refers to its author familiarly in *The Pardoner's Tale*, on the subject of poisoning, and even uses the technical word *fen*, by which the sections of the *Canon* are designated. In metaphysics, moreover, Ibn Sina's fame as a thinker is known to every student of scholastic philosophy, because his writings, which were influenced by Aristotle and neo-Platonism, found their way to Europe through the so-called Arabian philosophy of the Moors, became widely known through translations, and exercised a strong influence on Scholasticism. Persian Sufism also, with its transcendental ideas, although not the result of Persian thought alone, presents many interesting analogies to European mysticism of the Middle Ages, in whatever manner we may seek to explain the likenesses. In the realm of science, furthermore, Nasir ad-Din of Tus in Khorasan was an astronomer who enjoyed a great reputation in the East,¹ and many of us call Omar Khayyam "the astronomer-poet of Persia," without recalling the fact that he wrote also an algebra. In the department of history and chronology the name of Mirkhond may be mentioned with praise, and I may add that a number of the Eastern medieval writers whom we think of as Arabs were really Persians, but chose the language of their conquerors as a vehicle to express their thoughts.

The student of social institutions, political economy, and science of government may learn something also from the code of the *Avesta*, or better still from the organization of the Persian Empire by Darius. His system of administration by satraps, his distribution of taxes among the provinces, his management of financial problems, fixing the ratio of silver to gold at a precise figure, and his encouragement of agriculture, as enjoined by Zoroaster, may be mentioned as single illustrations. The contrast between the present and the past of Iran in these respects is no less instructive, and the hand of a Darius, if not of a Cyrus, is needed once more if we are to have a *Persia rediviva*.

Nothing has been said thus far regarding the language of Persia, and our interest in that study. The discovery and translation of the *Avesta* by Anquetil du Perron marked a new era in philology as well as in the study of religion, and the decipherment of the cuneiform inscriptions of the Achæmenian kings by Grotefend and Rawlinson added a chapter to the story told by Herodotus, corroborating the facts of ancient history previously known from other sources, and throwing fresh light on the monuments of the past. The researches into the Middle Persian or Pahlavi texts and inscriptions, supple-

¹ See the sketch by my friend, Professor Paul Horn, *Was verdanken wir Persien?* in *Nord und Süd*, Heft 282, p. 289, Breslau, 1900, to which I am indebted for several suggestions.

mented by a knowledge of the Modern Persian and its dialects, and still further elaborated by a study of the coins and gems, have helped to place Iranian linguistics on as firm a basis as that of any other group of languages and materially to further the science of comparative philology. The Modern Persian, moreover, with its admixture of Arabic and loss of inflections, both due to the Muhammadan conquest, offers an interesting linguistic parallel to English with its leveled case-endings, analytic structure, and vast infusion of Romance words due to the Norman-French invasion. In the matter of linguistic purity and the avoidance of foreign words in a national epic, the Persian poet Firdausi, author of the *Shah Namah* (A.D. 1000) affords an excellent parallel to the English poetic chronicler Layamon, author of the *Brut* (A.D. 1200); the one is as free from Arabic words, which later became popular, as the other from elements derived from the Norman-French.

Our own vocabulary to-day owes something to Persia. So common a word as *van*, used in moving furniture, is an abbreviation of *caravan* (which has been etymologized in the folk-speech as "carry-van") and is as much Persian as the name *shah* itself, or his *tiara*. The same is true of the words *paradise*, and *Peri*, *magic*, and *bakhshish*, which have a history as old as the *Avesta*. The Persian term *bazaar* is current in English, and *shawls*, *sashes*, *awnings*, *turquoises*, and *taffeta* are standard articles in our linguistic supply as well as in the business market. Products so generally common in America as the *orange*, *lemon*, *melon*, and *peach* (the latter word having come through the medium of the French from the Latin *malum Persicum*, "Persian apple") are Iranian in name as well as in origin. The vegetable *spinach* is Persian, and *asparagus* traces its lineage apparently through the Greek ἀσπράγος ultimately to Avestan *sparegha*, "shoot, stalk."¹ The list of our linguistic indebtedness to Persia might be increased by adding a score or more words, like *julep*, which is really an arabicized form of the Persian *gulab*, "rose-water," *hazard*, applied to taking one chance in a thousand (Pers. *hazar*), while *gul* and *bulbul* are familiar to every one who reads poetry about the nightingale and rose of Persia.²

The title of Persian literature to a place among the great literatures of the world is a recognized one, and it is perhaps in this domain that she can make the greatest claim upon our interest. In antiquity and compass Persian literature may rank behind its cousin, the Sanskrit of India, and its monuments may not date so far back as the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Old Babylonian, nor may its compositions make pretensions to rival the Psalms in loftiness, nor its style to match the

¹ This vegetable has gained much by being transplanted to the West, if I may judge by the asparagus which now grows in Persia.

² For a list of Persian words in English consult the appendix to Skeat, *Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*.

Greek in classic beauty, but this is equally true of any other Oriental literature. Persian literature has special claims of its own, and these are such as to allow it to rank high when compared with ancient models, and assign it a position of distinction in the line of epic, lyric, and descriptive poetry, when judged by modern standards.

Viewed in its broadest sense, the literature of Persia comprises all the literary monuments of Iran conceived as a national entity, and covers a period of more than twenty-five centuries. From the fact that "the book of records of the chronicles," according to Esther (vi, 1), was brought and read before King Ahasuerus, or Xerxes, we may infer the existence of annals, chronicles, and historical accounts, which were written and kept long before the days of Xerxes.

The *Avesta*, our oldest book in Iranian literature, is of importance chiefly because of its religious character and the light which it throws upon the conditions of early Media and Bactria; but some of the epic passages in its *Yashts* show that there must have been even earlier some sort of national literature in the form of annals or chronicles, lays or ballads, legends or mythical stories, traces of which survive in the *Shah Namah*, or Persian Book of Kings. The *Avestan Gathas*, or Psalms of Zoroaster, moreover, ring with the voice of a prophetic soul inspired by the greatness of his calling, and this lends a literary tone to the force of these metrical compositions. The Old Persian inscriptions have already been alluded to, and mention has been made of our interest in these rock-cut records of the great Achæmenian kings. Even the sober Pahlāvi, or Middle Persian literature, twice turns aside from its sacerdotal, scientific, or exegetical style of composition to give us an early instance of the Eastern biographical and historical romance, the *Karnamak*, or Gests of King Ardashir Papakan, and the *Yatkar*, or Battle of the Zoroastrian crusader Zarir.

Most interesting is the Modern Persian literature. This sprang up a century or more after the Arab conquest, as a revival of the old feeling of national pride and an effort to recall the lost glory of Iran then gave rise to a kind of literary renaissance. The names of the earlier poets of this era, like Rudaki and Dakiki, might be mentioned as worthy of praise, but we pass them over to pay homage to Firdausi, the Father of Persian Song, who wrote before the date A.D. 1000, and cast into the mould of undying verse the annals of Persia down to the Arab invasion. This work, a poem of 60,000 couplets, he called *Shah Namah*, Book of Kings; it ranks as a world-epic and entitles him to his proud name *Firdausi*, Poet of Paradise. His last poem, on the romantic story of the passion of Potiphar's wife Zulaika for the youthful Joseph, though written in old age, is a masterpiece and full of fervid imagination, while his panegyric and his satire on his patron but deceiver, Mahmud of Ghazni, is unsurpassed in power

of expressing eulogy and scorn. The last years of Firdausi were unhappy ones, marred by a failure to meet with a suitable acknowledgment of his true greatness, and tinged even by a suspicion of heresy imputed to him by reason of the sympathy shown toward the fire-worshippers in his epic. He died almost in exile, and this pathetic fact inspired the pen of the English poet Edmund Gosse to write *Firdausi in Exile*. Not to mention translations, and adaptations or versions of episodes in the *Shah Namah* which have been made in continental tongues, I may call to memory Matthew Arnold's *Sohrab and Rustum*, one of the finest pieces of epic narrative in the English language, which is based directly on Firdausi's tragic incident of the death of Sohrab by the hand of his father Rustum in mortal combat on the battlefield.

To speak of Persian poetry is to mention the name of Omar Khayyam, who flourished about A.D. 1100 and whose *Rubaiyat* has become an English classic through FitzGerald's memorable version of the quatrains. Editions, translations, commentaries, and appreciations of Omar in England, America, France, and Germany, number legion, and the study of this Persian poet has become so much a cult as to lead to the foundation of Omar Khayyam clubs in London and in Boston.

Less known in the Occident, but deserving a wider reputation than he has in the West, is Nizami (A.D. 1141-1203), a Persian master of the romantic epos. As an example of his narrative and descriptive power, I may mention his poem on the fatal love of the sculptor Farhad for Shirin, the lovely favorite of King Khosru. The monarch was aware of the artist's secret admiration; desiring to call forth new miracles from his chisel, as well as secure from him a work of lasting practical value, he promised the enamoured sculptor the hand of Shirin as a reward for his carving, provided he would also cut a channel through the lofty rock of Bisitun and lead the water to the plain beneath. The love-inspired artist accomplished the feat, but sacrificed his life in the task, for he threw himself down from the rock to destruction on hearing a false report that his beloved Shirin was dead. No more touching bit of narrative poetry is to be found than in Nizami's account of the tragic tale.

Familiar to every one interested in literature are the names of Sa'di and Hafiz. Sa'di's long life extended over most of the thirteenth century, and his experiences enabled him to combine the moralist with the poet. In his two best works, the *Gulistan* and the *Bostan*, Gardens of Roses and Perfumes, we have wise matter commingled with rich verse, and his short poems thrill with a human touch, while some of his stories and sayings are distinctly humorous. Hafiz deserves still greater fame. He died at Shiraz towards the end of the fourteenth century, and his tomb is pointed out, not far from Sa'di's, outside

the city of nightingales and roses. Hafiz is a poet's poet and one of the world's greatest lyrists; some acquaintance with his exquisite odes belongs to true culture.

If there were time, I should like to discuss the metaphysical poet Jalal ad-Din Rumi, of the thirteenth century, and the mystic Jami, who lived two centuries later, and to draw a comparison between their verses and the mystic poetry, sensuous imagery, and transcendental symbolism of the seventeenth-century English poets Donne and Crawshaw, or the *Purple Island* of Phineas Fletcher. Space also forbids me to include in the list dozens of minor names from Abu Said ibn Khair, an author of quatrains who died in 968, or Kamal of Isfahan, 1200, to the prose of the late Shah Nasir ad-Din's diary of his journey to Europe in 1889. Among the curiosities of Persian literature, moreover, is a culinary poet, Bushak of Shiraz and Isfahan, who lived in the fifteenth century and whose verses in praise of the cuisine would delight the heart of a gourmand; or again the clothes-poet, Mahmud Kari of Yezd, in the sixteenth century, whose lyre responded to the *Sartor Resartus* theme of robes and garments. Though the times to-day do not favor a poet's birth nor foster the cultivation of the Muses, the Persian race has not forgotten how to sing, and a renaissance of the poetic art may come perchance some day with a new order of things.

Little space remains for adding a few words about the influence of Persia on our own poetry. In the earlier ages Persia was little known to England except as a name, yet Chaucer alludes to Persian blue, "pers," in the *Prologue*, and "robes de pers" occur in the French original of the *Romaunt* which Chaucer translated. Marlowe has Persian names and Persian scenes in his *Tamburlaine*; and Shakespeare alludes to Persian attire in *King Lear* and to a Persian prince in *Merchant of Venice*, as well as to a voyage to Persia in his *Comedy of Errors*. Milton, besides making other allusions, summarizes the earlier history of Persia in his *Paradise Regained*, and Shelley recalls the pillared halls of Persepolis in a passage in *Alastor*. Byron's *Giaour* and Landor's *Gebir* hark back to the old Zoroastrian faith of Iran, and Matthew Arnold and Edmund Gosse have already been cited as falling under the spell of Firdausi. A dozen other instances of Persian influence on English poets might be cited, the best known being Tom Moore, whose *Lalla Rookh* fills the senses with the melody and perfume, color and beauty, tenderness and tremulous ecstasy, which is associated in imagination with the East.

In the realm of English prose, two volumes of *Persian Tales* were widely read in Europe in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and the so-called *Arabian Nights* are really largely Persian. The inimitable Persian novel, *Hajji Baba of Isfahan*, by Morier, is so thoroughly Oriental that Persians who read English mistake it for

a serious composition and take umbrage at some of its amusing accounts. One of our contemporary American writers, Marion Crawford, selected Zoroaster to be the hero of a pseudo-historical novel. A dozen more of examples would occur to mind if I had chosen to go outside of English and speak of the influence of Persia upon French, German, and other European literatures, but enough has already been said.

In conclusion and by way of summary I would emphasize again the value of Persian studies in the lines of history, religion, and sociology, art, architecture, and archæology, language and literature, and incidentally in philosophy and science. I venture also to express the hope that America may be led further to emulate the example of France, England, Germany, and Russia, in encouraging investigation in these particular branches of study relating to Iran and the Land of the Lion and the Sun.

SECTION B — CLASSICAL LITERATURE

SECTION B — CLASSICAL LITERATURE

(Hall 3, September 21, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ANDREW F. WEST, Princeton University.
SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PAUL SHOREY, University of Chicago.
 PROFESSOR JOHN H. WRIGHT, Harvard University.
SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. G. MOORE, Dartmouth College.

THE Chairman of the Section of Classical Literature was Professor Andrew F. West, of Princeton University, who in calling the session to order congratulated the large audience present that the great and abiding value of classical literature was recognized amid all the external splendors and distractions of this vast International Exposition. He then advocated the thesis that it was classical literature, rather than philology or archæology, that had the most value for the most persons in the modern world, that this was due to the quality of the ancient literature as Art, not as Science, — and that what was most needed in America to make the classics beneficent and effectual was the revival in full power of the *Literae Humaniores*, the trilogy of ancient literature, history, and philosophy which contains the beginnings and foundation lines of Western thought and expression.

RELATIONS OF CLASSICAL LITERATURE TO OTHER BRANCHES OF LEARNING

BY PAUL SHOREY

[Paul Shorey, Professor of Greek, University of Chicago, since 1892. b. Davenport, Iowa, August 3, 1857. Graduate, Harvard University, 1878; Ph. D. Munich, 1884; LL. D. Iowa College, 1905. Professor of Greek, Bryn Mawr College, 1885-92. Author of *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*; *The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*; *The Odes and Epodes of Horace*; *The Unity of Plato's Thought*.]

THE mutual interdependence of the constituted sciences, mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, if it does not admit of uncontroverted exposition, at least provokes arguments as definite as those of Spencer criticising Comte's classification of the sciences, or Professor Karl Pearson correcting the theories of both Spencer and Comte. But the *globus intellectualis* which this Congress has undertaken to survey includes other disciplines that are mainly, if not merely, collections of facts, as histories, or, at the most, systematic methods of envisaging facts, as psychology, ethics, sociology. And in respect of these, candor requires the acknowledgment that the topic of "Relations" is merely the theme of a discursive essay whose quality will vary with the talent or information of the writer, but which remains a literary exercise rather than the authoritative report of an expert. It is well that the historian of England or America should have the broad outlook of a Freeman or a Fiske. But he can do estimable work with no other equipment than the education of a gentleman, industry, and a facile pen. And similarly, though almost any fact or method of history or physical science may prove useful to the psychologist and the sociologist, hardly any could be singled out as indispensable in present practice. Inquiry into the relations of such subjects is chiefly occupied with the proof that they, scientifically speaking, exist. But, as Renan observes, the first geologists did not concern themselves with *a priori* demonstration of the existence of geology — they geologized. Now it may be true in the abstract that man writes books as the bee secretes honey or the silkworm spins its cocoon, and that literature as a mental, supra-organic, or social product will some time be brought under the province of psychological or sociological, not to say biological, law. But at present the study of literature is history, or, at the most, critical and scholarly method, and its relation to other pursuits is to be found on the one hand in the unity of modern historical and critical method to whatever subject applied, and on the other in the material which it provides for the student of psychology, ethics, sociology, ethnology, and comparative religion.

In these respects there is little to distinguish the historian of the classic literatures from other historians. His exposition of the known, his divination of the unknown, raise the same problems of literary, erudite, or critical method that confront the student of English, German, or Japanese literature. And if classical philology be defined as "the knowledge of human nature as exhibited in antiquity," the human nature of the Greek is presumably as significant for folk-lore, ethics, and sociology as the human nature of the Vedda or the Polynesians, and the *Iliad* is as instructive a document as the *Kalevala*.

But to pursue either of these truisms further would be to lose ourselves in detail, and after all miss the root of the matter. The essential facts that determine the relation of classical (and especially Greek) literature to the other intellectual interests of the modern world are those that distinguish it from other literatures, its peculiar intrinsic excellence and the influence which it has as a matter of history exercised upon the development of Western civilization. Herbert Spencer deplors the exaggerated attention that is still bestowed upon "two petty Mediterranean tribes." And it is true that to the geological and cosmogonical imagination familiar with æons of time and million-leagued space, the glory that was Greece, the grandeur that was Rome, dwindle to the punctual insignificance of the Roman Empire in Scipio's dream, or of the globe at whose "vile semblance" Dante smiled in retrospection from beyond the seventh Sphere. But our minds do not really inhabit the eternities and the infinities, but the historic atmosphere of the past three thousand years, and we do not live by the geological and cosmogonical imagination, but by admiration, hope, and love, and by the imaginative reason.

And a like answer holds when the petty parochial scale of Greek life is contrasted with the vaster ancient empires revealed by Oriental studies, or with the world-commerce and the world-politics which the progress of science and the fusion of races may be preparing for the twenty-first century. The ancient civilizations of China, Babylonia, and Egypt possess for us an interest of erudite curiosity. They do not speak directly to our minds or hearts. We are not their spiritual children, but the sons of Greece and Rome. Time may alter this by merging the life of Western Europe in a wider world-civilization whose unity will rest solely on the telegraph and the associated press, on the laboratory, the rolling-mill, and the battle-ship, and in which the peculiar spiritual inheritance and tradition of China and Japan will count for as much or as little as that of Italy, France, and England. When that day arrives a Martian sociologist, viewing mankind with impartial survey from China to Peru, will tabulate the statistics of Græco-Roman civilization in the fashion of Herbert Spencer, with no consciousness of the special quality that differentiates

them to our apprehension from analogous phenomena in the civilizations of the Nile, the Euphrates, the Hoang Ho, or the Amazon. A primrose by the river's brim will be a yellow primrose to him, and nothing more. With Mr. Goldwin Smith, he will speak of Hector's Andromache as "that savage woman." A line of Homer that happens to illustrate a "survival," a trait of primitive psychology, or the development of a political institution, will be for him a fact of precisely the same significance as a Babylonian brick, an Egyptian scarabæus, or a Fiji fetish. But that it had also been used as a text by Socrates and Plato, emended by the founders of Alexandrian criticism, imitated by Virgil, Milton, Goethe, and Tennyson, recited on the field of battle by a Roman Emperor, declaimed in the crisis of his destiny by an English prime minister, translated by Chapman, Pope, and Bryant, and singled out as a touchstone of true poetry and talisman of the grand style by Matthew Arnold, — these would be irrelevant and incidental associations, misty obscurations of the dry light of science.

Now for many purposes of the philologist as well as of the sociologist this scientific impartiality is the merest postulate of sound method, and to deprecate it is sheer sentimentality. "Into paint will I grind thee, my bride." Literature, even Greek literature, is raw material for the style statistician and the syntacticist of to-day, for the sociologist of to-morrow. As M. Gustave Lanson observes, in his courteous but cautious lecture on *Histoire Littéraire et la Sociologie*, the historians of literature have all been sociologists in the fashion of M. Jourdain, who produced prose all his life without knowing it. But the sociologist is abroad, and M. Jourdain is growing self-conscious. He now publishes his abstract of Buchholz's *Homerische Realien*, or his notes on *Athenian life in Aristophanes* in the *Journal of Sociology* and entitles them the *Sociology of Homer and Aristophanes*. They smell as sweet. The present speaker himself at the Congress of the Chicago Exposition delivered, or was delivered of, a study that has never recovered from the handicap of its baptism as *The Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides*. The contagion is irresistible, and for many purposes, I repeat, benign. But for the purpose of estimating the still vital significance of Hellenism to modern life and thought, this aping of scientific method is a falsifying abstraction from the essential facts of the historical tradition. The objectivity which it affects is possible to a child of modern Europe only by virtue of an ignorance which will prove more misleading than the prepossessions and prejudices of the professional Hellenist. It may be left to the sociologists of Tokio and Peking, who share no family tree of civilization with us unless it be that in the branches of which ancestors probably arboreal found nightly repose.

There are, however, some other conceptions of a science of Greek literature which if space permitted we might dwell upon at greater length by way of introduction to our main theme, or which from another point of view might even take its place. The best, the only history of Greek literature which is at the same time itself a literary work, is that of Alfred and Maurice Croiset. But despite its fullness of matter and finish of form, it is not the final scientific construction to which Professor Wilamowitz speaking for the new philology, or M. Brunetière as the representative of the science of literary evolution, look forward. For very different reasons neither would accept as adequate the definition of Matthew Arnold: "I call all teaching scientific," he says, quoting Wolf with approval, "which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources." Now if the sources were accessible, this definition might satisfy Professor Wilamowitz. But the record, like that of geology, is full of faults — gaps. And to the twentieth century philologist the science of classical antiquity has come to mean the fascinating art of piecing out the defects of our tradition by conjectural and divinatorial combination. Such work is scientific in its nice weighing of evidence and its methodical use of hypothesis. Where the analogy fails is in the lack of the means possessed by physical science for the control of hypothesis. The consequence is that while classical science slowly advances with wasteful, but, in the sum, not wholly ineffectual toil, the flower of classical culture and the fruits of classical education are choked by a riotous overgrowth of highly specialized pedantry and unverifiable conjecture. In spite of the forty thousand emendations of *Æschylus*, it may be doubted whether the most recent texts of the *Agamemnon* are any improvement upon those of the eighteenth century. The hair-splitting refinements and the formidable terminology of modern syntax have not impaired the point of De Maistre's observation that "since they have taught us how to study Latin, nobody really learns it." And the dreary literature which has gathered about Homer, Plato, and Cicero, if it establishes nothing else, amply proves that the sane interpretation of great world books depends far more on the total culture which the individual reader brings to their perusal than it does on any collective progress of "science."

But this is by the way. There can be no question but that in some fields there is real progress in the filling out of the record. This is notably the case in the domain of Attic institutions and Attic law, where combination and conjecture are at once stimulated and controlled by the new material supplied by inscriptions. The same may be said of the history of Greek art, which has been completely reconstructed since Winckelmann, and of that history of Greek religion whose future outlines we can dimly discern. How far is it or can it be true of literature? We may hope for anything in what have

been called these "piping times of Papyrus." The immense literature called forth by the discovery of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* has brought us sensibly nearer to a complete conception of Greek historiography. In Bacchylides we have recovered not only a charming poet, but a standard by which to measure Pindar, and a clue to the history of the dithyramb. Herondas enlarges our conception of Greek realism. Timotheus, besides enabling Wilamowitz to reconstruct the obscure history of the νόμος, teaches us that a contemporary of Lysias and Xenophon could outbid in fantastic euphuism the most conceited Elizabethan, the most "precious" frequenter of the Hôtel de Rambouillet. We are no longer wholly dependent on Plautus and Terence for the restoration of Menander. The latest edition of Blass's Attic orators can illustrate in detail the contrast between the gentlemanly urbanity of Hyperides and the tense, professional eloquence of Demosthenes. And the tantalizing bits of Sappho that come as the one pennyworth of Hellenic bread to an intolerable deal of Hellenistic and Ptolemaic sack remind us that the greatest gap of all — that made by the loss of Greek lyric — may be filled any day.

But the modern science of classical philology is not content thus to wait upon the inheritance of the tomb. It has the courage of its methods. Its "hope treads not the hall of fear." It undertakes by sheer pertinacity in sweat-box interrogation of the extant witnesses, and by the exercise of the detective ingenuity of a Sherlock Holmes in the combination of data, to recover Greek literature for itself without waiting for the aid of Egypt or any other foreign nation.

From this point of view the science of Greek literature consists of such work as Professor Wilamowitz' reconstruction of what he naïvely styles "die ewige Poesie" of an entire lost Hesiodic epic from seven lines of fragments and a few remarks of the scholiast on Pindar; or Blass's detection of fragments of early Attic prose imbedded in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus, or the restoration of the writings of the Sophists from the polemic of Plato and his imitators, or the reconstruction of the plots of Euripides' lost plays, or the recovery of the lost post-Aristotelian philosophic literature, by the analysis of Cicero's philosophic works and the moral essays of Plutarch, Dion Chrysostomus, and Epictetus, or the determination of the literary chronology of the fourth century by logarithmic tables of Platonic particles and the polemical allusions in Isocrates. Only when all our losses have been thus made good, and the iniquity of oblivion repaired, can the "scientific" history of Greek literature be written, we are told.

To be distinguished from this philologist's science of literature is the conception of Taine, Hennequin, Posnett, and Brunetière, who would understand by the phrase something analogous to the

natural history, the comparative anatomy and embryology, the evolutionist biology, of the nineteenth century. On the first explicit promulgation of these theories by Taine their suggestiveness was conceded, their too vigorous and rigorous application deprecated by Sainte-Beuve and Scherer in criticisms to which the discussions of the past two decades have added little. There is, perhaps, some naïveté in laboring this point. To critics of the calibre of M. Brunetière, M. Faguet, M. Lemaître, M. Anatole France, M. Pellisier, the application of biological analogies to literature, and the theory of the evolution of *genres* is, like the question of objective and subjective criticism, a convenient theme for dialectical variations, a pleasant device for keeping aloft the shuttlecock of rejoinder and surrejoinder in the Parisian *feuilleton*. None of his critics can know better than does M. Brunetière that it was not the distinction between literary "history" and literary "evolution" that enabled him to write his admirable book on the French lyric of the nineteenth century, but rather his scholarly mastery of French literature, his trained gift of exposition, and his lifelong loving familiarity with the poets. The system does not save him from preferring, *tout bas*, Racine to Sophocles. It does not preserve him from vagueness and uncertainty when he touches on the poetry of England and Greece. Nor does the absence of a system prevent Scherer from being perhaps the only French critic of his generation who writes of English poetry as one to the manner born. The only law of literary development that has any prospect of general recognition is the law of fashion — expressed in the words imitation, culmination, exaggeration, satiety, reaction. And the chief canon of literary criticism was announced by Cicero two thousand years ago: "Nemo potest de ea re quam non novit non turpissime loqui."

What, after all, does *La Méthode Scientifique de l'Histoire Littéraire* of the conscientious Professor Rénard contain but a bald and painfully explicit enumeration of questions, problems, points of view, generalizations which every competent and scholarly modern critic applies as a matter of course when he needs them? And what genuine student of literature would exchange for a wilderness of such abstract categories the letters in which FitzGerald communicates the thrill of his literary admirations, or a Shakespearian interpretation by Lamb, Hazlitt, or Coleridge, a *Causerie* of Sainte-Beuve, an essay in criticism of Arnold, an "Appreciation" by Pater, a seeming-frivolous *feuilleton* of Anatole France or Jules Lemaître? Here, if anywhere, the saying of Renan applies: "It is the part of a clever writer to have a philosophy but not to parade it."

In any case, the battleground or field of application of the new biological criticism will for some time be French rather than Greek

literature. Greek will at the most be drawn upon for casual illustration of principles elsewhere established. M. Brunetière himself can hardly expect that after he has shown us how modern French lyric is a transformation of seventeenth century pulpit eloquence, he will be able to prove a like origin for the Æolian lyric of Sappho and Alcæus. The mere mastery of the erudition indispensable to the historian of classical literature will exercise a sobering and conservative restraint upon speculation, and a deep sense of Hellenic logic, measure, and proportion is incompatible with the exaggerations of the Spirit of System. We may venture to predict, then, that the future historian of Greek literature will have no thesis to sustain, but will write rather in the spirit of Croiset's admirable Introduction.

Thirdly the idea of a possible science of literature finds expression in the phrase "Comparative Literature." The literary criticism of the Romans, as it appears in Aulus Gellius and Macrobius, was mainly a comparison of Latin authors with their Greek sources. The criticism of the Renaissance often took this form, as we may observe in Francis Meres' naïve Macedon and Monmouth "comparative discourse of English Poets, etc., with the Greek, Latin and Italian Poets, etc." The comparison of the various Merope, Sophonisba, Medea and Iphigenia tragedies has always been a popular scholastic exercise. Comparative literature in a sense also is that discussion of the relative merits of the ancients and moderns which was suggested perhaps by Tacitus' *Dialogus* to John of Salisbury, Leonardo Bruni, and Dryden, and which constitutes an interesting but sufficiently studied chapter in the literary history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹ But something more than this is meant by the modern science of comparative literature, though precisely what it is not easy to say. In the International Scientific Series² it stands for a method of correlating the forms of literature with the corresponding social and political conditions, applicable impartially to the "tribal" epic inspiration of Homer or the Hottentots, to the drama and oratory of the city-state, to the development and expression of personality that accompanies the growth of the modern nation and finds its fullest expression in the modern "novel." In the practice of the few university chairs that bear the title, comparative literature is more concerned with coexistences than sequences, and seems to mean the special study of those periods of European culture which are swept by a common wave of thought and literary taste, — as the Middle Age, the Renaissance, the Reform. From this point of view are written the *Periods of European Literature*, edited by Mr. Saintsbury.

¹ Rigault, *Histoire de la querelle des Anciens et des Modernes* (Paris, 1859).

² Posnett, *Comparative Literature* (London, 1886). See also in *Contemporary Review*, June, 1901, his naïve account of how he founded the "new science."

The journals of comparative literature have hardly yet defined for themselves a field distinct from that of *Poet Lore* or the special journals of English, French, and German literature. Their hospitality welcomes almost any erudite inquiry that includes more than one literature in its scope, from the article on *Internationale Tabaks Poesie*, in the *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Litteratur-Geschichte*, N. F. vol. 13, p. 51, to the exhaustive study of *Der Einfluss der Anakreon-tik und Horazens*, auf Johann Peter Uz, in vol. 6, p. 329.

In this convenient, if not precisely scientific sense, "comparative literature" is simply the study of literature as practiced by the growing body of scholars who are enabled to compare one literature with another by the broadening of modern erudition, the multiplication of monographs, and the bibliographical facilities and card catalogues of modern libraries. From such studies a science may or may not emerge, but at present their constitutive principle is no definable scientific method, but Goethe's conception of a world-literature, or rather Matthew Arnold's idea of Europe as a federation of states whose culture is measured by their knowledge of one another and of classical antiquity.

If we lay due stress upon the slighted second element in this definition, comparative literature brings us back to our main topic, the historical influence of the classics upon the literatures of modern Europe. The proportion of articles devoted to this fundamental subject by the journals is absurdly small. And in return M. Texte, in his introduction to M. Betz's useful *Bibliography of Comparative Literature*,¹ complains that the new science has been coldly received by classical scholars. And it is doubtless true that the classicist is absorbed in his own specialty, and is inclined to be tenacious of distinctions of quality which scientific impartiality is supposed to ignore. But, to dismiss these recriminations, there is plainly a great work to be accomplished which demands the coöperation of both classical and modern philologists and critics. The relation of the modern literatures to one another can never be understood until their common debt to antiquity has been measured.

The merest outline of the work to be done requires more space than can be given to it here. The inspiration and influence of classical antiquity must be characterized for each of the great epochs of modern culture, it must be traced in the development of each of the national literatures, it must be minutely observed in the education and life-work of individual authors, it must be studied in the specific history of each separate literary form and tradition.

To the Middle Age it is Aristotle, the master of them that know, Hippocrates the physician, Virgil the mage, Ovid the story-teller,

¹ Louis P. Betz, *La Littérature comparée, Essai Bibliographique*, deuxième édition, etc. Strasbourg, 1904.

Boethius the consoler; it is the dream of Scipio with allegorical exegesis, the Platonic Book of Genesis in a maimed Latin version; it is the Tale of Troy and the Legend of Alexander, looming monstrous through the mists of tradition, or fantastically distorted in the mirror of chivalrous fancy. The *Roman de la Rose* itself, the quintessence of medievalism, is in its way as much indebted to classic *motifs* and copied from classic models as a poem of the Renaissance. The very epochs and revolutions of medieval thought are determined by the stages of its acquaintance with Aristotle, from the commentaries of Boethius and Porphyry, through Latin versions of Hebrew renderings of Arabic and Syrian translations to the recovery of the complete Aristotelian *corpus*. Its revivals of culture and reforms of education are pathetic preludes of the Renaissance, — the establishment here and there of a cloister school in which the Greek alphabet is learned and a few additional Latin poets are read. Its greatest thinkers and scholars are precisely those who avail themselves best of such opportunities for a wider classical culture — a "Venerable" Bede, a Scotus Erigena, a Gerbert, a Rabanus Maurus, a John of Salisbury, a Roger Bacon. Nothing could be less Hellenic than the distinctive quality of medieval thought and feeling. Yet it is no accident or paradox that an old-fashioned classicist like Victor Leclerc, transferred to this new field at the age of fifty, proved the best editor of the *Histoire Littéraire de la France* of the Middle Age. For the discipline of classical philology and the exact knowledge of the classical heritage of the Middle Ages are the indispensable equipment of the medievalist, in default of which the columns of Migne and the tomes of the Schoolmen remain a labyrinth without a clue.

To the Renaissance, again, the vision of antiquity is the dispersion of a long night, the rolling away of a great mist. It is the restoration of the title-deeds of humanity, the liberation of the human spirit from creeds that refuse and restrain, the discovery of man, nature, and art, of personality, eloquence, and fame. It is philosophy transfused with poetry. It is the religion of Beauty and the cult of Pleasure. It is Platonic Idealism and Platonic Love. It is incondite erudition, omnivorous reading, omniscient scholarship. It is Homer, Æschylus, Sophocles, Demosthenes, Cicero, Tacitus, Plutarch, pouring at once into the wide hollows of the brain, — knowledge enormous, making man as God.

To Humanism it is the diction of Cicero and Virgil. To the Reform it is the text of Scripture and the faith of the fathers.

To the classicism of the seventeenth and eighteenth century it is nature conceived as right reason, it is art controlled by common sense and submissive to a tradition of sustained dignity and nobility, it is humanity generalized and rationalized. It is law, order, measure, propriety. It is Aristotle, Horace, and Quintilian. It is correct tragedy,

Virgilian epic, and the point, finish, and hard-surface polish of Latin epistle, satire, and epigram.

To eighteenth-century sentimentalists, who saw it through the eyes of Rollin or Rousseau, it is the heroic and virtuous antiquity of Plutarchan *naïveté*, the nobly draped patriotic antiquity of Livy. It is Seneca recasting in rhetorical epistles the antithetic paradoxes of Stoic ethics, Juvenal declaiming against luxury, Tacitus idealizing the blue-eyed barbarian and retrospectively tempering despotism with epigram.

To the philosophy of pre-Revolutionary France it is enlightenment emancipating from dogma and superstition, nature throwing off the yoke of artificial convention.

To the nineteenth century it is the recapture of something of that first careless Renaissance rapture tempered by a finer historical sense, controlled by a more critical scholarship. It is the reconstruction of the total life of Græco-Roman civilization by German philology. It is the Periclean ideal of a complete culture reinterpreted by Goethe and Matthew Arnold. It is the deeper sense of the quality of the supreme masters, Homer, Æschylus, Pindar, Plato, Aristophanes. It is Greek sculpture recovered from the soil and appreciated by the finer connoisseurship that is aware of the difference between the Apollo Belvedere and the Hermes of Praxiteles, and the "Theseus" of the Parthenon. It is the inspiration of Greek poetry revived in Keats, Shelley, Tennyson, Arnold, and Swinburne. It is Greek philosophy, an unexhausted domain of research for the scholar, an inexhaustible source of suggestion for the thinker and the poet.

If we turn from the European to the national tradition, each of the great modern literatures will claim for itself the preëminence which Bursian's excellent history of classical philology asserts for Germany. And each will be in a measure justified. The culture of Italy never lost touch with Rome, and medievalism there was the twilight of an arctic summer. It was no mere affectation of the Renaissance that regarded Italian literature as one, whether written in Latin or the vernacular. The unity of tradition and the unity of national feeling imposed this point of view. Dante reaches the hand to Virgil across the centuries in a way impossible to a Chaucer or a Racine. And in the heroic lines of Petrarch, repeated as a trumpet-call in Machiavelli's *Prince*, in Leopardi's *Ode to Angelo Mai*, on the recovery of Cicero's *Republic* from a Vatican palimpsest, in Carducci's ringing alcaics on the exhumation of the Brescia Victory, we are sensible of a fervor and glow of feeling which no antiquarian theme could kindle in Northern breasts. Petrarch, the inaugurator of the Renaissance, the first literary dictator of Europe, and the first modern man, felt himself as much a Latin author as an Italian.

"Questi son gli occhi della lingua nostra," he boasts of Cicero and Virgil in the *Triumph of Fame*. The literature of the Renaissance is equally classic in motive in whatever tongue composed. The exquisite *Winnowers' Song* of Joachim du Bellay is a paraphrase of the Latin verses of Andrea Navagero, themselves the elaboration of an epigram attributed to Bacchylides in the *Palatine Anthology*. The sonnet of Angelo di Costanzo selected for special praise by Mr. Garnett is a combination of one of Ovid's *Amores* in the Octave, with a sestet translated from a conceit of Martial. Such surface indications merely point to the wealth of the mine that awaits the properly equipped explorer of the polyglot Renaissance classicism. Not only may we trace to it countless minor poetic *motifs* of the "Pleiad" of the Elizabethan and seventeenth-century lyric and of Milton, but it is the source of the French drama, of the literary criticism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,¹ of their political philosophy, and philosophical rationalism. And even where the classic form became a mere convention, the use of old bottles for the new wine, it was still, as in the days of Schiller, the sun of Homer that ripened the grape, and the old bottles that gave to the vintage its peculiar flavor. The decline of classical studies was a chief symptom, if not cause, of the Italian decadence. The Spanish inquisitor laid his ban at Rome upon that study of Plato which had kindled the enthusiasms and the idealisms of Florence. And when the lowest depth was reached in the conceits and affectations of the Marinists and the Petrarchists, the restoration of dignity and strength began with the return of the worthy if uninspired Chiabrera to Hellenic models. The slow revival of the Italian spirit through the eighteenth century was accompanied, if not caused, by the renewal of serious archæological and classical studies. United Italy to-day is a vigorous rival of France and England in the second and more scientific Renaissance of which Germany is the leader, and the names of three enthusiastic Greek scholars, Alfieri, Leopardi, Carducci, who are also the three greatest poets of Modern Italy, bear witness to the unwaning power of Hellenism in her higher literature.

For three centuries the literary and critical fashions of Europe were set by those of France, which in turn were determined by, or at least reflected, the phases of European scholarship. A revival of classical studies was repeatedly the prelude to a new development in literature, — at the Renaissance, in 1660, in the second half of the eighteenth century, in the middle of the nineteenth. Reaction leads to decadence or proves to be the substitution of one form of classical influence for another. The intellectual aridity of the later middle age was partly due to the encroachments of science, as then understood, upon literature in education. The literary studies of the Trivium,

¹ Spingarn, *History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, New York, 1899.

as John of Salisbury complains, were curtailed in order to hurry the student forward to Aristotelian dialectic and scholastic theology. The revolt against the medieval Aristotle was conducted in the name of Plato, and when the seventeenth-century Cartesianism at last banished the Aristotle of the *Physics*, literary criticism enthroned in his place the Aristotle of the *Poetics*. Ronsard, Montaigne, Rabelais, are direct products of Renaissance erudition and Renaissance enthusiasm. Ronsard is with the exception of the Hellenists, La Fontaine and Racine, the only poetical poet in French literature before the Hellenist André Chénier. Montaigne's saturation with ancient criticism of life makes the *Essays* a chief source of all subsequent ethical and reflective literature. Rabelais, beneath the veil of Aristophanic buffoonery and Lucianic satire, is pregnant with educational and social suggestions three centuries in advance of his age.

The half-century which ensued was one of decline in classical studies and of literary decadence. The classical revival of which Boileau became the legislator was, despite Racine, La Fontaine, and Fénelon, more Latin than Greek. This is the classicism that dominated European literature for a century and a half. For the healthy encyclopedic appetite and uncritical enthusiasms of the Renaissance it substituted a nicer taste and a more discriminating admiration. It marked the distinction between the antique and the classic. It undertook to correct the crudity of Senecan tragedy and Spanish melodrama by the precepts of Aristotle and the practice of Sophocles. It selected fewer models for more careful imitation, and completely assimilated the urbanity of Horace, the elegance of Virgil, the humanity of Cicero, the good sense of Quintilian.

The end of this classicism was, to copy the title of M. Bertrand's interesting book, at the same time a return to antiquity.¹ But it is only because he confines his survey to eighteenth-century France that M. Bertrand can describe this return to antiquity as a recommencement of the work of Malherbe, an attempt to resist the German and English invasion by galvanizing into artificial life a dying tradition. The tragedies of Voltaire or Ducis, the Georgics of Delille, the Pindaric odes of Lebrun, the criticism of La Harpe, may possibly be reduced to this formula. But the memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, the connoisseurship of Caylus and Choiseul-Gouffier, the investigations and discoveries of Villoison, the real if coquettishly displayed erudition of the "Anacharsis," are evidences of a genuine revival of scholarly interest in antiquity. In France and Italy this movement, after producing a few estimable scholars, antiquarians, and connoisseurs, was checked by the ignorance and educational unsettlement which the Revolution brought in its train. But in Germany it developed continuously into the new Renaissance in which

¹ *La Fin du Classicisme et le Retour à l'Antique*, etc. Paris, 1897.

we are still living. Again, we are reminded of the close connection between literature and the programmes of the schools. M. Faguet plausibly attributes the failure of the brilliant Romantic movement to create enduring drama, epic narrative, or serious philosophy, to the fact that the generation of 1815 had not learned their humanities. He sees the effects of a sounder classical discipline manifesting themselves between 1850 and 1870 in the more solid work of Flaubert, Taine, Renan, Leconte de Lisle. With the generation of 1870 we enter again upon a period of decline and decadence. But we need not consider the matter so curiously in order to appreciate the significance of the classics both for French literature and the scholarly study of its history.

This secular interaction of scholarship and literature cannot be traced in Germany, for the simple reason that while German scholarship dates from the Renaissance, or it may be from Charlemagne or the Apostle Boniface, German literature, in the proper sense of the word, begins with Lessing and may almost be said to end with the deaths of Goethe and Heine. But this fact only makes more prominent the coincidence and interdependence of this brief bloom of German literature with the great revival of classical scholarship which is one of Germany's chief gifts to the modern world. The detailed history of this relation is yet to be written. The outline is so familiar that I need not labor the point. Lessing, the founder, occupies a place in the history of philology only second to that which he holds in literature.¹ Of Winckelmann, the creator of the history of Greek art, Goethe says that he made his own career possible. The fruitful conceptions of historical method, national development, and the genius of primitive poetry, of which Herder became the herald, were derived from or illustrated by his study of the Greeks. The mainly Latin scholarship which he brought away from the University Goethe supplemented by long and ardent study of the Greek poets.² Schiller's preoccupation with the classics is manifest in his correspondence with Goethe and in his independent critical and æsthetic studies. All the great writers were the pupils, friends, or colleagues of the great scholars, the Heynes, the Wolfs, the Hermanns, and lived and worked in an atmosphere not merely of classical culture, but of enthusiastic scholarship.

As might be anticipated, the relation of English writers to the classics is more individualistic. English literature does not illustrate the periods of European thought so clearly as does the literature of France, and it is at no time so intimately associated with productive scholarship as the literature of Germany has been. But if we accept Macaulay's definition of the scholar, as one who reads Plato with his

¹ Kont, J., *Lessing et l'Antiquité*. Paris, 1899.

² Thalmeyr, *Goethe und das klass. Alterthum*. Leipzig, 1897

feet on the fender, the training of the English public school and the dilettante culture of the universities has given to English literature a larger number of scholars who are poets and poets who are scholars than any other literature can boast. As Tickell says in his *Life of Addison*, an early acquaintance "with the classics is what may be called the good breeding of poetry." Spenser, Ben Jonson, Milton, Addison, Gray, Johnson, Shelley, Landor, Tennyson, Browning, Arnold, Swinburne, are only the most prominent names in a list that, by the standards of other literatures, might fairly be enlarged to include Dryden, Pope, Thomson, Byron, and even, in a sense, Shakespeare, if Mr. Churton Collins¹ is to be believed, and Keats. And in consequence no other European literature is so rich in spontaneous and luxuriant classical imagery, or in the exquisite reminiscence and adaptation of classic phrase.

The detailed illustration of this belongs primarily to the editor of the classics, the commentator on the English poets. Thence it may be collected in monographs such as Professor Lounsbury's inquiry into the learning of Chaucer, Mr. Moore's *Scripture and Classics in Dante*, Professor Mustard's *Classical Echoes in Tennyson*. Such work is easily confounded with the trifling pedantry of the old-fashioned parallel-passage-monger. Yet it may be redeemed from this by judicious discrimination between incidental quotation and spiritual influence, and careful observation of the distinction between mere coincidence in human commonplace, and traits of difference in resemblance that help to characterize both the model and the copy.

In any case this despised detail is the indispensable basis of any science of comparative literature that deserves the name. And the critic of modern literature who neglects it exposes himself to strange mishaps. He is liable at any moment to emend the text or discourse on the typical significance of a passage which is a direct translation from the Greek or Latin. He will hear a unique Elizabethan lyric cry in a conceit versified from a Greek Sophist. He will taste the inimitable flavor of Elizabethan euphuism in an antithesis borrowed from Plato or Heraclitus, a "Gorgian figure" imitated from Isocrates, an epigram translated out of Seneca or Lucan. He will discern the moral progress of the age in a parænetic letter compiled from Isocrates, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and the Pythagorean verses; and note the symptoms of spiritual decline in a string of cynical epigrams copied from Juvenal and Tacitus. He will detect the distinguishing note of eighteenth-century Deism in a paragraph borrowed from Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, illustrate the special quality of Herrick's fancy by a couplet conveyed from Martial, and pitch upon a paraphrase of Æschylus to typify the romantic imagin-

¹ "Had Shakespeare read the Greek Tragedies?" *Fortnightly Review*, July, 1903.

ation of Shelley. Such critics may well take to heart the warning of Fielding: "The ancients may be considered as a rich common whereon every person who hath the smallest tenement in Parnassus has the right to fatten his muse. Nor shall I ever scruple to take to myself any passage which I shall find in any ancient author to my purpose without setting down the name of the author from whom it was taken." Even Mr. Swinburne sees the personal genius of Ben Jonson in scraps of the elder Seneca that found a way into his notebook, and dogmatically emends as meaningless a sentence that is an accurate rendering of a line of Euripides. Even M. Brunetière selects to illustrate how far the plasticity of Leconte de Lisle surpasses the art of Alexandria a passage directly translated from an Epyllion of Theocritus. Even Symonds celebrates the one fine tirade in the *Misfortunes of Arthur* without observing that it is a version of Lucan. It would be pedantry to attach any importance to items like these which might be multiplied indefinitely. But collectively they point a plain moral to the student:

" 'Tis not for centuries four for nought
Our European world of thought
Hath made familiar to its home
The classic mind of Greece and Rome."

The general reader may enjoy literature in ignorance of these pitfalls. But the professional interpreter and critic of literature must have the acquaintance with the ancients, or a certain *flair* for imitation and paraphrase, that will enable him, as Dryden says of Ben Jonson, "to track his author in the snow." He cannot evade the task by facile denunciations of the pedantry that spies upon the plagiarisms of genius. It is not a question of plagiarism at all, but of inspirations, origins, and sources. Nor may he dismiss the importunate topic with the Gallic lightness of M. Lemaître, who tells us the essence of all ancient authors is to be found conveniently potted in Montaigne. Rather will he declare with M. Brunetière that the chief desideratum of systematic literary study to-day is a history of humanism, and a history of Hellenism and the influence of the classics in Italy, Rome, England, and Germany. Such works will doubtless be written. The history of classical scholarship is already brought down to the Renaissance in Sandys's admirable compendium. For a satisfactory treatment of the larger theme, the history of the influence of antiquity, we must wait. The preliminary labor of detail is only begun. The accumulation and sifting of "parallel passages" in commentaries and monographs must go on. The history of every literary form or *genre* must be studied with a devotion not less minute but more discriminating than that which has been bestowed upon the epic and the drama. The fortunes of special literary *motifs* and commonplaces must be curiously followed. The sources of each of the great modern,

the influence of each of the great classic, writers must be traced backward and forward through the centuries. There must be a multiplication of such monographs as Tollkühns' *Homer und die Römische Poesie*, Comparetti's *Virgil in the Middle Age*; Rheinhardtstöttner's *Plautus and his Imitators*, Stein's *Sieben Bücher zur Geschichte des Platonismus*, Spingarn's *Literary Criticism of the Italian Renaissance*, Thalmeyr's *Goethe und das classische Altherthum*, Bertrand's *La Fin du Classicisme et le Retour à l'Antique*. Zielinski has sketched the influence of Cicero in the course of the centuries. Who will comprehend for us in a similar survey the Aristotle of antiquity, of the Middle Age, of literary classicism, of nineteenth-century scholarship and political science? Who, supplementing the work of Gréard and Volkmann, will show us not merely what Plutarch was to his own day, but what he has meant for Montaigne, for Shakespeare, for Rousseau, for Madame Roland, for Emerson? All this detail, however, though of intense and curious interest to the specialist, will receive its true significance only from the larger synthesis for which it is the indispensable preparation. The pseudo-classicists of the eighteenth century half seriously justified their slavish adherence to classical models by affirming that to copy them was in reality to imitate nature. As Pope says of Virgil: "Nature and Homer were, he found, the same." From this superstition the philosophic historian of Hellenism will be free. But he must and will recognize that classical literature collectively has been to the modern world something more than a certain number of particular books written by individual authors who lived in a pre-scientific age, though to a literal and nominalistic apprehension it is obviously and merely that.

But viewed across the chasm of the Middle Age in its transfigured historic detachment, its idealized totality, the art and literature of antiquity has been felt as a great objective fact like nature, a complete system of knowledge like science, the embodiment and symbol of a spiritual and moral ideal like Christianity. And as the history of our civilization could be written in relation to any one of these three great facts or ideas, so it can and must be studied in the various phases of its apprehension of classical antiquity as a whole. Such an historic survey will have more than a merely scholastic or erudite interest. It will confirm the salutary faith that the Hellenic inspiration, though often transformed, never dies, that it persists amid all change a permanent and essential constituent of the modern spirit, that it remains to-day for our finest minds in Pater's phrase not an absorbed element, but a conscious initiation. Across the gulf of the centuries, undimmed by the mists and fervors of the Middle Age, undeflected by the prismatic splendors of our twentieth-century palaces of art and science, the white light of Hellenism still pours unwavering its purest ray serene.

PRESENT PROBLEMS OF THE HISTORY OF CLASSICAL LITERATURE

BY JOHN HENRY WRIGHT

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THE comprehensive scheme of the organizers of this Congress for passing in review the various branches of human knowledge — their past achievements, their present conditions and relations, and their future prospects — has provided for classical antiquity under five fields of learning, in the group of sciences known as the Historical Sciences, where the term "historical" and "history" are used mainly in the old Greek sense of investigation. These fields are: the political history of Greece and Rome; the history of Roman law; languages, especially Greek and Latin; literature, especially classical literature; and classical art.

Classical antiquity, the civilization of the ancient Greeks and Romans, has left a record of itself in many ways. This record was made by persons, living, breathing human beings, with a wide outlook; hence it has a universal and a perpetual appeal to humanity. The ancients recorded themselves, their lives, works, ideas, and ideals, either collectively (or in smaller collective groups), or individuals among them made the record. The collective record is found primarily in all the institutions of the social organism (religious, political, and the like), and in that great social institution, as Whitney used to call it, language, — language as form and expression. The record of the smaller collective groups or of individuals was made in the various forms of individual or mainly individual expression, chiefly in art, and in literature which is language as artistic form and content.

The ancient record is in large part lost, in large part blurred and become difficult of decipherment. But much has been preserved, either actually and immediately, or mediately and indirectly in the tokens of influences on other civilizations; and by the use of methods and instruments of ever-increasing precision in philological research the difficulties of decipherment are nearly met. Thus by the aid of hints that we have we can discover anew in some measure what we

have not. For, as Terence¹ says, "there is nothing so difficult that it may not be found out by searching."

Of the various kinds of record, that of literature, whether extant or reconstructed, is much the most important. This is because literature is itself the very essence and exponent of whatever was most characteristic and significant in the civilization of the ancients; because it is the clearest and most intelligible of the records; because it is the amplest. Indeed, without it all the other forms of record are practically non-existent, or, if existent, are unintelligible. All philosophy, nearly all history, nearly all the light on religion and social institutions, are but the content of literature. The monuments of art, though they speak a language all their own, gain new and fuller meaning from the testimonies in literature concerning the art and artists of antiquity. Language itself exists in amplitude and variety only in the literature; indeed, in the case of the Greeks at least, there is little of the language extant that is not literary, *i. e.* marked by conscious art, even the rude memorials engraved on stone or bronze being thrown into literary form. And the full character and meaning of language, its range and power, are not revealed except in the highly developed forms of literature. If all other kinds of record were lost or made inaccessible we could still read in literature alone nearly the whole story of antiquity, in all its beauty and strength, though this might lack, to be sure, some elements of vividness and concrete reality that the monuments of art in particular yield us. Yes, as Bacon says, "the images of men's wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted from the wrong of time, and capable of perpetual renovation."

Extant literature, as has already been intimated, is the foundation and chief substance of our studies. But extant literature is for several reasons defective. In the first place, from it are absent many important constituents of the whole, the vision of which is the ideal of our efforts. Not only are the works of many great writers of antiquity lost, and known to us only at second- or third-hand in quotations or in scattered and obscure allusions, but even whole classes of literature have no adequate representatives in what has survived. Herein how different the problem of the student of a modern literature from that of the student of classical literature: the former is bewildered by the wealth of his materials, from which he must choose in order to draw his pictures; the latter is embarrassed by his poverty: at critical points he often can make only a sketch, and that, too, a conjectural one, whereas the other gives us a picture rich in detail. Then, too, in its transmission to our day, ancient literature has

¹ *Nil tam difficile est quin quaerendo inuestigari possiet*; which reminds one of Chaeremon's

οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὅτι
οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ ζητοῦσιν εὑρίσκεται.

suffered many mischances. The text in passing through the hands of scribes either unintelligent or too intelligent has often become something other than it originally was: it has been padded with inept glosses; its meaning has been misapprehended, and the false explanations that from generation to generation have gathered about and over the text have beclouded the eye of the reader so that he has not read the clear truth. He must, as George Herbert says, "Copie fair what time hath blur'd."

And yet even these unfavorable conditions have had their good effect. The fragmentariness and the perversion of the literary record have ever stirred the scholar to earnest endeavor. They have evoked the spirit of criticism, and have developed in the guild of classical philologists methods of accurate research, methods that in time have become models for all forms of historical inquiry as well as of philological inquiry in other fields. Again: these conditions have lent singular preciousness to every smallest item in the tradition. Each little thing, — each sound, each word, each phrase, each idiom, each thought, each turn, — each littlest thing has become important because of its possible significance in the reconstruction of the whole, that great edifice, the House of Ancient Life. We love and study the little because it is a member of the whole. Perhaps at times the idea of the whole has been lost sight of, in the student's concentration on the fragmentary and intrinsically petty. Of the scholar that goes astray for such small things, let us say what Hugutio¹ said in the twelfth century of a Latin verse, the writer of which had sinned in the quantity he gave *sincerus*, "Let it and its writer be erased from the Book of Life, and be not enrolled among the Righteous (*Abradatur cum suo auctore de libro vitae et cum iustis non scribatur*)."

One who speaks upon the problems of classical literature finds before him a vast field, in which scholars have been toiling for more than twenty-three centuries, with varying ideals, aims, and methods, meeting and solving problems of the most diverse character. At the earliest period, in the times of the creation of classical literature and in the times immediately subsequent when the speech in which literary works were composed was still a living tongue, scholars were concerned mainly with the interpretation of poets, with the explanation of obsolete words and of other obscurities. Then came an age of criticism and of comprehensive learning, when the ancient texts were collected, classified, edited, further explored and explained, the texts of prose writers as well as of poets, — an age of scientific scholarship, from the fragmentary remains of which we still have much to learn; then followed an age of scholarship in the service of education, with its excerpts, anthologies, its limited editions of classical authors, its handbooks

¹ Sandys, *History of Classical Scholarship*, p. 640.

its compilations of compilations. Then supervened the Dark Ages, when the lamp of pure literature, if trimmed at all, was trimmed for the service of sacerdotalism, or, burning low in an alien atmosphere, little drew the eyes of men: an age when literature was made subsidiary, treated as a storehouse of materials for discipline in the arts of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, and not as a noble end in itself — the *auctores* being slaves of the *artes*. These times were followed by the Great Awakening, when little by little the full significance of the ancient heritage dawned on men: at first, a period of literary enthusiasm, when the form of ancient literature chiefly engaged the attention of the educated world, and men sought to write like the ancient masters; then, a period when the interest of scholars was turned from the form to the matter, when the items of knowledge and wisdom buried in the ancient writers were disinterred, and set forth in works and editions that are even to-day marvels of learning and lore. Next followed an age of criticism, which was exercised mainly on the texts of classical writers. "It was," as Professor Hardie has said, "neither creative nor ardent, like the first [period], nor encyclopedic in its material knowledge like the second, but critical and grammatical." It clarified the texts, healed corrupt places, sought to establish canons of idiom, formulated the laws of meter, discriminated with severe judgment the spurious and the authentic in ancient literature. Finally, hardly more than a century ago, began a period of classical scholarship in which all the finer qualities of the three preceding periods (since the Renaissance) are happily combined and developed, — an age of searching criticism, of encyclopedic learning enlarged by the lessons of comparative grammar, of history, of art and archæology, and of enlightened literary enthusiasm and appreciation, an age of better methods in all departments of classical scholarship and of the coördination of these departments into a single whole, so that one throws light on the other. The outcome of it all is that we may to-day say to the wise student of the ancient texts, what was said to Macrobius centuries ago:

meliora reddis quam legendo sumpseras.

The conception of the function of the student and teacher of classical literature has thus varied somewhat from century to century, ever gaining new and enriched meaning. But I doubt whether we have much improved upon the definition of this function as given toward the close of the Alexandrian age and recorded by a commentator on Dionysius the Thracian, the first of the venerable guild of grammarians. The task of the *γραμματικός*, or student and teacher of literature, we are told, has four parts, — τὸ ἀναγνωστικόν, "accurate reading aloud"; τὸ ἐξηγητικόν, "explanation"; τὸ διορθωτικόν, "correction of the text"; and τὸ κριτικόν, "criticism," i. e. mainly æsthetic.

The first — μέρος ἀναγνωστικόν — emphasizes the great truth that ancient literature is almost without exception the spoken word written, and that unless the word once spoken is *heard* again the voice of literature loses many of its most significant notes. Not only must there be correct pronunciation of single sounds, but the unique cadences of ancient speech, so different from ours, must be caught and reproduced. The book, the written page, the printed word, must be made, as it were, to disappear; must not stand between author and reader; the voice of the poet, the orator, the philosopher in his conversation on high themes, must speak directly to the ear and mind of the student. The second part — τὸ ἐξηγητικόν — reminds us that it is the duty of the teaching scholar to remove all the difficulties that lie in the way of complete and intelligent apprehension and appreciation, manifold as these difficulties are. The third element of the scholar's function — τὸ διορθωτικόν — means that the scholar must purify his texts, correcting them so as to bring them as nearly as may be to the words originally spoken. The fourth — τὸ κριτικόν — that he must judge the works he studies in their larger relations, especially in the light of the standards, æsthetic and ethical, that either have been set up by the achievements of other masters, whether in classical literature or in other literatures, or may be inferred by the philosopher from the constitution and normal life of the human soul.

The problems that confront the student of classical literature at the present time may be present problems either because they are perpetual problems — hence ever at hand — or because they are peculiar to our present age, either newly arisen, or re-arisen, their immediate demand upon us to-day being caused by conditions and emergencies peculiar to these our own times.

In speaking of some of these "present problems," I have not kept nor shall I hereafter keep distinct these two classes; nor will it be possible to do more than hint at a few of the problems, whether old or new, that call for a solution, or a better solution. These will be taken, in what remains to be said, from the field of the history of classical literature, and will have to do mainly with the demands that may reasonably be made on the historian of classical literature. And by historian of classical literature and the demands to be made on him, I mean not only the writer of formal works on this subject, but the classical scholar, investigator, and teacher who deals with themes from or phases of the subject of the history of classical literature, and the ideals he should set before himself. In touching upon deficiencies in present or past performance, and in sketching the limitations as well as in extending the boundaries of our field, of course many problems will be suggested by implication, though the allusion to them will be brief and the treatment of them sketchy.

The historian of classical literature has to do, to begin with, with individual authors, with the literary creations of men who were once alive and who spoke each to a particular audience. These men or their work he makes real to himself, and as writer or teacher real also to the world in which he himself lives. He is thus, in the first instance, one who understands and appreciates his author, and, in the second place, an interpreter.

As one who seeks to understand his author, he must first be able to place himself at the point of view of the reader to whom the book was originally addressed. The writings of the ancients, in spite of their universal appeal, were not written for us; they were written each for a particular audience, and it was that audience that most fully understood them. Hence it is only as we can put ourselves in the place of members of this audience that we can apprehend the meaning of the message they received. This means, in brief, that for the time being we must ourselves be the ancients, must know their language as they knew it, — in its power, delicacy, and subtlety of expression, — must be familiar with all the circumstances and elements — social, religious, political, ethical — that conditioned the production and determined the character of the literary works in question; we must respond to every emotion that anciently stirred: we must surround ourselves with the atmosphere spiritual and intellectual that surrounded the original audience. How much this means! It means, for us who live in a different age, a power of keen and discriminating appreciation and an almost limitless learning, vital and vivifying, in many fields, not in language alone, but also in history, in antiquities, in philosophy, in art.

The student must also be able, in a way, to put himself at the author's point of view; to realize vividly that the author was once a living personality and individuality. This implies the amplest and most sympathetic knowledge possible of the author himself, and of all that will make him intelligible: the world of ideas in which he lives, his characteristic habits of expression whether in his language — in its vocabulary, grammar, and idiom, in its rhythmical flow — or in choice and arrangement of his material; recognizing above all that every author is his own best interpreter, to be known only by him who reads and reads and re-reads him time and again. Furthermore, enabled in the ways indicated to see and hear and understand his author as he was to the men of his own day, the scholar must be competent to place himself, for the most fruitful contemplation of his author, at what we may call the universal point of view, the point of view at once of common humanity stripped of its accidents, focused on realities, and of the enlightened scholar and wise man who, knowing in an organic way, like a master, the best and most significant things that men of all times have achieved in letters, with these

compares and contrasts, and in the light of these passes judgment on what the author of antiquity has done.

But the student of classical literature, if he is to be also something of an historian of this literature, has a further function: he is the interpreter of the ancient writer, his interpretation finding expression in formal works on literary history, or in monographic studies of special topics, or in the comment that accompanies editions of classical books, or in translations into the vernacular. The interpreter's first qualification for his task is of course the understanding of the work he would interpret in the spirit and to the extent already indicated. But it is obvious that besides this qualification he needs others that are very different, such as thorough knowledge of the language of interpretation, and a mastery of the art of interpretation, which involves among other things a knowledge of the audience to which the interpretation is to be made not unlike his knowledge of the audience for which the work was originally intended, and a power effectively to reach and move that audience. The work of the interpreter of classical authors can never be wholly done. It must be renewed from age to age, from generation to generation. The authors remain, and perhaps their text reaches its final form, but with the discovery of new material, with the invention of new instruments of research, the knowledge that gathers about them grows apace, and the new knowledge throws things into a new perspective, and brings out unsuspected relations. With all this must come new interpretations, demanded not only by the newer light, but also by the incessant though almost unobserved changes in the media of interpretation, in the meaning and values of language, changes in the æsthetic standards that regulate expression, but yet more changes in the audience to which the interpretation is addressed. It has been so in the past. Again and again the phenomena of the ancient world, as these have shimmered before us in literature, their spirit and significance, have been imperfectly grasped and falsely explained. Antiquity sometimes has been understood solely in terms of the times in which it was passed in review, just as the ancient languages have been pronounced by students of these languages according to their own vernacular, students who thought, forsooth, they were speaking Latin or Greek. The scholars of the early Christian Church, some of the leaders of the Renaissance, the motley crew of neo-Pagans, have each and all had their own understanding and interpretation of antiquity — how imperfect, how far from the truth! Lack of sound and comprehensive knowledge and prepossession by subjective theory or fancy have caused the failure to behold the truth. And yet even views that are only partially true, or are dark, highly colored or distorted, or unsubstantial, have been fraught with instruction. It is for these reasons and for others that

the work of the interpreter of classical antiquity is never finished, can never be finished. Authors will continue and must continue to be edited, monographs must be written, and there will ever be calls for new histories of classical literature.

The interpreter of the writings of the ancients — especially of the great poets of Greece — must always have a happy task. His work will have a universal appeal; in no other literature than that of Greece has been so complete and so adequate an expression of national life and ideals, in this case of the whole of the life and thought of a people marvelously endowed passing in brilliant review before us. Then too the Greek poets (as Aristotle has observed), in fact, all great poets, express the Universal with penetrating and impressive power: the individual is the speaker and mouthpiece, but the message is from humanity to humanity. "The 'I' [of the lyric poet]," says Tennyson, "is not the author speaking of himself, but the voice of the human race speaking through him." "Der vollkommene Dichter spricht das Ganze der Menschheit aus," said Goethe.

There is another fine saying of Goethe's, quoted by Biese: "Literature [what Goethe elsewhere calls *Welllitteratur*] is but a fragment of fragments; of what has been done and spoken only a very small part has been written down; and of what has been written down only a very little has remained, and yet even this little shows so much of repetition that we are impressed with the thought of how limited are the soul and fortunes of man." A national literature, like that of the Greeks, is but a part, a member, of the *Welllitteratur*, and is apprehended in its fullness only when so apprehended. Similarly, Greek and Roman literature themselves, when each is considered with relation to what makes it up — its several groups or kinds of literature, and within these the individual authors, and under each author his own separate works, every one of these being (as Plato has reminded us) a living organism — are but organic parts of larger and larger units, the lesser being intelligible only in their relation to the larger units, and the larger intelligible only when their relation to their organic constituents is recognized. Hence the historian of classical literature will do more than know and interpret the individual authors, and his history will be more than a collection of notes and memoranda of this nature, arranged on a chronological string. He is concerned with authors not alone as separate individuals, but also — and primarily — in their relation to each other and to their literary progenies; he is concerned less with static conditions than with dynamic relations. Literature, a particular literature, as an organism, has had an organic growth and development: it is his concern to discover the origins; to trace the complex stages of growth; to determine the modifying influences; to analyze each

successive form of literature and to study its inheritances as well as its original features; to show how one movement of thought passed into another, with the fitting modes of expression, how action and reaction succeeded each other; in the case of individual authors to ascertain and set forth their sources, — in the fullest sense of this much abused word, — the great types according to which their works were framed — how these types arose — and their modification of the types; their special literary originals and the degree to which they were dependent on these originals; their personal innovations and their characteristic additions to the riches of literary expression whether in art or in substance of thought. Literary histories of this nature — or perhaps I should say studies in literary history of this nature — are now beginning to be written. Foundations for them have been laid in a more comprehensive and accurate knowledge of some of the branches of literature and of some of the authors, and the superstructure will arise as a matter of course. To be sure, at times even in our day some of these attempts are for obvious reasons foredoomed to failure: like those of a French ecclesiastic, who has recently undertaken to prove that Homer is but a copy and travesty of the Bible: Is not Agamemnon's refusal to deliver Briseis modeled on Pharaoh's denial to release the Israelites? and are not four children given to Agamemnon because Saul, King of the Jews, had the same number? — the very difference in the sex of the members of the two families — one son and three daughters as against three sons and one daughter — being but a subtle proof of this theory!

We have already briefly adverted to the problems that will confront the historian of classical literature, as, first, he studies the individual work, then passes on to the author, then to a branch of literature, and at last to the national literature either of the Greeks or of the Romans. But these national literatures are, as we have remarked, organic parts of what Goethe has called *Weltliteratur*. What — we now inquire — is the relation of the historian of classical literature to the science of *Weltliteratur*, which, for want of a better name we call "Comparative Literature," and what are the problems that arise from this relation?

As a science fundamentally historical, comparative literature has exactly the same problems that we noted as arising in the study of a national literature, though on a much larger scale, "and in diffusion more intense" (as George Eliot says). But comparative literature has something more; it has in fact some of the qualities of what the makers of the programmes of this Congress might call a Normative Science: it teaches us, or should teach us, the fruitful doctrines of æsthetics and psychology as applied to literary creations. The ancients constructed their canons of art of various kinds, not as

a result of abstract metaphysical conceptions, but concretely from a study of all accessible materials and models of the particular art, whether of poetical criticism as by Aristotle, or of oratory as in the tradition that emerges to view in the lesser writings (*e. g.*) of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, or of plastic art as in the series of writings beginning with Xenocrates and Antigonus of Carystus. But vast additions have been made to the wealth of literary expression since the days of Greece and Rome, and these additions must be considered by him who to-day would lay down the canons of universal literary art; Aristotle, were he alive now, would be the first to recognize that no theory of epic poetry would be complete that omitted Virgil, or the *Nibelungenlied* or Dante, no theory of tragedy that failed to consider Shakespeare and Molière and Goethe. As Aristotle's theory of the state was founded on studies of a vast number of special states, Greek and non-Greek, — a theory that he used effectively in the criticism and illumination of the history of the Athenian and Spartan states in particular, — so must every theory of literary criticism that is to be applied to the elucidation of ancient literary history be a comprehensive one and be based on a consideration of all that deserves the name of literature, whether ancient, medieval, or modern.

As an historical science comparative literature has at least these three functions: (1) Comparison of similar forms of literature as these are cultivated by different people, with different languages, different traditions of all sorts, attention being drawn to resemblances and contrasts: such as forms of the narrative, whether in the epos or in romance, and the manifold forms of dramatic and lyric art. Obscure passages in the history, within a given literature, of one of these forms may receive something of illumination from the history of it in another, though here an *ignis fatuus* has often been taken as an authentic flame. (2) A second function is the study of the history of the treatment of special literary *motifs* in different literatures, *motifs* which often crop out absolutely independently in various parts of the world, to the bewilderment of the scholar. (3) A third function is that of tracing the history of the influence of literary ideals and models, and of individual authors and individual works belonging to one literature, upon the literature or literatures of subsequent times; or, turned about, of making inquiries wherein the varied phenomena of one literature are followed up to their sources in another or in several others.

Obviously, in a derived literature, or in one whose elements are to a very large extent inherited or borrowed, the necessity of tracing these inherited or borrowed elements to their originals will be imperative, and of that form of activity may consist in large measure the investigation of the history of these literatures.

Such derived literatures are, to a greater or less degree, all the literatures of Western Europe, after that of Greece. Latin literature is, of course, original in some of its elements and qualities, but for the most part, as of course I need not demonstrate in this presence, it is an imitation or an echo of Greece. Hence the student of the history of Latin literature will be vastly concerned with Greek literature in order to understand adequately his own.

The student of Greek literature, for the purpose at least of ascertaining its originals, will have little occasion to make use of the lessons of comparative literature; though occasionally even here valuable hints may be received, *e. g.* on certain Semitic or Oriental influences on Greek literature in and before the sixth century B. C.

Greek literature, as everybody knows, is marvelous in its originality — originality in forms and types of literature, in themes, in treatment, in metrical and rhythmical expression, in adaptation of word and phrase to thought — in all that makes up literature. The student of Greek literature is drinking ever at the fountain-heads of European literature. For some creations of Greek literature that are lost in their original form and are found only in later imitations or workings-over in Latin (or even in the Semitic tongues — such as Arabic or Syriac), the student of Greek literature may need to follow down and examine the later productions — as for example in reconstructing the Greek originals of plays of Plautus or Terence, of lyrics of Catullus or Horace, and of many other books in Greek prose or verse that exist only in later excerpts or abridged translations.

It is at once vastly interesting and suggestive to trace the later fortunes of Greek literature and of individual works, but this is a *πάρρησις* for a student of Greek literature; there is almost too much to be done in Greek literature itself. We are less concerned, as distinctive students of the history of Greek literature, with what it became than with what became it! On the other hand, from the point of view of the comparative study of the development of the forms of literature, and of the history of identical literary *motifs*, as from that of its universal philosophical lessons, the science of comparative literature will be useful to the historian of Greek literature (as that of comparative philology has been to the student of the history of the Greek language), while from almost all points of view it is absolutely essential to the student of the history of Roman literature, and of all later literatures.

I have sketched, in meagre outline, the principles which the historian of classical literature should follow in order to solve the problems, new and old, that confront him. Have the demands herein involved been as yet adequately met? To me there seems very much to be done: first, in the successful application of all

these principles; secondly, in the coördination of the items of knowledge already won; and thirdly, especially with reference to the lessons obtainable from comparative literature, in ascertaining many new and essential items of knowledge.

The mere statement of the principles has suggested obviously, in large measure, the method of their application. The historian of classical literature must above all be an artist; disaster and failure will attend him if he allows his learning, or rather his mass of scientific information, to confuse or obscure for him the simple and severe outlines of his ideals, the clear manifestation of which is his aim. His work in its final form must be marked by due proportion in all its parts, and must be transfused by the vital spirit.

The most difficult, because the most comprehensive, task is of course that of writing general histories of classical literature. From the failure to apply in the right way all these great principles, the perfectly satisfactory general history of classical literature has yet to be written. On the other hand, the successful application of these principles, in work on certain classical authors or on special branches or topics in the history of classical literature, has often been made, though in outline. It may be invidious to name names; but I would recall, of German scholars of recent date, among the dead only Bernays, Ribbeck, Rohde; among the living, Usener, Diels, Wilamowitz, Hirzel. In the ascertainment of essential items of knowledge, how much these men, and countless others, have accomplished! And yet how much remains to be done! I will not venture to draw up a list of *desiderata*, but will only call attention to a topic or two. We lack, for example, for certain phases of Greek literary history, careful compilations of all the available ancient data that relate to them. With all the investigation of sources (in the narrow sense of the term) that has characterized the last half-century, there is still a sorry absence, in much of our work, of that careful discrimination of primary, secondary, and other mediate sources, through which alone sound conclusions can be drawn. Are there not many dark places yet to be explored in the relation, *e. g.*, of many Latin works to their originals? With the new light of all sorts recently won, may not many a lost Greek play be more successfully reconstructed than has been possible in the past? Are the relations of certain of the Greek and Roman writers to their own times so clearly apprehended as they might be? The history of certain branches of literary expression need to be followed out, such as some of those suggested by Ribbeck sixteen years ago: the forms and principles of poetic narration from the *Iliad* down to Nonnus's *Dionysiaca*, including the development of the epos,—mythic-heroic and historical,—the narrative *ἔμπος*, the epyllion, and the idyll. The history of the elegy or of the elegiac form of literary expression,

of tragedy, of comedy, of satire, of oratory, of the rhetorical writers (to limit myself to works distinctively literary) suggests many a new problem, besides the many already solved.

Numerous and vast as are these problems, they will not long remain unattempted and unsolved, though new ones, for the reasons earlier given, must incessantly arise. The unity of spirit, in the bond of peace, which to-day unites scholars, and the ampler provision for the organization and promotion of research that has been made of late by learned societies and by universities, will simplify and advance the scholar's work as never before.

The wise and fruitful study of special topics will lead on to and prepare for the more difficult knowledge of the classical authors as personalities, delivering each his own message to his time and to all time — and this again will yield, to him who seeks it in a right spirit, a broader and deeper conception of humanity, of the meaning and beauty and wealth of this our mortal life. Herein will be fulfilled our highest desire: for, in the words of Goethe:

"Humanität sei unser ewig Ziel!"

SHORT PAPERS

PROFESSOR W. S. MILNER, of the University of Toronto, presented a short communication to the session on "The *ἀμάρτια* of Aristotle's *Poetics*."

PROFESSOR FRANK GARDNER MOORE, of Dartmouth College, presented a paper on "Rhythm in the Philosophical Works of Cicero."

PROFESSOR H. R. FAIRCLOUGH, of Leland Stanford, Jr., University, presented a short paper on "Virgil's Relations to Græco-Roman Art."

SECTION C — ENGLISH LITERATURE

SECTION C—ENGLISH LITERATURE

(Hall 1, September 22, 10 a. m.)

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FRANCIS B. GUMMERE, Haverford College.
PROFESSOR JOHANNES HOOPS, University of Heidelberg.

THE RELATION OF ENGLISH LITERATURE TO OTHER SCIENCES

BY FRANCIS BARTON GUMMERE

[Francis Barton Gummere, Professor of English, Haverford College. b. Burlington, New Jersey, 1855. A.B. Haverford College, 1872; A.B. Harvard College, 1875; Ph.D. Freiburg University, 1881; studied at University of Christiania, Norway, and University of Berlin, 1887-88. Instructor in English, Harvard College, 1881-82; Head Master of Swain Free School, New Bedford, 1882-87. Member of American Philosophical Society, Modern Language Association of America. Advisory Editor Modern Philology. Author of *Germanic Origins; Old English Ballads; Beginnings of Poetry.*]

ANY literature in the vernacular must always pay a heavy price for that quality which may indeed insure it against neglect, but which cannot fail to invite the charlatan and the unprofessional patron. The accessibility of English literature is in vivid contrast to the professional safeguards of such studies—I take the late President Porter's example—as quaternions; those forts and towers, one may be sure, shall never be “a joy of wild asses.” But the abuse of this accessibility is by no means confined to Baconians and other lithe creatures who snuff up the wind of literary doctrine; scholars themselves have not been free from blame. What Bernheim says¹ of history is true in even greater degree of literature; the representatives of other sciences think themselves justified in dealing with literature from their own point of view, for their own purposes, with their own methods, and without any special preparation within the literary pale. They apply theories and formulas, which may be valid for their own science, but which are inapplicable to the problems of literature until tested by the control of literary facts and submitted to methods of literary research. In this relation of English literature to other sciences, the scholar's one duty is defense; and defense, obviously enough, lies in a rigorous demand for adequate preparation, for exact knowledge of the English tongue in all its stages, for acquaintance, in reasonable degree, with the sources and the texts, and with their mutual relations as documents of literature.

¹ *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, 1894, p. 68.

Seven eighths of the current reproach of pedantry flung at modern studies in English, at excessive zeal for linguistic problems, may be said to spring from an unholy desire to talk about Shakespeare and Chaucer without the trouble of finding out precisely what Shakespeare or Chaucer means. But the English scholar has other than defensive relations with science; he must not neglect the relation of literary facts to laws which psychology, ethnology, sociology, have shown to be of permanent importance for literature itself, precisely as the psychologist or sociologist must not too eagerly impose these laws upon literature without due study of the particular case. In certain brilliant researches, psychological and biological in method, sociological in aim, M. Tarde, working on the lines started by Walter Bagehot in his *Physics and Politics*, arrives at the formula of invention and imitation, a formula which he declares to be of quite universal validity. He then goes on to apply it to literature, really with no more novelty in this general view of the case than can be found, stripped of biological and psychological allusion, in a dull paper about the same formula read by the younger Racine long ago before the Academy of Inscriptions; but M. Tarde announces, without due researches in literature itself, without due employment of a literary method, that all great literature begins (*débute*) with a great book, like the Bible, or the Iliad.¹ Now, while M. Tarde's theory of the social process may be right, as opposed to Herbert Spencer's theory about the development of the arts, it is nothing but grotesque in this invasion of literature. Again, for the other instance, a student of English literature, say in its development in the days of Queen Anne, who should refuse to take account of the considerations urged on social and psychological grounds by Bagehot himself in his brief study of "literary fashion," would be darkening his room against a welcome flood of light from the allied sciences. Some use of these sciences is certainly desired; to determine it, one should take into account the specific work in hand, the point of view and the objective point, and one should also know something of the steps by which scientific method in general, as well as particular results of scientific research, have come into the alliance with literature.

First of all, it should be clearly understood in what function the student of English literature appears; much of our current controversy might be avoided if these lines of research were more carefully drawn and the object of it were kept steadily in view. Passing by the publisher's public, the mob of gentlemen who read with ease, and coming to those whose attitude toward the subject is of importance for other reasons than mere supply and demand, we may count three types: the individual reader with valuable opinions, who notes down what M. Anatole France has charmingly called the adventures of

¹ *Les Lois de l'Imitation*, p. 233.

one's mind among books, — the irresponsible but genial critic; then the responsible and professional critic, the critic of the schools; and finally the man whom, for lack of a more specific name, we may call the scholar. Montaigne, Sainte-Beuve, and Taine would perhaps best impersonate these several functions on a high plane of achievement. The first is a literary free-lance, and his alliances cannot concern us. For the other two, while it is evident that the critic is frequently a scholar, in the best sense of the term, often a far better scholar than the manufacturer of dissertations, and while there are surely more bad scholars than bad critics, seeing that the critic is anchored to his facts, while the scholar may drift over seas of erudition to no purpose whatever, none the less there is a very well-marked distinction between them, and this distinction points imperatively to a useful division of labor. It divides the critic's main task, which, in Professor Saintsbury's phrase, is "the reasoned exercise of literary taste," or, in other words, the assignment of values and the maintenance of a standard, from a task which is not so much the "bird's-eye view," so heartily detested by Professor Saintsbury himself, as a scientific study of facts in their whole range, and a search for the principles and laws which govern the course of literature as an element in human life. Everybody knows the distinction; but in practice it is neglected to a most astonishing degree. Too often scholar and critic are at odds, each thinking of his own intent and imputing it to the other; and these barren disputes, waged back and forth over quite familiar facts, could be settled offhand, or else dismissed as groundless, if only it were clearly understood that on one side critical considerations are at stake and on the other side interests of the scholar's larger but no more important research. To take an illustration from the learner's point of view, Ward's *English Poets* is an anthology on the great scale which could hardly be surpassed; it was fitting that Matthew Arnold should write the introduction for it, and that critics of the first rank should write the separate appreciations. One hears it said that to read this book aright is to understand the history of English poetry, — and no statement could well wander farther from the truth. Here is no history of English poetry, but rather a practical and admirable criticism; not because long epics and all dramas had to be omitted, but because the history of any body of national poetry, of any literature, is something quite different from a synthesis of appreciations. For the critic the sum of parts in a literature is vastly greater than the whole; for the student of literature as a social element, the whole is vastly greater than the sum of its parts. Let us take a still more obvious illustration of the neglect to keep in view the real object of research. The dispute about literary types, not yet lulled to rest, loses its seeming contradictions so soon as we separate critical from scholarly interests.

Hennequin, like M. Tarde, ridiculed the notion of a type; and from a critical point of view they were right in defying any one to combine into a type of Touraine authorship such natives of the soil as Rabelais, Descartes, Alfred de Vigny, and Balzac; while the late Joseph Texte¹ was quite as successful, defending his views on the making of cosmopolitan literature, when he challenged the critics to detach the typical Scotsman, the typical northern peasant, from their idea of Robert Burns. For Burns means one thing in the scale of literary achievement, and he means quite another thing in the scale of literary evolution; and the two meanings, while related, must not be confused. The critic is right when he insists that the sense of values in a work of art should not be merged into mere questions of environment; the scholar is right when he protests that discussions of artistic value, of personality, shall not cloud his view of cause and effect working in long ranges of literary evolution. As the critic deals mainly with the product and its maker, the science outside of literature which most nearly concerns him is psychology. Professor Dilthey's several essays² have called attention to this application of psychology to the problems of authorship and the individual in art,—an example that so far has had little following in the study of English literature by any consistently psychological method. On the other hand, it is clear that the study of this literature as a social development, and as a whole, calls for help from such sciences as sociology, ethnology, and anthropology, with history, of course, as an inseparable ally. To trace back these two tendencies, one toward an isolated and individual problem, and one toward the problem of evolution in literature, is an interesting task; both of them begin in the oldest critical studies. No doubt they can often unite in one effort, and with the happiest result,—witness the perfection of that study of Villon made by the late Gaston Paris, and many another masterpiece of the same kind. For the purposes of this paper, however, they should be considered each for itself.

Before undertaking this task, it may be well to glance briefly at an alliance of literature with scientific studies which concerns neither critic nor scholar, but rather the poet himself. Professor Shaler has recently called upon criticism to decide whether an imagination trained by the quest of things scientific may not be fitted by such training for poetic achievement, and has submitted certain interesting dramas of his own making for the test. The answer will be of considerable interest; for the assumption is quite different from that other and quite familiar appeal which from time to time has urged

¹ Defending also the *milieu*; see his *Jean Jacques Rousseau*, p. xvii, ff.

² Notably his *Beiträge zum Studium der Individualität*, Sitzungsber. der Berlin Acad., 1896, I, 295, ff. The psychological school of criticism in Germany, mainly concerned with Goethe, has done little so far of a comprehensive and positive character.

the poet to get his material and refresh his style from the results of scientific discovery. In 1824 Sainte-Beuve noticed a book by Ferdinand Denis, *Scènes de la Nature sous les Tropiques, de leur influence sur la poésie*, — intended, as the critic says, to serve poets and to “open new sources for their inspiration.” This praiseworthy cause, however, had been for some time the care of sundry English writers who formed a little school of their own, and who, while they failed in their practical ends, did no small service to the cause of a more scientific study of literature. Dissenters by creed, physicians, ministers, and the like by profession, they were cut off from university training, and treated classical traditions with anything but respect. Their actually scientific papers¹ gave place now and then to a scientific discussion of literature. To this group belongs the credit of Aikin’s somewhat tiresome essay, *On the Application of Natural History to Poetry*;² it suggests more modern subjects for the poet and more accurate description for his method. Take the “migration of birds,” says Aikin, and the “calabash tree,” and “that enormous gigantic serpent of Africa, which a poet might employ with striking effect.” Dr. Percival urges³ “the alliance of natural history and philosophy with poetry,” recommending even a knowledge of medicine. Addison, in his deistic enthusiasm, had long before advised poets to seek inspiration in these things; and even Coleridge seems to have heard advice of this sort, probably from some of his Unitarian friends. At any rate, he attended certain lectures on chemistry in order “to increase his stock of metaphors.” But the *Ancient Mariner* relied on no such expedients; it was honest Erasmus Darwin who made the supreme effort of this school, forgotten now save for one title, the *Loves of the Plants*.⁴ Whatever the scientific poet may do, and he may do much, the poetry of science has not yet become the poetry of poetry.

It is the scientific spirit in literary studies which claims our attention here. Vico made a foothold for the precise formula and the general principle; but more exact dealings with certain problems of literature had begun before his day. Accuracy of observation, and collection of related facts, took the field primarily in the study of language as means of literary expression. Kircher — I suppose him to be the man whom Archbishop Usher, talking with Evelyn in August, 1655, called a mountebank and cited as instance that the “Italians” of that day “understood but little Greeke” — Kircher touches this exact method in his *Musurgia Universalis*, a not quite unreadable book; it correlates poetry with song, gives musical

¹ See the *Proceedings* of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Manchester.

² Warrington, 1777.

³ *Moral and Literary Dissertations*, Warrington, 1784, the sixth essay.

⁴ Goethe’s *Metamorphose der Pflanzen* has more to say on the subject; but it is after all a *tour de force*.

notes for the crowing of a cock, and is illustrated by pictures of the ear. Similar illustrations, showing the invasion of literary criticism by scientific minds, can be found in the anonymous *De Poematum Cantu et Viribus Rythmi*, really the work of Isaac Vossius who died in 1673 as canon of Windsor. The Abbé du Bos, who knew the book and who is himself so surprisingly modern in his conception of his task, suggests for the student of literature a closer study of phonetics. The extreme phase of this scientific method is doubtless to be sought, in Marmontel's *Natural History of Poetry Considered as a Plant*, the title of a section of his essay on that art.¹ Beattie, in an otherwise dull essay,² would consider the physiognomy of a land in relation to the character of its poetry, a task which was undertaken for English literature only a few years ago by the Romanes lecturer at Oxford.

Here, of course, the scientific spirit has called in actual science as an ally in literature; and here too, very obviously, is a phase of that long and famous discussion about the influence of climate. From climate to social conditions is a short step. The older controversy was begun in its modern form by Du Bos; but questions of the kind go far back. Galen says that Posidonius taught this doctrine;³ and it was current in Plato's day. Du Bos, remarking that Fontenelle suggested the idea and ought to have developed it, undertakes to give proof for it; arguing from individuals to nations, and from a nation to its literature, he makes out a fair case for physical environment. The arguments grew warm, with the critics, as one might expect, mainly in opposition. Blackwell, by his studies on Homer, outstripped Du Bos in enthusiasm for the idea; Dr. Johnson, in his life of Milton, sneers at it. A temperate summary of the case occurs in a book neither deep nor original, and now quite neglected, but valuable for its cosmopolitan note, Denina's *Discorso sopra le Vicende della Letteratura*, published in Turin in 1760, translated in 1771 into English by John Murdoch in a small volume called *An Essay on the Revolutions of Literature*, and republished not only twice in Italy, but also in Berlin in 1784, under the auspices of Frederick the Great, to whom it was dedicated; the author uses German as well as French writings, and has a very modern sort of chapter⁴ entitled "Influenza dell' Inghilterra nella Letteratura del Continente," — a neat supplement to the still limited ideas of Du Bos on the scope of comparative literature, and not without interest for the student of to-day. Like the modern critic, Denina is inclined to lay more stress on the com-

¹ *Poésie*, in vol. iv of his *Eléments de la Littérature*, contributed to the *Encyclopédie*.

² *Poetry, and Music as they affect the Mind*, in *Essays*, Edinburgh, 1776, but written in 1762.

³ Gudeman, *Sources of the Germania*, in *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, xxxi, 108.

⁴ In the Naples edition of 1792, II, 230.

parison of literature with literature and less on the results of other sciences. He is sure that Du Bos rides the climatic hobby too hard. But his protest, however mild, was unavailing. Montesquieu made climate almost supreme, but brought the people itself into full view; in time, Comte corrects the physical influence by the moral and the mental, adding his famous *milieu intellectuel*; and at last Taine comes to the full notion of sociological, ethnological, and physiological environment as controlling factor in literature. Taine marks for literature — by a happy chance, particularly for the study of English literature — the culmination of a great movement in the arts, in statecraft, and in philosophy at large, which everywhere tended to find the source of things not in individual initiative, human or divine, but in vast forces, cosmic law, working with absolute certainty and to ends of a consummate perfection. As men turned in government from king to people, and in nature from a personal and voluntary supervision to the great democracy of natural forces, so in literature itself, art as well as science, one put the individual author into the background and began to talk of the literature of a nation, the poetry of a people. Literature as a whole loomed large in the foreground and absorbed the individual product. Origins and beginnings were eagerly studied; and along with this particular study, helping it and helped by it, rose the new and yet unnamed sciences with which we are now concerned. "Study the people" is the new cry of an anonymous reviewer, probably Goldsmith himself, giving advice to the poet; "study the people," repeated the scholars who took special literatures in hand; and "study the people" was the watchword of that school of thinkers in England and France who founded the science of sociology. At these two last-named groups we are now to look.

It was literary criticism, old as literature itself, which began the new movement as part of that eternal discussion about the tests and character of genius. Blackwell, Lowth, Hurd, Warton, Young, and Robert Wood, the English group, Condorcet, Montesquieu, and Rousseau in France, and, above all, the German Herder, drove criticism from dusty library corners into the fresh air. This process, so often described as a "return" to nature, to medievalism, to sincerity of heart instead of acuteness of mind, — the gist of Rousseau's first discourse, — to savage simplicity instead of civilized duplicity, — the theme of the second discourse, — was really a sociological and ethnological extension of the timeworn discussion of genius in the spirit of the great democratic movement everywhere astir. Lowth put the genius of Hebrew poetry, even of its figures and tropes, in the life of the Hebrew people; Wood, following Blackwell, but with a saner conception of things, did a like service for Homer, comparing Homeric "manners" with those of American red men;

Sir William Jones, in one of two essays¹ added to his poems, pits spontaneity and natural genius against the theory of imitation as defended by the Abbé Batteux, and opens a significant view into the literature of an old and distant people; everywhere a transfer of genius from individual to folk, nation, race. Young's essay, highly rated as it is, has less novelty than one might suppose; Hobbes had written to something of the same purpose, and St. Evremond, exiled in England, had seen the great light long before Young; poetry, he said,² is the speech now of gods and now of fools, but rarely of ordinary men. This, of course, is the claim for *esprit*, championed by Du Bos, against Boileau's plea for common sense. All the threads of this long controversy for genius and the people, nature, spontaneity, were woven by Herder into his doctrine of natural, national genius, and the history of humanity itself.

Parallel to this movement in literary criticism went the progress of the new sciences themselves. In England, Locke and the grotesque but incisive Mandeville, then Hume and Adam Smith, and, I am fain to add, Lord Monboddó, along with the French school, gradually made these new allies of literature into recognized sciences. Locke invoked the reports of travelers, and advocated the study of "children, savages, and idiots."³ The comparative method seized upon modern instances. England's influence on France, French ideas in England, are constantly cited by this school. Mandeville, and, after him, Hume and Adam Smith, use what would now be called statistics. Mandeville, long before Rousseau set up a perfect savage, insists on the savage as he is, and laughs at Sir William Temple's virtuous red man as "fit to be a justice of the peace." Hume, though skeptical about the influence of climate on national character, finds⁴ that the "rise and progress of the arts and sciences" are due to sociological conditions rather than to personal initiative and imitation. Adam Smith, however small the compass of his essays on this topic, is of supreme importance; Dugald Stewart, indeed, his editor, thinks that Smith really invented that "theoretical or conjectural history" which deals by scientific inference with the origin and growth of things hidden in a remote past. As for Monboddó, while it may be true, as Sir Leslie Stephen says, that he followed dull Harris in an attempt to revive Aristotelian philosophy, what he really accomplished was his own. Gibbon on the steps of the capitol at Rome, planning his great work, is matched by Monboddó moved to write his *Origin and Progress of Language* by the perusal of a Huron dictionary supplementing a book of travels among the American

¹ "On the Arts commonly called Imitative," in *Poems . . . from the Asiatic Languages*, Oxford, 1772.

² *Œuvres Meslées*, Tonson, 1709, II, 119, ff. "de la Poésie."

³ Patten, *Development of English Thought*, p. 158.

⁴ *Essays*, ed. Green and Grose, I, 174, ff.

Indians. The comparison is suggestive. Sociology, ethnology, — Monboddo complains that only three "barbarous" languages were in his time accessible, — and now anthropology, take the field. The last named, one may say, was founded by Voltaire, Turgot, and their followers, as well as the history of civilization so called; these sciences, meanwhile, were made popular by Rousseau,¹ precisely as it was left to Herder to popularize the sociological study of literature. From Herder to Taine is simply a progress of the alliance.

The great century of the sciences had hardly begun, however, when a reaction set in, feeble at first, but gathering strength in certain critical and philological quarters. A. W. Schlegel called the student of literature back to his own ground, insisting — salutary work! — on a critical knowledge of the subject, on profound philological studies. Historical and comparative to a brilliant degree, Schlegel nevertheless distinctly opposes the spirit of sociological combinations and generalizations then invading literature. He refuses to lose the author in his environment. Lachmann performed a somewhat similar service in philology pure and simple; and the often admirable work of Müllenhoff shows not only a praiseworthy concentration on the literary problem itself, but a superfluously contemptuous attitude toward the aids that were offered by actual ethnological and sociological studies. The democratic movement came into disfavor everywhere. Cosquin ridiculed the autonomy of the popular tale and turned it over to the tender mercies of imitation — imitation on a new and literal scale unknown before. Taine's own masterpiece was hardly published before a goodly number of critics and scholars were at work to throw down the main prop of his literary method, the doctrine of the *milieu*; while all the old watchwords of the sociological school came more or less into discredit. "Laws" and "forces" are phrases that are as plainly obsolescent in some quarters as "providence" is obsolete. A very healthy reaction, to which all praise is due, was meanwhile putting the real facts and the unquestionable problems of literature into the foreground of investigation, and sending theories of origin to the rear. The great doctrine of environment, the great problem of evolution, are not exactly put away forever, but they are certainly postponed to a more convenient season, or else relegated to books² that make no pretense to exact literary research; while, for this research itself, the theory which now holds the field is that convenient formula already named, the formula of invention and imitation. Students of English literature consult Taine nowadays, not because his theory is right, but because of his genius and grasp

¹ A remarkable passage in Rousseau, *Sur l'Origine*, etc., ed. 1793, I, 58, ff., suggests that two men, one rich and one wise, should circumnavigate the globe simply in order to study the human race.

² Posnett and Letourneau, for example, are both scholars who really belong to another department of investigation.

of significant facts; for method, they follow rather such an historian of our literature as Hettner, in his admirable volume on the eighteenth century; his definition¹ of literature — "the history of ideas, and of their scientific and artistic forms" — is dominant over Taine's famous triad. Of allied sciences, psychology is now the favorite; for psychology is in demand with each of the two divisions of literary research. The formula of invention and imitation is neatly halved. To the critic goes invention; his old quest of genius, his old study of the individual and responsible artist, is restored in full measure; while to comparative literature, a new and lusty science, which must ignore social forces and all such exsufflicate and blown surmise, is assigned the glorified search for stolen goods, mainly, however, without imputation of unrighteousness in the theft, — in a word, the trail of imitation. The "history of ideas" and their "artistic form" is a more dignified phase of the same task, but in a larger scope; to trace ideas and artistic forms from place to place, from time to time, glancing only as an incident of the way at environment and social influences, is beyond all doubt the present way to the stars. Criticism, meanwhile, is taking good care of invention, and is preserving genius from all popular contamination. In a word, the relation of English literature to other sciences is now a relation far more limited and reduced in the strictly professional domain than was the case four decades ago, or at the opening of the preceding century.

This reaction against sociological studies has, however, gone too far. No science has ever rejected in mass its store of old achievement; and while the extravagances must go, the mistaken method and the too confident, too sweeping theory, ancient good is not all uncouth, and the solid gains of those great scholars who fought the democratic fight in literature shall not be flung away. Returning to the useful division of labor between critic and scholar, one asks what is their present attitude, in sober and rational survey, toward the sciences in question, particularly toward sociology? What shall they reject, and what shall they retain? It is clear that the monarchical school, like the democratic, may run to an extreme; while the latter took a poet entirely out of his own personality, and overwhelmed him in a flood of influences, inheritances, movements, and things not only figuratively but often literally in the air, the monarchical method tends to surround the author with a hedge of divinity and psychology, and to set up a theory of divine right in matters of art. Criticism of the best class now begins to refuse recognition for this theory. Brunetière, in his study of literary types as well as literary personalities, is witness for a still lively relation between modern science and the larger scope of criticism. His studies, however, border closely

¹ Preface to fourth edition.

on the scholar's domain; and there is as good evidence for the need of a sane alliance with sociological theories in the unsatisfactory results of those studies of authors which depend altogether on psychological analysis; the sight of these inverted gentlemen diving or burrowing into the alleged mind of a Goethe is not inspiring, and Goethe himself would have been the first to recommend them a bout with even sociological hard facts.¹ Sainte-Beuve's way was far more productive. And for the scholar himself, even Taine's way is not yet abandoned; with certain smoothings and straightenings it will still prove the best way. As the atmosphere slowly clears up, it is seen that of all the host who have tried the task, Taine alone came near to writing a real history of English literature; he did not quite do it, — no; but only with him does one have the sense of a whole literature in broad and general movement, yet without loss of the sense of values and the delicate shading of the parts. To come back to the old disconnected array of summaries and appreciations, with more or less eloquence about the divinity of art, would be suicidal. A recent historian of English literature has the air of introducing one to his club, and recommending the more important members. This will never do. *Suum cuique*. The true history of English literature should not be a series of criticisms, any more than the criticism of some one English author should be a general history and treatise on contemporary life, with a few apologetic individual details. What is really needed by way of correction for Taine's method is not only to reckon with the literary shortcomings of the work, but to get a new and sound idea of environment and social conditions from sociology in its modern form, and from history at its best.

Taine's most vulnerable point, of course, was his treatment of the Early English period; he knew little about it, and, when he wrote, little was known about it by anybody except the Germans. Here his theory of the *milieu* was at its worst, simply because he combined a ton of theory with two or three ounces of fact. The Englishman of that early period, reasoned Taine, gorged himself with pork, or starved on acorns, and drank oceans of beer; he fought incessantly; he had no manners and few books; hence a literature of pork or acorns, beer, clownishness, ignorance, and turmoil of fight, — a literature which Taine read only in scanty excerpts of an inadequate translation. But it does not follow that the modern historian should give up Taine's sociological idea. He can well keep it, and practice it, provided only that he cleave to his facts; and they are difficult

¹ They seldom refer to their great master's advice:

Wer die Dichtkunst will verstehen
Muss ins Land der Dichtung gehen;
Wer den Dichter will verstehen
Muss in Dichters Lande gehen,

— which seems to cover the case.

enough. The scanty remnant of literature read at first hand, he has to put this into proper relation with its environments in order not only to understand it, but to supply the omissions, and to restore, so far as he can, the literature as it was in its whole range and expression. Back and forth, between these scanty remnants of literary achievement and the baffling hints of history, he must fare, until he decides just what this literature has to say for itself, — its proportion of emotion and thought, its relation to classic remains, its proportion of monkish isolation, and its measure of supply from contemporary life, — and until he decides whether this life itself was of the noble, semi-barbarian type which Grimm and Waitz and Freeman championed, or that feudal complex of a few chieftains and a host of serfs which certain sociologists now declare to have held the foreground of earliest Germanic as well as English history. Ethnology is offered as an aid in this study; but ethnology, so far as it parallels past stages of our race with modern savage conditions, must be used with a caution which borders closely upon abstinence itself. English survivals, on the other hand, are of vast importance for early English literature and life; and what the Germans call *Culturgeschichte*, and Professor Tylor wrote without so expressive a name, but with a wealth of material and consummate genius of exposition, is a science with which the scholar in literature must maintain relations as intimate as may be. And all this is in the spirit of Taine.

Students in English literature, however, are not mainly busied — or at least, let us hope they are not — with the reaches of literary evolution. At the farthest extreme from this task they work on the trails of imitation, and trace the course of jest or theme or phrase in its passage from land to land, from century to century, from author to author. I have elsewhere expressed the opinion that this work, highly valuable in itself and as a detail in larger tasks, assumes too much importance when it makes itself the main business of comparative literature and becomes a kind of vast bookkeeping for the settlement of accounts as among the literatures of the world. As I hinted, behind this mere barter are the mines, the mills, and the seedfields of literature itself. No better corrective for the abuse, or at least superfluous use, of comparative literature on these trails of imitation can be found, as I believe, than an alliance with sociological interests. Studies which take environment into account, and reckon with social conditions at every turn, which grant that while the story may pass everywhere, yet the form of it and the expression of it belong to the time and the locality as well as to the author's genius, these, combined with analysis of the actual literary traffic, will go far to restore dignity to literary investigation without impairing its exactness. Literature is a thing of export and import; it is also a thing of growth, and always stands in some connection with the society which produces it.

When the individual author is in question, other scientific influences come rightly into play. Here scholarship, as one is forced to call it, must lean heavily upon criticism and ask psychology for aid; here is the field for doctrines not only of the intellectual process, of authorship in itself, but of heredity as well. What subtle influence plays through the heredity of literature, passing from author to author and from group to group, M. Brunetière has told the world of criticism, heretofore too eager for discoveries in individual genius, too eager to write down invention as its master-word. But the significance of groups and schools in authorship frequently remains hidden without sociological help. In dealing with any school of the sort, which has got its vogue in whatever way, there must be careful consideration whether this vogue is due to the author or to certain social, national conditions. It is probably right to connect the vogue of Shakespeare's historical plays, on English ground at least, and in their own time, with a demand for a glorification of England brought about by the ruin of the Armada and by the new feeling of national importance. It is also, doubtless, right to connect the recent outburst of historical novels in America with a similar sense of national importance rising steadily since the Civil War and leaping into prominence with the results of the war with Spain. But the offspring of the one Spanish war is not to be compared with the offspring of the other. There the social forces ran far behind the literary power of execution, and in Shakespeare's case the social parallel amounts barely to a detail; here, so far as one can judge at short range, the social, national phase is overwhelmingly important, and the books themselves, save possibly in one or two cases, are merely of commercial importance. Of the two facts regarded as literary phenomena, one is full of significance for the sociological study of literature, and has no attraction for the critic, while the other, interesting in a casual way on the social side, is carried impetuously from any such point of view and is submitted to the great court of literary achievement.

This division of labor is, then, evident enough as at least a partial solution of our problem. The relation of English literature to other sciences lies mainly in the need, for aid in the scholar's undertaking, to study its evolution as a whole, to investigate its groups, its general movements, and the influences which have determined its course. The sciences which offer this aid direct are those that deal with society, with racial and national divisions, with the general history of man on the earth. Criticism, on the other hand, seeking after values and maintaining standards, has little use for these sciences save in an indirect and casual way. It finds its warrants in its own material. In individual psychology, however, it may have a valuable ally. For both of the great interests, finally, scholarship and criticism alike, history is an indispensable background.

One science I have left altogether out of account. Psychology of the people, demopsychology, whatever its name, has been lately revived after a long sleep in the volumes of its almost forgotten journal, — a sleep that seemed to be the sleep of death. But it is yet too formless, even in its modern shape, for satisfactory use. Including every social achievement, politics, art, language, letters, it bids fair to be a science of things in general; and till it is completed in that perfection, sociology will comfortably serve our turn.

PRESENT PROBLEMS OF ENGLISH LITERARY HISTORY

BY JOHANNES HOOPS

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THE subject which was assigned to me for my address would seem naturally to require a certain choice and limitation. The number of problems with which students of English literary history are at present occupied is endless; only the principal ones can come into consideration for our purpose, and even among these a selection is necessary, which must needs be of a subjective character: opinions will differ as to the importance of different problems. Nor can a solution of the problems discussed be attempted in the scope of a lecture; only some suggestions can be given.

Significant problems present themselves in all periods of English literary history. In Old English literature the Beowulf question still awaits its final settlement. Some points, to be sure, are almost unanimously accepted to-day. So far as the historical basis of the Beowulf epic, the age and the dialect of the manuscript, the scene of the action, and the home of the saga is concerned, there seems to be an almost general agreement; but as to locality, time, and mode of the genesis of the Beowulf poem, as to its mythological foundation, the author, etc., opinions at present still differ widely, and it surely will be some time before the controversy about it will subside, if this will ever be the case.

In Chaucer philology one important task is above all to be solved; the establishment of a critical text. Meritorious as Skeat's great edition certainly is by reason of its valuable introductions, notes, glossary, and various readings — the text is treated too arbitrarily and cannot be regarded as final. No doubt, the establishment of a critical Chaucer text is particularly difficult: it is not only a task, it involves a problem. But it must be tackled and will be achieved some day. John Koch's critical edition of *The Pardoner's Tale*, lately published, on the basis of the entire material, is an encouraging attempt in this direction.

In spite of the thousands of books that have been written on Shakespeare during the last two centuries, in spite of the legion of authors, both learned and dilettante, who are still engaged in editing, criticising, and commenting upon the works of the greatest British

poet, there remain a great many questions unanswered, and new ones crop up continuously that demand an earnest consideration. I am not thinking of the famous Shakespeare-Bacon squabble, which is nothing but a literary farce. Originated in the land of humbug, and eagerly adopted by would-be scholars in the land of mists and in the land of dreamers, it is still carried on by a set of people who may, on the whole, be characterized either as amateurs with an enviable superfluity of leisure; as hysteric women with a sense for the mysterious; or as cranks, or as swindlers. It would be an encroachment upon the reader's time to enter once more into a discussion of this literary sea-serpent. But the origin of the *Hamlet* drama, the rainbow character of its hero, the relation of the two Quartos to one another, the personal allusions in the Sonnets — these and many others are questions which still excite, and may well excite, the curiosity and sagacity of men of letters, and which continue to provoke new attempts at explanation.

Yet it is none of these much mooted problems that forms the subject of my present paper. I rather beg leave to direct my readers' attention to a few less known tasks, the handling of which appears to me to be a thing of urgent necessity.

An important problem of this kind is a pragmatic history of Oriental subjects in English literature. To point out the historical facts which, in their turn, caused the ever-renewed interest of the Occidental world in the Orient, the literary subjects which at different times found their way into the European literatures, their significance for the development of English poetry especially, and the numberless channels and rills and veins through which they were spread, and separated, and interwoven, and handed down from generation to generation: such would be the task of the future historian who dares grapple with this difficult problem.

I venture a few unpretending suggestions as to the general history of these Oriental influences in English literature.

The Bible, and especially the Old Testament, has always directed the interest of the Christian nations to the Orient. It was indorsed by influences of classical literature. Earlier than to other countries of the West, the Alexander saga found its way to England, where as early as the eleventh century we meet with translations of the Latin *Epistle of Alexander to Aristotle* and *De rebus in Oriente mirabilibus*, containing miraculous descriptions of the Orient and of that land of wonders, India. To the same period belongs the Old English adaptation of the late Greek novel of *Apollonius of Tyre*, from a Latin version. The stories of sea-voyages, storms, pirates, and adventures which occur in this novel seem to have rendered it particularly congenial to the Anglo-Saxon reader.

An important part as intermediaries between the East and the West was played by the Moors in Spain. From the tenth to the twelfth century Cordoba was a centre of culture and arts and science for the whole of Western Europe, and a large number of Oriental books and literary subjects owe their introduction into the literatures of the Occident to Moorish or Spanish authors. It was in Spain that the converted Jew, Petrus Alphonsus, compiled the famous *Disciplina Clericalis* (1106) from Arabic sources.

The Crusades gave a fresh and lasting impulse to the interest in the Orient in all countries, an impulse which can hardly be overrated as to its importance for the literary history of Europe. The number of tales with Oriental subject-matter or Oriental scenery now increases rapidly. The Middle English story of *Richard Cœur de Lion* is a direct product of this era of chivalrous romanticism and aspiring religious ideals. The *Book of the Seven Sages*, together with the *Disciplina Clericalis*, became a treasury of Oriental subjects for all European literatures, headed by the French. It was from one of the many French versions that this collection of Eastern novels was translated into English early in the fourteenth century, under the title of *The Proces of the Sevyng Sages*. The *Lai of Dame Siriz*, and the story of *Generydes* are of Oriental origin, and *Floris and Blanchefleure*, *The Romance of the Sowdone of Babylone*, *Sir Ferumbras*, *Rowland and Vernagu*, and other novels of the Charlemagne cycle are more or less full of Oriental elements. Like *Richard Cœur de Lion* and *The Proces of the Sevyng Sages*, most of these poems are translations or adaptations of French originals.

In the thirteenth century the court of Frederick II in Sicily, and afterwards the North Italian city-republics, continued the relations with the nations of the East, and were the centres of exchange for the cultures of the Orient and Occident.

Pilgrimages and journeys to the Holy Land, too, had become frequent since the Crusades. They were greatly encouraged by the appearance in the fourteenth century of John Mandeville's *Travels in the Orient*, a fantastic compilation which, written originally in French, has come down to us in numerous versions both in manuscript and in print, in the Latin, French, and English languages, testifying to the immense popularity which this work enjoyed. All the old legends of the *Miracles of the Orient* are here amalgamated with much that is new about those fabulous monsters with which the medieval fancy populated the mysterious East.

The relations with the Orient received a new and mighty impulse through the victorious progress of the Turks and the Mongols in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the perpetual wars against the Turks in the following periods. The glorious reign of Solymán the Magnificent (1520-66) especially drew the eyes of all Christian

nations to the Muhammadan people that, by conquering Constantinople in 1453, had gained a firm footing on European soil. This gave rise to an altogether new series of Eastern subjects: whereas the older class of Oriental tales is of purely literary character (fables, parables, fairy-tales, stories, etc.), the Turkish wars occasioned a number of compositions, chiefly dramatic, dealing with characters and events taken from contemporary history. The rule of Solymán, the tragic death of his eldest son Mustapha in 1553, and the deeds of his general Ibrahim, became favorite subjects of Occidental poetry.

As early as 1567 we find some Turkish tales, "Mohamet and Irene," "Sultan Solymán," and others, in Painter's *Pastyme of Pleasure*, and in the French collection of novels *Le Printemps*, by Jacques Yver (1572, translated into English by Henry Wotton in 1578), the story of "Solymán and Perseda" is related. In 1581 a Latin drama, *Solymán et Mustapha*, was performed; in 1587 Marlowe produced his *Tamburlaine the Great* on the stage; in 1592 the drama of *Solymán and Perseda*, generally ascribed to Kyd, appeared, followed in 1594 by the anonymous piece, *Selimus*, ascribed to Greene, in 1609 by Brooke's *Mustapha*, and in 1612 by Daborne's *A Christian turned Turk*. In 1603 Knolles published his fundamental *Generall Historie of the Turks*, which filled young Byron with enthusiasm for the Orient, excited in him the desire of seeing the Levant with his own eyes, and, according to his own statement, contributed toward giving the Oriental coloring to his epic tales.

The above-named borrowings from Turkish history are almost the sole Oriental subjects which can be pointed out in Elizabethan literature. Only Greene's *Penelope's Web* (1582) and Marlowe's *Jew of Malta* (ca. 1589) remain to be mentioned. Otherwise English literature in the age of the Renaissance keeps remarkably aloof from Oriental influences. Spenser, Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, save for occasional isolated instances, show no Oriental features at all. *Antony and Cleopatra*, in spite of its local background, is a Roman tragedy. Classical antiquity and the great national tradition are the commanding influences in English Renaissance literature by which all others are overshadowed. The fact that England in those times, as contrasted with the ensuing centuries on one side and the era of the Crusades on the other, was comparatively little concerned in the political events of the Orient, may also in part be responsible for the lack of Oriental influences in the literature of the age.

In the latter respect a change was to take place soon enough. The goal of all the great explorers in the epoch of discoveries had been the land of gold and wonders, India, to the quest of which even the discovery of America was due. During the sixteenth century, the Indies had been in the hands of the Portuguese and the Dutch; the foundation, in 1600, of what was later called the East India

Company, however, marked the commencement of the conquest of India by the English, which was gradually achieved during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A number of books of travel, among them notably those by Linschoten, Hakluyt, Sandys, and Purchas, apprized the British public of the men, manners, institutions, and scenery of the newly conquered countries. But it was long before the conquest of India became of significance also for English literature. Fletcher's *Island Princess* (1621) and Dryden's *Aurengzebe* (1657) remained rather solitary specimens of poems with the scene localized in India. Nor were the treasures of old Indian literature disclosed and made accessible until much later times. The importance of the steadily proceeding conquest of India for English literature in the next century and a half consisted principally in keeping the interest of the English permanently directed toward the Orient.

The countries east and south of the Mediterranean, from the old Moorish dominion in Spain and Morocco to Persia and Turkey, still continued to furnish the local background of the majority of poems with Oriental subjects.

But to the sober zeal of the Puritans, with their strenuous religious and social aims, the satiated, indolent, sensuous life of the heathenish, Muhammadan Orient in general could not but be a matter of detestation. It is, therefore, natural enough that in the first half of the seventeenth century, as in the preceding Elizabethan ages, we find but comparatively few works with Oriental coloring. Massinger, in his drama, *The Renegado* (1624), created the type of the defiant renegade which was to become such a favorite figure, especially in the poetry of Byron. Fletcher's *Island Princess* (1621) has already been mentioned; Chapman's *Revenge for Honour*, Lord Brooke's *Alaham* (1633), Suckling's *Aglaure* (1638), and Denham's *The Sophy* (1641) belong to this period.

With the Restoration of the Stuarts, however, which caused such a general revolution in the history of English literature, a golden age of Oriental subjects began, occasioned partly by the historical facts already mentioned, partly by literary forces—the influence of French literature, and, coherent with it, the rise of the heroic drama.

In France the interest in Oriental subjects had been revived by the novels of Madeleine de Scudéry. In 1641, her *Ibrahim ou l'Illustre Bassa* appeared, which contained an episode on *Mustapha et Zeangir*. It was dramatized by her brother Georges in 1643, and was translated into English. Between 1649 and 1653 *Artamène, ou le Grand Cyrus*, was issued, followed in 1660 by *Almahide*. All of these novels furnished subject-matter for dramatic productions by English writers. The heroic novel was succeeded by the heroic drama. Both novelists and dramatists took their themes with conscious preference from

civilizations remote either in space or time, in order to give to their figures the dignity adequate to the character of their heroic poetry, and at the same time to allow themselves a greater freedom in composition. Besides classical antiquity, therefore, especially the rulers and events of modern Oriental history were chosen as subjects for novels and plays.

The same holds good for England where the heroic play was introduced from France. It was Davenant who, in his epoch-marking opera, *The Siege of Rhodes*, in 1656, took the lead in the new fashion of Oriental dramas in England, taking for his theme the famous siege, in 1522, of the island of Rhodes by Soliman the Magnificent, who finally succeeded in conquering the fortress which had long been gallantly defended by the Hospitallers. Davenant's example was followed by Roger Boyle, Earl of Orrery, in his drama *Mustapha* (1665), based upon Madeleine de Scudéry's *Mustapha et Zeangir*. In Head's *English Rogue* (1665-80), a unique mixture of the picaresque and the traveling novel, the scene is also laid to a great extent in the Orient. Then came the long series of Oriental dramas, both ancient and recent, with which Elkanah Settle flooded the contemporary stage for thirty years (from about 1666 to 1694): *Cambyses*, *The Empress of Morocco*, *The Conquest of China by the Tartars*, *Ibrahim the Illustrious Bassa* (adapted from the English translation of Mlle. de Scudéry's novel *Ibrahim, ou l'illustre Bassa*), *The Distressed Innocence, or The Princes of Persia*, *The Heir of Morocco*, a sequel to *The Empress of Morocco*, etc. Dryden, too, wrote several dramas with Oriental subjects: *Almanzor and Almahide, or the Conquest of Granada by the Spaniards* (1670), derived from Mlle. de Scudéry's *Almahide*; *Aurengzebe* (1675), the Indian drama already referred to, and *Don Sebastian* (1690). Crowne followed suit with *Cambyses* (1670) and *Darius* (1688), Southern with *The Royal Brother, or the Persian Prince* (1682), Banks with his *Cyrus the Great* (1696), on the model of Mlle. de Scudéry's *Artamène, ou le Grand Cyrus*, Mary Pix with *Ibrahim, the 12th Emperor of the Turks* (1696), and Rowe, in his *Tamerlane* (1702), tried his hand on the same subject which Marlowe had handled before him. The title of Davenant's *Siege of Rhodes* gave rise to several Oriental dramas or tales with similar titles: Nevil Payne's *Siege of Constantinople* (1675), Durfey's *Siege of Memphis* (1676), Hughes's *Siege of Damascus* (1726), and, to conclude with the most famous, Byron's *Siege of Corinth* (1816).

This list of heroic plays dealing with Oriental subjects aims by no means at completeness, but it will sufficiently show how immensely popular themes of this kind were in the days of Dryden.

In the age of Pope, Oriental subjects disappear together with the heroic drama. *The Vision of Mirza* and the *Story of Shalem and Hilpa*, in the *Spectator* (no. 159, September 1. 1711 and nos. 584, 585,

August 23, 25, 1714), Young's *Busiris* (1719), Hughes's *Siege of Damascus*, just mentioned (1726), Lillo's *Christian Hero* (1735), and Mallet's *Mustapha* (1759), are the last stragglers. In France the enchanted world of the *Arabian Nights* had already in 1675 made its first entrance through de la Croix's specimens of translation, and in Galland's classical rendering of *Les mille et une nuits* (1704-17), a repertory of inexhaustible riches for Oriental subjects was disclosed which was to become of great and fruitful significance for the development of romanticism. Montesquieu in his *Lettres Persanes* (1721), on the other hand, and Voltaire in his Eastern dramas and novels (1732-48) opened a new epoch in the application of Oriental themes by making them the background of their rationalistic philosophical speculations, a movement which attained its climax and conclusion in Germany with Lessing's *Nathan der Weise* (1779).

Both currents reached England comparatively late. The rationalistic bent has sporadic representatives in Johnson's *Rasselas* (1759) and in Horace Walpole's anonymous squib, *A Letter from Xo Ho, a Chinese Philosopher in London, to his friend Lien Chi, at Peking* (1757), which was written in the manner of Montesquieu's *Lettres Persanes*, and in its turn gave rise to Goldsmith's kindred *Chinese Letters* (1760), reprinted, in 1762, as *The Citizen of the World*. The *Arabian Nights*, on the other hand, though recommended to the British public, in Galland's translation, by Addison in the *Spectator* (no. 535, Nov. 13, 1712), had hardly any noticeable influence until after 1760, when it gradually became an important element in the development of the new romantic movement. Beckford's *Vathek* (1786), so highly admired by Byron, is its first lineal descendant in English literature.

In the mean time an entirely new departure in the Eastern influences affecting European literature was initiated by the final conquest and opening up of India through the English in the times of Lord Clive and Warren Hastings. To the ancients and in the Middle Ages the eastern border of the world had been the mysterious home of wonders and monstrosities, and their conception of it had been greatly colored by Christian ideas throughout medieval times; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the countries of the East had been haunted and partly conquered by adventurous conquistadores in search of gold and riches; the eighteenth century had viewed the Orient through the spectacles of deism and rationalism: it was now for the first time that a really scientific investigation of the literatures, languages, laws, institutions, and manners of the Oriental peoples was begun.

Of important significance in this respect was the restless activity of Sir William Jones (1746-94), who, in 1772, published a volume of *Poems* containing translations and adaptations of Arabian, Persian,

and Indian poems, followed in 1783 by a rendering of the Arabian *Moallakat* and of Kalidasa's *Sakuntala* in 1789. He was the founder and lifelong president of the Asiatic Society. Through his and Colebrooke's efforts, moreover, translations of Indian and Persian books on law and philosophy were undertaken that added a literary interest in India to the political.

The outcome of it was the rise of Oriental studies which pervaded all the European countries, and which in Germany resulted in the creation of such works as Friedrich von Schlegel's *Sprache und Weisheit der Inder* (1808), Goethe's *Westöstlicher Divan* (1819), Rückert's long series of Oriental poems and translations (from 1822 on), Platen's fairy epic *Die Abassiden* (1834), Bodenstedt's *Lieder des Mirza Schaffy* (1851), and others. Schopenhauer's philosophy was greatly influenced by these Oriental studies, and the beginning of comparative Indo-Germanic philology was one of the earliest consequences of this new movement. In Denmark it gave rise to pieces like Oehlen-schläger's *Aladdin* (1805), a dramatic fairy-tale from the *Arabian Nights*. In France Châteaubriand (*Les Martyrs*, 1809, *Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem*, 1811, *Les aventures du dernier des Abencérages*), Victor Hugo (*Les Orientales*, 1828), and others, owe much to this era of Orientalism.

Its effect on English literature, too, was far-reaching. It so happened that the commencement of Oriental studies, in the sixties of the eighteenth century, coincided with the beginnings of the romantic movement inaugurated by Macpherson, Percy, Walpole, Chatterton, as a reaction against the rule of rationalism. The Orient with its wonders and mysteries, its legends and fairy-tales, its splendor of colors and sensuousness, has always been particularly congenial to romanticism; no wonder, therefore, that the adherents of the new spirit soon turned to the East for inspiration in their poetry.

The revival of the interest in the Orient which now began in England was furthermore nourished and deepened by political events like Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt (1798-99), the Peninsular War (1808-14), and the struggle for independence in Greece, events in all of which England was most vitally concerned.

In consequence of all this, a second period of cultivation of Oriental subjects was opened in English literature, as different in its character from the first as romanticism differs from rationalism. Beckford led the van with his splendid Eastern tale *Vathek* (1786), already mentioned, which has with it all the fairy charm of the *Arabian Nights*. Coleridge's gorgeous vision, *Kubla Khan* (composed in 1797), Landor's *Gebir* (1798), and Southey's Arabian epic, *Thalaba the Destroyer* (1801), came next. Almost all the leading poets of this great era came under the spell of these Oriental influences, nearly all of them treated Eastern subjects in their poems, the only exceptions being

Wordsworth and Keats. The Peninsular War occasioned no less than three poems dealing with the conquest of Spain by the Moors: Scott's *Vision of Don Roderick* (1811), Landor's *Count Julian* (1812), and Southey's *Roderick, the last of the Goths* (1814). In 1810 Southey published his Hindoo tale, *The Curse of Kehama*; from 1813-1816 Byron poured forth in rapid succession his series of Oriental epics (*The Giaour*, *The Bride of Abydos*, *The Corsair*, *Lara*, *The Siege of Corinth*), which were devoured with delight by his compatriots; but by far the finest sketches that Byron has given us of Oriental life and characters are to be found in his *Don Juan* and *Sardanapalus*: a figure like that of Haidee is so intensely Oriental in all her passionate love and tender sensuousness that it has no equal in the Oriental tales of English literature.

Moore followed the example given by Byron in his Eastern epics; *Lalla Rookh* (1817) is one of the most perfect attempts at imitating the style and atmosphere of genuine Oriental poetry. Shelley, too, did homage to the Orient in *Alastor* (1816) and the *Revolt of Islam* (1818). Of Walter Scott's novels the two "Tales of the Crusaders," (*The Betrothed* and *The Talisman*, 1825), *The Surgeon's Daughter* (1827), and *Count Robert of Paris* (1832), belong to our province. One of the most brilliant specimens of Orientalism in the English literature of this period is James Morier's *Hajji Baba of Ispahan*, which beats *Vathek* in the fidelity of its descriptions and the vivacity of its narrative, and has become one of the classical books of English literature.

Of the poets of the Victorian era, Tennyson borrowed the idea of his *Locksley Hall* from Sir William Jones's English translation of the Arabian *Moallakat*, and according to an acute observation by Koepfel, even the solemn, majestically broad-flowing meter was suggested by the cadence of the Arabian original as he read it in Sir William Jones's translation. From the same current which caused Goethe, Schlegel, Rückert, and Bodenstedt to study Oriental literature, sprang Matthew Arnold's *Sohrab and Rustum* (1853), and the free adaptation of the *Rubaiyat* from the Persian of Omar Khayyam, by Tennyson's friend Edward Fitzgerald (1859), which in its turn exercised considerable influence on the pre-Raphaelites and younger bards, and is an abiding stimulus to the study and translation of other Persian poets. Sir Edwin Arnold's *Light of Asia*, too, is an outcome of the same movement. Of American authors Emerson and Thoreau were deeply impressed by Oriental philosophy and *Weltanschauung*.

All these literary works belong to the period that was initiated by the English conquest of India and which may be termed the period of learned study of Oriental languages, literatures, and institutions. Rudyard Kipling's Indian tales, with their descriptions mostly

realistic of human characters and nature painted from life, seem to begin a new period in the history of Oriental subjects. And the rise of the Japanese in the last decades and their successes in the present time may perhaps result in giving another impulse to the literature of the West, and may transfer the interest in the Orient from the eastern border of the ancient Græco-Roman world to the shores of Cathay and the Land of the Rising Sun.

Let us now turn to another group of problems which challenge the acumen of the literary historian, in the field of recent literature, where everything is moving and developing, where literature itself is busy with the solution of problems. It is an indispensable task of the literary historian to grasp the main currents of modern literature, to recognize and appreciate the problems with which it is engaged, to understand and describe them in their origin and development, and to contribute to their solution.

After the battles of Trafalgar and Waterloo, England had the uncontested sway of the sea. The result was an enormous increase of trade and commerce, but together with this unprecedented rise of commerce and national wealth a certain narrow-minded utilitarianism and commercial spirit seized hold of the majority of the British people and invaded even the policy of the Government. It was the period of unlimited individualism, of the Manchester doctrine which had the command of British politics for several decades of the middle nineteenth century. But in the second half of the century two different reactions set in against this policy of utilitarianism and individualism: the social or humanitarian and the imperialistic movement, which both had their reflection in literature.

The former is the older of the two. It ran parallel with, and was antagonistic to, the free-trade movement of the liberal parties by which it was only temporarily outstripped. The reform of 1832 had principally fulfilled the desires of the middle classes; it left the laborers unsatisfied. It was this feeling of disappointment in the working classes that gave rise to the first utterances of a socialist spirit in the Chartist movement. Among the first to recognize its essence and importance was Carlyle, who in his books on *Chartism* (1839) and *Past and Present* (1843) pointed out its significance and made an attempt at a just appreciation of it. The ideas he puts forth in these works are those of a strong opponent to the individualist *laissez-faire* doctrine, and of an ardent believer in collectivism, in this respect disclosing him as an adherent of the spirit of the Middle Ages, for which he otherwise had little admiration.

If Carlyle's writings were more or less historical, economic, and philosophic treatises, the new ideas were not slow to invade also the field of belles-lettres proper. Strongly influenced by the Oxford

Tractarian movement, Disraeli, in *Sybil* and other novels, advocated the rights of the people from a social conservative point of view. In decided opposition to the ascetic Tractarian spirit, but in pursuance of the same general aim of ameliorating the condition of the people, Kingsley, in *The Saint's Tragedy* (1848), *Yeast* (1848), *Cheap Clothes and Nasty* (1850), and *Alton Locke* (1850) displayed his ideas of Christian Socialism and muscular Christianity. Though a promoter of trade-unions and coöperative societies, he has nothing of a socialist radical in him. His novels exhibit a rare combination of the stalwart bravery of the old Teutonic warrior with deep Christian piety and humane social collectivism.

A long series of other writers coöperated in the same direction: Maurice, Hughes, Thomas Hood, Ebenezer Elliott, Thomas Cooper, Bamford the Weaver, and, last but not least, Dickens. They all in their turn and in their respective lines contributed to the development of the idea of social reform, to a greater acknowledgment of the rights of the people by the governing classes, and towards a reaction against the liberal Manchester school.

As time passed on the socialist doctrines by degrees consolidated themselves to the present system, mainly communistic in character. And here again some of the leading men of the purely literary world were among the first to adopt the new ideas and impress them upon the reading public. Inspired by Carlyle, Ruskin after 1850 imbibed the social spirit. Socialism in his mind is strangely connected with romanticism. He hated the nervous competition of the present age, with its materialistic, commercial spirit and capitalistic organization of industry, he hated the modern division of labor which reduced man to a machine, he had an innate aversion to engines and factories, they disturbed his æsthetic sense, and he regarded their introduction as the principal cause of the general discontent of the laboring classes. In *Fors clavigera* (1871-94) he called upon the workmen of Great Britain to join him in order to save English country life from the invasion of machinery. He longed for a return to the primitive conditions of the Middle Ages where every artisan was an artist. With all his sympathy for the social current, he had no sense for the necessary development of things, like those people of the present day who are unable to realize that the organization of capital in the form of pools and trusts is merely the inevitable reaction against the organization of labor and a necessary outcome of the general economic development of our age. If Carlyle's social opinions were deeply saturated with a strong moral and philosophic sense, Ruskin's social theory may be described as an amalgamation of socialist and æsthetic views.

Starting from Carlyle and Ruskin, William Morris, in his Utopian romance, *News from Nowhere* (1890), in his *Poems by the Way* (1891),

in his work on *Socialism: Its Growth and Outcome* (1893), and other writings, developed more radical ideas. He, too, is a hater of large cities; he, too, in a manner is an admirer of the Middle Ages, but without feudalism, monarchy, and church. He preaches the abolition of the differences of classes, he demands higher wages, shorter hours, more chances of amusement for the working people. His ideal, like Ruskin's, was a blending of socialist and artistic elements, and in his practical activity as an artist he tried to carry out Ruskin's ideas of the mission of art as a means of refining and adorning the every-day life of the people.

In the field of fiction, the American Bellamy in his *Looking Backward* (1889) made an attempt at constructing an ideal picture of the socialist state to come, and of late H. G. Wells has ventured upon similar ground. In dramatic literature Bernard Shaw who, like W. Morris, has also taken active part in the socialist movement in a series of dramas full of cynical criticism, caustic satire, and grim humor, attacks the present foundations of society with a view towards a socialist revolution. Though in most of his pieces the "tendency" is too obtrusive to make them enjoyable from an æsthetic point of view, some no doubt exhibit a true dramatic spirit, and have been successful on the stage.

On the whole, in surveying the part which socialism plays in modern English literature, we receive the impression that though it figures in belles-lettres rather more considerably than one might at first expect, the influence which the literary representatives of socialism have had on the reading public of Great Britain appears to have been but small. Even Ruskin's powerful mind has hardly been able to impress his socialist views upon any large circle of educated English readers, seeing that socialism has after all gained but a scanty influence on the political life of Great Britain and America as compared with that of the Continental European states.

Far more important both in its political and its literary significance is the imperialist movement. The commercial spirit of the Manchester doctrine reached its climax in the Little England movement of the sixties, which through Granville and Gladstone even gained control of the practical policy of the Government, and which down to the present day has its advocates in some prominent representatives of the old liberal era, such as Goldwin Smith, with whom I had the privilege of having a long conversation on the matter only the other day. The radical postulate of this group of politicians and writers, to get rid of the colonies and above all of India as soon as possible, could not but evoke a strong patriotic reaction which manifested itself first in literature, then in politics.

And here again Carlyle is the leader. In the same impetuous manner in which he combated individualism in internal politics, he

waged war upon the commercial spirit and utilitarianism in foreign politics, his friend Tennyson effectively aiding him in the language of poetry. The first work, however, in which the claims of a Greater Britain were deliberately opposed to the adherents of Little England, was Charles Dilke's *Greater Britain* (1st ed. 1867, new ed. 1890), which exercised a deep and far-reaching influence on the public opinion of England. The new spirit soon showed itself also in politics: in direct opposition to the demands of the Little Englanders, Beaconsfield, when he came into office, endeavored to bring about a closer union between England and India. It would appear that he had the somewhat fantastic idea of winning Syria and Palestine for England and of founding a continuous Oriental empire under English control from the Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal — a scheme with which he resumed a dream of Lord Byron's, whose ultimate idea in going to Greece and sacrificing his fortune, his poetry, yea, his life, to the cause of Greek rebellion was to lead the modern Greeks through battle and victory to the border of India, and thus to become a second, an English Alexander! Beaconsfield could not carry out his ambitious plans, but he at least succeeded in persuading the Queen to assume the title of Empress of India (1876), an event that was in so far important as it was the first official manifestation of the idea of a British Empire.

The further development of the imperialistic movement in England was principally influenced by historical events of extreme significance. Up to 1860 England's command of the sea was practically uncontested; after that date several new nations sprang up which before had almost been *des quantités négligeables* for English foreign policy. Germany and Italy were consolidated into national states of the first order, and Germany particularly soon entered upon a very close commercial competition with England, so that at the present day she is her most dangerous rival. France recovered with an astounding vitality from the blows which the war of 1870 had dealt her. In the United States a field of almost unbounded possibilities for commercial and industrial enterprise opened after the crisis of the Civil War, and with the marvelous growth of their industries, the rapid increase of their population and wealth, their national importance grew from year to year and resulted in their abandonment of the traditional Monroe policy and their first effective interference in European politics on the occasion of the Spanish War. Russia built a navy and made menacing progress in Asia toward the frontier of India. Lastly, Japan, too, joined the number of the Great Powers and became a serious rival of the European nations in the trade and commerce of the far East.

All these events which have taken place in the course of the last forty years could not but deeply impress the mind of the English

people, and create, by way of reaction, a wave of national pride and patriotic enthusiasm which culminated in the desire for a closer union of the mother country and the colonies in the shape of an imperial federation. A number of prominent writers, both in prose and in verse, greatly contributed in making this idea popular. Froude in his *Oceana* (1886) portrayed in vivid pictures the greatness and expanse of the empire to the eyes of the British people, and Sir John Seeley, in his lectures on *The Expansion of England* (1883), brought home to the hearts and minds, first of the Cambridge students, and then of a wider public, the necessity of an imperial union, and helped largely to foster and spread the new idea among the professional classes. What Seeley and Froude did in prose essays and addresses, Kipling expressed in poetry and fiction. His warm and vivid sketches of Indian life and manners went a long way towards creating a new interest in India among the British public, while the powerful outburst of patriotic feeling in collections of poems like *The Seven Seas*, etc., which indeed is sometimes not far from chauvinism, touched kindred strings and found a rejoicing echo in the hearts of thousands of his countrymen. Nor was he the only patriotic singer in the field: the Boer War especially produced quite a series of poems of a similar character, Alfred Austin, the poet laureate, Swinburne, and others, being among those who chimed in with the author of *The Barrack Room Ballads* and *The Seven Seas*. All these writers paved the way for that chief political representative of imperialism, Joseph Chamberlain, whose ambition it is to become the Bismarck of the British Empire.

America, too, was not slow to respond to the appeal of the imperialistic spirit which in point of fact seems to pervade all nations at present. Here again the men of letters had a considerable share in the spreading of the new ideas. It was the epoch-marking works of Captain Mahan above all that prepared the public for the far-sighted and ambitious foreign policy which was inaugurated by President McKinley and his counselors, and continued by the present Government.

Besides these political currents there are several of a purely literary character. One of the most remarkable features of English poetry in the second half of the nineteenth century is the predominance of a formal, æstheticizing tendency.

In the age of Scott and Byron the material interest was greatly predominant in poetry. The descriptions of nature and of plain and simple human conditions in Wordsworth's poems are conveyed in an unpretending, sometimes even prosaic language; in Southey's and Scott's works it is the story itself and the culture-historical background; with Byron it is passion and the general view of the world; it is philosophic and æsthetic speculation with Shelley that form the essential features in their poetry respectively and claim the reader's

principal interest. With some of them indeed, as especially in the case of Shelley, form and matter are almost equally balanced, equally prominent, but in none of them is form domineering.

This prevalence of matter, of contents, is still stronger in the tendency of Carlyle's works, which indeed in a manner are hostile to all poetry. Resulting partly from the tradition of Scottish Puritanism, partly from the influence of German thinkers, a rigid moral standard is here set up for judging literature, and æsthetic aims are made subservient to ethics. In the outward garb of Carlyle's writings, too, form is entirely subordinate to matter; his capricious language has deservedly been reprimanded for its impossible imitations of German models, though it should never be forgotten that underlying this rough and rugged surface there is an elementary force of mind and character in the Sage of Chelsea which has impressed its stamp upon the literature and the thought of a whole age, and it is an unjust exaggeration when Gosse compares Carlyle to an ill-tempered dog that barks at mankind, "angry if it is still, yet more angry if it moves."

The same combination of deep thinking with outward formlessness recurs in Browning, who adds dramatic power and subtle psychological analysis to the moral strength of Carlyle. Striking and original though his poetic images frequently are if judged singly, his language in general is the reverse of formally beautiful.

Although both Carlyle and Browning lived till the ninth decade of the nineteenth century, literature in the second half of this century was on the whole rather characterized by a trend towards refinement of form. In many respects this was directly antagonistic to the style of Carlyle and Browning, and derived its inspiration from such lofty singers as Shelley, or perhaps even more so from romanticists like Coleridge and especially Keats, who endeavored to teach mankind the lesson that "Beauty is truth, truth beauty; that is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know," and in whose poetry the significance of matter decidedly yielded to the beauty of form.

The victory of the formal element this time was not, as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, achieved by classicism, but by romanticism. Tennyson was strongly influenced by Keats, but in Tennyson as in Shelley, and, for the matter of that, also in Wordsworth, contents and form are harmoniously balanced. It was especially Ruskin, the apostle of beauty, and his friends the pre-Raphaelites, to whose work this triumph of form was largely due. Starting as he did from the ethical standpoint of Carlyle, which he retained in his views on social policy, Ruskin at the same time supplied what was lacking in Carlyle by adding the æsthetic principle to his view of the world. He thus became the leader and adviser of the younger generation of poets.

The latent influence of Coleridge and Keats is noticeable everywhere in this new movement. As in the poetry of Keats, the material interest in the poems and pictures of the pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood and their congeners is generally small. The continued repetition of similar motives and the perpetual reiteration of the same frail, hectic, morbid characters would needs have a monotonous and tiring effect, if not counterbalanced by beauty of form, which was therefore elaborately cultivated.

This instinct for formal beauty in poetry attained its maximum in Swinburne, who, together with Pope and Byron, is perhaps the most marvelous formal genius in English literature. His productions are conspicuous for a wonderful word-melody, and he has not unjustly been termed the musician among English poets, but the value of his creations is lamentably impaired by his irresistible inclination toward sacrificing sense to form. In an epic poem like *The Tale of Balen* the interest in the story is entirely overshadowed, the discriminating faculty of the intellect is almost lulled asleep by the continuous jingling of melodious words and alliterative or rhymed phrases; the reader does not even get a clear conception of the poetic pictures which form such a prominent feature, for example, in the plastic poetry of Keats.

And it is similar in painting, with which poetry is indissolubly connected in the work of the pre-Raphaelites. In the pictures of the first pre-Raphaelite painters, there was at all events variety and interest of subject. Burne-Jones is typical for the predominance of form. His figures are to a great extent conventional, monotonous, tiresome, the effect of his pictures being principally due to the beauty of lines and color. In the paintings of Burne-Jones the transition to the decorative is clearly visible; the increased emphasis is laid upon the decorative element, in the natural course of events led to a preference for the industrial arts, which were successfully cultivated both by Burne-Jones and by William Morris, and which, principally through the merit and efforts of the latter, have witnessed a new era of their development in the last decades.

English literature had once before seen a period when the formal element had the sway over poetry; it was in the age of classicism, the age of Dryden and Pope. As in those times, so at the present day, we find closely correlated with it an ascendancy of French influence in England which again is not restricted to the formal side alone.

From 1795 to 1850 the heroes of German literature had exerted a far-reaching influence on the English world of letters, and Carlyle had been its enthusiastic apostle. According to the natural law of change the taste of the public became gradually satiated, and grew tired of it. Now it happened that while the interest in German literature faded slowly away, and the level of German poetry itself was

decidedly declining, French literature witnessed an era of remarkable brilliancy: the age of Balzac, Victor Hugo, Mérimée, Dumas, Sainte-Beuve, Musset, Gautier, Augier, Baudelaire, Sardou, Zola, Daudet, Maupassant, etc. It was also perhaps not without significance that the French court under Napoleon III occupied a leading position in Europe similar to that which it had had in the great age of Louis Quatorze. Thus it seems natural enough that the interest of the English public in French literature and life should have conquered the position which in the first half of the century had been occupied by the interest in Germany.

The French influence manifests itself in different directions: it is not restricted to the formal side, the elegance of the language and terseness of expression, it is also conspicuous in the matter of tendency, and in this respect both the romantic and the realistic schools have fallen under the spell of French writers. Neo-Romanticists like O'Shaughnessy (*An Epic of Women*, 1870, *Lays of France*, 1872, *Music and Moonlight*, 1874, *Songs of a Worker*, 1881), John Payne (*A Masque of Shadows*, 1870, *Intaglios*, 1871, *Songs of Life and Death*, 1872, *Lautrec*, 1878, *New Poems*, 1880), and Th. Marzials (*A Gallery of Pigeons*, 1873), wrote under the influence of Victor Hugo, Gautier, and the decadents, such as Banville, Baudelaire, and Bertrand. On the other side, novels, like those by Thomas Hardy, George Moore, and George Gissing (who, in spite of a recent utterance of Mr. Wells, is after all essentially a realist), would be simply incomprehensible without Guy de Maupassant, Zola, and other French authors.

In criticism, too, French influence is very prominent. Since Ruskin and Matthew Arnold most English critics, *e. g.* Swinburne, Saintsbury, Gosse, and others, have shown a decided preference for the French school of thinking and feeling.

A further striking characteristic of English literature at the present day is the almost entire lack of dramatic poetry of high standard. The effects of the blow which the Puritans inflicted on the English drama in 1642 have never been wholly overcome. The theatre is still regarded in many quarters, even among the educated classes in England and America, as an amusement of lower rank, or rather people fail to recognize the educational value of good stage performances. There are no city or court theatres as in Germany, where the stage has long since been officially acknowledged as a source of refinement and higher education. Irving's endeavors in this direction have so far been unsuccessful. Private theatres, however, naturally favor modern sensational pieces which insure full houses.

But the lack of high-class dramatic poetry in England and America may find a further explanation in the general growth of commercial life, which causes a certain prosaic sobriety in the tastes and interests of the people. There is no such lively sympathy with literary ques-

tions as there was, *e. g.*, in the eighteenth century. The astounding development of sport, moreover, since the beginning of the eighteenth century, absorbs the entire interest of wide circles of the people in the hours of leisure and dulls the capacity for amusements of a more refined sort. The public that does attend theatrical performances wants to be amused rather than educated; hence the preference for comedy, farce, pantomime, operetta, and melodrama. Various attempts to raise the level of the stage have been without result. To-day it is an undeniable fact that most good book-dramas do not succeed on the stage, while those pieces that attract the public are generally poor poetry.

Creditable work, to be sure, has been done by the late Oscar Wilde, or by living authors like Stephen Phillips and Bernard Shaw, but they could not be called first-class dramatists. *Paolo and Francesca* no doubt is full of dramatic vigor, but it is a single scene stretched out into a drama. *Candida* and one or two other pieces of Shaw's have been successful on the stage, but his work on the whole is hampered by a tendency to doctrinairianism. The fact remains that since Sheridan England has not had a dramatic writer of first rank.

Lyric and epic poetry suffer from the same misfortunes. Epic poetry indeed has never occupied an important place in English literature. But at present lyric poetry is unpopular in England, as, for that matter, it is in Germany, where the drama is a favorite with the public.

All literary interests of the English public to-day are absorbed by the novel and the magazines and newspapers. They furnish the intellectual daily food of thousands of people. Reading, like stage performances, must be light and amusing to insure the relish of the public. But the English novel seems to have passed its culminating point, and there is reason to hope that we may witness sooner or later a revival of the other kinds of poetry like that which followed the great age of English novelists in the eighteenth century.

These would seem to me to be some of the burning questions that claim the interest of the historian of English literature. A vast amount of work has still to be done before all these problems will be adequately treated, and there is a wide field of work for scholars both on this side and the other side of the Atlantic. A considerable part of this work will fall to the share of American scholarship, which is progressing with such astounding rapidity.

SECTION D — ROMANCE LITERATURE

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(Hall 8, September 22, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ADOLPHE COHN, Columbia University.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PIO RAJNA, Institute of Higher Studies, Florence, Italy.

PROFESSOR ALCÉE FORTIER, Tulane University, New Orleans.

SECRETARY: DR. COMFORT, Haverford College.

EVOLUTION OF THE STUDY OF ROMANCE MEDIEVAL LITERATURE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY PIO RAJNA

(Translated from the Italian by courtesy of L. Cipriani, Ph. D., Chicago University)

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IN order to account for the evolution of the study of Romance medieval literature during the nineteenth century, I begin by placing myself at the starting-place, and I look backward. What had been done until then?

It is imperative to keep well in mind that, for the Middle Ages, there is a profound difference between Italy and the other nations whom language makes her sisters. For the latter, archaic literary productions are withered branches of the tree; for Italy they constitute the very trunk. The contrast, less great in the Iberian Peninsula, where there is no break between the old and the new, is most marked in France, where a distinct literature was formed by the older phases, of which the southern one had indeed the characteristics of a foreign literature.

The causes are manifold, but one stands out overwhelmingly. Neither France nor Spain (I call the whole peninsula Spain) had the privilege of a Dante. And the finish of Petrarch, the mellowness of Boccaccio, soon took their place beside the genius of an Alighieri. Thus the fourteenth century had not yet closed when Italy already possessed a literature which could rightly be called classical. And it remained classical even when a second period followed the marvelous productiveness of the first.

Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, were subjects of constant admiration.

And this admiration brought forth a study that took all forms permitted by the capacity of the times. Nor was this study restricted to the greatest authors. Thanks to them, even the lesser, indeed the least of writers, were studied, especially after Tuscany had set up its ancient language as the standard tongue.

At the end of the eighteenth century Italy knew her remote past as well as her near past. I cannot indulge in details; but in order to measure the work done, it suffices to recall that Italy had already produced the *Storia* of Tiraboschi, an exposition of ordered and ascertained facts that can hardly be surpassed. Nor did Italy stop here. Having in the beginning a knowledge, later regained, that other kindred people had forestalled her in the vulgar tongues, and that their example urged her on, she glanced beyond her boundaries. The *De Vulgari Eloquentia* is filled with the conception of the unity of the Romance nations in literature as well as in language. And in the second half of the sixteenth century the *Eloquentia* was worthily matched by the sketch of the history of Roman poetry with which Giovan Maria Barbieri intended to preface a treatise on the *Art of Rhyming*.¹ The most important place, next to the Italian, is here held by the Provençal lyric; and to this all care was always, and by the nature of things had to be, particularly turned. Do not let us exaggerate the result of this care. No real tradition of Provençal doctrine was ever established. Every scholar had, so to speak, to begin anew. The fact is nevertheless noteworthy enough; and the Troubadours owed to this Italian care the preservation of many and many leaves in their laurel wreaths, and owed to it also that these leaves kept more or less green.²

In Spain the national spirit was never lulled, and remained ever faithful to certain ancient ideals. The name of the Cid particularly has never ceased to make all Spanish hearts beat. They certainly beat, even in the fifteenth century, when a new art more refined and less spontaneous, the acquaintance with Italian models, and humanistic studies, made them look down contemptuously on those "ro-

¹ Unluckily this work stopped here; and this first book was published, as is well known, more than two hundred years later by Tiraboschi, under the title, perhaps somewhat exceptionable, *Dell' origine della poesia rimata*. Modena, 1790.

² The harsh words that on this subject burst from the irritated lips of Legrand d'Aussy in his introduction to the *Fabliaux*, Paris, 1779, p. iv, do not sound disagreeable to Italian ears: "D'un autre côté les Troubadours Provençaux ont laissé après eux, je ne sais trop pourquoi, une renommée qui a ébloui tout le monde: non qu'on se soit laissé abuser par les éloges prodigués dans le temps à ces tristes Chansonniers, ou qu'on ait été séduit par leurs Ouvrages; mais l'Italie dont ils furent les maîtres, et où les introduisit l'affinité du langage, s'est plu à immortaliser leur mémoire; et telle fut l'origine de leur grande et trop heureuse fortune. La reconnaissance de deux ou trois Ecrivains célèbres les a sauvés de l'oubli. On les a cru de grands hommes parce que Pétrarque et le Dante les chantèrent; et aujourd'hui que peu de gens sont en état, ou plutôt que personne ne conçoit l'idée de vérifier ces panégyriques trompeurs, adoptés sur parole, l'opinion de leur mérite prévaut tellement, même parmi les gens instruits, qu'il n'en est aucun qui ne les croie les pères de toute notre Littérature moderne."

mances é cantares de que las gentes de baxa é servil condicion se alegran."¹ But this art, this knowledge, this culture, powerless to produce anything vital, became fatal to the preservation even of what preceding centuries had produced, and which they themselves had, besides, hardly cared to make widely known. Indeed, was it not possible to lose even the certainly precious collection of the poetical works of an ingenious prince, who flourished as late as the first half of the fourteenth century, of Don Juan Manuel? And it is due to the contempt of the ancient style, that the history of the *Amadís* is still so obscure.² The national spirit that I spoke of continued nevertheless to expand greatly. The sixteenth century produced "romances" lavishly, which exalted, vilified, lamented ancient deeds and persons, although not restricted to these subjects alone, preluding thereby the most fertile theatre, which sprang also from the most intimate fibres of the Spanish people. But we would gladly give up this new wealth in order to recover, more numerous and in better shape, the humble popular models which we now laboriously seek amongst that luxuriant growth. It would, however, be absurd to blame any one. Let us rather praise Spain for having preceded other nations in the general review of her literary past. This she did with the two *Bibliothecae* of Nicolás Antonio, of which, if the *Nova* is a mere dictionary, the *Vetus*, which here alone concerns us, has the order if not the connection of history. It is true that what followed was not worthy of such a beginning. We have a mere outline in the *Orígenes* (which come down to the times of the author) *de la Poesia castellana* of Velasquez, published towards the middle of the eighteenth century;³ and the *Memorias* of Sarmiento are rich, but a jumble.⁴ But Spain makes up for this, and surprises us again with the *Coleccion de Poesias Castellanas anteriores al siglo XV* of Sanchez, which began to appear in 1779, in which collection the *Cid*, amongst other things, first saw the light.

The neglect of medieval literature was nowhere so great as in the country in which it had been incomparably the most fertile, that is in France. Nowhere was the voice of the past so completely stifled by the mutable present. Only the historians, the *Romance of the Rose*, and certain *Romances* of the Round Table, escaped oblivion. As for

¹ "Prohemio é carta quel marqués de Santillana envió al Condestable de Portugal con las obras suyas," sect. ix.

² Observe the title at the beginning of our Castilian text: "Aquí comienza el primero libro del esforzado é virtuoso caballero Amadís, hijo del Rey Perion de Gaula y de la Reyna Elisena; el cual fué corregido y emendado por el honrado é virtuoso caballero Garci-Ordoñez de Montalbo, regidor de la noble villa de Medina del Campo, é corregióle de los antiguos originales, que estaban corruptos é compuestos en antiguo estilo por falta de los diferentes escriptores; quitando muchas palabras superfluas, é poniendo otras de mas polido y elegante estilo. . ."

³ Malaga, 1754.

⁴ *Memorias para la historia de la poesia y poetas españoles*. They were published in 1775, three years after the death of the author, by whom they had been composed long before.

some of their Carolingian brethren, they could hardly be recognized in the new garb they had been compelled to don. The songs of the Troubadours had ceased to be heard as soon as their authors had been laid in the grave; and amidst the Italians who moved amongst these tombs was seen only one Frenchman, attracted by the example of our countrymen,¹ namely, Jean de Notredame; and he would better have not been seen there, either. Let us rejoice that the southerner, Notredame, roused, as I believe, the very different northerner, Fauchet.² But Fauchet, and his rival and co-worker Pasquier, had no followers;³ and the seventeenth century, which was then beginning, turned minds more than ever from the early literature, creating a new one inspired by other ideals, which rose to heights that appeared even loftier than they actually were. Thus ignorance was united to contempt.⁴ And ignorance and contempt would have continued till the Lord knows when, if at that same time scholarship had not acquired, even in France, a vigor not seen before, and if from beyond seas and rivers a prejudice-destroying wind had not begun to blow. To scholarship, as well as to the related natural sciences, every subject is worthy of study. And study becomes imperative whenever scholarship aims at a complete and connected, that is historical, knowledge and presentation. This happened even in regard to the order of things which concerns us in the times we are going back to, exactly the period in which the idea and the need of a literary history took shape. Therefore popular medieval literature had to be placed beside the Latin in the *Histoire Littéraire*, which, after a long preparation by himself and others, Dom Rivet began to publish in 1733, with the intention of carrying it from most remote to modern times.⁵ The place granted the medieval popular branch would not have been so great if the execution of this grand work had remained in Benedictine hands. In the twelve volumes due to Dom Rivet and his immediate followers, popular literature has a smaller share than the date of 1167, which we reach, would demand. The Benedictines felt no great liking for this literature, though they were extremely suscepti-

¹ This appears as well from general reasons as from the book itself: dedicated to Catherine de Medici, brought to light (the author says) by the request of four gentlemen, two of whom are Italian, and by one of these two published in Italian when the printing of the French original was not yet completed.

² Fauchet gives "les noms et sommaire des œuvres, de CXXVII Poètes François vivans avant l'an mccc." Notredame's troubadours were seventy-six.

³ "En vain jusqu'ici," Dom Rivet will say regretfully, "deux de nos auteurs de la fin du XVI siècle ont fraîé la voie" (*Histoire littéraire de la France*, i, ii).

⁴ Boileau's verses, "Durant les premiers ans," etc., are too universally known to be more than mentioned here.

⁵ Vol. vi, p. 15: "... Quant aux Italiens en particulier, un de nos Sçavants, qui a beaucoup travaillé sur l'origine de notre langue, assure que le fameux Boccace a pris des Romans François la plupart de ses nouvelles, et Petrarque, et les autres Poètes Italiens, ont pillé les plus beaux endroits des chansons de Thibaud Roi de Navarre, de Gace Brulez, du Châtelain de Couci, et des vieux Romanciers François."

ble to the gratification national pride gained or seemed to gain from it. They did not appreciate its importance, so that in volume VII, which nevertheless marks a remarkable progress, Dom Rivet, even for a monument as important as Boëthius, limits his quotations to nine lines of the fragment made known by the Abbé Lebœuf, and this "pour être moins à charge à ses lecteurs."¹ A higher degree of sympathy and intelligence appears in the dissertations gathered and published in the volumes of the *Histoire* and *Mémoires* of the *Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*.² And one of the Academicians, La Curne de Sainte-Palaye, spent all his long and industrious life within the recesses of the languages, the literatures, the history, of medieval France. It is noteworthy in him that he had no sectional preferences, and was the first northerner who turned towards the south, so that from his material, when he had given up all hope of elaborating it, came forth the *Histoire littéraire des Troubadours* of the Abbé Millot,³ faulty indeed, yet better than its fame. His broad patriotism contrasted with the narrow patriotism of Legrand d'Aussy, who, in his introduction to the *Fabliaux ou Contes du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle*, published soon after,⁴ and owing their birth still to La Curne,⁵ inveighs, for the greater glory of the literature of the *langue d'oïl*, against "ces tristes Chansonniers" of the south.⁶ Overlooking this pettiness, we can call the introduction of Legrand the most notable review of old French literature which we find in the eighteenth century. Quickened with an eager love of its subject, it is the fruit of much reading, which Legrand d'Aussy continued,⁷ in preparation, I think, of his promising history of French poetry, broken off by death.⁸ It is greatly significant, however, that the author deems it necessary to publish the *Fabliaux*, not in the original text, which nothing forbade his accompanying with a translation, but translated, abridged, applying, though improved, the method followed for other compositions in the *Bibliothèque des Romans*.⁹

¹ p. xxxi.

² Already in the second volume, which jointly with the first contains contributions from the period 1701-1711, we have rich "Discours sur quelques anciens Poètes et sur quelques Romans Gaulois peu connu," by Galland (pp. 673-689). Here Galland, establishing himself exclusively on MSS. in the possession of Foucault, gives information about authors, "dont le nom et les ouvrages ont été inconnus à la Croix du Maine et à Fauchet." In the same volume there is a notice on the *Vie de Christine de Pisan et de Thomas de Pisan son père* (pp. 704-714).

³ In 1774.

⁴ 1779-1781.

⁵ Vol. I, p. lxxxix: "Je dois à M. de Sainte-Palaye les premiers matériaux avec lesquels j'ai commencé cet Ouvrage, et qui m'en ont inspiré le projet. . . . Le possesseur généreux de ces richesses littéraires me les a abandonnées . . ."

⁶ See p. 434, note 2.

⁷ It may be seen about how many works he gives information in the 5th volume of *Notices et Extraits de Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque*, formerly *du Roi*, and later *Nationale*. The volume bears the date of "Apr. 7": 1798-99.

⁸ His death happened on the 6th of December, 1800; just when the century also was coming to an end.

⁹ A *Bibliothèque* of ancient French novels only, quite different from that of Tressan had been planned much earlier by La Curne de Sainte-Palaye: "Si je puis

The example given thirty years earlier by Barbazan, instead of urging him on to follow the same path, turns him from it. France did not yet seem ready for the publication of original texts.¹ Nevertheless as early as 1742, one year before being received at the *Académie des Inscriptions*, Lévesque de la Ravalière published the *Poésies du Roi Thibaut de Navarre*.² This is indeed a swallow that brought no summer.

I have reached the end of my retrospective review. What I shall add to this will concern more the future than the past. As we have seen, much had been done in Italy, not much elsewhere. France stood in the very rear, although she had labored more than Spain; and this was because of the vastness of the task. Yet, both where much and where little had been done, things had to be done over. It was the least of evils that methods of investigation must be more rigorous, or rather that the critical rigor used by some in certain cases should be used everywhere. This would be accomplished *per se*, in consequence of a normal progress. But the greatest needs were of a different kind. Greater depth and breadth of thought were requisite. Not the mere connection, but the intimate relation, the very life of facts was to be laid bare, so that scholarship should be the means, not the end. And, on the other hand, that taste, breaking its fetters, should acquire a full aptitude to appreciate the beautiful wherever it might appear, independently of traditional prejudice, the drama, with the scarecrow of the three unities, is at hand to illustrate better than any other kind. This was no venture into unknown regions. Few centuries have thought as much as the eighteenth, to which none can deny the legitimacy of the title of philosopher, which it assumed (how often was

me flatter d'avoir affaibli la prévention ou quelques personnes pourroient être que la lecture des Romans de Chevalerie étoit une lecture aussi ingrate et inutile que frivole et insipide; qu'il me soit permis de souhaiter que quelques gens de Lettres se partagent entre eux le pénible travail de lire ces sortes d'ouvrages, dont le temps détruit tous les jours quelques morceaux, d'en faire des extraits, qu'ils rapporteront à un système général et uniforme. . . . On pourroit ainsi parvenir à avoir une bibliothèque générale et complète de tous nos anciens Romans de Chevalerie, dont la fable, rapportée très-sommairement, renfermeroit ou le détail, ou du moins l'indication de ce qui regarde l'auteur, son ouvrage, et les autres auteurs du temps dont il auroit fait mention. On s'attacheroit par préférence à tout ce qui paroîtroit de quelque usage pour l'Histoire, pour les Généalogies, pour les Antiquités françoises et pour la Géographie: sans rien omettre de ce qui donneroit quelques lumières sur le progrès des Arts et des Sciences. On pourroit y conserver encore ce qu'il y auroit de remarquable du côté de l'esprit et de l'invention; quelques tours délicats et naïfs, quelques traits de morale et quelques pensées ingénieuses." Thus speaks La Curne in the remarkable "Mémoire concernant la lecture des anciens Romans de Chevalerie," *Histoire de l'Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, xvii, 797-798. Nobody will deny that this design, expressed on the 17th of December, 1743, is worthy of note. Consider how much it anticipates facts.

¹ p. lxxxvii: "Ce n'est pas connaître les Lecteurs François que de leur présenter un pareil travail. Aussi l'ouvrage est-il resté inconnu, et il est même ignoré des Gens de Lettres." Reflect that even La Curne had contented himself, in 1752, with publishing in translation *Aucassin et Nicolette*. In that form it had good luck, and was reprinted in 1756 and 1760.

² M. de la Ravalière had had special reasons of an historical nature for taking interest in those poems.

the phrase "esprit philosophique" and its reflections on the lips!), although in taking this epithet the eighteenth century intended to identify itself with Voltaire, and we confirm the epithet by reason of Vico and Kant. And in seeking the intimate cause of things, thanks to the scientific method bequeathed to it by its predecessor, the eighteenth century had gained its training. Then it had brought all nations into closer contact, and had carried even into the realm of literature the need of universal knowledge and representation.¹ This contact, even though only mechanical, prepared exchange and reciprocal action. And the general tendency was here of more consequence than one of its specific determinations: the falling of the barriers that kept England unknown to the Continent. The knowledge of Shakespeare was of capital importance; and not much less important in the present, lasting besides in its results, was the bringing to light of the pretended poems of Ossian. Palates gained new strength from this unaccustomed food, the efficaciousness of which was all the more helpful because it did not lend itself to true and proper imitations. Hence a return to more normal conditions ensued.² All this and more the eighteenth century offered; but unfortunately in a state of aspiration, of preparation, of semi-consciousness. And causes existed without the ensuing effect. Therefore the same judgment can come from Andrés and La Harpe: Andrés, the author of the audacious work which purports to be "A critical history of the vicissitudes that literature has suffered amongst all nations" (literature means to him, besides art in every form, all that knowledge can grasp), "a philosophic image of the progress it has made from its origin to the present times in all its branches in general, and in each branch in particular"; and La Harpe, the man who knows nothing and sees nothing beyond the Greeks, the Latins, the French of the century of Louis XIV and the period which immediately followed. Hearken to this judgment: "Neither Shakespeare, nor Jonson, nor Vega, nor Castro, nor Calderon, nor all the English and the Spanish poets together, suffice to counterbalance the dramatic merit of the great Corneille." These are the words of

¹ More even than by the bulky works of Quadrio and Andrés, which recur to the mind of every one, that want is efficaciously demonstrated by other works of small size; as, for instance, the *Discorso sopra le vicende della Letteratura* (ill-used by Baretti) of Carlo Denina. It was published at Turin in 1761; and transformed itself into the "Five Books" (*Vicende della Letteratura: Libri cinque*), dedicated to Frederick the Great of Prussia twenty-three years afterwards.

² Normal conditions, whatever the cause, appear in Legrand d'Aussy. "Eh! pourquoi pas?" he exclaims (p. iv, note), after referring to Fleury, who a hundred years earlier, in the *Traité du Choix et de la Méthode des Etudes*, ch. ix, had acknowledged that among the ancient poets there were "des gens d'esprit, et qui pour le temps avoient de la politesse": "Les Arts, les Sciences, la Législation, tout ce qui est le fruit de l'expérience et du temps était encore informe, il est vrai, mais ce que donne la nature, l'esprit, la sensibilité, l'imagination, sont de tous les siècles et de tous les pays, et ne tiennent que par le plus ou moins de goût aux connaissances acquises."

Andrés ;¹ but if they did not take too much scholarship for granted, they might be those of La Harpe.

To the nineteenth century is due the credit of turning semi-consciousness and aspirations to full self-knowledge, and of uniting brooks and torrents into one great flood. A scarcely definable influence is traceable even here to the French Revolution, awful storm, as we are apt to figure it, which, however, cleared away an unbearable sultriness, and which, whilst it strewed the ground with branches and trunks, revived the energy imprisoned in the soil. It certainly stands between two ages which it renders vastly different one from another.

But a foreign nation shared in a singularly large degree in the work which we wish to survey: the German nation, which was led to fulfill this office by a chain of circumstances, beginning with the very fact of her being foreign ; a condition which might at first appear a difficulty. This would have been an obstacle if the Germany of the eighteenth century had not purposely thrown all her windows wide open, so as to look out on every side, and so that light and air might pour in from every direction. The apparent disadvantage was thus changed into the immense advantage of feeling for any literature, for any single literary product, an interest determined only by intrinsic reasons. That universality was set up as a principle was due largely to the fact that, from a literary point of view, Germany may be considered a new nation, just then traversing its classical period. In this universality the simple and popular, to which, through natural disposition and through historical motives, the nation had always remained alive, shared to such a degree as often to become a governing criterion. And to this, sometimes fused with it, sometimes distinct, was coupled the love of national subjects. This did not in the least prevent Germany from attaining great vigor of speculative and scientific thought, which penetrated everywhere, quickened everything, even scholarship, and for which the universities were fertile and marvelous workshops. It is, therefore, easy to understand that the first history of modern literature, in which the knowledge of facts and æsthetic considerations were on a par, should be Germanic. Certainly Frederik Bouterwek, who published eleven volumes from 1801 to 1819,² and in a deliberate succession corresponding to an organized plan, passed from Italy to Spain and Portugal, and from there to France and England, ending up with Germany, did not carry away a mere mass of information from his Romance teachers. He conceives his history as a " *Geschichte des ästhetischen Geistes und Geschmacks*,"³ and in " *Geist* " and " *Geschmack* " we

¹ Vol. I, p. 423, in the original edition of Parma.

² *Geschichte der Poesie und Beredsamkeit seit dem Ende des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts*.

³ See at the very beginning the general preface at the head of the first volume.

easily recognize the "esprit" and the "goût" which were so dear to the minds and the lips of the French of the eighteenth century. Let us recall that Montesquieu, author of the memorable *Esprit des Lois*, undertook to write an essay on taste for the *Encyclopédie*. But the taste of Bouterwek, though not always faultless, is not prejudiced, like that of the French, whom he blames for taking from the century of Louis XIV the standard of judging all that had been done previously.¹ It is a pity, therefore, that in this work Provençal literature is omitted, and a small share allowed Old French, although the reason for this is easily seen. It is to be found in the insufficiency of preparatory studies,² rather than in the circumstance that nominally (only nominally) the work began with the end of the thirteenth century,³ or in the conviction that others had sufficiently covered the ground in the encyclopedic collection of which this history of literature formed a part.⁴ The scarcity of the work done by others, and the difficulty of seeing for himself, did not deter Bouterwek from putting together a history of Spanish literature, that for a long time remained the only one worthy of the name.⁵

He was no German, indeed, he, who, going back to its origin, changed his family name, Sismonde, into "Sismondi." He was from Geneva and was familiar with the German and the English tongues. His abode in different countries, his varying occupations even, had contributed to increase the breadth of thought in a previously well-disposed intellect. And this breadth was increased by the influence of Coppet: wonderful intellectual forge, where French and German hammers, handled by the robust arms of Benjamin Constant, of Wilhelm Schlegel, and of many others, in the presence of and with the incitement of Madame de Staël,—the very synthesis of the revived and of the revivifying France of the eighteenth century,—strove with each other in striking sparks from the iron they unceasingly hammered. In 1811, before an audience amongst whom

¹ Vol. v, pp. iv-v.

² *Ibid.* p. vi: "Möchte doch endlich einmal die poetische Litteratur der mittleren Jahrhunderte in ihrem ganzen Umfang" — France only is here meant — "einen ihrer würdigen, also auch der provenzalischen und altfranzösischen Sprache mächtigen und mit den alten Handschriften hinlänglich vertrauten Geschichtschreiber finden!"

³ See p. 440, note 1.

⁴ Vol. i, p. v: "Die Geschichte dieser Morgendämmerung hat aber schon Hr. Eichhorn in seiner *Allgemeinen Geschichte der Cultur und Litteratur der neueren Europa* ebenso lehrreich, als ausführlich erzählt." It was Eichhorn, chiefly known as Orientalist, who conceived the plan of the encyclopedic collection. "Il ne semble avoir eu qu'une connaissance superficielle des littératures des langues modernes," Hallam will say, relating to this *Geschichte der Cultur*, in the Preface to the *Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth Centuries*. (Not having the original text at hand, I am forced to quote from the French translation of Borghers, Paris, 1839.)

⁵ It was not by means of a most copious equipment of notes joined to the text in the German translation by J. A. Dieze (*Geschichte der spanischen Dichtkunst*, Göttingen, 1769) that the work of Velasquez could become what it had not been, in the beginning.

were also many girls, Sismondi undertook to paint a picture similar to the one of Bouterwek; and out of this half-fulfilled task grew his work, *De la littérature du Midi de l'Europe*. This work seeks to present facts, not to go in for original research. It owes much to Bouterwek, and acknowledges it. Being published when little yet was known, it fell into serious errors. But it is the work of a thinking mind. It served well to diffuse among the Romance people a critique which is human, not national; which feels the need to grasp much in order to comprehend; which goes deep, which soars high. We feel the air of Copet.

When publishing, Sismondi could, for the Italian literature, take advantage of the *Histoire Littéraire de l'Italie* of Ginguené, which likewise grew out of a course of lectures, given in 1802-03, 1805-06. I note the fact of this genesis which is repeated not a few times (even the oral exposition of Old French literature on which Marie Joseph Chénier ventured about this time,¹ was much praised), because it certainly served to give literary history more connection² and to enrich it with other material than mere facts. But it is not due to this alone³ that the history of Ginguené, which cannot so far as scholarship goes be compared to Tiraboschi's, has far more life, and proceeds from outward considerations to inner ones. Time and environment certainly coöperated with great efficacy. And the very phenomenon of a Frenchman who takes upon himself to describe the vicissitudes of a modern foreign literature proves the change in the times. Nothing similar had, if I do not err, ever happened before.

Ginguené goes back to the beginning, and this leads him to follow even the phantom of a powerful Arabic influence, a phantom followed with better reason by Andrés,⁴ and which was afterwards to be called up afresh by Sismondi and not a few others. And he dwelt quite a little on the Troubadours. He followed untrustworthy guides. Yet during the short span of life still granted him (he died in 1816), he took upon himself "The Troubadours" in the Benedictine *His-*

¹ The course of lectures on this subject by Chénier was held in the years 1806-1807. And the lectures regarding the *Fabliaux* and Novels were published also.

² Consider how things appeared to the mind of Dom Rivet when he was undertaking his grand work (vol. 1, p. xxii): "En lui donnant le titre d'Histoire, parce qu'il est plus commun et qu'à la rigueur toute narration peut porter ce titre, il sembleroit peut-être qu'on y dût donner une histoire suivie et continuée, telles que sont les autres histoires ordinaires. . . . Mais il n'en est pas de l'Histoire littéraire comme de l'Histoire de l'Eglise, par exemple. . . . Au contraire dans l'Histoire Littéraire, où les faits sont indépendants les uns des autres comme il le sont dans l'Histoire de la vie des Saints, on ne peut guères la bien traiter qu'en la divisant par titres ou articles, dans lesquels on raporte de suite ce qui regarde un Auteur, avant de passer à un autre." In all this truth and error are mixed together.

³ The first volumes only correspond to courses of lectures. It is true that, once on this track, it was natural to go on in the same manner.

⁴ Andrés had had predecessors; among whom Barbieri (see p. 434, note 1) had been perhaps the most ancient, and also, I think, the most notable for his method of reasoning. Consider his chapters iii and iv.

toire Littéraire,¹ intrusted to the Institut in 1807. It was a happy decision to resume, after forty years, the noble enterprise which had been breathing its last since the death of Dom Rivet, who first conceived it. The *Histoire Littéraire* never had been, and never succeeded in being, a true history. And it was not made one by the *Discours sur l'Etat des Lettres* which preface every century, "discourses" that have besides the inevitable fault of condensing into a synthesis things not yet analytically known.² It always remained a "bibliotheca" even after abandoning the mechanical device of chronological order by dates of death. There is besides this no difference between it and the volumes entitled *Notices et extraits de manuscrits*, which the Académie des Inscriptions began to publish in 1787, and where in the fifth volume we already find ample space given to Old French. In arrangement only is there a difference from the *Manuscrits français de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, which later came from Paulin Paris. But this lack of organism permitted an almost absolute liberty of movement, which turned out most useful. It is due especially to this that the *Histoire Littéraire* has increased remarkably the knowledge of French literature in the vulgar tongue, which in this phase began to occupy a far greater place than it had ever occupied before. And with this progress, what had been done did not satisfy. Hence delays and journeys backward, which, if they destroyed even the shadow of an historical plan and resulted in not reaching far into the fourteenth century after one hundred years of labor, nevertheless came near enough to the ultimate goal.

The awakening which showed itself would have rejoiced Legrand d'Aussy.³ Nor would he have considered unreasonable the reprint which Méon made of the *Fabliaux* of Barbazan.⁴ Méon would surely have rejoiced his heart with the *Roman de la Rose*, 1813, with the addition to the *Fabliaux*, 1824, and the *Roman du Renart*, 1826; and he would have been delighted with Roquefort, who in his *Glossaire de la langue romane*, 1808, offered a tool useful for the reading of texts.⁵

¹ A. Duval says of him in his necrology at the head of volume XIV: "Il se réserva la partie de l'ouvrage où l'on doit traiter des poètes français et des troubadours des XII^e et XIII^e siècles: il était préparé à ce travail par les recherches qu'il lui avait fallu faire sur la littérature *Romane*, qui eut une grande influence sur la littérature italienne, dont il s'occupait depuis si long-temps."

² Speaking of himself Daunou says, vol. XVI, pp. vi, vii, that in composing the "Discours" about the thirteenth century, "on a reconnu combien il était difficile d'esquisser ainsi le tableau de la littérature de tout un siècle, avant d'avoir pu en examiner les productions. Ces exposés seraient plus complets et moins inexactes," if, instead of preceding, they should follow.

³ See p. 437, note 7.

Fabliaux, vol. I, p. ii: "Les catacombes de nos anciens Poètes, dans lesquels personne n'est encore descendu, ou qu'on n'a fouillés que fort superficiellement, offriront à des travailleurs intelligents et courageux plus d'une découverte pareille à faire; et je croirais avoir bien mérité des Lettres si mon exemple animait à cette laborieuse entreprise, des mains plus habiles que les miennes."

⁴ The edition of Barbazan came out in 1756; that of Méon in 1808.

⁵ Subsequently Roquefort published the *Poésies* of Marie de France. The dedi-

Little by little the literature of the "langue d'oïl" awoke from its centuries of sleep: and we can say that the literature of the "langue d'oc" arose and walked. Francis Raynouard, mature and well known in other lines, was prompted by love for his native region to give himself up to his studies with great zeal; and this zeal proved very fruitful. It is a grievous error for the French to consider him the founder of Romance philology. And the title of *Grammaire comparée*, which was read for the first time on one of his volumes,¹ and which Raynouard owes to Frederick Schlegel,² no longer misleads any one. The author lacked scholarly training;³ but the lucid choice of Provençal texts which he edited, and the *Lexique Roman* on which he labored so long, constitute an imperishable work. A comparison with the contemporary *Parnasse Occitanien* enhances the merit of Raynouard's work far more than it diminishes its originality. The difference is seen in the effect. The *Parnasse Occitanien* had none;⁴ the works of Raynouard became known in France and abroad, and everywhere (unfortunately accompanied by erroneous ideas) they spread a knowledge of the Provençal. Even our Giovanni Galvani owed them much,⁵ although his incentive to work in this language came, not from them, but from his ancient fellow citizen Giovan Maria Barbieri and from Francesco Redi. Italian tradition had not ceased to work.⁶

cation to de la Rue bears the date of 1819, while most of the copies bear on the title-page "1832." The book was not easily sold.

¹ *Tome sixième, contenant la Grammaire comparée des langues de l'Europe latine, dans leurs rapports avec la langue des troubadours*. The date of this volume is 1821. And the verb "comparer" appears often in the text. In the same way appears in it "comparaison."

² As known, he was the first who spoke of "vergleichende Grammatik," in the memorable book *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, Heidelberg, 1808, p. 28. However, it was not from this book, but from conversations with the author and with his brother William, both his friends, that the inspiration must have come to Raynouard.

³ "Raynouards arbeiten scheinen mir nur bis zu einem gewissen punct lobenswerth," declared Jakob Grimm to Diez (*Zeit. f. roman. Philol.*, vol. vi, p. 501). And Diez in return: "Was Raynouard betrifft, so stimme ich Ihrem Urtheile bei: die vornehme Haltung des Verfassers schadet dem Werke erstaunlich; er sagte mir selbst, er habe nicht mehr geben wollen, als was er nicht selbst verstanden habe, das übrige sei unverständlich und des Abdrucks nicht werth — und so vermisst man mehrere wichtige und bei den Troub. berufene Lieder. Seine Litteraturkenntnisse in diesem Fach sind mir sehr zweideutig, ich glaube, er ist bei Millot stehen geblieben" (*Ibid.* vol. vii, p. 486.)

⁴ Diez, in January, 1826, seven years after the publication, had not yet been able to get it. He received it shortly after from Grimm.

⁵ He acknowledges it speaking, "Ai Lettori" of his *Osservazioni sulla poesia de' Trovatori*, Modena, 1829, p. 7: "Le Opere del ch. Raynouard sono per le mani di tutti, ed io non che ne fugga, ne desidero anzi il confronto, e me gli confesso discepolo e massimo ammiratore." These words would bear us farther than the truth, if they had not as corrective a letter which Galvani wrote in the last years of his life to Pietro Bertolotti, and which has been printed by Bertolotti in the *Notizie intorno alla vita ed alle opere di Mons. Celestino Cavedoni*, and reprinted by Antonio Masinelli in the *Notizie intorno alla vita ed alle opere di Galvani himself*, Modena, 1874, p. 10. In that letter Galvani relates, with many particulars, the origin and progress of his Provençal studies.

⁶ Therefore Cavedoni also, as an offset of Galvani, proceeds from the Italian

Of Romance philology proper, as we understand it now, Raynouard can be considered the godfather, not the father. Its father was a foreigner. And what could he be but a German? The German scholar, young or old, was in the condition of an agriculturist expert in agrarian chemistry, provided with all instruments invented by modern mechanics, who undertakes to cultivate a soil whose previous workers had been satisfied to use old manners, old spades, and old plows. Uhland is an eloquent example of this. Ludwig Uhland was a youth of twenty-three when, in 1810, having gone to Paris for the study of laws, he got deep into the study of French medieval literature, turning at once to the MSS. Having returned after only eight months, he published, in 1812, a paper *Ueber das altfranzösische Epos*,¹ a beacon of light in the heavy darkness. This light shone only for the Germanic world. The Latin world continued for some time to confuse, as had been done until then, distinct things, and to speak of "Romances of Chivalry" as one genus subdivided into three species: Carlovingian romances, the Romances of the Round Table, Amadís and its family.

The value of his example is increased by the fact that Uhland was above all a poet. A poetic soul and poetic skill were also found in Frederick Diez, his junior by only seven years. Nor did he prove wanting in these qualities when he turned to the Spanish "romances," either in reviewing the *Silva de romances viejos* of Jakob Grimm, or the *Sammlung Spanischer Romanzen* of Depping, or in publishing the *Altspanische Romanzen* in his own translation.² Spain was of all Romance nations the one which exercised the greatest charm on Germany.³ She exercised this charm through her ballads, Herder

tradition; Cavedoni, whose dissertation *Delle accoglienze e degli onori ch' ebbero i Trovatori Provenzali alla Corte dei Marchesi d'Este nel sec. XIII* (in *Memorie della Reale Accademia di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti di Modena*, vol. II, pp. 268-312) can be called a standard work. Very curious is the way in which the propagation happened. We know it from the letter quoted in the preceding note.

¹ In the review *Die Musen*, which La Motte Fouqué had begun to publish at Berlin. In the review itself this writing could not easily be seen; but it was reprinted in Uhland's *Schriften zur Geschichte der Dichtung und Sage*, vol. IV, Stuttgart, 1869, p. 327 ff.

² It is to be noted that the *Altspanische Romanzen übersetzt von Friedrich Diez*, which the title-page assigns to 1818, belongs in reality to the former year. See *Zeit. f. roman. Philol.*, vol. IV, p. 583, and compare vol. VII, p. 481. As to antecedents which did not leave the silence of home, see Stengel, *Erinnerungsworte an Friedrich Diez*, Marburg, 1883, p. 23, note 1, and *Diez-Reliquien*, Marburg, 1894, p. 1.

³ Hear Bouterwek, preface to vol. III, p. viii: "Nur dann aber werde ich glauben, diese Geschichtsbücher in der Hauptsache nicht umsonst geschrieben zu haben, wenn sie mitwirken, die spanische und portugiesische Litteratur unter uns in Aufnahme zu bringen; empfängliche Gemüther für sie innigst zu interessiren; und, wo möglich, zu veranlassen dass der deutsche Geist durch diese schönen Töne von Süden her zu neuer Selbstthätigkeit belebt werde. Deutsches Gemüth und spanische Phantasie in kräftiger Vereinigung, was könnten die nicht hervorbringen?" The spaced words are in the original printed in larger letters. The first who led his countrymen to the Iberian peninsula was Dieze. (See p. 441, note 5.) What the conditions were in his time, is said in the preface: "Bey der eifrigen und mannigfaltigen Bemühungen, die Kenntniss der ausländischen Literatur unter uns zu verbreiten, ist die spanische noch sehr

being the principal promoter of their study; through her theatre; through her history even. Italy had her share, however, in Diez's mind;¹ and a preponderant share soon fell to Provence, largely owing to Raynouard, whose *Choix* the attention of Diez was first directed to by Goethe.² Raynouard furnished materials and tools; William Schlegel, who would have become a Provençal scholar of great merit if his many-sidedness had left him time for it, was an inspiring power. Well fitted out, Diez went to Paris in 1824. And he performed a miracle greater than the one performed by Uhland. For was it not a miracle that three months' stay sufficed to permit the composition of such classic works as *Die Poesie der Troubadours* and *Leben und Werke der Troubadours*? He had preceded them by a dissertation *Ueber die Minnehöfe*, which proved to be a challenge to Raynouard, who had treated *ex-professo* of the same subject. David met Goliath and slew him. He showed that the pretended feminine law-courts, which it was claimed had, during the Middle Ages, held jurisdiction in matters of love, solving practical and poetical questions, had grown out of misunderstandings and deceptions. But Goliath and his followers pursued their way as if nothing had happened. The talk about "Courts of Love" in the anti-critical sense of Raynouard continued. And, indeed, in a time very near to us, in the South of France, the extreme was reached of restoring to them a semblance of life, which still holds out.³ They remained a symbol *par excellence* of the environment in which lived the Troubadours,⁴ whose art was called by the anachronistic designation of "*gaya sciensa*," first used by the over-rhetorical academy of Toulouse, when gayety had in truth vanished. The two expressions — *gaya sciensa*, *cours d'amour* — can serve as a touchstone: when they are heard, modern criticism has not yet penetrated.⁵

weniger, oder vielmehr gar keiner Aufmerksamkeit gewürdigt worden. Man lebt nicht allein in einer gänzlichen Unwissenheit derselben, man ist auch noch so gleichgültig, dass man sich nicht einmal die Mühe giebt, zu untersuchen, ob sie unsere Achtung verdiene, ja man ist wohl gar so ungerecht, sie ohne Prüfung schlechterdings zu verachten."

¹ As early as 1819 he wrote many pages on the translation of the *Rime* of Petrarch published by Karl Förster, and many others on another translation, viz., that of *Orlando Furioso* by Karl Streckfuss. See Friedrich Diez's *Kleinere Arbeiten und Recensionen*, hrsgg. von H. Breymann, Munich, 1883, pp. 17-38.

² The fact is attested by too good an authority (see Stengel, *Erinnerungsworte*, p. 22, note 1), to be doubted. Of the work of Raynouard, when in 1818 Diez visited Goethe, only the first volumes were published.

³ The first *Cours d'amour* was held by the "Felibres" at Carpentras, the 15th of September, 1891. An account of it can be found in the *Revue Félibréenne*, vol. vii, 251 ff.

⁴ A. Meray gave the title *La vie au temps des Cours d'amour* (Paris, 1876) to the book which should serve as a counterpart to his *Vie au temps des troubadours*.

⁵ Therefore *gaya sciencia* could be heard also from the lips of Diez, when, in 1820, he gave an account about the first volume of the *Choix* and about the *Observations sur la langue et la littérature provençales* of Schlegel (*Klein. Arb. u. Recens.*, p. 39).

After this first period Diez took up especially linguistic investigations. He meant to do for the family of Romance languages what Grimm had done for the Germanic family; and he succeeded to an unparalleled degree. Just through this he became the founder of Romance philology, that needed indeed a solid foundation. For linguistic studies can, from their very nature, be converted into pure science more easily than literary ones. But even for the latter a knowledge of the structure and the history of the language is of inestimable value. This Diez himself proved every time he returned to the realm of literature. His last return, worth mentioning for the subject, is in the little book, *Ueber die erste portugiesische Kunst und Hofpoesie*, of 1863.

Diez was an exquisite fruit of the Germanic tree, not an isolated phenomenon. Therefore we find him surrounded by a whole pleiad of other scholars, amongst whom he will only gradually take the place of leader and master. Here we shall find Bekker, whom his quality of classical philologist shall not deter from joining Uhland in his studies in Paris, from printing the very first *Chanson de geste* (which by chance was in Provençal version), from bringing to light with the *Bonvesin de la Riva* monuments of our Italian literature, rich in varied dialects; here also Ferdinand Wolf, vigorous pioneer in the researches, still faulty in many respects, in the rhythmic and musical forms of the Middle Ages;¹ here Witte, who will acquire the leadership in Dante studies; here a swarm of other editors of texts and investigators. And a younger generation will grow up by the side of the older one. And we shall have Bartsch with his *Peire Vidal* — an important example of the extension of the critical method in reconstructing texts — with the most useful Provençal and French chrestomathies,² with abundant writings and publications. We shall have Theodor Müller, Conrad Hoffmann, and a multitude of others beside. And always greater will become the place which Romance philology has, from the very beginning, been allowed to take, by their very liberal rules, in German universities. And the labor of the instructors will be strengthened by the coöperation of the students, who will produce an infinite number of doctors' dissertations, frail twigs taken singly, not to be broken when gathered

¹ *Ueber die Lais, Sequenzen und Leiche. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der rhythmischen Formen und Singweisen der Volkslieder und der volksthümlichen Kirchen- und Kunstdieder im Mittelalter.* Heidelberg, 1841.

² "Texte critique" Genin had named in the title itself his edition of the *Chanson de Roland*; and to that name might also have aspired, with more reason, perhaps, the edition of the same poem that in 1851 Theodor Müller printed and suppressed. But from these and other attempts to the *Peire Vidal* the distance is great. The good-natured system practiced by Raynouard had besides been already condemned by Diez in his preface to the *Poesie der Troubadours*, p. xi: "... War es zu wünschen gewesen, dass der Verfasser die wichtigsten Lesarten, nicht eben jede nichtssagende Variante, seinem Texte untergelegt und so den Leser an der Kritik hätte Theil nehmen lassen, ein Punkt, der für die gelehrte Benutzung der Werke von entschiedener Wichtigkeit ist."

in a bundle. Even in this domain Germany will show the compact ranks that have rendered her victorious in war, in politics, in industries, as well as in science generally.

Let us cross the Rhine. They have not idled, indeed, in France since we have left her. How could they idle, when, to the natural increase of the movement that we have seen in its beginning, was added the fact that the free literary tendencies of the so-called "romanticism" grew and took shape? It is not without significance even for us that this movement was due especially to a Germanic impulse, and significant also, in its nebulousness, is the designation itself, which, whether we will or not, takes us back to the pure Middle Ages.¹ The attraction of the Middle Ages grew more intense, and with it the attraction of all that which, though belonging to modern times, had preserved a flavor of the Middle Ages.

We can therefore imagine what an echo answered the eloquent word of Villemain, when, from his chair in the Faculté des Lettres, he opposed to the mean criticism of the eighteenth century a criticism winged like an eagle, a human taste to the narrow taste which had ruled so long. In Villemain Madame de Staël is continued and completed. The historical sense which permits the appreciation of lasting beauty through changeable conditions is wide awake.² And Villemain will speak of Shakespeare, of Provençal literature, of Old French, of Italian, of Spanish. And from a chair more solemn than the one from which, a few decades earlier, the high priest of the criticism of his time declared "monstrous and full of queerness" the *Divine Comedy*, granting it only many scattered beauties of style

¹ Remember how the word "romantique" is defined by Madame de Staël, who. "Si . . . n'a pas tout à fait inventé le mot, . . . l'a popularisé" (Sorel, *Mme, de Staël*, in the collection *Les grands écrivains français*, p. 171): "On prend quelquefois le mot classique comme synonyme de perfection. Je m'en sers ici dans une autre acception, en considérant la poésie classique comme celle des anciens et la poésie romantique comme celle qui tient de quelque manière aux traditions chevaleresques. Cette division se rapporte également aux deux ères du monde: celle qui a précédé l'établissement du christianisme et celle qui l'a suivi." (*Ibid.*, p. 172.) Did perhaps this passage of the general preface of Bouterwek (vol. I, p. iv) influence her? "Die erste Poesie in neu-europäischen Sprachen ist die 'fröhliche Kunst' (*gaya sciencia*) der Troubadours, und die erste Prosa nach dem Aussterben der lateinischen Volkssprache die romantische in den *Rittergeschichten* aus der letzten Hälfte des dreizehnten und der ersten des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts." Another passage of Bouterwek in the preface to the *History of French Literature*, (p. v) issued in 1806, seems noteworthy to me: ". . . die übrigen Werke . . . aus denen man den romantischen Geist der altfranzösischen Poesie in seinen freilich nicht so eleganten, aber in einem höheren Sinne poetischen Erfindungen und Aeusserungen lernen könnte, grössten Theils in Handschriften verborgen geblieben sind." The author puts himself in evidence by the different way of printing the two words that are here of interest to us.

² *Cours de Littérature française, Tableau du dix-huitième siècle*, vol. III (1829), p. 187: "Est-ce que toutes ces bizarreries de l'imagination grecque n'auraient pas été vraiment intolérables pour le bon goût du XVII^e et du XVIII^e siècle? Faut-il décider cependant que ces fantasques inventions étaient absurdes, ridicules, et qu'il n'y a pas un état de société, un état de l'imagination humaine où ces choses puissent avoir leur grandeur, leur énergie? Faut-il nier même qu'elles n'aient une beauté durable, pour qui saura les comprendre par cette imagination qui se rend contemporaine de toutes les époques?"

and expression "that might be vividly felt by the author's countrymen, and even some fragments of general beauty sufficient for the admiration of all nations,"¹ he ended the study of Dante by calling him not only the greatest poet of the Middle Ages, but "a poet whose sublime and spontaneous verses will never be forgotten as long as the Italian tongue exists, as long as poetry is beloved in the world."²

Villemain could speak of Dante with first-hand knowledge; but the greater part of the medieval domain was for him (nor does he at all hide this)³ an unknown country. Hence it is all the more noteworthy that he should enter there to stay.⁴ Far different is the case of a man for whom towards the end of the very year that Villemain ventured on these shores, 1830, a new chair of *Littérature Etrangère* had been founded in the same Faculté des Lettres.⁵ "Have you not known in Paris, Fauriel, the editor of the popular songs of Greece? He is one of the pleasantest Frenchmen I have ever met, and at that time" (in 1814) "he did much in Provençal, possessing accurate copies even of MSS. in the Vatican, and intending to publish some longer narrative compositions that Raynouard does not mention at all." Thus Jakob Grimm wrote to Diez in 1826.⁶ "One of the pleasantest Frenchmen"; let us add, in genius of the richest, and, perhaps, also the greatest scholar amongst them. And how well within him the powers of the mind, which transformed into living forces the heavy food of erudition, answered to profound goodness! Consider Fauriel, such as Sainte-Beuve has known how to paint him with his magic palette,⁷ look at him as he shows himself in his letters, and then try

¹ La Harpe, *Cours de Littérature ancienne et moderne*, in the "Discours sur l'état des Lettres en Europe, depuis la fin du siècle de Louis XIV" (vol. iv, p. 178, in the edition of 1817). La Harpe means, in his own manner, to exalt the influence exercised by Italy at the end of the middle ages: ". . . Ces deux hommes furent le Dante et Pétrarque: l'un, dans un poème d'ailleurs monstrueux et rempli d'extravagances que la manie paradoxale de notre siècle a pu seule justifier et préconiser, a répandu une foule de beautés de style et d'expression qui devaient être vivement senties par ses compatriotes, et même quelques morceaux assez généralement beaux pour être admirés de toutes les nations . . ."

² *Cours de Littérature française, Littérature du moyen âge*, vol. i, p. 416: "C'est dans ce mélange de sentiments si divers, d'inspirations si opposées, que s'est formé le plus grand poète du moyen âge, ce poète dont les vers sublimes et naturels ne s'oublieront jamais, tant que la langue italienne sera conservée, tant que la poésie sera chérie dans le monde."

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1: "Jusqu'à présent, je parlais de choses que je connaissais assez bien. . . . Maintenant, je vais parler de choses que je sais à peine, que j'apprends à mesure que je les dis."

⁴ The importance of the subject is proclaimed in the "Avertissement des éditeurs": "Pour la première fois, dans une chaire publique de France, on aura essayé d'exposer le développement simultané de plusieurs littératures qui sont sorties de la même source, qui se touchaient dans leurs commencements, qui se sont souvent rapprochées dans leurs progrès, et qui n'ont cessé de communiquer ensemble."

⁵ I should be glad to know that in this fact Villemain had a part. He was at the time a member of the Royal Council of Public Instruction, and could exercise a great authority.

⁶ *Zeitschr. f. roman. Philol.*, vol. vi, p. 501.

⁷ *Portraits contemporains*, vol. iv.

not equally to admire and love him, as Alessandro Manzoni admired and loved him with his whole soul. I find a resemblance, striking in every respect, between Fauriel and him who would surely (and how much more worthily!) have spoken to you in my place, if he had not been taken from us before his time. He shared with Gaston Paris an unquenchable thirst of knowledge. This thirst led them in great part to the same sources: classical languages and literature, modern literature, Romance and Germanic, the literature of the Middle Ages, linguistics, which in Fauriel's time had hardly begun, and popular poetry; and Fauriel accomplished what Paris only longed for.¹ He mastered two Oriental languages: Sanscrit (which, together with Chézy and Frederick Schlegel, he introduced among the French) and Arabic. And if Gaston Paris knew Russian, Fauriel knew the Bask language, and moreover Celtic, which might make him the object of special envy. I regret to break off this comparison without exhausting it.

Averse, as much as any one ever was, to notoriety, Fauriel had communicated but little to the public of his persistent and manifold studies, of his intense meditations, when, almost sixty years old, he was installed in the chair of the Faculté des Lettres. From thence he spoke, and this was his principal mode of publication. In 1831 and 1832 he lectured on Provençal poetry; in the two following years on Dante, of what preceded and prepared him, of the linguistic history of Italy. And the habit of writing his lectures permitted, sooner or later after his death, these courses at least, amongst many he had held, to be published in book form.² They are as rich in thought as in fact, and can still be valuable to whoever runs no risk of being carried away by certain aberrations. They contain yeast for many a batch of bread. The most noteworthy thing in Fauriel, and that which shows him essentially modern, is his vivid curiosity concerning origins. With this, and to the strong liking which, from earliest youth, he had felt for simple and spontaneous poetry, was allied his intense interest in epic poetry. He had studied (and this means that he compared) the Indian, the Persian, and the Germanic as well as the Greek monuments. And he was well acquainted with Wolf's ideas concerning Homeric poems.³ What a pity that, being a southerner, he was soon attracted more by the literature of the *langue d'oc* than by that of the *langue d'oïl*, and that the very nature of his chair made him persevere in this to the end! The consequence of this was that, instead of studying

¹ See the note of my commemorative speech on Paris in the *Atti della R. Accademia della Crusca*, "Adunanza pubblica del dì 27 dicembre, 1903," Firenze, 1904.

² The one, in 1847, under the title *Histoire de la Poésie Provençale*; the other, seven years later, *Dante et les Origines de la Langue et de la Littérature italiennes*.

³ See what is said by Mohl in the *Histoire de la Poésie Provençale*, vol. II, p. 223; and a short note of mine in the *Romania*, vol. XIV, p. 402.

French epic poetry where it really was, he studied it where he imagined it to be. But he again shows depth of thought and sharp insight by the importance he gives this kind.

Fauriel's pretensions to claim the epic poetry of France for the southern region¹ awoke the eager opposition of Paulin Paris, a youth who, imbued with the spirit (I do not say with all the ideas) of the Romantic School, had vowed himself to the literature of the *langue d'oïl*. He so well understood the value of the epic that he began the publication of a collection of texts concerning it, a collection which would certainly have deserved to harbor the highest product, not only of its kind, but of all the literary French Middle Ages. The *Chanson de Roland* saw the light through the efforts of one of the other scholars and exhumers of old texts, who had by this time grown numerous. But amongst all who then wandered through the halls and recesses of the old and no longer silent castle, none can contest the leadership with Paulin Paris. Therefore when, in 1853, a special chair for Old French literature was founded in the Collège de France, Paris was rightly called to occupy it. This foundation is in itself as eloquent as possible. And the Minister to whom it was due soon afterwards accepted, and consecrated with a decree, the plan of publishing integrally, at the expense of the Government, all that could be unearthed of the "Anciens poètes de la France."² Nothing less! It was the plan of dreamers. And practical reason soon took it upon itself to restrain this daring. But nothing more characteristic can be imagined. Now, we all see, France is wide awake. Nor is it to be feared that sleep may fall upon her again. Nothing need be feared, especially for the epic, to which an enthusiast, who has wept hot tears over the *Chanson de Roland*,³ has devoted himself. Léon Gautier will have no peace until the *Chanson* has been introduced even into the secondary schools.

Let us look upon the other Romance nations. Italy, as we know, did not have to do, but to complete what had already been done, and to do better. I hastily pass over the school of the Purists, amongst

¹ His ideas on the subject, which to a certain extent were later on by himself recognized as faulty, had been soon after published; and something of these ideas had already leaked out even before he mounted the chair. Villemain, *Littérature du moyen âge*, vol. I, p. 245, note.

² Detailed information we receive from Gautier, *Epopées françaises*, 2d ed., vol. II, p. 736. The wish for a wide publication of ancient French (epic) texts, was, I think, expressed for the time in the 6th volume of the *Acta Sanctorum Maii* (col. 811) of the Bollandists, published in 1688. Quotations from poems of the cycle of "Guillaume au Court nez" that occurred in Catel's *Histoire des Comtes de Tolose*, gave there occasion to say: "De Francica . . . veteri lingua fortassis non male mereretur qui eiusmodi poemata proferret in lucem." The wish, it is seen, comes from foreign lips. In like manner the Italians, as early as the sixteenth century, had conceived the design of publishing the Provençal poets; and they had done more than conceive the design. Certainly there were some who were unequal to the enterprise they longed for; but that cannot be said of Barbieri, about whom see *Giornale di Filologia Romanza*, vol. III, p. 36, note 1.

³ *Epopées françaises*, vol. II, pp. 733, 734.

whom stood first Cesari, who dreamed of the resurrection of the language of the fourteenth century. But many devoted themselves to the research, the illustration, the publication of old texts, with more temperate ideas, even though usually not exempt from the whim of the "Testi di lingua." And for us none is so worthy of being pointed out as Vincenzo Nannucci, author of the excellent *Manuale della Letteratura del primo secolo*, which appeared in 1837. Nannucci follows the Italian tradition even in having his eye continually upon the Provençal, with which he makes continual comparisons. Ever increasing ardor and richness of content are found in the Dante studies, that receive a worthy banner in the *Discorso sul testo della Divina Commedia* of Ugo Foscolo, which was brought forth in a land of exile. Dante and their country — their country enslaved and awaiting freedom — become inseparable loves for all elevated minds, for all generous souls: Rossetti, Troya, Balbo, Tommaseo, and I know not how many others. And even outside of Dante, neither mere erudition, nor the consideration of form according to old conceptions, any longer satisfy: one demands thought. More steeped with thought than any that had preceded it amongst us is the *Storia delle Belle Lettere in Italia* of Emiliani-Giudici. Foreign streams descend to render fruitful our fields. Not to speak of Ginguené, Sismondi, Villemain, Fauriel, Ozanam who succeeded Fauriel in his chair, act upon our scholars and gradually educate the generation that will come forth later. Even the German action is felt. Biondelli follows on the tracks of Bekker, and begins amongst us the publication of old dialect-texts, governed by scientific principles. German pollen of quite a different kind falls upon a southern flower, and produces an exquisite fruit, with a flavor all its own: the æsthetic-psychological criticism of Francesco de Sanctis.

In the Iberian Peninsula the German action produced since 1828 the plentiful *Romancero general* of Augustus Duran. But fruitfulness could not be expected from a country at once upset and depressed by civil, political, and religious conditions. No wonder, therefore, that Spain should to a great extent learn the history of her own literature from a translation of Bouterwek,¹ and later from the far larger work published in English by George Ticknor, a son of the United States, the first who can be said to enter, and with no small honor, into this studium of ours. Ticknor was often assisted by one of his future translators, Pascual de Gayangos, who notably increased the Spanish version, and who afterwards gave to the important *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, undertaken by courageous editors,

¹ A Spanish translation of the parts concerning Spain was undertaken by J. Gomez de la Cortina and N. Hugalde y Mollinedo. A first volume was published at Madrid in 1829; but the publication stopped there; and it was a pity, because in the form of notes the extension of the original work had been much more than doubled by the translators (pp. 107-273).

a collection of *Escritores en prosa anteriores al siglo XIV*, which corresponds to the poetical collection of Sanchez. The task of providing his country with an indigenous history of literature, which, in scope and in abundance and accuracy of information, should leave behind all foreign histories, was undertaken by José Amador de los Rios. And we shall not, on account of the impatience occasioned by his wordiness and useless talk, deny him the deep debt of gratitude to which he is entitled. Almost as a compensation Spain simultaneously offers us Milá y Fontanals,¹ a Catalan, it is true, in whom sobriety almost reaches the degree of dryness. He was one of those privileged minds, knowing the right road by a kind of instinct, without needing a guide. The book *De los Trovadores en España* was already written when Milá became more or less acquainted with Diez;² and entirely original, notwithstanding the almost painfully careful review of all his predecessors, was the book on the *Poesía heroico-popular castellana*, worthy of being called a real surprise, and to whose power is due all the best that Spain has produced since then.

I have been led to mention a publication of 1874. But in general my review aimed to stop at about 1860. Indeed I could not speak of the period that followed on account of the overwhelming abundance of the material. Yet here the question is not one of reviewing special studies, but rather of pointing out how the present conditions have been reached.

The freedom and unity of Italy, the prevalence which liberal sentiments have gained almost everywhere, the relaxation of hindering religious restrictions, and, very happy circumstance, the undreamed-of facility of communications at home and abroad, have begun to change the aspect of Europe, and have prepared still further changes. Science had the will and the power of being universal to a degree it had never reached before. Ascertained doctrines became known, methods of ascertaining grew familiar. And Germany was in our study, as well as in many others, directly and indirectly, teacher, — Germany, which had done much to perfect the singularly efficacious critical, historical, comparative method which was used on words, on things, on thoughts. Special merit was acquired by certain men in this "propaganda," and it will be a mere debt of justice to single out two: Adolph Mussafia, and, surrounded by a far larger number of proselytes, Gaston Paris. But men could have done far less without suitable tools; and a wonderful instrument of unity was found in the reviews, thanks to which monographic work grows, within the minds of the readers, into a whole. It was a memorable day, therefore, when Adolph Ebert, assisted by Ferdinand Wolf, started

¹ Amador de los Rios and Milá were born in the same year, 1818.

² See the "Prólogo."

the *Jahrbuch für romanische und englische Literatur*.¹ The paper of Edelstand du Méril on *La vie et les ouvrages de Wace* had the first place in it. And French names were plentiful, nor was the Italian and Spanish collaboration entirely lacking. Exhausted in strength the *Jahrbuch* brought forth the vigorous *Romania*, and the *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie* can also be called its posthumous daughter. The foundation of the *Romania* marks in a certain way the Romance emancipation from Germanic guardianship. And there certainly was no need of a guardianship, where Gaston Paris and Paul Meyer, his worthy competitor and comrade, were to be found. But this emancipation did not prevent the continuation of harmony. And the esteem in which Germany held her former ward is also shown by the numbers who crossed the Rhine to listen eagerly to the spoken word. In the first decades of the century for Uhland, Bekker, and Diez, Paris was comprised in its libraries. Since 1870 the German students have frequented the Collège de France and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes no less than the Bibliothèque Nationale.

The *Grundriss der romanischen Philologie*, imagined, coördinated, and in no small extent also carried out by Gustave Gröber, shows how wonderfully and usefully productive the industriousness of the period to which I wish to refer has been. This is an encyclopedia of which, a century ago, not a single chapter could have been written. Together with literature it takes in languages and other things too. Together with the middle age, the modern age. But how much space our subject-matter occupies in it! The recognition for the literary order of those medieval rights that one had long been compelled to recognize for civil and political history really constitutes one of the characteristic features of the culture of the nineteenth century. It is plain to all now that not even what follows can be fully understood without going back to the sources. Likewise it is now clear that we cannot judge of one region without considering the others with which it has connections. Hence a privileged condition for France, standing first in time and productiveness, and against which we come up on every side. And by this, the single histories of literature are changed; in the first place French literature. Examine the one produced under the direction of Petit de Julleville, or the more succinct one of Suchier and Birch-Hirschfeld, and compare it, let us say, with the work of Nisard, which comes only a few decades earlier,² and what a difference is seen, in some places more, in some less distinctly (for much still remains to be done), for Spain and

¹ Already in 1846 L. Herrig and H. Viehhoff had begun to publish the *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen*, still alive and prosperous. But it was not their purpose to give special attention in it to Romance medieval literature; nor is the scientific value of the *Archiv* in its ancient phases to be compared with that of the *Jahrbuch*.

² The first of the four volumes of Nisard was published in 1845; the fourth in 1861.

Portugal! For reasons we know, the history of our literature has had to undergo less change; but look at the work of Bartoli, unfortunately too soon broken off; consider that of Gaspary; imagine an undertaking of this kind accomplished by D' Ancona and Carducci, who have carried so many stones to the building, and a vast contrast with the past will always show itself.

We have seen strangers and natives attend the exhumation of the Romance Middle Ages. A post of honor is due to Germany. Little by little other nations followed. Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Russia, even tiny Finland (not to mention Roumania, Romance herself) have rendered distinguished services to Romance philology. It is singular that, outside of Dante studies, England has kept apart, notwithstanding the manifold appeals of her own literature, of her language, of her history. But what the mother failed to do, the daughter did instead. Amongst you Romance philology has attained a truly conspicuous place. And the uncertainty of the first steps is followed by a surer gait, pledge of a precious coöperation in the fulfillment of a task which can hardly be considered half finished. And the mother country is rivaled in what concerns Dante, the true sun of medieval literature, just as the literature of France is its star-studded sky. Your most famous poet, Longfellow, lovingly undertook to render the *Divine Comedy* into his own tongue. Nor has the fear of comparison deterred other valiant souls from renewing the attempt. A Dante Society exists, and is usefully active here. The richest Dante collection gathered until now is found in this your American land. A greeting, therefore, to you from the country of Dante, from his own native city!

PRESENT PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD OF ROMANCE LITERATURES

BY ALCEE FORTIER

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I FEEL greatly honored to have been invited to read a paper before this Congress of scholars, but I fear that I acted with rashness when I accepted the invitation of the committee. The subject assigned, the "Present Problems in the Field of Romance Literatures," is too vast to be treated in its entirety, and to do it full justice it would require the learning of Friedrich Diez or of Gaston Paris. These two great professors were philologists in the highest sense of the term, and to them Romance philology meant not only the study of grammar, but also of literature, of civilization. Diez had a preference for literary subjects, and published in 1826 an important work on the *Lives and Poetry of the Troubadours*. His masterpiece, however, is his *Grammatik der Romanischen Sprachen*, of which the first edition was published in 1836. Gaston Paris also had a high literary taste and was a worthy member of the French Academy. He was at the same time an accurate student of language, and his edition of *La Vie de St. Alexis* served as a model for subsequent scientific criticism. Literary ability and taste and high scholarship in philology in its restricted sense are a rare combination. Dante wrote his treatise *De vulgari eloquentia*, and this work is interesting as being the first written about the philology of one of the Romance languages. Yet it is the *Divina Commedia* that has given immortality to the wonderful bard of Florence. On the other hand, Raynouard's literary works, his tragedies, are completely forgotten, while his comparative grammar of the Latin languages has placed his name next to that of Diez among the founders of Romance philology, in spite of his erron-

eous statement that Provençal was the link between Latin and the languages derived from it.

In science we are far above the men of antiquity, whether we include in the term science the study of language or of the natural sciences, but we cannot claim any superiority over the ancients in letters or in art. At the very dawn of history the mind of man seems to have been as vigorous as in our own time, and the genius of Homer, Virgil, Apelles, and Phidias is not surpassed by that of Dante, Shakespeare, Molière, Hugo, Goethe, Raphael, and Michael Angelo. The artistic feeling, literary genius, is the direct gift of God to a great man, who will produce immortal works, provided he labors sufficiently and cultivates his genius. The knowledge of science, however, is the heritage of centuries, and each generation enjoys what the preceding one has bequeathed to it. The discoveries of Pascal and Newton will never be lost to the world, and the bulk of knowledge will go on increasing down the ages. Literary works remain also, but they are not dependent upon one another for their existence. Dante did not need Homer to enable him to produce his masterpiece, and Homer, long before Dante, produced a work as great as the *Divina Commedia*. Archimedes, on the other hand, could not have done the work of our modern scientists, and they, in their turn, are generally indebted to their predecessors for some principle on which their discoveries are based. If, therefore, we speak of the highest works of literature, we find among them but few problems to solve.

It is, however, interesting to study the forces which have influenced men of genius in some parts of their works. The creative instinct was theirs as a divine gift from the very beginning of their career, and they did not owe to their predecessors that essential part of their works which has given them immortality. Let us, nevertheless, endeavor to discover the sources of the minor parts of great literary productions. We shall, in this way, understand better the workings of a great mind and obtain a more accurate knowledge of the character and disposition of the author. How interesting it is, for instance, to study in Molière's works what that extraordinary man owed to French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, and Latin models, and what he owed to his wonderful observation of the living man. There are, therefore, many influences and tendencies which affect greatly the mass of literature, and we shall endeavor to discuss some of those problems.

The teaching of the Romance literatures in the colleges and universities of the United States is one of the most serious problems which we have to solve. For a number of years higher instruction in our country has been dominated by the German methods. The splendid work done by the German universities attracted to them

many American students, who acquired there the true scholarly spirit, that is to say, rigid accuracy and thorough dissection of a subject. The influence for good of German scholarship on American professors was incalculable, and raised to a high degree the standard of teaching foreign literatures. Before this introduction of German methods both the teaching and criticism of literature were too vague, too dilettante. The attempt had been made to cover too much ground in a limited time; whole periods were gone over, and the principal authors in those periods were studied in a general way. This was changed by the introduction of the German method in graduate work, and it was thought better to study in detail one author or one work, to endeavor to ascertain all possible facts concerning the author and the work. This rigid scientific method was first applied to Romance philology in the United States by Professor A. Marshall Elliott at the Johns Hopkins University, and he has rendered thus an immense service to American scholarship.

Professor Elliott was also the founder of the Modern Language Association of America, which has been one of the principal factors in the development of higher education in the United States and in the diffusion of the scientific spirit, *l'esprit universitaire*, on which so much stress was laid in 1900 at the Congress of Higher Education in Paris. At the first meetings of the Modern Language Association there were many discussions about methods of teaching modern languages, but soon the Association declared as its opinion that the chief purpose of teaching modern languages in the United States was to impart the culture obtained by the study of their literatures. This did not mean that the training acquired by the study of linguistics was to be abandoned, but it indicated the idea of the Association that the literary spirit should be attended to more than it had been in the past. This expression of opinion on the part of the Modern Language Association of America was very important, and the result was that, in our secondary schools and our colleges, much more extensive reading has been done, and therefore a better knowledge of literature has been obtained.

In University or graduate work the effect has been felt also, but to a lesser degree. The rigid, accurate work of German scholarship was carried to an extreme, and the study of literature from an æsthetic point of view and for the purpose of culture had been very much neglected for a number of years. There has been lately a reaction, and a great demand for a broader and more artistic study of literature has arisen. For many years I have been convinced that the problem could be partly solved by introducing into our American universities some of the French ideals, some of the French art and culture. This could only be done if a sufficient number of Americans were to study in France and be permeated with the French feeling

with regard to literature. There should be a combination of the German painstaking accuracy and of the generally superior appreciation of art in literature of the French. This would produce admirable results in American universities.

For a long time there were few students from the United States in France, for it was very difficult to obtain the French Doctor's degree. It is to Mr. Harry A. Furber, of Chicago, that Americans are indebted for the possibility of obtaining the degree of "*Docteur de l'Université*," which corresponds to the German "*Doctor of Philosophy*," without being obliged to fulfill all the requirements demanded of French students. We should encourage our young men and young women to go to France for the study of the Romance languages, in order that we may have later in this country a better appreciation of the Romance literatures. This would be felt, not only in the colleges and universities and by the students there, but almost immediately by the general public. The scholars who would have acquired in France, or under instructors animated by the same ideas, the French taste for literary art, would write reviews and criticisms which would have a great influence on the people who read journals and magazines. In this respect let us say that the opinion of the American public with regard to French life, as seen in many novels, is entirely erroneous. It should be the duty of American students of French literature to correct this false impression and to show that nowhere in the world is family life nobler and more respected than in France.

A professor in an American college assumes a great responsibility when he attempts to direct his pupils in the study of the Romance literatures. In most of our colleges the teacher of literature is also the teacher of the language in which that literature is written, and he should try to teach literature when he teaches the reading of the language. It is, therefore, interesting to see how much reading is done in our institutions of collegiate grade. Professor Henry Johnston Darnall, of the University of Tennessee, has calculated most patiently from catalogues the number of pages read in undergraduate French courses in twenty colleges in the following Southern States: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The largest numbers were 3772, 2991, 2705, 2516, and 2100. The smallest number was 423, and the average was 1795. The courses were generally of two years; some were of three, and very few of four. We should endeavor to raise the average number of pages read to at least 2500 in two years. This can be done by giving parallel reading, from the first year, ascertaining by an examination, either written or oral, whether the work assigned has been well done. As given in the catalogues the texts read seem to have been judiciously

chosen, and represent authors from the seventeenth century to the twentieth.

Out of the twenty Southern colleges referred to thirteen offer courses in Spanish, generally of one year, and six have short courses in Italian. It is evident that there is great room for improvement in the study of the Spanish and Italian languages and literatures in our Southern States. Judging from the catalogues, the courses in the three principal Romance literatures, French, Spanish, and Italian, in the large universities in the North, in the East, and in the West are very extensive, both in the undergraduate and in the graduate departments. In undergraduate classes it is not possible to give to the students a thorough understanding of the literary merit of a work, unless the course be of more than two years' duration. Beginning with the third year the professor should often have his students read the text in French, Spanish, or Italian, without translating it into English, and asking questions about the text, which should be answered in the language studied at the time.

In graduate work some of the larger American universities offer good courses in literature, but thus far the apparent result obtained has not been very satisfactory, as there has been little work of a high order done by American scholars, students of American universities, in literary criticism of the Romance literatures. More attention should be given in our higher institutions of learning to this important branch of study. There should be close seminary work of the masterpieces themselves, and also of the works of the great European critics, among whom the French stand so high, from Sainte-Beuve to Taine, Brunetière, Faguet, Doumic, Lemaitre, and Pellissier. Utmost attention should be given to make the students feel the artistic, æsthetic, eternally human spirit which pervades all the masterpieces in literature.

The study of literature can only be complete when it is supplemented by the history of the people, political, social, and economic, and by the study of the fine arts. It is impossible to understand a number of the greatest works written in the Romance languages without knowing thoroughly the history of the countries where lived the authors of those masterpieces, and an appreciation of the beautiful works in painting and in sculpture helps to understand art in literature. Were it possible I should like to see the students of Romance literatures appreciate also the masterpieces of the great musicians. They should, while studying Lamartine and Hugo, Dante and Petrarch, Lope de Vega, and Calderon, visit the great museums of art in Europe and in this country, and go often to the theatres to hear admirable operas. The study of literature should be scientific, that is to say, literary works should often be analyzed critically; but I repeat it, it should be, above all, æsthetic, so that we might

enjoy completely the art of the author, as well as the subject which he treats. There is no better way to understand the Romance literatures than to make a comparative study of them. There are not enough works like Villemain's *Cours de Littérature Française*, where he compares so well the masterpieces of different literatures, especially those of the eighteenth century.

I present to this Congress as one of the most important problems in the field of Romance literatures the study of those literatures in the United States and in other countries. I might have expanded considerably a subject which I consider extremely important and entirely pertinent to my theme, as it concerns the diffusion of the Romance literatures in foreign countries by the help of the higher institutions of learning. Very efficiently, too, may this diffusion be carried out by courses of lectures given by men eminent as critics or as authors, such as the courses so happily inaugurated by Mr. James H. Hyde, of New York, for the French Circle of Harvard University and for the Federation of "l'Alliance Française" in the United States. It would be very fortunate if similar courses were established in Italian and in Spanish. In many parts of our country there could be found audiences which might appreciate lectures delivered in these languages.

In speaking of the Romance literatures let us remember that it is not only in Europe that they flourish. Although Spain has lost her colonial possessions in America, she has left her impress on millions of men in the New World, and there is an interesting Spanish literature in Cuba, Mexico, Central and South America. In Brazil also is to be found a literature which had its origin in Europe, and writers not unworthy of the land of Camoens have written works of merit in the Portuguese language. Professor Elijah Clarence Hills,¹ of Colorado College, has given the following list of some of the Spanish-American writers of the nineteenth century: Chile, — Miguel Luis de Amunátegui, Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, José Taribio Medina; Colombia, — Miguel Antonio Caro, Jorge Ysaacs; Rufino José Cuervo; Cuba, — Gertrudis Gomez de Avellaneda, José María Heredia, Joaquín Lorenzo Luaces; Ecuador, — Juan León Mera, José Joaquín de Olmedo; Mexico, — José Joaquín Pesado, Manuel Carpio, Juan de Dios Peza, Manuel Acuña; Nicaragua, — Rubén Darío, José Batres y Montofar; Peru, — Felipe Pardo y Aliaga; Argentine Republic, — Olegario Víctor Andrade; Uruguay, — Zorrilla de San Martín; Venezuela, — Andrés Bello.

It would be very interesting to note what has been the influence of the literatures of the former mother countries on those of the emancipated colonies, and to ascertain whether the latter have exerted any influence on the works of the Spanish and Portuguese authors.

¹ Colorado College Studies, June, 1904.

There is no doubt of the influence of the European writers during the periods of the Spanish and Portuguese dominations and for some time after the independence of the colonies, just as we can trace the influence of English literature on the works of American writers. After colonies have become independent, there soon arises a literature more or less national and with interesting local color. How far have the European writers been influenced by it, and would it not be a way to renew to some extent the literatures of Spain and of Portugal? Some time ago there met at Madrid a congress of delegates from the Latin-American republics. Would it not be advisable to hold such congresses at stated times, either in Spain or in the different states of Spanish America, in order to expand the scope of Spanish literature and make it more world-wide, *plus mondiale*, as the French say?

There has been a large immigration of Italians into South America and into Louisiana. They have newspapers of their own, and they continue to make use of their language as a mother tongue for two or three generations. Have they produced any literary works written in Italian, or is it likely that they will ever produce any, and how would it be possible for Italian writers to encourage that production? Is there any Italian literature outside of Italy? I could wish my learned colleague, Professor Pio Rajna, to answer this question.

It is well known that in Canada there is an important native French literature which comprises history, poetry, and fiction. Some of the Canadian writers are known in France, and their works have been rewarded by the French Academy. The tenacity of the French-Canadians in keeping as a mother tongue the language of their ancestors is indeed wonderful. Although Montcalm fell in 1759, and Canada has been British from the capitulation of Montreal in 1760, the descendants of the men of that time still love France and the French language, and have produced an extensive French literature. Should the Canadians be influenced in their works by the French authors, or should they evolve a national literature? I read not long ago, an article in a Canadian magazine in which the author said that the Canadians should not look to France for their inspiration, but should make their literature suit their own local conditions. There is a great deal of truth in this statement. Let there be local color, and let local patriotism animate the writers in Canada, but let them always continue to study the great works in French literature, especially contemporary works. Separated from the former mother country for a century and a half, the Canadian language has not, as a rule, the true characteristics of modern French, and will lose them more and more in the course of time, if the Canadian authors do not continue to make a close study of modern French

literature. If they choose to evolve a literature of their own, written in a language which will differ considerably with time from modern French, it will be an interesting experiment. They are numerous enough not to have to fear their being absorbed by the British element of the population, and their literature will ever continue to be written in French, although their language will contain many dialectic differences from the French of Paris. The Greek of Asia Minor was not wholly the Greek of Athens, and the French of Belgium and of Switzerland is said to be not always the French of Paris. These remarks about the Canadian French literature are not meant as a criticism, for I have the highest admiration for the courage and perseverance which the French-Canadians have displayed in preserving the language of their venerated ancestors, and I admire also greatly many works of their literature. I merely wish to state an interesting problem concerning one of the Romance literatures.

In Louisiana we have also a native French literature of merit. It dates from the year 1779, when Julien Poydras wrote a short epic poem on the conquest of Baton Rouge from the British by the heroic young governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Galvez. We had in 1814 a tragedy in classic style, *Poucha-Houmma*, by Le Blanc de Villeneuve; and later several interesting plays of the Romantic School, such as *Les Martyrs de la Louisiane*, by A. Lussan, and *France et Espagne* and *Qui perd gagne*, by L. Placide Canonge. In history we have the works of Gayarré and of Debouchel, and in poetry several works which may be compared favorably with some written by the best French writers. Our poets seem to have been inspired by the romantic history of Louisiana, by its stately river and its picturesque lakes and bayous, by its mild climate and luxuriant vegetation, and by the beauty and grace of the women. We have, therefore, more poems written in Louisiana than any other kind of literary works, and we honor greatly the names of our poets in the past, Adrien and Dominique Rouquette, Dr. Alfred Mercier, L. Placide Canonge, Alexandre Latil, Dr. Charles Testut, Mme. Emilie Evershed, Oscar Dugué, and Dr. Charles Deléry. We have had few novels, but these are interesting and have a pleasant local color, such as Mme. de la Houssaye's *Pouponne et Balthazar*, Dr. Alfred Mercier's *L'Habitation St. Ybars*, and George Dessommes's *Tante Cydette*.

The problem in Louisiana is more difficult to solve than in Canada. The French-Canadians are numerous, while the Louisianians of French origin are in a minority in their state. They are loyal Americans, but, like their Canadian brethren, they are sincerely attached to the country and to the language of their ancestors, and they still have an important daily newspaper and a native French literature, not so large as before the Civil War, but very interesting. The problem of maintaining the French literature of Louisiana was partly

solved when Dr. Alfred Mercier founded in 1876 the "Athénée Louisianais," a literary society whose publications contain many important contributions, and which comprise several large volumes. As this admirable World's Fair is held to celebrate the centennial of the cession of Louisiana to the United States, you will allow me to call your attention to the exhibit of French Louisiana in the Department of Anthropology and History of the Exposition. There you may have an idea of the French literature of the oldest state formed out of the immense province acquired by the United States in 1803. It is a literature influenced principally by that of France, but which contains nevertheless some works influenced to a high degree by local surroundings.

The French language in Louisiana will long continue to be spoken as a mother tongue by many thousands of persons, and local French literature will continue to be produced, because the writers are animated by the purest feelings of filial piety, and are entirely disinterested. They know that their works written in French will be read by few persons outside of Louisiana, and they have no idea of pecuniary gain. The Creoles of Louisiana, that is to say, the *white* descendants of the French, although they know the English language and are in no wise hostile to it, consider the French language as much their own as it is that of the native Frenchmen. It forms part of their inheritance as well as the traditions, the names, and the blood which their fathers have transmitted to them. They have produced works written in French just as naturally as they have spoken the language which they learned at their mothers' knees, and have never thought of being rewarded by the French Government for an act which is a simple expression of hereditary feelings. They are pleased, however, when their brethren in France send them tokens of remembrance in the form of affectionate letters from distinguished statesmen or authors, or when these eminent men come in person to express their fraternal feelings. The Creoles of Louisiana, although they are thoroughly loyal to the American Union, are highly pleased to see, when they go to France, that they are not considered as strangers in the native land of their ancestors. The "French Family," *la Famille Française*, as it has often been expressed so admirably by M. Louis Herbette, of the "Conseil d'Etat," should maintain close bonds of affection all over the world, and it should be thus with the Italian, the Spanish, and the Portuguese families. In this way the development of the Romance literatures in foreign countries might be greatly encouraged.

Let no one think that love for the language, the literature, and the country of the ancestors will ever prevent the descendants in the United States from loving above all the land of their birth. Study the history of the French Creoles of Louisiana, and you will see that,

from the year 1803 to our days, no men, no women have ever been more patriotic Americans. Whatever was the native land of our forefathers, however much we wish to preserve our family traditions, we are all in this country sincerely attached to the American system of government, to our American political institutions, which are based on the Anglo-Saxon principles of individual liberty, upon which Washington and his collaborators founded our American Republic. I hope that my colleagues at this Congress will pardon this apparent digression from my subject, but as I speak before a cosmopolitan audience, I wish to be thoroughly understood when I say that a native American may work with enthusiasm for the development and diffusion of the Romance literatures in the United States, and yet remain entirely loyal to the Constitution of the United States.

One word more on this part of my theme, and I shall pass to another phase of it. One of the most important influences in America for the study of an interesting Romance literature and for its production is the Federation of "l'Alliance française" in the United States, founded in 1902 by Mr. James H. Hyde. The Association has been very successful, and comprises societies in all parts of the Union and 25,000 members. Many college French circles are affiliated with the Federation, and the continued success of this large organization will contribute to solve the important problem of how to encourage the study of the French language and literature in the United States. Is it not possible to establish Spanish and Italian societies, like the Federation of "l'Alliance française," to bring together the different Spanish and Italian groups scattered over the United States, or may not the example of the Federation be followed in Mexico and in South America? Nothing certainly would be more beneficial to the development of the Romance literatures on the whole American continent.

In studying the problems in modern French literature I cannot do any better than to base some of my remarks on the very important article published by M. Gustave Lanson, in August, 1900, in the *Revue de Synthèse Historique*. Many of these problems would present themselves to any careful student of French literature, but M. Lanson has stated them with such clearness and with such a scientific method that I shall follow to some extent his presentation of problems which I have often mentioned in my own teaching of French literature, but with far less scientific accuracy. M. Lanson is highly endowed with *l'esprit universitaire*.

The historical method should be applied to literary criticism, that is to say, the biography of the author and the history and analysis of his works should be studied simultaneously, and not as if the one was independent of the other. The works form part of the

life of the author and are explained as a development of that life, especially in the French authors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The work of Rousseau, Voltaire, Mme. de Staël, Châteaubriand, George Sand, Victor Hugo, Alfred de Musset, and many other writers, can be understood only by studying them at the same time as the events which inspired them, and also by studying the social and historical forces produced in the lifetime of the writers. One of the most important problems, therefore, in the field of Romance literatures is the study of social and historical forces in those literatures, and I wish to repeat here a few ideas which I expressed in 1898 in my address delivered as President of the Modern Language Association of America:¹

"It is true that all mankind is animated by the same psychical forces inherent in humanity, and that a great work of art, whether produced by a Homer, a Virgil, a Dante, a Shakespeare, a Calderon, a Molière, a Goethe, is permeated with the same broad human feeling, but each man is bound to reproduce in his work the effect of the civilization to which he belongs. That civilization is largely an inheritance which the individual enjoys by the mere fact of being born in a certain atmosphere; but as civilization means development, new historical and social forces are constantly being brought to bear upon the individual and modifying his ideas. There are, therefore, three great causes which mould the mind of the individual: (1) the fact of being a man, which gives him ideas and sentiments common to all men; (2) his birthplace, which impresses upon him the civilization of his country; (3) the historical and social forces produced in his own lifetime. . . .

"M. Brunetière says that the principal influence in literature is that of works upon works. That influence is certainly very important, but it is not the principal one. So many forces have contributed to the civilization of every country and to the development of every literature that it is very difficult to say which one of these forces has been the most active and the most fruitful. If a great writer has produced a change in the civilization of his time, that change is never so complete as it might appear, inasmuch as the writer must reflect some ideas common to his race, to his country, and to all men. Again, admitting that the personal influence of one man had produced a change almost complete on his epoch and on the literature of his time, that influence of an individual becomes a social force and reacts on other individuals, who may, in their turn, impress the stamp of their genius on civilization and on literature. Historical and social forces are, therefore, continually brought into contact with forces apparently entirely personal and literary, and there is a perpetual reaction of the one class of forces on the other."

¹ *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association of America for 1898.*

The three great sciences auxiliary to literary history are bibliography, lexicography, and the preparation of texts. M. Lanson says that bibliography has lately made great progress, but that there is still lacking a general bibliography of French literature. The same remark may be made about the other Romance literatures. There should be also complete bibliographies of works of individual authors, of the different literary ages, of the principal magazines and reviews, of publishers and printers of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. Catalogues of the libraries of writers are also very important, such as those of Montaigne and of Racine, made by M. Bonnefon; for, "those inventories," adds M. Lanson, "at a time when the use of public libraries was almost unknown, help us to know what books were read by the great writers, what were their instruments of labor and their tastes." Good lexicons of special writers, such as that of Molière by Livet, are needed, and also good dictionaries of the different Romance languages. The dictionary of the French language by Darmesteter, Hatzfeld, and Thomas is admirable, and similar works should be produced for the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese languages.

Bibliographies and lexicons are useful tools to the student of literature, but accurate texts are indispensable, and the publication of *inédits* has added greatly to the literary treasures of nations and to the better knowledge of the character and disposition of authors, whose letters and memoirs have been discovered and given to the world. However unsavory it may appear to some persons, the recent publication of the letters of Alfred de Musset and of George Sand has made us understand better the complicated problem of *Lui et Elle* and of *Elle et Lui*. There is no more fruitful theme in the field of Romance literatures than the proper preparation of texts and the publication of *inédits*. The study of medieval French literature was only possible after Paulin Paris had published in 1832 his edition of *Berte aux grands pieds*, and the admirable *Chanson de Roland*, the witty *Avocat Pathelin*, and other interesting works of the Middle Ages, could be fully appreciated only when good critical editions were published by distinguished Romance scholars in Europe and in America. The field is here immense and is yet hardly explored, in spite of the excellent work of Gaston Paris, Paul Meyer, Gröber, Suchier, Schuchardt, Pio Rajna, A. Marshall Elliott, H. A. Todd, Adolphe Cohn, and many others.

The biographies of writers are so important for a proper understanding of their works that no pains should be spared to produce accurate biographies, which should be psychological as well as narrative, and many biographies considered complete thus far should be rewritten. It is important, in many cases, to determine exactly in what province of a country a writer was born. Michelet, in the

second volume of his *History of France*, presents to us a striking tableau of the characteristics of each of the provinces, and gives an admirable explanation of the influence of local causes, of topography and geography, on the genius of a nation and of a man. Great social and historical forces were at work at different epochs in the different provinces of France, Spain, and Italy, and the Romance literatures and civilizations are the result of all these forces. I wish to mention here as a model of complete and accurate biography the work on *Honorat de Bueil, Seigneur de Racan*, by Professor Louis Arnould, of the University of Poitiers. Several works of this kind have been published lately by laborious and distinguished scholars.

Just as historical legends are destroyed by our modern historians who base their statement of facts upon well-authenticated documents, so are legends in literary history destroyed by modern critics, whose methods are scientific and exact. Let not criticism, however, be entirely mathematical, let the critic appreciate always the æsthetic element in literature. Like the historian of political events, he should be accurate and yet understand the interest, the poetry, always inherent in humanity. If the artistic element in a literary work is to be destroyed by criticism, then, in my opinion, that criticism is false. As an example of useless, and, I may say, of harmful minuteness in criticism, I may mention one of the discoveries of a modern iconoclast. I read, sometime ago, in a French magazine that M. Edmond Biré had proved that Graziella was the daughter of a shoemaker, and consequently that the incidents of Lamartine's excursion to the Isle of Procida were all invented by the great poet. It was well known that the *Confidences* and *Raphael* were not accurate autobiographies, and that their value consisted in the knowledge which they gave us of the feelings of Lamartine, of his *état d'âme*, at certain periods of his life. Of what interest, therefore, is it to us to know who was Graziella? The charming girl created by Lamartine is much more interesting and real than the shoemaker's daughter discovered by M. Biré. The former makes us understand the poet's feelings much better than the latter. In our studies of the Romance literatures let us endeavor to discover all erroneous statements made by writers, but let us use our judgment with regard to publishing discoveries which are useless to our knowledge of men and of works, and which may, in some degree, destroy the poetic illusions of the readers of the works. When M. Biré, however, proves to us that it was materially impossible for Châteaubriand to have visited the countries which he describes in his *Voyages en Amérique* and in his *Mémoires d'Outre-tombe*, he does a useful work, because he discovers the sources from which Châteaubriand has drawn his descriptions.

The study of the sources is one of the most important problems in the field of Romance literatures, and although a great deal has been done in that direction, the work not yet accomplished is still immense. The literary relations between France, Italy, and Spain, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were very close, and are an interesting subject to investigate. Also the influence of England and Germany on French writers, principally in the first half of the nineteenth century. Excellent works have been written on these subjects by Messieurs Brunetière, Morel-Fatio, Jusserand, V. Rossel, and J. Texte, but comparative literature is almost a new science, and a great future awaits the scholars who will devote themselves to it. The influence of Ibsen and Björnson, of Mickiewicz and Tolstoy, of the Scandinavian and Slavonic literatures, on the Romance literatures is itself a broad and important field to explore, one which presents many interesting problems to solve.

M. Lanson's article on Modern French literature is so exhaustive that I have used it partly as a text for my commentary on that subject, and I shall recapitulate briefly a few of his statements. He recommends that correct and critical texts of the great writers be published and says that there hardly exists a single scientific edition of the texts of the nineteenth century. The history of comedy in its transformations has not been written, and there should be a history of lyric poetry, of epic poetry, and a history of history. The history of the *genres* is yet very incomplete. Strange to say, the history of Latin influence on French literature in the three classic centuries has not been written, and that of Greek influence very inadequately. The problem of the origin of French romanticism has not yet been solved, and the eighteenth century is not well understood. The genealogy of a writer and his physiological temperament should be studied in order to understand better his biography and his psychology. The most interesting problem, however, is to determine which are the really great works produced in the nineteenth century. The above observations may be applied in general to the literatures of Spain, Portugal, and Italy, as well as to that of France.

Although French literature was considerably influenced in the nineteenth century by English and German writers, it exerted in its turn a great influence on foreign literatures, especially on the Italian and the Spanish. The modern literatures of Spain and of Portugal have exerted little influence in France, but that of modern Italy is better known and appreciated. The works of Leopardi, Fogazzaro, Matilde Serao, Edmondo de Amicis, Giovanni Verga, and Ada Negri are said by French critics to be popular and to have exerted a beneficent influence, while Gabriele d'Annunzio, whose genius is much admired in France, is viewed with some distrust. M. de Vogüé, in 1895, saw

in his works a "Latin renaissance," but M. Joseph Texte¹ said of him: "The influence of d'Annunzio is one of those which we do not wish to see our France feel too deeply." Each one of the great Latin countries has its own individuality, its own genius, but they have all in common many traits which they have inherited from ancient and splendid Rome, and one of the important problems in the field of Romance literatures is to endeavor to bind by a closer intellectual bond people whose languages and civilizations are principally Latin.

In this paper I have not yet mentioned the Catalan, Roumanian, Rhætian, and Provençal literatures. Important problems may be found there, but I have no time to study them. I wish, however, to call attention to the interest which lies in a study of Catalan literature and of its influence on Spanish literature and even on Spanish politics. The *félibrige* in France is also very important from its literary as well as from its political aspect. The works of Mistral, of his predecessors, and of his friends, have not only a literary value, but are important with regard to the effect which they may produce on the question of *décentralisation*. Of like effect may be the novels which describe provincial life, such as those of Ferdinand Fabre, André Theuriet, Emile Pouillon, and René Bazin.

Political questions have always exerted a great influence on literature. A great change was brought about in Spain by the French Revolution and by the struggle against the Napoleonic invasion; and such poets as Espronceda, Nuñez de Arce, Campoamor, and Zorrilla; such novelists as Juan Valera, Pedro Alarcón, Emilia Pardo Bazan, and Armando Palacio Valdés; such dramatists as Echegaray and Pérez Galdós, are the products of the literary renaissance which began after the fall of Napoleon. But the most important force in the development of Spanish literature would be the development of the educational system of the country. Education is not general enough in Spain or yet in Italy. Republican France, since 1870, has given a great example to her Latin sisters and has made wonderful progress in public education. It will be interesting to note in a few years what have been the results on literature of the present policy of the French Government concerning congregational schools. The influence of parliamentary democracy is an important subject to study. Has its establishment been the cause of pessimism in literature or not? In Italy also political history has exerted a marked influence on literary history, and the establishment of the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel and the loss of the temporal power of the Pope have given rise to interesting problems in literature as well as in politics.

¹ Petit de Julleville, *Histoire de la Langue et de la Littérature française*, volume VIII, p. 695.

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The dominant trait in the Romance literatures at present is more individuality, less enslavement to schools and their supposed rules and precepts. There is, in general, a broader human feeling, a well-marked interest in things common to mankind, and this feeling is evidenced by the presence at this Congress of Arts and Science of distinguished men and women from all parts of the world. Let each one of us cherish above all the land of his birth, the land where reside those dearest to him, but let us all unite in a common love for the noble thoughts contained in the great literatures of the world, among which are to be found, in a position of well-deserved honor and dignity, the Romance literatures.

SECTION E — GERMANIC LITERATURE

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(Hall 3, September 23, 10 a. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR KUNO FRANCKE, Harvard University.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR AUGUST SAUER, University of Prague.

PROFESSOR J. MINOR, University of Vienna.

SECRETARY: PROFESSOR K. D. JESSEN, Bryn-Mawr College.

THE INFLUENCE OF NORTH AMERICAN LITERATURE ON GERMAN LITERATURE

BY AUGUST SAUER

(Translated from the German by Prof. Robert S. Woodworth, Columbia University)

[August Sauer, Regular Professor of German Language and Literature, University of Prague, since 1891. b. Vienna Newstadt, Austria, Oct. 12, 1855. Graduate, University of Vienna, 1876; Ph.D. *ibid.* 1877; University of Berlin, 1877-78. Substitute Professor, University of Lemberg, 1879-83; Special Professor, University of Graz, 1883-86; *ibid.* University of Prague, 1886-91. Member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Society for the Advancement of German Science, Art, and Literature in Bohemia and Prague. Author of *Concerning the Iambic Pentameter of Lessing's Nathan*; *Studies in the Philology of Goethe* (with Minor); *Portrait of Women from the Golden Age of German Literature*; and many other works and papers on Germanic literature.]

METHODOLOGICAL questions are capable of two sorts of treatment. One can make a survey of the whole complex of problems and exhaust all the possibilities. Or one can point out the best manner of treatment by means of an example specially fit for the purpose. It is in no spirit of contradiction to the philosophical spirit which conceived the idea of this World's Congress and called it into life that I choose the latter of these two ways, and seek to fulfill the task assigned me—that of showing the relations of German literature to foreign literature—by tracing this connection in the case of two authors who have hitherto been considered as very far apart from each other. I mean by this choice to give strong expression to my conviction that the slow and toilsome work of detailed research can never be avoided in the life of science. Everything depends, however, even in such work, on gaining the broadest possible outlook and never losing one's feeling for the great whole.

The longer the span of history we survey, in a national literature, and the more different national literatures we follow in their origin and development, the more the history of all literature appears to us as a single organism, the separate organs of which stand in closest, most indissoluble connection with each other, while even the smallest

component parts exert a mutual influence. Thus there is reared, on the foundation of the separate sciences of the national literatures, a general or comparative science of literature. Such a science was foreshadowed and sketched in outline by far-seeing thinkers even a century ago; it was further shaped with varying success by their followers; to-day, though still vague in aim and uncertain in method, it is of great promise for the future, especially in such a field as America, where so many languages and literatures meet, and whence, indeed, has sprung one of the more successful of recent investigators who have devoted themselves to this branch of literary history.

Dependence on others as models and standards is a matter of course, a natural and necessary condition. Every author, even he who seems most original, must first of all have fought his way from dependence to independence. Writers inherit from their predecessors the richest treasures, without will or codicil. Even a writer who has long seemed so eccentric and pathological as Friedrich Hebbel is gradually seen to have a truly organic place in the regular development of our composition and style. The same work of art belongs to the most varied lines of development. Philosophy of the world and of life, idea and tendency, matter and motive, technique and presentation, style and language, — each has its own line of development. Originality in one direction does not exclude dependence in another; a poet, a work, may on one side open up a fresh line of development while on another side standing at the close of an earlier line. Myriad crossings of the different lines are possible.

The history of a people's literature is an almost uninterrupted succession of culture borrowed, influences received, stimulus felt from other literatures. When one people is culturally, socially, and politically superior to another, and at the same time in close geographical contact and lively intercourse with it, the weaker, younger, more primitive people is wholly surrendered to the intellectual influence of the more advanced. In such a transfer of culture, involving the passing over from one people to another of their philosophy of life and of the world, their social structure, technical achievements, morals, and customs, it may happen that the art of the one people is simply transplanted to the new soil. The dependence of the new literature is very marked, sometimes amounting to complete lack of originality; the new shoot does not count for anything in the development of the world's literature. The foreign literary works are circulated and read in their original tongue, they are abbreviated and excerpted, annotated and paraphrased; translations, imitations, and a freer working-over of the matter into new form follow; the material, motives, and characters that have been taken over are changed and remodeled, at first sparingly, but later with greater and greater freedom. The first thing to become nationalized is the

language and mode of expression, after that costume and scene, finally the thought and tendency. The national character does not take possession of the whole at once; it may even show itself first by what it rejects, by what it finds uncongenial in the foreign literature.

It is not always the most important works of one literature which exercise the decisive influence on another. A writer may be of more importance for the history of a foreign nation than for his own. A work little prized by men of its own language may thus become the cornerstone of a new literature.

In connection with such a transfer of culture, permeating the whole life and thought of a people, the points of agreement between single works or authors have of course little significance; the important things to notice are the deviations from agreement, even the slightest and most in detail — the displacements and distortions; what the new writer omits, overlooks, ignores, misunderstands, avoids, perhaps parodies or travesties. The growing independence is first revealed by negative signs.

In times of strong dependence on foreign culture, it is already a proof of a high grade of independence in an author, if, believing the foreign influence excessive or even hurtful, he seeks to break away from it, and to open the way for the influence of some other literature more closely related to the spirit of his own people. Though substituting one dependence for another, he at least changes the literary centre of gravity.

Culture can also be borrowed from peoples far distant in time or space. Dead literatures can wake to new life, and in their renaissance exert a new and mighty influence. Or it may happen that a literature voluntarily subjects itself for a time to another apparently remote from it, as when an exotic style of composition becomes the fashion.

Besides these universal inundations of culture, single fields of literature, single forms of composition, are exposed to inroads more limited in space and time. While one sort of writing is flourishing in full independence, another sort may simultaneously, and among the same people, be completely subject to the influence of foreign models. The number of literary subjects and motives is not very great; the forms of composition have, during the course of thousands of years, been only slightly widened in scope; even the metric forms, the turns of style, the figurative means of expression, are confined within certain limits. They preserve their identity even when their connection with the literatures is dissolved; they become diffused.

Single authors also, like mighty conquerors, undertake invasions of the fields of foreign literature. Usually it is the strongest intellects which, in isolation, separated from their native literature, — or, it

may be, as its representatives, — rule upon foreign soil. Often the tyranny narrows down to the rule over a single work, but sometimes it maintains itself for centuries.

As applied to the methods of historic investigation, the preceding considerations go to show that the important task is not the detection of such influences — by collecting parallel passages, making lists of allusions, counting up what one author has borrowed from another, pointing out reminiscences, or even discovering plagiarisms. Rather is it the main thing, when once this relationship, whether plain or obscure, is established, to utilize the fact for understanding the characteristics of the writer influenced, for determining his degree of dependence, for estimating the proportions of the ingredients in the resulting mixture, and for indicating as exactly as possible the point at which a work, an author, a literature achieves a relative independence, the point where the personal, subjective, original comes to light, where the national character frees itself from the chrysalis, and rises, splendid and radiant, into the air.

In this regard, one urgent demand to be made on our discipline is a prompt right-about-face. Dozens of researches are seen to be at the least superfluous, if not utterly on the wrong track. One couples together two names from a national literature or from the world's literature, without asking whether the connection is sufficiently close to make its investigation worth the trouble. One overlooks the fact that certain foundations lie, unavoidably and as a matter of course, at the basis of certain periods of literature, and that in such cases the more precise determination of details is of no consequence. One fails to see that in the study of each writer it is only necessary to consider certain central authors who have influenced his development in essential and decisive points, and without whom the younger author's work would have been inconceivable. But the real disease of this sort of researches is that they picture the influence of one author on another much too externally and mechanically, while they conceive the highly complex creative process in far too simple terms; they degrade the individual author, till he is made to seem the helpless prey of vultures swooping down on him; they interpret a work of art as they would a machine produced by the joint efforts of many unthinking laborers; they do not even see that the influence of one work often excludes that of another, or that the most important question is whether a given work of art, known, perhaps, to a writer for a long time, was actually occupying his attention so strongly at a definite moment that it could exert an influence on a newly arising work of art germinating within him at that moment; they do not see that they must know the order in which different works impressed themselves on the author in a stimulating and life-giving fashion.

How necessary it is to bear all these points in mind will be shown in the following discussion by an example. It is an example of the influence of an apparently remote literature upon an author, in whose case foreign influences have not previously been suspected. The particular example chosen seems here all the more in place, because it deals with the influence of North American literature upon a German writer, a countryman of my own, with whose works I have made myself familiar by years of careful study.

Adalbert Stifter, a son of the German Bohemian Forest, sprang suddenly into fame in the early forties of the last century by the publication of his *Studies*; criticism scattered its incense before him, no less an authority than Eichendorff was the first to grasp his epoch-making significance. For a time he had great vogue. His later works, however, did not meet with the same success; an unjust enemy, with whom he was not equipped to fight, arose in the inexorable Hebbel, who thought to annihilate him with savage attacks. After a period of unobtrusive influence in narrower circles, he has come again into general and still increasing favor. It is only the history of nineteenth-century literature — a study which is still in its beginnings — that could make nothing of him. A few thoughtless catch-phrases, such as that regarding Stifter's lack of passion, have been passed on from one book to another. An otherwise valuable book on German fiction of the nineteenth century omits entirely the name of the author, who has given us in his *Nachsommer* one of the most intimate and original of German romances. The authority of a Nietzsche was needed to compel the indifferent to attend to him. In Stifter's home, to be sure, no such impulsion was required. As is the case with all German stocks and fragments of stocks that are politically separated from the mother country, the home literature in Austria has a hearty recognition and its history is zealously cultivated. The best Austrian story-writers of the present day attach themselves to Stifter and esteem him highly. He is honored as one of the noblest of native artists. An extensive biography of Stifter from the hand of an enthusiastic supporter (Alois Raimund Hein) has just appeared, a work of years of loving industry. Eager collectors care for the preservation of his paintings and drawings, autographs and letters, for the storing of which a Stifter-Archive has been founded in Prague. The "Society for the Advancement of German Science, Art, and Literature in Bohemia" is publishing in its *Library of German Authors of Bohemia* a complete critical edition of his works.¹ Vigorous young blood is entering zealously into the study.

¹ *Bibliothek deutscher Schriftsteller aus Böhmen*. Vol. 11: A. Stifter, *Sämtliche Werke*, 1 vol., *Studien*, 1 vol., herausgegeben von A. Sauer (my introduction to this volume has several points of contact with the present lecture). — *Bibliothek*, vol. 12: A. Stifter, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 14, *Vermischte Schriften*, 1 vol., herausgegeben von A. Horcicka (Prag, J. G. Calve).

The Hebbel revival finds a necessary counter-weight in a Stifter revival.

Stifter has been hitherto regarded as one of our most independent writers, a true product of our soil, peculiar to us more than any other. He sprang from a district which then lay far from the channels of trade, where wood, cliff, and heath meet, where a bit of the primeval forest still remains in Europe. A knotty, primitive type of man, not unlike the old frontiersman of America, there struggles hard for his scanty living. They are hunters, wood-choppers, and the like. Odd and original characters are not lacking among them. There depth, inwardness of soul, thrive in hardy strength, leading at times to taciturn hardness, but occasionally also to a dreamy thoughtfulness and to poetic talent. The legends and traditions of his forest home sounded around Stifter in childhood. His education in one of the worthiest of the Austrian convent schools confirmed him in his native Catholic view of the world, which became his unshakeable conviction. Not till late in his career did he exchange the painter's brush for the pen of the writer. Practically unaffected by all the good or evil movements in the spirit of the times, he entered literature when nearly thirty-five years old, or about 1840, the very year in which Friedrich Hebbel appeared, and two years after two spirits kindred to his own, Eduard Mörike and Annette von Droste-Hülshoff, had published their epoch-making collections of poems. Like these two, he shows the opposite tendency to that of "Young Germany," like them he unites in himself all the healthy elements of Romanticism, without falling to the grade of a weak imitator or gleaner epigone — all three are Romanticists after the Romantic movement. Once more the heart won the victory over the intellect, enthusiasm over enlightenment, idyllic peace over the so-called "Movement-literature"; the poet free from politics, free from time, won the day from the poets of the times, the political lyricists, the tendency dramatists, the writers on current events, who, like smugglers, misused fiction as the "dark-lantern of ideas." At the very moment when the manifesto of the Halle Yearbook against Romanticism was scoffing even at its love of nature and enthusiasm for the woods, there arose in these sensitive artists the best interpreters of nature and the woods, their truest worshipers and most inspired prophets.

His first *Studies*¹ (*The Condor, The Field Flowers, The Fool's Fort, Great-grandfather's Map*) show Stifter following the same path as Jean Paul, E. T. A. Hoffmann, and Tieck. *The Heath Boy*,² written in the tone of an Oriental legend, proves him for the first time a master of nature description. In his own home, familiar to him

¹ *Der Kondor, Die Feldblumen, Die Narrenburg, Die Mappe des Urgrossvaters.*

² *Der Heideknabe.*

from childhood, he discovered the fairest object of his poesy. In the *Mountain Forest*,¹ finally, he became, more decisively than Wilibald Alexis or Charles Sealsfield, the real founder of provincial romance in Germany.

As an historic narration from the days of the Thirty Years' War, the *Mountain Forest* is in line with the Walter Scott tradition; but the historical matter is sketched only in a slight and almost shadowy way. Real historical studies were scarcely made by the author; the truth was rather that the legends of his native region afforded him the stimulus. The whole action is suitable to the present day, or else to a land of fable. Legends and parables are inserted; the legendary tone is preserved throughout. The women are pictured as fairy forms; the hero, a natural son of Gustavus Adolphus, seems a legendary prince; in eternal youth and beauty the form of the dead floats before the eyes of his loved one. Like a legend, too, is the end of it all; the survivors grow preternaturally old. No one ever learned of their death.

The story is attached to a ruin near Stifter's home, which the people called a haunted castle. In the story it is peopled and alive, a home full of a noble civilization and high culture. But the wood to the west of it he describes as the virgin forest untouched by civilization, the action of the story being for it merely a rapidly passing episode. On the shore of the lake, where the characters of the story built a blockhouse, the seed of the forest is sown again, and every trace of human footsteps disappears.

With great artistic power the author brings the fortunes of his characters, the weal or woe of their loves, into intimate relation with the course of nature, the cycles of day and year, the life of the forest. He pictures the dark and gloomy aspect of the forest, the sublime loneliness of its measureless extent, the stillness, the silence of it, and then, too, the tones that enliven it; he shows it in its splendid summer attire, and in the icy garb of winter; all its colors, tints, and shades he seeks to reproduce. He makes the wood a thing of life, with a soul, he illuminates it with love and goodness, he regards it as the most magnificent of the Creator's works, as a church, a temple, a cathedral. The forest makes one good and reverent, innocent and childlike, it assures outward and inward peace. A glorification of the forest, a hymn to its beauty and power, which are like those of paradise.

With such a child of heath and wood, who in one of his first letters describes a stroll through the primeval forest, and pictures the spectacle of the wood flaming by night in the storm, as he himself had experienced it, where is there opportunity for any foreign stimulus? Yet it is present. In his descriptions of nature he is a pupil of Jean

¹ *Hochwald*.

Paul. He emulates Tieck and other Romanticists in his descriptions of the forest loneliness. Lenau's wood-pictures were well known to the Austrian writer. The meadow-lark's song is heard simultaneously in Annette's "Heath-pictures." The splendid descriptions of wood and heath in Charles Sealsfield's novels can scarcely have been unknown to Stifter. He could not indeed have known that the great anonymous writer was an Austrian, a son of the Sudetic country, and thus his closest compatriot. Many points of agreement in their diction can be explained from their community of origin; for instance the Czech influence, which is seen in both, though more pronounced in Sealsfield than in Stifter.

Lenau and Sealsfield received the inspiration for their descriptions of nature in North America; Lenau during his unlucky visit, which afforded him so little satisfaction, Sealsfield during a long residence, which made him an American citizen and a spirited adherent and admirer both of the scenery and of the politics of North America. The longing for distant lands and for the New World was felt also by Stifter, and transferred by him to the characters of his tales for youth. In youthful excess the pupil of Klopstock cries out in one of his letters: he would fain, arm in arm with his future lover, throw himself into Niagara Falls (1837). The artist in the *Condor* sails across the Atlantic Ocean. In *Field Flowers* America is not simply the land of the hero's dreams; the action of the prologue is partly on American soil; Emil passed two years in America, and relates how in a forest he had nursed back to health a strange dog. The poetically gifted "Heath Boy" travels to Palestine, Egypt, and into the Desert. Ronald, the Swedish prince, is lured on by a glittering city, by the limitless wilderness of the new land. The North American literature of that time cannot therefore have been unknown to Stifter.

With Washington Irving (1783-1859), his brother-in-law, James Kirke Paulding (1779-1860), and James Fenimore Cooper (1789-1851), the native literature of North American soil made a triumphal entry, in the third decade of the nineteenth century, into the world's literature. A new domain of literary material was discovered, a new world opened to view; Châteaubriand had only partially raised the curtain before it. The applause of the European reading public was unexampled. In 1823 translations of Irving began to appear, in 1824 those of Cooper; in the same year W. Alexis translated Paulding's novel, *Königsmark the Long Finn*. The esteemed publishers Sauerland in Frankfort-on-the-Main produced Cooper's and Irving's complete works in many volumes, and combined the American fiction of Paulding and of Dr. Bird into a *Library of the Classic Authors of North America*. Goethe read Cooper's novels with interest and

admiration, and praised them publicly; Grillparzer, visiting him, found him just reading the *Sources of the Susquehanna*. Mörike read with his family in 1848 Cooper's sea-tales and was much pleased with them. In a somewhat regretful note in his *Outlines* the statistician of our literature, Karl Goedeke, attests the enormous popularity of the Cooper novels from recollections of his own youth. The innumerable imitations of Cooper in the German language have never yet been catalogued.

Literary history cannot assign to Cooper's novels an extremely high rank. He is a gifted but weak imitator of Walter Scott, who simply had the good fortune to discover, in the romance of the sea and of the Indians, a fresh, unhackneyed store of material. Börne contrasted the active life and mighty events and deeds of his novels with the inaction of the heroes of German fiction. Sealsfield's criticisms still hold good: Cooper exaggerates and idealizes beyond measure. In his portrayal of the Indians he is far surpassed in truth by Sealsfield; so also in the ardor and magnificence of his descriptions of scenery. With all his enthusiasm and high-flown passages, he still remains in reality sober. His novels fairly drip with moralizing. But he knows well how to group strong, rough, glaring effects, how to tell a story in an absorbing and even exciting way. The strong charm of the matter of his novels brings it about that selections from his works have a greater effect on youth — even to the present day — than the originals themselves. Cooper injured himself chiefly by the great bulk of his writings. Impelled by success he let himself be carried down a declivitous path, took up one period after another in the life of his Leather Stocking, and had to admit himself, in the prefaces to his later books, how hard it was to make the same characters appear in four or even five works without repeating or contradicting himself too much. This precipice Cooper by no means escaped. His imitations of himself became weaker and weaker. As an artist he stands far below Stifter, though he exerted a powerful stimulating influence on the younger man.

As far as I can see, Stifter never mentioned Cooper's name in his works or letters, just as he never speaks of the other mental pabulum which he may have taken in, in the way of entertainment, during his early years. But it is a safe assumption that he knew all five of the Leather Stocking novels, and that their hero had long been a cherished and familiar character in his mind from the three older novels (*The Pioneers*, 1823; *The Last of the Mohicans*, 1826; *The Prairie*, 1827), when the appearance of the two final novels (*The Pathfinder*, 1840; and *The Deerslayer*, 1841), the German translations of which followed immediately, perhaps even in 1840, kindled the fire anew within him, nourished his just-awakened desire for literary production, and caused the imagination of the young poet to bear

fruit. These hastily got up German translations, which bristled with un-German idioms and constructions, must be made the basis of our study, since Stifter undoubtedly had them before him. It is scarcely probable that he had read the novels also in the original, as he seems not to have had a mastery of English.¹

An accident led my honored co-worker in the editing of Stifter's works, Professor Adalbert Horcicka of Vienna, to the detection of a number of resemblances in subject-matter between the *Mountain Forest* and the *Deerslayer*. At my suggestion, Mr. Karl Wagner, student of philosophy in the University of Prague, then undertook a minute comparison of Stifter's book with the *Pathfinder* and the *Deerslayer*, and I myself extended this study to all the five novels. On account of the close connection of the whole cycle, and its many repetitions of motives, language, and even definite expressions, it is impossible to determine surely in detail and in every case what particular passage may have had its effect on Stifter. The relation between the two authors appears most strongly and clearly, as far as regards the substance, in comparing the *Mountain Forest* with the *Deerslayer*.

In this novel Cooper unfolds a picture of the hazardous hunter-life, a life which also forms the background of Stifter's narrative. Old Tom, in his earlier years a notorious freebooter, enters on a late, and, as it seems, loose sort of marriage with a woman of high birth and checkered past, the mother of two daughters; he goes west and leads a hunting-life in idyllic fashion. For a home he constructs a log house, which for better protection against enemies he locates in a large lake surrounded by the forest. At the beginning of the action, the unfortunate wife has long been buried in the lake, and a son laid to rest beside her, but in the memory of her daughters, Judith and Hetty, she still lives as their illuminating genius. So also, in the *Mountain Forest*, the mother of Johanna and Clarissa has long been dead, her name is not even mentioned in the story, while Felix, the brother, is made a very secondary personage.

The attention, here as there, is directed to defense against an approaching enemy. The Swedes are preparing an expedition against the upper Danube country; their goal is not really the storming of the castle — just as, in Cooper, a war between the rival French and English is expected in the West, the first forerunners of which appear

¹ I make my citations from the following volumes of the Sauerland complete edition: *Die Ansiedler, oder die Quellen des Susquehannah*, 2 Auflage, 1838. 2 Teile. *Der Letzte der Mohikaner*. Eine Erzählung aus dem Jahre 1757. Aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Heinrich Döring. 4 Auflage, 1845. 2 Teile. *Die Steppe*. Eine Erzählung. 2 Auflage, 1840. 2 Teile. *Der Pfadfinder, oder der Binnensee*, 1840. 3 Teile. *Der Hirschtödter*. Ein Roman. Aus dem Englischen übersetzt von O. von Czarnowski, 1841. 3 Teile. [The citations from the *Deerslayer* and *Pathfinder*, in the English version of this paper, are often taken directly from the original. — Translator.]

in the form of the dreaded Mingo Indians, who really undertake the plundering of the castle only because it is good booty, lying accidentally in their way. Help comes to Old Tom, thus surrounded with impending dangers, in the person of an acquaintance and hunting comrade, a rough man, superhumanly strong, called Hurry Harry, who sues in vain for the love of Tom's elder daughter, the wondrously beautiful Judith, even as the knight from Upper Austria sues for Clarissa's love. Judith has formerly been in love with an English officer, Warley, as Clarissa has loved the Swedish Prince Ronald. Gregory I regard as the parallel to the *Deerslayer* himself.

Almost all of this cycle of Cooper's novels start out with some sort of a forest journey. In the *Deerslayer*, the two hunters press on through the wilderness, in order to reach the lake and floating Tom. The same situation is more fully worked out at the commencement of the *Pathfinder*, where the four characters likewise reach a "windrow" in the forest, in which the fallen trees lie "blended like jackstraws," and from which they enjoy a sublime prospect over the measureless expanse of woods. "An exclamation of surprise broke from the lips of Deerslayer, an exclamation that was low and guardedly made, however, for his habits were much more thoughtful and regulated than those of the reckless Hurry, when, on reaching the margin of the lake, he beheld the view that unexpectedly met his gaze." A gentle exclamation of astonishment escapes also from the maidens at the sight of the broad surface of "glistening water, over whose bosom the soft image of the moon floated like a lazy cloud." The lake in *Deerslayer* is called "Glimmerglass, seeing that its whole basin is so often fringed with pines, cast upward from its face; as if it would throw back the hills that hang over it." In a pregnant passage in the *Last of the Mohicans*, the "sparkling streams" are spoken of with great emphasis. Glimmer, shimmer, glitter¹ are also favorite and oft-recurring words with Stifter. The whole lake scene in Stifter is like that in Cooper; the changes which he has introduced into the geographical relations of Blockenstein Lake can be explained as results of this literary influence. The equipment of the forest house in Stifter is closely patterned after that of the castle in Cooper, even to the padlock and to the fortification with palisades²—a wholly superfluous fortification in case of a building standing on dry land. In the arrangement of both houses, great precautions are taken against fire. Just as, in Stifter, the furnishings are surprisingly comfortable, so also we read in Cooper: a single glance sufficed to show that the house was inhabited by females. Most clearly do the rafts in Stifter betray their foreign origin. Old Tom, for the sake of

¹ "Glimmern, schimmern, flimmern."

² Later, Stifter uses "Pflöcke" as the equivalent of "Palissaden" in the translations of Cooper, "Pfeiler" is also employed.

protection against the bullets of enemies, had erected a sort of blockhouse on a smaller scale upon his ark — commonly designated as boat (*Boot*) or scow (*Fähre*), once, however, as raft (*Flösse*), although besides it genuine rafts were present. On a primitive raft of blocks of wood, a seat was made for Hetty. In the corresponding descriptions in Stifter a contradiction has crept in; at the beginning one raft carries an elevated framework with seats for the company, but later on both rafts carry "bullet-proof houses." The exaggerated precautions that are taken to keep the raft always at a suitable distance from the shore likewise recall the American novel. And when old Gregory, after shooting at a hawk, laid his gun down along a tree-trunk, and waits to see the unfamiliar noise fetch the animals up out of the water, this too sounds like an Indian trick, so many of which are described in Cooper. The inaccessibility of the strongly fortified spot is strongly emphasized; so far aside from human traffic does it lie that no path, no footprint, no trace of one, can be spied. This tautology recalls the importance of spying out enemies in Cooper's novels. Yet, in case a hostile band should wander into this wilderness, Gregory knows of a cave, some hours distant up among the highest rocks, to which he only knows the approach; there he can hide the girls till the danger is over, even as Cooper's characters often find refuge in caves. Also in the equipment of the two lake colonies there is much that is similar. When the sisters, in great anxiety about their paternal house which can be seen glistening in the hazy distance, examine it from the "block stone" through a telescope, old Gregory struggled hard to comprehend the enchanted thing, which was quite inexplicable to him. So, too, in Cooper the little company in the lake make observations with the telescope on the castle when it was visited by the enemy; the wonder and curiosity are painted in the same colors. In the *Pioneers*, also, a telescope comes into use. Stifter's employment of the telescope cannot be called an anachronism, as it was already in widespread use by the middle of the seventeenth century.

In these similar settings goes on, both here and there, the idyllic life of the sisters, at first disturbed only, at rare intervals, by some beast of the forest. "Low and tremulously, but earnestly and solemnly," Hetty sings in the quiet of night; her spirit consoles itself in the prayer of simple faith. So also the tones of Clarissa's harp "penetrate the sleeping midnight air like a sweet heart-throb." As between the two sisters, Clarissa strongly recalls Judith in her chief traits. Of a singular, dark-eyed beauty, Judith has an unconquerable love for bodily ornament, as appears especially in the unpacking of the old chest, descended from her mother. In like manner the two sisters in the mountain forest feel first delight and later shame at this "girlish weakness," as they put on their finest clothes

and view themselves in the mirror. Judith puts on most eagerly the red brocade, taken from the chest, in order to impress her naïve friend, but must content herself with a reproof from him; and later she wears it again, when, driven by her love, she goes into the enemy's camp, in order to free her loved one from the hands of the Indians, who, thirsting for revenge, have condemned him to death. It is expressly said of her: "A charming creature! And she looked like a queen in that brocade dress." Clarissa, too, goes to meet her former lover in all her finery and in her most beautiful dress (a velvet also), "so that she was like a noble lady, who is brought to a king's feast"; and the author assigns a similar motive for her action: "There is something in woman's finery and festive clothes that keeps you at a distance; it is the court dress of their souls; and even the old son of the forest, who had never seen any jewels except those of morning in the fir trees, felt himself oppressed and almost subdued by Clarissa's beauty." And Ronald begs her to lay aside the "stiff finery," as Deerslayer begged Judith. The latter is taken with a tender love, delicately portrayed by the author, which by degrees fills her whole heart; but she is cold in her expression of it, as she is oppressed with remorse on account of her earlier relations with Warley. Clarissa as well regards her love for Ronald as a sin, but finally gives herself entirely up to it. The mutual love of the two sisters is also similarly portrayed by the two authors. Johanna is like Hetty, especially in the unconscious awakening of her love. Cooper likes to bring women of high birth or culture into his novels; and bringing in *two* sisters is quite typical of him, and of Stifter as well (*Field Flowers*, *Two Sisters*); the very similar pair of sisters, Cora and Alice, in the *Last of the Mohicans*, may have hovered before Stifter's mind in many passages.

In comparing Gregory with the Deerslayer, their difference in age need not be too strongly emphasized. In spite of his youth, and though he is on the warpath for the first time, Deerslayer is yet a mature man in thought and action; and Gregory, though standing at the utmost limits of advanced age, is as enthusiastic and fond of adventure, and toys as much with plans for the future, as Deerslayer. Young Deerslayer is already compared with the most experienced veterans; he speaks earnestly and solemnly, acts with dignity and respect, and is called Straight Tongue. The contrast between his youthful years and his prudent, circumspect bearing and carefully weighed words impresses even the Indian, who says of him: "My brother has two scalps — gray hair under the other. Old wisdom — young tongue!" or "Young head — old mind"; "Young head — old wisdom."

Both Gregory and Deerslayer have grown into unity with their forests: "This is grand! — 't is solemn! — 't is an education in itself,

to look upon," says Deerslayer. "Not a tree disturbed even by red-skin hand, as I can discover, but everything left in the ordering of the Lord, to live and die according to His own designs and laws!" To him, as to Gregory, settlement seems a desecration of the virgin wilderness! "The woods are never silent," says the Pathfinder, "if one but knows how to interpret their voice. I have wandered through them alone for many days, with never a longing for company. And as regards conversation, there is no lack of varied and instructive talk, if one but understands the language." Gregory, too, goes rather into the forest than to vespers or to the public-house, and he begins "gradually to hear the talk of the wood, and his senses were opened to understand its signs, and they were all words of splendor and of mystery and of love concerning the great Gardener, whom he often felt he must behold, wandering somewhere among the trees." The poetic gift, with which Cooper so often endows his heroes, is Gregory's also. Deerslayer is called "a man of strong native poetic feeling. He loved the woods for their sublime solitudes and for the impress that they everywhere bore of the might and wisdom of their Creator. He rarely moved through them without pausing to dwell on some peculiar beauty that gave him pleasure, though seldom attempting to investigate the causes; and never did a day pass without his communing in spirit, and this, too, without the aid of forms or language, with the infinite Source of all he saw, felt, and beheld." Gregory's former hunting-comrade praises him in these terms: "The wonderful thoughts were unfolded from his heart even in those days, like the flowers of some exotic spring . . . and it often seemed as if one were reading from some beautiful old book of poetry. Many jeered at him, and against them he closed the fountain of his words as with a stone." And in another place: "His whole course of life, his very soul, he had moulded after the teachings of the forest; and in turn he so harmonized with it that he could not be thought of in another setting. Thus he made himself and the wilderness appear to the eyes of his protégés in such wondrous enchanted form and nature that it began to speak to them, too, while they seemed to themselves to be always floating in the midst of a fairy-tale." The "traditions and legends" of his people influence him as they do the young Deerslayer, who is averse to all book-learning and rejects all metaphysical hair-splitting.

But Cooper did not picture his son of the forest — the Pathfinder, the Deerslayer, Hawk Eye, Leather Stocking, etc. — simply as a young and vigorous man, but also followed him through his later life; he makes the representative of inherited right, of remorseless truth and of faith, when pressed by the always advancing settlers and pioneers, the bringers of innovation and destroyers of the forest's majesty, retreat in proud self-command to the west; and conducts

him in the *Prairie* to the furthest bounds of old age, till the splendor of eighty-seven winters dims his eye, and he goes, calm and self-possessed, to meet his death.

Stifter portrays his Gregory at his first appearance as an extremely old man with waving, snow-white hair. His large, true, sagacious eyes contrast strangely with the two snow-white arches over them. On the hard cheeks lay sunburn, age, and health. "A noble simplicity and goodness was stamped on the whole man." "A comrade of the noonday heat and of the storm, a brother of the rock," he is called. The woodsman, the huntsman, the son of the forest, formerly so keen and daring a hunter, now he is a little weather-worn, and wears some of the "dignity" ¹ of nature ("dignity," a favorite word of Cooper, as for example in this passage of the *Pioneers*: "with the bearing and dignity of an emperor"). The baron has immovable confidence in him.

The Pathfinder is pictured as a man of admirable qualities. Always the same, of single heart, honest, fearless, and yet prudent, in every honorable undertaking the first, in his peculiar way a sort of prototype, as one might conceive Adam before his fall, — not, however, that he was completely sinless, — full of native tact, that would have done credit to the best education. "His feelings seemed to have the freshness and naturalness of the woods, in which he passed most of his time." His fine, unerring sense of right is perhaps the most distinguished trait in his moral composition; his fidelity is firm as the rock that no storm can shake, treason is for him an utterly impossible thing. His blamelessness, self-devotion, and disinterestedness are often praised.

Stifter saw his human ideal realized in this character. In the preface to his *Motley Stones*,² where, in opposition to Hebbel, he sketches the programme of his philosophy of life and of art, he says: "A whole life full of righteousness, simplicity, self-control, reasonableness, efficiency in one's sphere, admiration of the beautiful, joined with a calm and cheerful death, I hold to be great: mighty storms of passion, fearful irruptions of rage, the lust for vengeance, the inflamed spirit that strives for activity, demolishes, alters, destroys, and in the excitement often throws away its own life, I hold to be not greater, but less, since these things are, in my eyes, the outcome of single and one-sided forces, as are storms, volcanoes, and earthquakes." He had to imitate Cooper, because in essential convictions he was in agreement with him.

This venerable, prudent ranger or hunter with his serious moral traits, whom men like to call "the old," is reproduced trait for trait in Gregory, with his experience and wisdom, his foresight and circumspection, his prolix garrulity, with nearly all his views. He is

¹ "Anstand."

² *Bunte Steine*.

the Indian Leather Stocking in the garb and manners of a European woodlander; he, however, preserves many typical details of his original, even to his favorite position. Whereas the other characters support themselves but seldom on their gun or lance, Leather Stocking leans always and everywhere on his famed and feared "long rifle," from which the Indians have given him the nickname, "la longue carabine";—cool at the critical moment, at another time thoughtful and dreaming, motionless as a statue; in this position he gazes after the departing friend; in this position he stands even at the deathbed of his friend. It might be called his identifying mark. Often the situation is described at length: "He leaned on his rifle, and his sinewy fingers squeezed the barrel, sometimes with such violence as if they would bury themselves in the metal"; or, "they stood on the narrow shore, the Pathfinder leaning on his rifle, the butt of which rested on the pebbly beach, while both his hands grasped the barrel at the height of his shoulders." In the critical scene of the *Mountain Forest*, the four principal characters form a group quite in Cooper's style: "The old hunter stood leaning forward on his rifle, like a statue, no fibre of him betraying what might be in his mind. . . . After some seconds of silent emotion, the group gently dissolved." The illustrators of the *Mountain Forest* have preserved this scene.

Gregory, like the ranger in the *Prairie*, is completely filled with recollections of the past; he lives, as does the other, in the circle of those whose grandfathers he has known. The hearty affection which he has for his two protégés, as he had earlier for the baron's son and for Ronald, whom he loves as a father, finds repeated parallels in the life of Leather Stocking. The Pathfinder is attached with a fatherly love to Mabel. "In this moment the whole honest, manly affection of Pathfinder showed clearly in his features and his glance at our heroine, equal to the love which the tenderest father feels for his favorite child." When a very old man he goes to the Indians, to seek a son in Hardheart, whom he loves without measure; when Hardheart's life is threatened, his eye follows every movement of the tomahawk with the concern of a real father.

Stifter makes Gregory disappear into the darkness of the forest: "An old man, like a phantom, was still seen once and again walking through the wood, but no man can tell the time when he still walked there and the time when he walked there no more." Even so the Pathfinder disappears at the close of the novel that bears his name: "and he was lost in the depths of the forest. Neither Jasper nor Mabel ever beheld the Pathfinder again." As an unknown hunter, in strange dress and unusual bearing, and with a new name, he emerges later in a distant place before them, only to disappear again from their field of view.

For the rest, the opening and closing scenes of the *Mountain Forest*, both of which are enacted in the ruins of Wittingshausen, recall the close of the *Deerslayer*. Judith is separated from her lover; "fifteen years had passed ere it is in the power of the Deerslayer to revisit the 'Glimmerglass.' . . . They reached the lake just as the sun was setting. Here all was unchanged; the river still rushed through its bower of trees; the little rock was wasting away by the slow action of the waves in the course of centuries; the mountains stood in their native dress, dark, rich, and mysterious; while the sheet glistened in its solitude, a beautiful gem of the forest. . . . From the point, they paddled the canoe towards the shoal, where the remains of the castle were still visible, a picturesque ruin. The storms of winter had long since unroofed the house, and decay had eaten into the logs. All the fastenings were untouched, but the seasons rioted in the place, as if in mockery at the attempt to exclude them." Everything is desolate and dilapidated. "From all these signs it was probable that the lake had not been visited since the occurrence of the final scene of our tale. Accident or tradition had rendered it again a spot sacred to nature."

The greatest agreement is shown in Cooper's and Stifter's descriptions of scenery. Each pictured his land as the land of marvels. Both depict the forest, the primeval forest in its untouched virginity, in its silence and calm, in its sublimity and greatness, as it came from God's hand. The feeling of sublime loneliness awakens in their heroes the thought of God's nearness. "So it is in the woods," says Pathfinder, "there are moments when God seems to walk forth in all his might, and then again a calm reigns far and wide, as if his eternal spirit had peacefully laid itself down to slumber." Even so Stifter gives his heroes the deep feeling of inward piety. Both authors array themselves on the side of nature, against the all-uprooting culture. Both are conservative spirits. Both lose themselves gladly in the stream of nature. Here again their agreement in detail can be explained from the likeness of their fundamental convictions. In the before-mentioned preface to the *Motley Stones* we read: "The breezes of the air, the purling of the water, the growing of plants, the verdure of the earth, the brightness of the sky, the twinkling of the stars, I hold to be great; the magnificence of the thunderstorm, the bolt that cleaves houses, the whirlwind that devastates the fields, the mountain that spews forth fire, the earthquake that overwhelms the lands, I hold not to be greater than the above-mentioned appearances, I even hold them to be less, since they are but effects of much higher laws." So Cooper also prefers the gentle mobility of smaller things, the quiet majesty of all that is really great and powerful; for *Deerslayer*, love dwells in the forest, in the dew on the grass, in the twigs of the trees, in

gentle rain, in the clouds that hover over the blue sky, the birds that sing in the bushes, the cool springs in which he slakes his thirst, and in all the other noble gifts that God's providence affords.

Stifter's whole romance of the woods is foreshadowed in Cooper, — the sublime solitude of the wild, the solemn stillness and cheerful calm. An atmosphere of pure morality issues from the high, gloomy vault of verdure, from the colonnades and porticoes of the forest. The forest never deceives, "for it is governed and controlled by a hand that remains always unshaken." The "quiet charm of nature, the impression of profound calm and undisturbed solitude" subdues men. The landscape as pictured by the two writers is almost the same, a fact that no longer surprises one who has had the opportunity of comparing the scenery of eastern North America with that of Stifter's home. Cooper as well as Stifter speaks of dark hemlocks, "quivering aspens and melancholy pines, white birches, firs, and maples." The psychological process is to be conceived about as follows. No doubt the mysterious witchery and charm of the woods had enthralled Stifter's soul from his youth; but Cooper's example first led him to give expression to these beauties. The tongue of the silent admirer of nature is loosed by the eloquent foreign author. Soon the pupil surpasses the master. Cooper's stock of words and figures, in his descriptions of landscape, is very limited; we find almost all of his favorite expressions in Stifter again, but they are modified and developed into greater richness. The woodland glade is in Cooper "a sort of oasis in the solemn obscurity of the virgin forest"; the little spot where the forest house stands, in Stifter, is a "warm, sheltered oasis"; the forest is called a "luxuriant oasis"; Gregory is designated as the "jewel of the wilderness," or, with a biblical allusion, as the "voice of the desert." Cooper takes refuge gladly in citations from other writers; Stifter, more self-dependent, can draw from his own spring of poetry. Cooper is more prolix and circumstantial; where he requires a whole sentence ("It was principally covered with oaks, which, as is usual in the American forests, grew to a great height without throwing out a branch, and then arched in a dense and rich foliage") Stifter can express the same in a single epithet, "high-trunked." Both give life, soul, personality to nature. In Cooper a half-fallen giant of the forest leans so far over the surface of the water as to make care necessary in avoiding its limbs. In the first version of the *Mountain Forest*, Stifter calls a tree a "grandfather," or speaks of the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of an unusually large tree. In Cooper a beech and a hemlock lean together "as loving as two brothers, or, for that matter, more loving than some brothers." In a more fully developed scene in Stifter the slender stocks of the pines stand in company and gossip when a breath of wind comes by, the old maple stands by

itself and reaches out with its long arms into the air, the bushes, berries, and vines are pushed, like children, to the sides and into the corners, so that there may be room in the middle for the guests. Cooper likens some young trees, with few branches, to grenadiers standing as sentinels; and Stifter, in the *Heath Village*, still more drastically compares the locusts to Haiducks, in pale green uniform. Everywhere in Cooper we meet dead or dying trees. Keep good hold of your arms, — so reads a passage in the *Pathfinder*, — but lie as still as the corpses of dead trees. In the *Mountain Forest*, "here and there lies the skeleton of a fallen tree," or one sees along the further shore of the lake, "the old, whitened trunks lying in horrible confusion," or "fringing the dark water with a melancholy, white *abattis*." And once more Stifter simplifies in a way that gives greater strength and effect, when he remodels Cooper's "disabled trunks, marking the earth like headstones in a graveyard," into the plastic "tree-graveyard." The thought of gravestones is suggested also to Sealsfield's mind by the stumps left where wood has been cut. Stifter, however, is conscious of the difference between his landscape and the tropical landscape of Sealsfield, when he says in a comparison: "Grandly beautiful as a youthful heart, resting in the fullness of poetry and imagination, growing luxuriantly, resplendent as the tropical wilderness, but also as unconscious, as uncultivated, as rough, and as exotic as it."

If, in accordance with the preceding, we admit the marked dependence of Stifter on Cooper in the conduct of the action, in the characterization of the persons, in the description of the landscapes, and in many other points, we may also find a parallel between the two writers in many details, in which, however, the younger would have had no need of another's suggestion. For example, the important episode of the hawk is quite exactly prefigured in Cooper; and the similarity of the descriptions is the more striking, because the conversations connected therewith contain related motives.

Many figures and turns of expression, also, that are common to the two writers, cannot be ascribed to mere accident. Stifter's "imagination attuned to witchery" ("Zauberphantasie") recalls the "witchery" which the Indians spy everywhere. As "witchery" appears in the *Mountain Forest*, so Cooper's other favorite word "magic" comes to light in the *Heath Village*. Cooper and Sealsfield put everything in a pictorial or picturesque way, and often use comparisons drawn from painting; Stifter would naturally have been led to the same thing by his talent for painting and his occupation with it. The plastic arts lay further from his bent and knowledge, and when, therefore, he compares Gregory to a statue, and the two sisters to two faultless statues of marble, we are reminded of the countless similar comparisons in Cooper: "like a dark, proud statue";

"she resembled a statue, in which the artist intends to represent profound and silent attention"; "she was like a dumb statue of child-like love"; "like the model for a nude and beautiful statue of skill and strength"; "marble could not be colder nor more motionless"; "like to many lifeless statues," etc. The "Apollo of the wilderness," in the *Deerslayer*, reminds us of a comparison in the *Heath Village*, where the author drops for the moment the prevailing biblical and Oriental tone of the story: "like a war god."

The Indians in Cooper's stories love comparisons with animals: high as the eagle, swift as the stag, and many others; and they like to compare women to animals or flowers: Hist is the Wren of the Woods, Hetty the Drooping Lily or the Woodbine Flower, Judith the Wild Rose, a Huron girl a little slender birch, etc. Gregory turns his eyes, like two eagles, towards the girls: "They are two beautiful wood-flowers." Johanna's little white hand drops, like a dove, among the rocks of Gregory's fingers.

A close relationship is shown by the following two passages. From the *Deerslayer*: "The tramp of the warriors, as they sprang from the fire, was plainly audible; and at the next moment, three or four of them appeared on the top of the ridge, drawn against the background of light, resembling the dim shadows of the phantasmagoria." From the *Mountain Forest*: "These were the only words spoken by the company regarding the singular betrothal, which had glided past on their meadow like some strange phantasmagoria." Not only is the sameness of the figure striking, but the contrast between noise and noiselessness is similar in the two passages.

Cooper is fond of the expression: "There are always some who think . . . and others who think," a turn of expression that I have not yet observed in Stifter. But it is in a very similar vein that Gregory says, while relating the legend of the aspen: "There are here two opinions."

In the first composition of his works, Stifter thoughtlessly takes over, from the bad translations of Cooper, foreign words, which more care subsequently leads him to change to corresponding Germanized expressions; for example "Hauptcorps," later not very happily changed to "Hauptschlachthaufe."

Thus these Indian stories made fertile the European author's imagination, made his observation keener, awakened his feeling for style, and influenced his language. As if on a long and distant journey, he was carried through strange, far-off, untrodden regions, in a mad medley of unheard of adventures, in a different world. And hence the old familiar ground at home seemed often strange and weird to him, as if lighted by another and paler sun: "It is a wild jumble of torn strata, consisting of nothing but coal-black earth, the dark death-bed of a thousand years of vegetation, on which lie

many isolated globes of granite, like white skulls rising from the ground, laid bare, washed and worn by the rain." Does not this sound as if taken from an Indian romance?

Whether Stifter read also Cooper's sea-stories is a question that is not answered. Slight reminiscences of them may be indicated — since Stifter was unacquainted with the sea and quite unlikely of himself to think of figures drawn from naval warfare — by his comparing the scene of his narrative to a secluded bay of the sea, and by his speaking of "island summits of a submerged melody," or of a "squadron of thoughts."

In summary, we can say: A German writer of inborn poetic gifts, genuinely rooted in his native soil, was intoxicated, in his early years, by exotic stories of adventure, which had been borne across the sea from far North America, and which were then among the most widely read of entertaining literature. His religious and artistic development then took a direction quite independent of the foreign author, but similar to his. When in riper years the spring of literary production suddenly broke forth in him, new works of the old friend were the means of furthering and accelerating the creative process and giving it a definite direction. The invention of a plot was, all his life, Stifter's weakest point; but to his aid comes an author who is one of the richest in matter in the world's literature. The representation of a foreign landscape, not unlike that of his home, awoke in him the slumbering remembrance of the impressions of his childhood, and helped him to discover the most precious side of his talent, that of painting nature in words, which he had previously done only in colors. Through Cooper's influence, a mediocre painter becomes an eminent writer. The foreign divining-rod conjures ever new treasures from his native endowment. The literary stimulus unites with his close acquaintance with his own land and with the painful experiences of his own heart. What was foreign and what was individual fused most intimately to form a fresh and worthy literary work, which seemed to spring, as if from a fountain, out of the innermost being of its creator, and which has always counted as his most original production: a noteworthy example of the close and fruitful contact of two authors, two literatures, two hemispheres.

THE PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF MODERN HISTORY OF LITERATURE

BY JACOB MINOR

(Translated from the German by Professor E. Bagster-Collins, Columbia University)

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It is one of the youngest sciences on which I have the honor to report at this world-congress. For although its beginnings reach down deeper into the past, it is itself hardly more than a hundred years old. Indeed, the really scholarly treatment of the subject is younger still by half a century. For throughout the eighteenth, and even in the first third of the nineteenth century, the leading ideas emanated from men who did not really belong to the science, but who were firmly established in the literature of their own time. From this standpoint they attempted to throw search-lights into the past, although even the best and greatest of them had only a general idea, conceptions only measurably accurate, regarding this past. Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Humboldt, and the Schlegels, however great their influence for our science, belong very largely to literature, because the main part of their activity and the entire weight of their personality was devoted to its service. From the days of E. J. Koch, literature was thought to be amply provided for by bibliographical compendiums, that contained, in addition to titles of books, meagre biographical sketches and brief statements about material and content. It was called "Literary Biography." Later the science of history took up literature, and erected to it in the work of Gervinus a great monument, which, alas, was intended also as a mausoleum. For its author did not think that our literature would have a future; in his opinion it had spent itself in the "classical period" and it would now at the best lie fallow for some time. There followed after the historians, the philosophers and æstheticists; and what was done by the followers and the opponents of the Hegelian school in our subject is perhaps to-day no longer sufficiently known and appreciated. In the field of the literary-historical monograph, at least, the recently deceased Haym, although his lifework of course extended over the whole of the second half of the nineteenth century, stands unequalled both in extent and depth of attainment.

The philological follows the philosophical period, and although not unchallenged and unshaken, it has stood its ground and will continue

to do so, provided its representatives understand how to avoid narrow, pedantic ideas and the one-sidedness of method that have always been the greatest danger to philology. The philological method was transferred to our science simultaneously from classical philology and from the study of older German literature; for Lachmann and his followers, as you are well aware, had first employed the strict philological method in this latter field. Even in modern literature it at once yielded excellent results, as if as a foretaste of the future: Lachmann's edition of Lessing was the first edition of a modern High German writer planned in accordance with philological principles. Still, it was not until the seventies that W. Scherer tried to carry out strictly the method of the Lachmann school in the field of modern literature. I am speaking of things that I myself saw take root and grow. Yet the development lies far enough in the past to admit the possibility of a critical judgment. The chief advantage that the philological method had at the outset was a hitherto unheard-of accuracy and minuteness in scientific work. The student no longer contented himself with arranging a rich material *en masse* under general aspects or according to leading topics; he tried to work through it even to the smallest detail, and based far-reaching critical results upon the establishment of a single date, or upon the discovery of an obscure personal characteristic, or upon a striking parallel passage. A large amount of ingenuity and acumen was exercised in this way by Scherer and the most talented among his disciples. It was only slowly and gradually that the dangers which beset this, as every other path, dawned upon his followers. Even to-day there is great lack of clearness in regard to these matters, anything but complete agreement, and his attitude towards these questions is one of the chief problems to occupy the mind of every literary historian, perhaps not in his abstract thought, still practically in the concrete cases of his daily work.

I once read a statement of a prominent natural scientist that everything great that was done in the last century in the natural sciences was due to the transference of the method from one science to the other (for example from chemistry to medicine, etc.). I doubt whether this statement would apply with the same definiteness to the mental sciences, for in the case of these it depends, I suppose, less upon typical agreements than upon individual differences. We appear, however, to comprehend the dangers of the principle still less when we are dealing with a transference from the unsafe and uncertain to a field of greater safety and certainty. We shall probably always comprehend less how the people of ancient and medieval times thought and felt, and consequently how they wrote, than how Goethe or Kleist or Grillparzer composed. We shall always determine merely hypothetically how the author of the *Bacchae* regarded as a man the rites of Dionysos. Yet the fact that the poet of the second part of

Faust, in spite of its Catholic mythology, did not profess Catholicism, might easily shed more light upon Euripides than it can receive from him. At the very outset, then, one would think that a safe method would find its firmest basis of support in modern literatures. Indeed, I see the time coming when both classical and medieval philology will no longer despise consulting modern philology. It must surely be admitted that a critical method will be developed most highly and keenly where there is the greatest need, that is, where, compared with the large masses of material of modern literatures, a more meagre and incomplete material requires supplementing. Experience appears to me already to confirm two different facts. In the first place, the correct method, as well as the choice of the cleverest means always depend upon the subject, and any one simply deceives himself if he believes that he can attack huge masses of material of modern literature in exactly the same way as the older philology. And secondly, that the method, which is, after all, only a means to an end, must not unawares become the chief end in itself, so that the work is finally less a matter of investigation of the subject than of clever experimentation with the method. It cannot be denied that in our science opposite the left wing, composed of those that simply rummage about stupidly and thoughtlessly in the masses of paper, there stands a little band descended, for the most part, from the older school of literature, that feels so secure in possession of the one and only method, that it believes it can guess the exact knowledge of a subject. A method, however, without a subject is just as inconceivable as form without content. Every subject demands its own peculiar method of treatment. Accordingly, a method cannot be transferred any more from one subject to another than from a teacher to his pupil, except in so far as it belongs simply to the mechanism of the science or mere technique. It is correctly stated in the ten rules formerly laid down by Lehrs and Ritschl for classical scholars: "Thou shalt not speak the name method vainly." And Feuerbach cried to the Hegelians who had become fossilized in the method of their master: "What is method? Method is genius. Whoever does not possess genius has no method. To have a method means never to let the subject become master, but always be its master, to be in the subject above the subject. What is Hegel's method? Hegel's spirit, Hegel's individuality. To adopt Hegel's method means, strictly speaking, aping Hegel. The true method must be one's innermost, most real self."

One of the chief means of philological criticism is the parallel passage, which in itself always deserves consideration and always proves something. The question is only, what and how much does it prove? If one wishes to read into Schiller's verse, "Das Leben ist der Güter höchstes nicht" (Life is not the highest of possessions), the

fundamental idea of the classical period, the union of antiquity with Christian asceticism, and sees a world-wide gap between Schiller's time, to which this line belongs, and the joy of living of Young Germany, he has overlooked the fact that this same Schiller lets his Mortimer say, "Ist Leben doch des Lebens höchstes Gut" (Life is after all the highest possession of life); and again that this same Mortimer looks upon life as the only possession of the bad man. Or when another refers the sentence from Schiller's *Tell*, "Der Starke ist am mächtigsten allein" (The strong man is mightiest alone), to Friedrich Schlegel's *Alarkos*, "So starke Seelen sind allein am stärksten" (Such mighty souls are mightiest alone), and finds in Schiller's whole conception of *Tell* a product of the romantic tendency of the times, he forgets that Schiller received this isolated, non-political *Tell* from Goethe, who had sketched his plan long before the *Alarkos*, and that even Ibsen's *Enemy of the People* ends with a similar thought, which he certainly borrowed neither from Schiller nor Schlegel. Not blind worship, but sober critical treatment of parallel passages, that are as plentiful as blackberries in modern literature, is one of the most difficult problems of modern philology, and, because of the more easily accessible and richer material, can be heard with profit perhaps even in the *Babel und Bibel* controversy, or if it deals with the latest attempt to explain the Norse *Edda* from ancient models. On the other hand, one must be just as careful in asserting the dependence of, or the derivation from, as in asserting the originality of anything. One puts a finger on a passage and cries out: "Only Goethe can have said that." In a conversation, Scherer once said to me that the verse "Die Winde schwingen leise Flügel" (The winds swing gentle wings) was truly "Goethe-like" because of the powerful endowment of natural phenomena with life expressed in the verb, that no poet except Goethe, or at least, no poet before Goethe, could have written it. Later, however, I read even in old Lichtwehr in the fable *Der Wind und der Komet*: "Die Nacht schwang ihre feuchten Flügel" (The night swung its damp wings), and in the *Lied an die Freude* (The Song to Joy) by Uz: "Die Freude schwingt um sie die güld'nen Flügel" (Joy swings about them her golden wings), and, "Die Finsternis schwingt ihre trägen Flügel" (Darkness swings its lazy wings). Even in dealing with such a strikingly original genius as H. von Kleist such mistakes are not uncommon. The beautiful picture of the cherub passing through the night, whom the races of men, lying upon their backs, regard with wonder, in which the clever biographer thought he recognized most vividly, as a favorite picture of the poet, the individualizing concreteness of Kleist, is nevertheless taken from the balcony scene in *Romeo and Juliet*. If one also compares with Goethe's statement that Kleist always tried to produce confusion of the feelings, the phrase, "Verwirre mein

Gefühl mir nicht!" (Do not confuse my feelings), one should not forget to add that the same turn of expression is found more often still in the works of the gentle Eichendorff, who does not know feelings of such a nature.

Such experiences have made us more circumspect in daring to jump at uncertain general conclusions because of an isolated parallel passage. We are no longer astonished at such wild flights, nor do we regard them as particularly daring. We believe the words of Goethe: "The mistake of weak minds is that in reflecting they immediately go from the particular to the general, instead of seeking the general in the whole." We should likewise bear well in mind what Goethe said about hypotheses in general: "Hypotheses are scaffoldings that are placed in front of a building, but are taken down after the building is finished. They are indispensable to the laborer, only one must not mistake the scaffolding for the building itself." Yet how often philologists in the last decades have mistaken the scaffolding for the building itself! How often they have fitted together a scaffolding by eliminating or combining elements logically contradictory or homogeneous, and on this they have then undertaken their investigations, the results of which were naturally only valid for this scaffolding but not for the structure itself. Neither the beginning nor the end in philology will be reached by leaps and bounds hypothetical in character. Only the one who starts from the safe mean and goes either forward or backward step by step will approach nearer the goal behind and in front. And even though he himself does not reach it, still, he will have paved the way for others on which they, too, in turn will get a little farther.

We have recently been devoting especial attention again to the art of interpretation. We are no longer so readily contented with the simple logical understanding of the text; we give closer attention to the context and to the situation through which the poet or his character speak. We look more critically to see whether the word is to be taken in a broad or narrow sense, in a real or figurative meaning. The attempt, at one time the fashion, to understand everything in a pregnant sense, or word for word, has greatly misled *Faust* criticism particularly. "Warum musstest du mich an den Schandgesellen schmieden?" (Why fetter me to the felon-scoundrel?) cries Faust to the Earthspirit, and from this, the far-reaching conclusion has been reached that Mephistopheles did not originally appear in Goethe's *Faust*-drama as the devil, but as a servant of the Earthspirit. The fact is, we are really dealing with a form of wrangling with the divinity, current in all languages, in which the human being fixes the blame and responsibility upon higher beings for what he himself has committed under their very eyes.

In our day the auxiliary sciences have reached an astonishing

degree of perfection. Much has been done, especially, in the way of critical editions. It has been shown, however, by the monumental Weimar edition of Goethe, that the adoption of principles applicable to classical and older German philology by no means suffices, that we must seek our own way for our differently constituted tasks. It would be desirable in this field to have greater uniformity in plan, arrangement, and printing, whereby the utility and convenience of our critical editions would be decidedly improved. A great deal of self-sacrificing and unselfish work has been given to bibliographies, reprints, and recently to indexes. This deserves hearty thanks, although we do not believe that the powers of the present generation should be tired out and exhausted, in order to serve and help future investigators. Research and accessory apparatus always accompany each other; they aid each other mutually. Even at the risk of making mistakes, the impulse to carry on research must be kept constantly awake and alive. A generation of mere makers of critical texts, etc., would make such work the end in itself, and only produce more men able to do such work, but not investigators.

The principle of the division of labor holds good in our subject, as well as in all other subjects involving mental activity. Large numbers of people seek work in our province. The German and Austrian universities are filled beyond measure; they put every year hundreds of new and vigorous workers in the field. It is well to raise again the question, with Lichtenberg, whether the making of books is after all the real purpose of study, and whether it is not a nobler task to study in order to know, than to study in order to write. Certainly all the fears with which men like Roscher in their time regarded the growth of seminars at the German universities have not been groundless. They feared from them the nurturing of premature and pretentious book-making, that lowers the students to a mere vehicle of propaganda. It is certainly neither a very healthy nor a normal condition, when, in a subject like ours, which presupposes years of wide reading and deep study, the veriest youngsters take the lead, and write books involving such an astonishing mastery of material that it would require twice the years of the writer to possess any real knowledge of all the books cited and discussed. Less would often mean more here; a question-mark left standing, a little uncertainty, some missing detail, would often be more convincing than the painful neatness that can only be attained by perusing, consulting, collecting, etc. All of us, the older even to a larger degree than the younger, lack the time and leisure for the extensive and collective reading of the great writers and whole literary periods. As a rule, too much is read *ad hoc*, for a definite purpose, and often for a predetermined result. Unbiased first-hand impressions are wanting, impressions that ought to form the

real basis of every profitable research. As a rule, there is also too much investigated, and that too hastily, and there is too little simply described; indeed, the ability to describe, the art of analysis, is in a serious decline among the younger generation. Yet this gift of artistic reproduction will always be counted among the indispensable qualities of the literary historian.

It is also useful simply to realize the limits that are set to the principle of the division of labor in the history of literature. Certainly the natural scientist does not need to repeat all the experiments and calculations that have been made by his predecessors; not even the historian is required to read over all the sources that his predecessors have already exhausted. Still, no disciple of our science can be spared the task of beginning his work with the reading of the chief works of every period of literature, although these have already been read and discussed by countless others. Hence a good part of our time and energy will always be spent in the reading that we share in common with others, and only a relatively smaller portion will be left to us for what we claim as our special field of research. Moreover, we must add to this the fact that even the results attained by others by no means carry with them the same conclusive proof that they do, for example, among natural scientists; for they calculate with uniform weights and measures, which we unfortunately do not possess. For instance, I cannot, for one, accept unreservedly another's investigations of the sources, as the physicist accepts the calculations of another. Our conception and point of view of the subject are widely different.

The theory of our weights and measures should by rights be contained in the study of style, meter, and poetry. But the active inquiry that one would expect does not exist with respect to these fundamental subjects. Our zealous special historical investigation of literature willingly relegates these matters to the more or less happy power of observation, and puts the results, rather unsorted and unarranged, upon the market. Particularly the theory of style lies almost entirely fallow, and no one has undertaken for a long time to reduce the huge collections of material that are scattered in critical editions and monographs to principles such as H. Paul succeeded in formulating for grammatical material. While the highly developed study of grammar has long since been based upon the living language and the dialects, our theory of style still depends upon book-language, although it is particularly in the individual use of the language that the audible, accent and melody, play the decisive rôle. Even to this very day a phrase like "*das ist gut, das ist schön*," depending upon mere parallelism and gradation, is explained as an anaphora, although the word "*das*" is not only unemphasized, but often almost vanishes; while the opposite accentuation, "*das ist gut, das ist schön*,"

undoubtedly is an anaphora. It is a difference, to be sure, not noticeable to the eye, but only to the ear. The style of a sentence containing a few paltry, absolutely unaccented interjections is still regarded as "excited" because of statistical summarizing, whereas a single strongly accented interjection throws a dozen weaker ones in the shade. Prosody has been far more intensively cultivated, to be sure, but only by a small group of men whose results are not accepted by the large majority of literary historians. In the long run, however, it will not be possible to construct statistical tables about accents before having a clear understanding of what accents mean; to explain questions of quantity from the nature of sounds and syllables, whereas the same word of course is employed by one and the same poet, and in the very same kind of verse, now this way, now that; or to infer directly, because of the various kinds of unstressed syllables, that it must be another poet, or at least another period of the poet, even though it can be seen from the dated manuscript of the *Walpurgisnacht* that Goethe used on one day theses of one syllable, but on the next theses of several syllables, simply because the thought required a more lively movement of the verse; or finally, to shake one's head at the placing of a stressed syllable in an unstressed position, because we not only sing but also read "*Heil dir im Siegeskranz.*" In addition to force we have also learned now to take into account pitch in a verse, and here in America investigations have been begun to determine the melody of language by means of physical instruments. Careful observations of the rhythm and melody of the spoken not the written language of the sentence, and not the separate word, will enable the study of meter in the future to base its observations less upon a lifeless theory of statistics than upon sound, just as the poet composed his verses according to hearing. In this way, the theory and practice of prosody, so long at variance with each other, will become reconciled. Even in the study of poetry attempts have been repeatedly made in the last decades to make use of the inductive instead of the deductive method. Some have wished to reconstruct it upon a scientific, others upon an ethnographic-anthropological, and a third upon a psychological basis. But here also the leap over intermediate terms of hypotheses will hardly lead us back to the origin; only that path will that starts out from the safe mean, by tracing step by step and ordering the rich detailed observations, of which even here there is no lack.

Latterly, the need has been set forth energetically and from different quarters of advancing beyond the limits set to purely philosophical treatment of the history of literature and of coming in contact with other branches of knowledge. Accordingly, much has been said of the comparative study of the history of literature, without, however, the same idea being everywhere associated with the expression,

or anything essentially new coming to light. Surely all scientific study of literature is in the last analysis based upon comparison, and it is not the broader (here international) sphere of activity, but only the unique method that can claim the name of a new science. Others have desired to bring the history of literature into closer relations with psychology than in their opinion the philologists did. Thus far, however, it has not resulted in anything more than a very superficial transference of what is well known to be a very heterogeneous psychological terminology. A more successful attempt was made here in America by our honored chairman in considering German literature from a social-psychological aspect, and of showing the change from subjective and individual to universal phenomena and periods. The youngest, as yet hardly sufficiently investigated phase, is the medical, more accurately stated, the neuro-pathological and the psychiatric treatment of the great literary figures, to which we already owe, alas, the sick Goethe and the healthy Kleist.

You see, we are not in need of means or ways, nor is there any lack of work or workers. And we can make use of them! For a great, broad field only little cultivated lies before us: the whole of the nineteenth century! Our science, it seems to me, has too long restricted itself to a comparatively narrow area, and time and again treated the same periods and the same personalities. Even science requires change of matter for its welfare. There is such a rich material here at hand that the eager and talented workers which America has of late years placed in the field are heartily welcome. So let us offer our hands across the great ocean with the motto — *Viribus unitis!*

SHORT PAPERS

PROFESSOR A. R. HOHLFELD, of the University of Wisconsin, presented a short paper on "Hebbel as a Literary Critic."

PROFESSOR JAMES TAFT HATFIELD, of Northwestern University, read a paper on "More Light on the Text of Goethe."

PROFESSOR M. D. LEARNED, of the University of Pennsylvania, presented a paper on "The German Impulse in American Literature before 1800." In calling attention to the fact of the general recognition of the part which German culture has played in American thought and life during the nineteenth century, it had not been so thoroughly understood that the German influence was a stimulating force in our literature during the eighteenth century: the speaker said that in the last decade of the seventeenth century Boston and Philadelphia each could boast of a great scholar of the universal type of knowledge which was characteristic of the countries of western Europe, — Cotton Mather of the Bay Colony, and Francis Daniel Pastorius of Germantown. An interesting parallel could be traced between the two men. Both were well versed in the learning of the time; both were prolific writers; both possessed that encyclopedic bent which was characteristic of the intellectual life of the old world; both were devoted to the intellectual and moral interests of their respective communities; both had a command of various languages, — Pastorius of as many as seven, and Mather of at least four. The introduction to Mather's *Magnalia* is most strikingly like the title-pages of Pastorius' *Bee-Hive*. It must have been a great "feast of reason and flow of soul," could these two men have come together in personal converse.

At the same time that Cotton Mather was forming the plan of his *Magnalia* for the New-English colonists, Pastorius was writing a vastly larger work for his children and those who should come after him. This book of Pastorius, entitled *Bee-Hive*, is a far more erudite work than that of Cotton Mather, and is the first known attempt at an American encyclopedia. The mammoth size of the *Bee-Hive* with its million words, and the more or less private character and purpose of the work, have prevented it from coming into print to the present day. Although it remains unprinted, it is nevertheless a noteworthy monument not only to the German industry of Pastorius, but to American literature as well.

The following works by Pastorius were printed in English: *Pastorius' Primer* (published in Philadelphia about 1700: Seidensticker), *Henry Bernhard Koster*, *William Davis*, *Thomas Rutter*, and *Thomas Bowyer*, *four boasting Disputers of this World briefly rebuked*; printed and sold by Wm. Bradford of The Bible in New York, 1697. (The writer, Francis Daniel Pastorius, signed his name on page 15.)

Franklin's travels in Germany in 1766 in company with the distinguished Dr. Pringle, and his direct contact with the great German scholars at Göttingen, must have enriched his knowledge and quickened his interest in the Fatherland of the Germans whom he had left at home in the province of Pennsylvania. That he had an open eye for German conditions is apparent from his later writings, particularly his pseudo-diplomatic documents written during the American Revolution, *The Dialogue between Britain, France, Spain, Holland, Saxony, and America*, and the letter *From the Count de Schaumbergh to Baron Hohendorf commanding the Hessian Troops in America*.

Many other illustrations were given by the speaker of German influence in literature of the eighteenth century and particular attention called to the growing

interests in America in things German after the Revolution, as attested by many publications. A short bibliography of works exhibiting the German influence in American literature closed the paper.

A SHORT paper was read before this Section by Professor Otto Heller of Washington University on "Ahasver in der Kunstdichtung." He said in part that there is hardly another literary theme so pregnant with motives, moral, philosophical, romantic and fantastic as the legend of the Wandering Jew. Accordingly it would be difficult to find any theme that poetry and fiction have so often seized upon. The modern versions, so far as they have any claim to be taken seriously, have yielded one and all to the attraction of the story's latent psychological possibilities, and, pressing beyond the crude facts presented in the chap-books, have introduced some adequate reason for the fateful crime of Ahasverus. The probable originator of this variation was Goethe, who imputed to the culprit an originally loyal disposition towards the Saviour and explained the sacrilegious act as the culmination of mistaken patriotism. Among the writers of the nineteenth century there are even those who openly side with Ahasverus as a man innocently punished, or, at any rate, one suffering far beyond his deserts. Some writers mirror in the story of the defiant Jew their own resentment of divine despotism. On the other hand, there are many proofs of a desire to harmonize the cruel judgment with the Christian belief in the infinite mercy of the Son of Man, which pious intent leads to the postulation of an educative purpose in the curse.

On its mythographical side the subject is generally thought to have received exhaustive and final treatment. The speaker called attention, however, to two extremely ancient legends pointed out by a Japanese Orientalist as analogous to the story of the Wandering Jew, which bid fair to overthrow the existing theories as to the origin of the saga. Professor Heller then surveyed the present status of research concerning the evolution of Ahasverus's character in modern literature. He deplored the defectiveness of the bibliography of the subject and showed that no great amount of critical scholarship has as yet been brought to bear on a study of the varied conceptions of the "Evil Wanderer" type.

In the second part of his discourse Professor Heller proceeded to dispel some prevailing errors of opinion regarding the Ahasverus literature. Not in France has the figure of its hero shown the greatest multiformity, but in Germany and England. The surprising number and great importance of English Ahasverus versions have heretofore not been properly appreciated. The poems by the Scotchmen Aytoun and Buchanan for perfection of form and significance of content must be reckoned among the noblest works inspired by the theme. Yet in the existing German treatises they are not even mentioned. The belief that the venerable wanderer is rarely caricatured is contradicted by a sufficiently long list of satirical and humorous versions. In conclusion, the most recent contributions to Wandering Jew literature are enumerated to show that the theme still continues to agitate the poetic imagination.

SECTION F—SLAVIC LITERATURE

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(Hall 8, September 21, 10 a. m.)

CHAIRMAN: MR. CHARLES R. CRANE, Chicago.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR LEO WIENER, Harvard University.

PROFESSOR PAUL BOYER, Ecole des Langues Vivantes Orientales,
Paris.

SECRETARY: MR. SAMUEL N. HARPER, University of Chicago.

AMERICAN INFLUENCES IN THE SLAVIC LITERATURES

BY LEO WIENER

[Leo Wiener, Assistant Professor of Slavic Languages and Literature, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. b. July 26, 1862, Byelostok, Russia. Studied at Minsk, University of Warsaw and Berlin. Assistant Professor of Modern Languages, Missouri State University; Teacher of Modern Languages, New England Conservatory of Music, 1895-96; Instructor in Slavic Languages and Literature at Harvard University, 1896-1901. Member, Modern Language Association. Translated Tolstoy's complete works, edited History of Yiddish Literature, etc.]

LIKE all the great nations of the world, the United States has variously exerted an influence upon nineteenth-century thought among the nationalities of Europe, especially upon Russia and Bulgaria. This influence has proceeded from a great number of sources, some of which can be easily traced, while others, though equally or even more effective, naturally escape the investigator's scrutiny. In the second half of the century American literature in its representative authors became known to Europeans, to be translated, and partly even imitated. Emerson, Thoreau, Poe, Walt Whitman, Longfellow, have palpably influenced, not only German and French, but also Russian, Bohemian, and Hungarian literatures. This source can always be easily discovered, as the translations give evidence of the interest in American literature, and the imitations are generally too obvious to admit of any doubt. Somewhat less apparent are the obligations of the European literatures to American thought as proceeding from scientific works, political, philosophical, sociological treatises and school-books, for the reason that scientific ideas are rapidly disseminated, and cross and recross continually, so that the first source is very soon lost sight of; this effacement is still further aided by the fact that the literary form of such treatises, which more than anything else betrays the borrowing, is of but secondary importance. Thus, though we are positive of the influence of the Unitarian writers, Channing and Parker, upon Hungarian writers as well as upon the Russian Tolstoy; though we

know of translations and discussions of the philosophical writings of William James, of the sociological writings of Henry George, and of many others in several of the Slavic languages, it is by no means so easy to trace their further effects upon the contemporary thought of the nationalities among whom they have appeared.

Still less capable of an exact valuation is the influence exerted by individual Americans who have come in contact with foreigners and have by their personal activities turned people's attention to the intellectual pursuits of the New Continent. Of these champions of Americanism there has been no lack, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. An energetic consul, or other person in the diplomatic service, may have directed the energies, not only of individuals, but even of whole nationalities, upon what they deemed to be American ideals: such, for example, was the activity of Stillman, whose memory lives among the Cretans and the Greeks, and that of Eugen Schuyler, who, besides his keen interest in Russian affairs, is hailed as the real author of the articles of St. Stefano, by which Bulgaria obtained its independence. Such also is the activity of those missionaries, and Americans in general, who have established schools for natives, from Spain to India, to serve as seminaries of ideas current in the United States. The importance of these schools is still further enhanced by the fact that a certain number of the pupils educated in them have come to America to complete their education, after which they have returned home, still further to increase the influence of American ideals. One of the most potent factors of this kind has been Roberts College in Constantinople, which has trained a whole generation of men from all the countries of the Balkan Peninsula.

This latter activity of the American School Board brings us to another factor, to which, more than to any other, several nationalities owe their incipient literary impetus — the activity of the missionaries abroad. At the present time the missionary work has fallen into the hands of mostly half-educated men who are in search of lucrative positions, and are willing to risk the religious propaganda of their particular denomination in distant lands. By their religious fanaticism or narrow-mindedness they now are gaining a rather unenviable reputation abroad; but in the first half of the nineteenth century the missionaries were for the most part college-bred men and women, whose chief desire was to carry American education abroad. Thus, while Americans surreptitiously aided the Greek Revolution in the first quarter of the century, and Dr. Howe was actively connected with the revolutionists, the missionaries stationed in Greek territory were busy printing pamphlets and gospel extracts in the spoken idiom, and these were at that time almost the only accessible textbooks in the Greek schools. Thus the printing-press at Malta became

of great importance for Greek schooling, and later, when peace was reëstablished in Greece, Capodistria duly acknowledged the important part played by American missionaries in the primary education of Greece.

A certain amount of importance is also to be attached to the ubiquitous American traveler, who since the end of the eighteenth century has visited all lands, invariably seeking the highest places, meeting kings and dignitaries, and never failing to leave behind him some reminder of his native home. Such influence, in the case of Russia, we find in the memoirs of Poinset, who in the beginning of the nineteenth century not only cultivated Alexander I's acquaintance, but also instructed him on American affairs. This tendency of Americans for more than a century to penetrate distant countries has led to an American interest in foreign matters which often is greater than it is at home. Thus we shall soon see that Slavic literature as a whole was made the subject of study in America long before it had gained recognition elsewhere, and thus we sometimes get a native influence which, after having been active in America, has come back to affect the native mind.

Nor do the above-mentioned sources exhaust all the possibilities of American influences upon the thought of European countries. There are also the general subtle influences of the so-called Americanization of Europe, that is, the introduction of social and commercial methods, of sports and school ideas, of newspaper and periodical methods, all of which leave behind them an effect upon literature, which, however, is seldom traceable. The great historical events in America have never passed unnoticed in Europe, and the effect of the American propaganda for the abolition of slavery has been, for example, the creation of a similar anti-slavery literature in Russia, the very liberation of the slaves taking place contemporaneously in Russia and in the United States. Far more powerful has been the influence of the American Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century; the part it played in hastening matters in France has lately been discussed by a French scholar, but the still greater influence upon the affairs in other countries has not yet been investigated.

I have so far indicated the sources that must be consulted in a study of American influences upon the intellectual pursuits of any given nation or set of nations. I shall now try to apply this procedure to the investigation of American influences upon the Slavic literatures.

The most peculiar relation of America to a Slavic country is that to Bohemia, for it is Bohemia of all the Slavic countries that has exerted an important influence upon the American mind. The Hussite movement, itself a reflex of the Wycliffite movement in England, had

led to an interest in Bohemian affairs, which persisted in Great Britain and also in America until the middle of the seventeenth century. Thus the pedagogical work of Komensky was appreciated to such an extent in America that in 1642 Winthrop, the former governor of Massachusetts, who met Komensky in Holland, proposed to him that he should proceed to America and take the rectorship of Harvard College. Nothing came of it, but it is a remarkable fact that the American pictorial school-book, which was first suggested by Komensky, has slowly become the standard of most of the readers of the world. No influence can be directly traced that proceeded from America to Bohemia, though with the large Bohemian immigration into the United States it must be assumed that American ideas are largely responsible for the woman question and other related ideas, which are so prominent there. In literature the direct influence has proceeded from France rather than from the United States, though the poet Sladek has translated Longfellow, and Vrchlicky shows that he has been impressed by Longfellow, with whom he has much in common.

Similarly, none but indirect literary influences may be discovered in the smaller groups of the Slavic languages, the Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Ruthenian; but the Slovak, which has for half a century been separated from the Bohemian, has of late come peculiarly under the influence of America. The emigration from the Slovak districts of the Carpathians to the United States has become so great that the literary activity is now centred in New York, rather than in Turocz St. Marton, and even the literary men at home write mainly for the American market. For this reason the American influence upon Slovak is now quite perceptible. The Polish language, in spite of the traditional relation between Poland and America through Kosciuszko, has never come very much under American influence, though many of the American prose writers and poets exist in a Polish translation. It is, however, a noteworthy fact that Sienkiewicz, soon after his literary career had begun, came to America to join Madame Modjeska in her colony in California. Here his American sketches were written, and the foundation was laid for those larger works upon which his reputation mainly rests.

The two countries which owe most to America are Bulgaria and Russia. Bulgaria, in fact, though now in every way independent of any direct influence, is a foster child of the United States. When Elias Riggs, the American missionary for Greece, found it impossible to continue his work after King Otho prohibited any but Orthodox schools, he repaired to Smyrna in 1838, and here among other things devoted his attention to the printing of Bulgarian tracts and parts of the Bible. Though there existed probably a dozen short tracts in a mixed Bulgarian and Church Slavic dialect, this was the first time

that Bulgaria possessed a printing establishment and that the spoken Bulgarian was regularly used in pamphlets and in the Bible. These works served for a time as the only text-books in the few schools that were then established. A few years later American school-books, such as a geography, were translated into Bulgarian and issued from the same press. These were hailed with delight, and served as a valuable addition to the scanty Bulgarian literature by which to educate the younger generation. At about the same time Fotinov, a school-teacher who came under Riggs's influence and who aided him in some of the translations, started the first native periodical, which was based entirely on a similar Greek periodical—the labors of the American missionaries for the Greeks. It is from this periodical that Bulgaria dates the beginning of its literature proper, and in 1894 the fiftieth anniversary of this periodical was celebrated throughout Bulgaria. It is also interesting to note that in the same year, 1844, Riggs published a brief Bulgarian grammar, the first of the kind.

In the sixties a new activity was developed by the American missionaries in Bulgaria. Schools were established, American school-books were translated, and special text-books, among them a Bulgarian grammar, were written by the missionaries. Meanwhile the Bulgarians emancipated themselves entirely from their foreign tutelage and regained their independence, this time again at the instigation of an American, who, as mentioned before, wrote out the Bulgarian constitution and had it accepted at St. Stefano. The missionary schools now do not exert any appreciable influence in the Balkan Peninsula, since the Government schools have entirely superseded the denominational establishments, but Roberts College still supplies a fair number of educated men to Bulgaria. At the same time a number of young men come every year to the United States to pursue their work in American universities, and these carry a still more powerful American influence back to their native country.

The most significant fact in the history of Slavic studies in the first half of the nineteenth century was the publication, in 1834, in the *Andover Review*, and later in book form, of the *Historical View of the Languages and Literatures of the Slavic Nations*, by "Talvi," the wife of Professor Robinson of Andover. Previous to that time Slavic studies were strictly confined to the Slavic countries, and the outside world knew only something of the Servian folk-songs, with which Grimm and Goethe had become acquainted. Even in the Slavic countries the interest had not gone beyond narrow scientific circles, and a history of Slavic literature was not yet to be thought of. There existed, indeed, something by that name, written by the Bohemian Dobrovsky, but that was merely a bibliographical sketch. It was Professor Robinson, the husband of the gifted scholar who

went under the pseudonym of "Talvi," who saw the importance of such a work, and prevailed on her to write it. This book for a long time remained a standard, and did much to acquaint the world at large with the literatures in the Slavic countries, especially with their folk-lore.

Naturally, the greatest direct influence of America is discovered to be upon Russia, which, more than any other Slavic country, has been thrown into contact with the United States. The prowess of American arms was the first thing to attract Russia's attention to America, in the reign of Catherine II, and Paul Jones, who had done so much for the navy of the United States, was called by the Empress to Russia, to serve as an admiral in her fleet. But also the scientific achievements and the political life of the new country beyond the sea were well known in Russia. It was not Franklin's general reputation alone, but his particular discovery in the electricity of the atmosphere, that attracted attention in St. Petersburg, since contemporaneously with him a similar activity was developed by Lomonosov, who may easily be called the Russian Franklin. In what way exact information reached the enlightened circle of men, of whom Novikov and Radischchev were the most representative, we do not know, but it is quite certain that Radischchev's *Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow* is, as regards political and social ideas, to a great extent inspired by his intimate knowledge of American matters. Indeed, he several times refers to the United States. And when this extraordinary literary production, in which an advanced liberalism, including even the liberation of the serfs, fell into the hands of the Empress, she condemned the book, as she deported the author, on the ground that he "praised Franklin," though Franklin's name is not mentioned in the production.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century the intercourse between the United States and Russia was at its height. The large importations of Russian raw materials into America brought a number of American vessels, mostly from Salem, to Russian shores, and with them came a long procession of travelers, who constantly importuned Mr. Adams and the other men in the diplomatic service of the United States to be presented to the Emperor. The Emperor was only too willing to meet these men from across the sea, treating them frequently as his equals. We have an excellent picture of Alexander from one such traveler, Poinset, to whom the Emperor offered any commission in the Russian service he would be willing to take. How welcome Americans were at that time, we see also from the fact that Nicholas's aide-de-camp was an American. Emperor Alexander expressed his admiration for the United States to Poinset by saying that if he were not the Emperor of Russia he would like to be a citizen of the United States. He also requested the American consul

to provide him with a draft of the American Constitution, and Jefferson sent him this. It is not unlikely that the American Constitution was well known to Speranski when he drew up a constitution for Russia. This still demands investigation. The Emperor's friendship for the United States caused him in 1812 to offer his mediation between England and America. Meanwhile, too, the enthusiasm for Russia was so great in the United States that Alexander's victory over Napoleon was most elaborately celebrated in Boston, Philadelphia, and Georgetown. This interest, independently of the opposition to Napoleon, had been systematically evoked in the American press by Eustaphieffe, the Russian consul in Boston, who persistently enlightened the public on Russian affairs and even wrote in English an elaborate, though insipid epic, *Demetrius*. This Eustaphieffe played quite an important part in Boston society, and, it seems, became quite Americanized.

There were also other Russians who visited the United States. Among them was one Poletika, who wrote one of the first books on America. This book was written in French and attracted attention even in the United States, where it was translated into English. This man's name does not appear in the list of those who took part in the Decembrist revolt, but as other Poletikas did take part in it, it is fair to assume that this acquaintance with American affairs existed among the Decembrists, and, in all likelihood, was also a determining factor in their revolt.

So scant is the information on American influence at that time that all the inferences must rest on circumstantial evidence alone. Thus it is also difficult to determine the personal influence of the many Americans who apparently stood on a footing of friendship with Russian literary, or at least intellectual, men. Such a man may have been W. D. Lewis, who lived for a long time in St. Petersburg, knew Russian, and was so much interested in Russian literature that he translated some poems of Neledinski-Meletski, Dmitriev, Derzhavin, Pushkin, and Krylov, during the lifetime of these poets, and had them published in America. These are the first translations from the Russian into English, some of them antedating the translations of Sir John Bowring. In the introduction to a small collected volume of his translated poems, *The Bakchesarian Fountain, and Other Poems*, published by him in Philadelphia in 1849, he speaks of his early friendships in Russia, and so it is not unlikely that he, together with other Americans resident in Russia, exercised a personal influence upon the men who in one way or another identified themselves with the literary movement.

A second stage of American influence upon Russian thought began with the abolition literature, which in America culminated in Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and in Russia brought

the peasant to the front in literature, for during the fifties and early sixties, and even later, the peasant is the chief subject of the novels and even of the poems of the time. Turgeniev's *Sketches of a Huntsman* are an example of this class of literature, but it is Grigorovich who with his sketches of peasant life earned for himself the title of the Russian Beecher Stowe, which at once bears witness to the American influence upon the Russian literature of the time.

Since then the best American authors have been translated into Russian, and Longfellow, Emerson, Lowell, and others are known to every literary man. But not one Russian author, indeed no author of any foreign country, has come so entirely under the influence of American thought as Tolstoy. From his earliest writings until the present he has reproduced the advanced ideas of the United States to his Russian people, and, on account of his great popularity, to the world at large. Tolstoy has been directly and consciously influenced by a great array of American writers, and of these he distinctly mentions Garrison, Parker, Emerson, Ballou, Channing, Whittier, Lowell, Walt Whitman, Henry George, and Alice Stockham. With most of these, however, he became acquainted at a comparatively late date, after his religious ideas of his so-called second period, since 1880, had been formulated by him. But there is sufficient evidence on hand to show that even at a much earlier period he stood, if not under the direct, certainly under the unconscious, influence of individual Americans and American thought. One such influence dates back to the beginning of peasant literature, and Tolstoy's love for the peasant, as shown in his earliest works, was in line with the tendency of the time. It cannot be ascertained at present whether Tolstoy had read any American authors before 1868. For that year we have the explicit statement of Eugen Schuyler in his reminiscences, that Tolstoy received through him a number of American school-books, if nothing else. Schuyler, with his usual perspicacity and interest in Russian matters, went in that year to Yasnaya Polyana, to meet Tolstoy, whose reputation was not fully established at that time even in Russia. Tolstoy had just begun his pedagogical career, and Schuyler procured for him a number of American books, and in the pedagogical articles written by him in the next few years, and in his readers, we find unmistakable influences of American methods. So, too, all his articles on progress and culture, in which he assumes a negative attitude, smack of similar productions in certain periodicals in the United States. The farther he proceeded in his religious and sociological writings, the greater became his indebtedness. If in the *Kreutzer Sonata* we only surmise some American influence, we are certain of it in the epilogue to the same, where it becomes evident that the medical writings of Alice Stockham and others of that character were well known to him.

The indebtedness of certain passages in his *Resurrection* to Henry George, whom he even mentions by name, are too obvious to need any proof. If we know by inference that Tolstoy's religious ideas were to some extent affected by Parker and Channing, we are quite certain that in his *The Kingdom of God is within you* he is directly under obligation to the American non-resistants, Garrison, Ballou, and the Quakers, whom he does not fail to give the credit for their influence upon him. To this may be added his occasional mention of some American author, of whom he seems to cherish Thoreau most. But to none of these, it seems to me, is Tolstoy more akin than to Walt Whitman, with whom, in spite of the vastest difference of temperaments, he shares the broadest conception of the brotherhood of man.

Such, in brief, are the influences that have for a century been exerted by American thought, not merely literature in the narrower sense, upon the literary movement of the Slavic countries, especially upon Russia. Much still remains to be done in this practically untouched field, before the exact indebtedness to the United States can be ascertained. On the other hand, we can now begin to speak also of a Slavic influence upon America, such as, for example, has been exerted by the Russian novel on some of the American writers. This, too, would form an interesting subject for investigation.

RUSSIAN AND STUDIES IN RUSSIAN

BY PAUL BOYER

(Translated from the French by Mr. Samuel N. Harper, University of Chicago)

[Paul Boyer, Professor of Russian Language, School of Oriental Languages, Paris, since 1894. b. Cormery, Indre-et-Loire, France, March 11, 1864. Studied at the Universities of Paris, Leipzig, Moscow; Licencié in letters, Paris, 1886; Fellow, University of Paris, 1888; Mission to Russia, 1889-90. Assistant Professor at School of Oriental Languages, Paris, 1890; member of the Committee on Historical and Scientific Works, 1897. Member of Linguistic Society of Paris (President in 1901), Geographical Society, Paris, Society for the Study of Modern Languages and Literatures, Paris. Author of divers translations from Russian into French; *On the Accentuation of the Russian Verb*; French edition of *The Finnish Population of the Sources of the Volga and Kama*, by J. Smirnov; *Manual for the Study of the Russian Language*.]

IN the programme of this Congress, the comprehensive synthesis of which seems to embrace all contemporary learning constituting the sum of human knowledge, a special place has been reserved for Slavic studies under the head of Slavic Literature. I beg to be permitted (and I ask it particularly of the eminent chairman of this meeting, whose authority is based on so many services rendered to the cause of Slavic studies in this country) to understand this name of Slavic Literature in a slightly special meaning, a meaning it does not ordinarily imply.

Literature, in the proper sense of the word, is the study of the written and oral works through which the spirit of a people manifests itself, and it is also the study of the men who were their authors. I want to speak to you not of these works, nor of their authors, but of the *verbal instrument* which the authors used for their composition, one of the most supple, delicate, and perfect that has ever been wielded by human genius. And since preëminence among the Slavic literatures belongs, if not by right of seniority, at least by right of incontestable superiority, to Russian literature, I wish to talk of Russian, of the language of Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, Dostoievski, and Tolstoi, examining with you the distinctive characteristics of its development in time and in space, indicating its present state, endeavoring to show what can be predicted as to its future, and, at the same time, determining what we have a right to expect from Russian studies.

(1) Limited to the question of origin, the linguistic definition of Russian can be formulated as follows: Russian, under its three aspects of *Great Russian*, or *Russian*, properly speaking, of *Little Russian* in Galicia, Hungarian Russia, Bukovina, and the Ukraine, of *White Russian* in White Russia, is an Indo-European language. It forms the second of the three groups into which the Slavic languages are

divided. The first, or Southern group, comprises Bulgarian and its Macedonian dialects, Serbo-Croatian (Servia, Old Servia, Bosnia, Herzegovinia, Montenegro, the Serbian colonies of Macedonia, Croatia, and Slavonia, the southern comitats of Hungary, Dalmatia, part of Istria), Slovenish (with Laybach, capital of Carniola, and Sjubljano as centre), and finally Old Slavic, also called Church Slavic because it was the language of the first Slavic translations of the Scriptures. The Old Slavic died out at the end of the eleventh century, and is not, as has been falsely believed at times, the common ancestor of the modern Slavic idioms, but a sister language. It is precious on account of its antiquity, and beyond doubt originated in Saloniki, the city of the two Slavic apostles Cyril and Methodius. It resembles the Old Bulgarian enough to justify excellent linguists in designating it by this name. The third, or Western group, comprises Polish and Kachoubish (dialect spoken to the west and north of Danzig), Czecho-Moravian and Slovakish (Bohemia, Moravia, and the northern comitats of Hungaria), Lusatian, or Serbian of Lusatia, and finally Polabish, or Slavic of the inhabitants of the Baltic coast, a language dead since the seventeenth century.

As for the importance of Russian among the other Slavic languages, it can be measured by the number of people who speak it, that is, by more than eighty millions (for Russian, Little Russian, and White Russian taken together), while the different Southern Slavic languages are spoken by not over thirteen millions, and the Western Slavic languages by hardly more than twenty millions.

But, when the origins of Russian have been explained, when, after examining Russian by itself, there have been noted certain facts of linguistic preservation, which, from the point of view of phonetics or accentuation (movable accentuation) as well as of morphology or syntax, show Russian to be one of the Slavic languages which has persisted most scrupulously faithful to the common Indo-European model, the essential features which contribute to determining its personal character have not been exhausted. One feature particularly deserves to be brought to light, and, because of its persistence through centuries, to arrest the attention. Since the moment when Russians appear in history until the present hour, the continued extension of their language has been assured by the continued progress of their colonization. The history of the Russian language is in measure only one of the aspects of the history of Russia itself; step by step the language has followed the colonist. We will indicate rapidly the principal stages of this progress and examine what were the consequences of this mode of propagation from a strictly linguistic point of view.

In the ninth century, when Russians positively entered into history, the lower valley of the Dnieper was the centre of their dominion.

They came from the west, from the plains that stretch from the foot of the Carpathians to the lower Danube. But neither the sedentary settlements, of which Kiev was the most firmly established, nor their political and commercial bonds of federation, checked the tide. While certain of their tribes pushed on toward the north and northeast, into Finnish territory, others, with an energy just reaching its acme in the ninth century, pointed toward the south. But soon, at the end of the tenth century, the resistance of the Turkish hordes (Pechenegs, Ouzes, and later the Polovzi) obstructed the road toward the south. A backward movement, more powerful each day, began toward the north and northeast, a movement which even the invasion of the Tatar-Mongols, in the thirteenth century, did not completely check. Moscow, destined to become the centre of gravity of Russian dominion, was built in the very midst of Finnish territory. The founding of Nizni-Novgorod established Russian supremacy over all the valley of the middle Volga. This irresistible tide of movement toward the east went on with a remarkable continuity during the entire modern epoch; Kazan and Astrakhan, these two strongholds of the Tatars, fell, the first in 1552, the second in 1554. Then, while the movement toward the south was again taken up and assured by the free *outlaws* of the Cossack countries, the conquest of Siberia continued, a task of centuries, which, in spite of the great work of colonization accomplished in the nineteenth century, is still far from completion. Finally, in the nineteenth century, came the conquest of the Caucasus and the penetration into Central Asia.

Carried on by this irresistible impulse, this *Drang nach Osten* (eastward movement), the Russians, as they gradually became more involved in the great events of which Europe was the theatre, had to turn also toward the west. The empire of the Tsars broke up Lithuania, conquered the Baltic Provinces, divided up Poland, and occupied Finland. But, although an uninterrupted current of immigration always followed the victorious advance of their armies toward the east, the smallest part of this current could not be turned toward the west. The Russification of the kingdom of Poland is only a term; it is in units that the few families of Russian peasants settled in Lithuania and in the Baltic Provinces should be counted. The rigorous measures by means of which the Government of St. Petersburg has lately thought to "assimilate" the Grand-Duchy of Finland seem destined to prove a complete failure.

It is therefore by the continuous movement of conquest and colonization that the Russian language has spread over the vast area in which it is spoken to-day, from the large rivers of the north, tributaries of the Arctic Ocean, to the Black Sea and the Kirgiz Steppe, from the valley of the Dnieper to the Pacific. It is precisely to this particular mode of propagation that Russian owes one of its most

essential characteristics, the one which, at the present epoch, can be considered its distinctive feature: the remarkable unity of its pronunciation, forms, and syntax.

Without doubt, each of the three Russian tongues developed from the single original trunk has preserved its independence. Little Russian, the existence of which is attested as early as the twelfth century, has not become confused with the Great Russian; ostracized in Russia, it has persisted in Galicia and Bukovina. Although the development of White Russian seems to have been more backward (thirteenth to fourteenth centuries), it continues to be the spoken language of the peasants of White Russia. But if one considers Russian in the proper sense of the word, the Russian of which the Moscow form justly passes as the purest model, one cannot but be impressed with the marvelous unity of its pronunciation, forms, and syntax. This does not mean that there are no Russian dialects; indeed, it has been possible to classify them, and that not without valid reasons, in two large series, the dialects of the north and those of the south. But in the complete table of the different Russian *parlers* (specific forms of local speech), nowhere are such numerous and marked oppositions of color to be found as, for example, in French or German *parlers*.

One might be tempted to explain this remarkable unity by the geography of the country. The large plains of eastern Europe and northern Asia, in which there is so little elevation that certain river valleys are confounded, scarcely favor, it would seem, the forming of dialects. This reason is in no wise convincing, and nothing authorizes us to believe that geography has had so decisive an influence in the development of a language. History alone, we have said, suffices to explain this phenomenon of unity in a language spoken throughout such a vast extent of territory. The language is one because it has been spread by conquest and colonization.

Moreover, whenever historical circumstances have been the same, the same linguistic phenomenon has been observed. Romance scholars admit that in the third century of our era, Latin, carried into all the Roman world by conquest and colonization, did not yet present any of the dialectical features, which, developed in the course of time, were to become the essential marks of the different Romance languages. The same Latin was spoken in the Gauls and in Spain, on the Danube and on the Po. Littoral Arabic owed its surprising unity to the Mussulman conquests. Spanish as spoken in America does not know the dialectical differences which class the Spanish of the Iberian Peninsula into various *parlers*. Finally, if it be permitted to add this feature of resemblance to so many others which, with too much readiness sometimes, have been pointed out between Russia and the United States, let one compare the expansion of the English language

over the prairies and through the forests of North America to that of the Russian language over the steppes and through the forests of eastern Europe and Siberia. Certain peculiarities of local pronunciation, certain eccentricities of vocabulary, do not mean that your language is not remarkably one, from New York to San Francisco, from Alaska to Texas.

In its continued march toward the east, a linguistic *Drang nach Osten* which went side by side with the political *Drang nach Osten*, Russian collided with two groups of languages, the Turkish languages spoken by the Turkish hordes of the southern steppes and the Tatar-Mongols who invaded Russia in the thirteenth century, and the Finnish languages spoken by the different Finnish populations which the Russian colonists ousted as they progressed. It is interesting to note the effects of this double contact. They reduce themselves to very little, as we shall see.

From the Turkish languages Russian has borrowed a considerable number of words, almost all substantives, referring either to political and civil life (*žalovanije*, *jarlyk*, etc.), or to domestic life and in particular to dress (*khalat*, *sapog*, *bašmak*, etc.). But these words are not more numerous than those already borrowed or those that have since been borrowed from Germanic and Romance languages. There is nothing comparable, for example, to the afflux of French words into English following the Norman Conquest, or even that of Osmanli words into Bulgarian.

The influence of the Finnish languages, since it exerted itself with more continuity, might have been more profound, and we might be tempted to exaggerate its importance. We might, for instance, not be content with pointing out the incontestable borrowing of words, but presume to explain, by this same influence, certain general facts which, in reality, have their similarities in the Finnish languages: the maintenance of the *y* (a hard and broad *i*) beside *i* (a soft and short *i*) when this distinction between the two qualities of *i* disappeared at an early moment in the Southern Slavic languages; the non-expression of the verb *to be* in the present tense (*on dóma*, *oná dobrá*); the construction of the instrumental used as a predicate (*on býl naznáčen korolēm*). But if it is true that the sound *y* exists in Finnish languages, it is no less true that it has been maintained in Polish as in Russian, and there could be no question of Finnish influence in Polish. The other two facts alleged are not more convincing. The non-expression of the verb *to be* in the present tense seems to have had its point of departure in the coexistence of the two forms of the adjective, the determinate and the indeterminate form (*nóvyj*, *nóvaja*, *nóvoje*, beside *nov*, *nová*, *nóvo*). The construction of the instrumental used as a predicate is very clearly explained by con-

structions in which this case is found with one of its proper values: *kúrica sídít nasědočkoj*; *on užé dbádat' lēt staršinoj*, etc.

The conclusion can therefore be drawn that the Russian language has not been appreciably altered by its contact with Turkish and Finnish tongues. This preservation of the integrity of its own proper form confirms what was said above in regard to its unity as well as to its general fidelity to the Indo-European model definitely abandoned.

(2) This Russian language, which presents to the linguist an interest equal to that of Sanskrit, Greek, or Lithuanian, of which Mérimée said, "It is the most beautiful language of Europe, Greek not excepted," while Turgeniev wishes to see in it the most certain token of the genius of his nation, — are we well acquainted with its present state? Has a complete inventory of its resources been made? Have the treasures of its vocabulary been collected? Have the multiple forms of its morphology been determined? Have the rules of its syntax been analyzed? Without failing to appreciate what has already been accomplished along these lines, it is permitted to express one's surprise that there still remains so much to be done.

A well-known *Manual*, already thirty years old, but, by four successive editions, brought to a point of perfection which seems difficult to surpass, the *Handbuch der Altbulgarischen (Altkirchenslavischen) Sprache* of A. Leskien, has determined, in an extremely epitomized form, the distinctive features of Old Slavic phonetics, morphology, and syntax. The works of A. Vostokov, I. Sreznevski, P. Fortunatov, A. Shakhmatov, and A. Sobolevski permit a faithful reconstruction of the successive stages of the vocabulary and grammar of Old Russian. But the present state of Russian has not been analyzed with any such mastery or minuteness.

If you ask a Russian book-dealer for a dictionary of his language in his language, he will offer you only works that are out of print, and have become rare. The *Dictionary of the Academy* is over half a century old (the edition of 1867 being only a simple reprint of the original edition of 1847). The *Dictionary of Dal* is more modern, the durable testimony of a considerable effort, but little solicitous of accentuation and morphology. The very distribution of the subject-headings, where alphabetical order has been sacrificed to derivation, often makes its handling most difficult.

Or, supposing you to be more interested in "up-to-date" Russian, the book-dealer turns your choice to the more recent unfinished works, the date of completion of which it is still premature to foretell. The new *Dictionary of the Academy* was begun in 1891 under the direction of J. Grot, continued from 1897, on a considerably enlarged plan, too enlarged perhaps, by A. Shakhmatov. The republication of the *Dictionary of Dal* was recently undertaken by J. Baudouin de Courtenay. In other words, the balance-sheet of Russian lexicography

at the present hour presents dictionaries that are old and out of print, and unfinished dictionaries (the *Dictionary of the Academy* does not go beyond the compound words of which *za* is the first element; the new edition of the *Dictionary of Dal* is at the letter *s*).

Phonetics are of no value except in so far as they examine sounds, phonemes, in the course of their successive evolution in time. The principal facts of Russian phonetics therefore found their expression in works dealing with the historical grammar of Russian, the authors of which have been designated above. But the same cannot be said of Russian morphology. The excellent grammar of A. Vostokov, so often reprinted (1st edition, 1831; 12th edition, 1874), of which the classical grammars used in Russian schools are only more or less faithful abridgments, is not sufficient to explain the forms of the present *parler*. When the old Buslaiev, only a few months before his death, presented me with a copy of his *Historical Grammar* (1st edition, 1858; 5th edition, 1881), the first part of which, entitled "Etymology," exposes in three distinct chapters, (1) Sounds and Corresponding Letters; (2) The Formation of Words or Derivation; (3) The Inflection of Words or Morphology, —he added with a charming simplicity: "Above all, do not make use of my chapters on derivation and morphology. They are antiquated, like their author, and are no longer of any value." For want of a comprehensive work it would be useful to consult the notes and corrections added by Roman Brandt to the Russian translation (by Shliakov) of the morphology of the monumental work of F. Miklosich, *Vergleichende Grammatik der Slavischen Sprache* (the morphology of the Little Russian and Russian languages appeared in the third part of the complete Russian translation, Moscow, 1886). The work itself of Miklosich could not be used in its original form, the indications given being, for languages other than the Slovenish and Serbo-Croatian, much too untrustworthy.

Russian syntax has had the advantage of an exposition made in a work that can justly be termed a masterpiece. The *Syntax* of Buslaiev, the second part of his *Historical Grammar* (see above), has deserved, since its appearance, this qualification, and time has not diminished its merit. This book, however, is open to a serious reproach. Its author does not distinguish, in the different facts which he analyzes, between those that properly belong to the regular development of the language, and those that were artificially introduced by way of borrowing and have not even outlived the authors who had given them right of asylum. Too often he persists in justifying a construction for which he seeks, in the history itself of the language, an impossible genesis, when this construction is only one of the varieties of what has been termed *lomonosóvshchina*. An example is the instance of the infinitive construction in Russian.

Buslaiev's book, therefore, is not one that can be used without a certain mistrust. Among the works of A. Potebnia, most profound and ingenious studies, the *Papers on Russian Grammar* (2d ed. Kharkov, 1889) should be mentioned in the first rank. But perhaps they are defective by that very excess which the author considered a merit. It would be better at times to find in them less psychological analysis, less "philosophy of language," and more simple description of facts and their interpretation, their explanation being sought in the history of the language rather than in the general laws of the human mind. Something of this same excess is found in a recent work of one of the best students of this master, the *Syntax of the Russian Language* of Ovsianiko-Kulikovski, an incomplete work, which beside the problems solved gives decidedly too much space to problems to be solved.

The number of problems stated and not solved in Russian syntax is very large. In any page of a contemporary Russian writer it is probable, it is certain, that you will find a construction, a fact of language, the explanation of which, however near it may be, has not yet been given.

Should we mention the dictionaries and grammars written by foreigners for the use of foreigners? The number is large; the quality is seldom more than mediocre. Only two exceptions, perfectly justified, moreover, should be made in the one as in the other field. In the matter of dictionaries, above the level of all others we find the excellent Russian-German dictionary of J. Pawlowsky (3d edition, Riga and Leipzig, 1900), of which one of the merits is that in more than one place it completes Dal; and also the very convenient and original Russian-German pocket-dictionary of Mieskowski (collection Feller, Leipzig, Teubner). There are also two grammars of praiseworthy conciseness, both recommending themselves by the correctness of their doctrine as well as by their practical character: the *Kurze Russische Grammatik* of Professor Oskar Asboth (1st edition, Leipzig, 1888) and the very original *Russische Grammatik* of E. Berneker (collection Göschen).

We see what still remains to be done in the vast field of investigation which the study of the Russian language presents. The tasks are numerous and can be coped with only by the joint effort of Russian and foreign scholars. Russian is a language which prodigious richness of vocabulary, suppleness of inflection, and variety of syntactical forms make one of the most difficult; without doubt it is, of all the principal languages of the globe, Chinese excepted, the least easily accessible. This would present less of a disadvantage if Russian were one of those languages which have, so to speak, only a linguistic interest, if Russian, like the Lithuanian for example, were only interesting on account of the antiquity of its forms, precious

for the reconstruction of the past evolution of one of the aspects of the Indo-European languages. But Russian is other than that. It is from now on, and will remain in the future, one of the most important, one of the cardinal languages of humanity. In the preface of a justly celebrated book Sir Charles Dilke said that the future was for three languages, Chinese, English, and Russian. Arithmetic proves his statement; it is something to have the law of numbers, the weight of mass, on one's side. Some fifty millions speak German; some fifty millions speak French; in a few years the number of those speaking Russian will be double that figure. The future of the development of Russian is immense. The vicissitudes of the present war are only an incident. Of what importance are a few thousand square miles more or less to a state that measures its dimensions by halves of *continents*?

And the same can be said of the Russian language that Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, in the preface of the English translation of his book *l'Empire des Tsars et les Russes*, has written of the Russian power:

"Whatever the future may bring, whatever the results of the Tsar's policy, domestic and foreign, may be, whether Russia is weakened or strengthened thereby, whether the sovereign's authority is shaken or confirmed by it in the end, one thing is certain, and that is that this huge country will remain, in any event, one of the three or four great states of the globe. It will, in our hemisphere, balance the United States in the other."

SECTION G — BELLES-LETTRES

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(Hall 3, September 24, 10 a. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ROBERT HERRICK, University of Chicago.
SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM HENRY SCHOFIELD, Harvard University.
PROFESSOR BRANDER MATTHEWS, Columbia University.

THE RELATIONS OF BELLES-LETTRES

BY WILLIAM HENRY SCHOFIELD

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BELLES-LETTRES! Perhaps, Ladies and Gentlemen, you know exactly what this term means. If so, you have me straightway at a disadvantage. For when, not long since, I was invited to address this International Congress on "The Relations of Belles-Lettres" (to other manifestations of human thought), I found myself unable to define satisfactorily these the main words of my proffered theme; and much subsequent inquiry has shown me to be not singular in this uncertainty. So great, indeed, is the variety in connotation of belles-lettres in the minds of those who employ it, that one is led to believe that in the interest of precision, for the sake of a clearer understanding of what it but vaguely suggests, the term is one we should do well to abandon.

When the French speak of "les religieux," they usually refer to monks of the Roman Catholic Church; but to most of us "the religious" has no such limited application. It may be that belles-lettres means still in France what it meant in the eighteenth century, — the cult of the classicists, advanced by appropriate ceremonies in the *salon*. But surely it does not mean this to us. Those who arranged the programme of this Congress did not intend to have a section devoted to the consideration of "polite and elegant literature" in the ordinary sense of this dictionary definition, any more than they desired to institute a section of Society to discuss the relations and problems of the "smart sets" in the many countries of the world. By belles-lettres they undoubtedly meant what we are now

disposed to call simply "literature," writings not planned primarily to convey information, but to arouse sensations of beauty, writings whose virtue is to awaken to new life.

The term "belles-lettres" envelops us with the atmosphere of the *beau monde*; it smacks of spice and sweetmeats; it has the aroma of concocted scent; it instills the sentiments of the drawing-room; it suggests curtsies and cushions, snuff and point-device; it demands as concomitants of its being luxury and ease; it is exclusive in its appeal. We prefer the term "literature" because, without restriction, it offers its riches to all in need, because it is the noble helpmeet of democracy. Its fragrance is of the outer air, its graces those of nature herself. Its beauty is not of the sort that merely kindles the fancies of the polite; it rejuvenates the hearts of all mankind. We now speak of literature as of religion in a larger sense than our ancestors: we acknowledge both universal in inspiration, though diversified in creed, found in all lands, in all ages, in all degrees of civilization, alike in essence, varying only in revelation, in understanding. We discover fundamental agreement the universe over in literary standards because of the common human emotions that make the whole world kin.

The spirit of literature, moreover, does not lodge in books alone. It did not arise with print or parchment or rune or hieroglyph. It arose the first time that one human being consciously strove to convey feelings to another in words chosen to create a desired effect. The spirit of literature found expression long before any instrument of record was used to body it forth. By this spirit even the commonest of folk, who strive not to fathom its agency, nay, can hardly spell its name, the simplest of people that tread the earth, are profoundly stirred, for it is the spirit of their poetic tradition, the soul of their imaginative life.

Speaking of the charming songs of Roumania that Mlle. Vacaresco first collected and rewrote, that accomplished lady remarks in her preface: "Avant de m'être révélés ils ont plané sur la vie des générations sans nombre." "Planer sur la vie" — truly an expressive phrase! "Planer" — how can it be rendered in English speech? One must use a sentence in default of a satisfactory single word. This poetry in Roumania, like popular literature in every land that is a permanent power, "fillet all round about and will not easily away."

But you say: "We are not concerned with this primordial force, with what you are pleased to call the spirit of literature. That is as intangible as the electric current that propels our cars and gives us heat and light. Pray, treat the embodied forms in which it appears." A reasonable request, in truth, at which one cannot demur! Yet not now would I attempt to enumerate in systematic order the various literatures of civilization, or to state the conditions of their rise

and flourishing. That were at any time a lordly enterprise and here, plainly unsuitable. Let me but comment briefly on certain aspects of literary study and literary creation that may be viewed among us with too little discernment of their rich significance.

Many of those who would subscribe themselves students of belles-lettres neglect deliberately — whether it be from affectation, or laziness, or from pure ignorance, one cannot always tell, but in any case deliberately neglect — sometimes openly scorn — the writings of their direct progenitors in earlier times. Most lightly they pass over nearly all the centuries of the Christian Era to the time of the Renaissance, as if forsooth the spirit of literature had been absent from the earth this long while, when the people lived simply, and only returned, like an Arthurian knight from the happy Otherworld, at a call to engage in tilt and tournament. “Go back behind the Renaissance!” one often hears students of our literature remark. “What is the need? Well, perhaps for the sake of Dante and Chaucer — but behind them again? There is surely no behind that one who is interested only in ‘art for art’s sake’ need bother about.” And I have marveled at the singular unwisdom of such men’s attitude, at their folly in thus limiting their powers to judge and appreciate adequately the periods of their own special predilection. Do they disdain knowledge of the earlier periods because they have it not themselves, or are they actually blind to the advantage of it? No one who can speak with knowledge but will affirm that he has never found any study of any period of any literature useless in the investigation of any other. The more one learns of ancient and medieval conceptions, the better one seems to understand those of one’s contemporaries. The more familiar one becomes with works written in French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Provençal, — works in German, Scandinavian, Dutch, and Celtic, not to mention the classics, — the more enlightenment one possesses for the elucidation of the best productions in one’s own native tongue. The more definitely conversant one is with the facts determining past phenomena in the history of any literature, the more confidence one may feel in a forecast of its probable future.

Formerly the literature of the so-called Dark Ages was thought to consist merely of a few pedantic treatises in barbarous Latin. Now a happy tendency is becoming manifest to consider as far more valuable than these artificial documents the wealth of embryonic poetry once instinct with the people, and partially preserved in artistic form. In such early indications of the common thought and feeling, we must, I believe, seek the primal quality of each nation’s originality, the determining spirit of its belles-lettres. Students will be more helped to a proper understanding of what literature really is by examining its development in periods of communal effort than in those marked by the sway of great individuals.

The literature of the Middle Ages differentiates itself from that of later eras by certain notable characteristics: it is in the main anonymous, and static in type, impersonal in attitude, and international in scope. A recognition of these attributes should affect not only the method of its study, but the judgment of its merit. It is a mistake to consider the productions of any one country in the Middle Ages apart from those closely connected with it, for the vernacular literature in all lands of Western Europe was then of very similar origin and kind. It is misleading to pick out a few individual writers whose names happen to be preserved, and romance about their personalities, for even had we details about their environment and careers, these would be found comparatively unimportant in determining the real significance of their work. Medieval literature is largely a record of society at large and not of its separate members. It evinces in one form or another the tastes, the sentiments, the needs of the whole nation. Nor yet of one alone, but of the several nations that belonged to the wide province under the control of the Church of Rome. France was then the centre of Western civilization, and at Paris were established the general canons of art, and the acknowledged standards of literary achievement. The fashions of Paris had a predominant influence on the writings of England for several centuries, and under their influence our literary styles were almost wholly transformed from what they had been in Saxon times.

Gaston Paris has convincingly shown that the Middle Ages form an epoch essentially poetic. It had few great poets, but it created or perpetuated a vast supply of poetic thought. Especially in the domain of fiction, — than which no imaginative production has ever exerted greater force, — its achievement remains unsurpassed. Many and fine are the literary conceptions for which the poets and painters and musicians of our own time are indebted to the Middle Ages. In some instances modern writers have ennobled ancient themes by treating them in maturer style. But often it is the charm, the spell of the past that is the power in their works most efficacious still. Only by knowing the facts of development in each separate case can our judgment of poems be fair. When art has alchemized base metal into gold, we should give all credit to the art. But when the foundation of the artist's experiments is gold, as it was with alchemists who of old beguiled many to their own advantage, then this truth should not be kept dark. We rejoice when we see poetic thought heightened in effect by the art of the poet; we see how a single man of genius can remodel old material immensely to the increase of its value. But we shall do well not to forget that he began where others left off; that some, moreover, of the greatest poems of the world are but the exaltation of valuable ideas previously existing in the rough. Therefore I would plead for a study of the elements as essential to

an understanding of the product. The underlying force is the vitality of art.

But pray do not credit me with insufficient appreciation of what we call style in composition. Style, on the contrary, is a virtue to which I am keenly susceptible. It is, I recognize, as manners to men — the outward and visible sign of good breeding. But for all that one may esteem courtesy and gentleness in one's associates, and lament their lack whenever it appears in one's own demeanor, it is clear that the world is better served by virility and earnestness, if a choice must be made. Fine feeling and delicacy are noble attributes of any man, but they are not to be equalized with native vigor and moral might, when it becomes a question of achieving a great task. Thus it is that I regard as just the critics' demand for evidence of strong elemental emotion in a work before they are willing to stamp it as great literature. I dread ever the blighting sway of conventionality, the prevalence of art that is "tongue-tied by authority." I lament the spread of good taste if it means that literature is to become anæmic, colorless, sapped of personality. Admirable is the force of restraint where there is something to hold back, great is the virtue of control when it regulates passion. An earnest writer strives to free himself of prejudice, and to avoid excess; he rids himself as best he can of self-sufficiency, and conceit; he is ready to learn of every one who has before wrought well in the domain of imagination; but all to this end, that his personal powers may be the more effective, that he may clarify his individual vision, and, being true to himself, promote the general good. What we need in literature is character, — more than refinement, more than intellectuality, more than passion, — character, that unifies all three, yet mounts higher to the majesty of wisdom.

Toward what are known as the "fine points" of style, I feel almost as Bacon felt toward "ceremonies and respects": "to attain them it almost sufficeth not to despise them; for so shall a man observe them in others, and let him trust himself with the rest. For if he labour too much to express them, he shall lose their grace, which is to be natural and unaffected. . . . How can a man comprehend great matters, that breaketh his mind too much to small observations?" Few, in fact, are the words required to sum up the law and the prophets of the highest literary creed; and details of command are good only as sign-posts of wise direction to travelers already in the way of truth.

We hear a great deal of empty talk nowadays about "art for art's sake." This once pregnant phrase is now so bandied about by the glib and the facile, so wrenched to suit private inclination, that it has no clear and definite meaning. To some critics it seems to justify petty desire to dismiss as worthless everything that does not accord with their own preference, to minimize the merit of careful study, to cry frantically, "Out! harrow! and weylaway!"

at the bare sight of a specialist near their Chaunticleer's yard; it leads them to be vainglorious in ignorant disdain. Such critics forget that to be merely entertaining is to be hastily dismissed; they forget that, while a superficial knowledge of many things is a strong armor to a man with a profound knowledge of some one of them, he who wears it without individual power may soon be as ridiculously overthrown as the threatening clay-giant Mokkurkalfi whom Thor befooled and, at a single blow of his mighty hammer, tumbled down on the dismal plain. Again, some young poets are persuaded by the phrase to write only to please a select company of congenial spirits, particularly to win applause by the display of cleverness which only the initiated can enjoy, and thus are deluded to their own harm.

"Art for art's sake," otherwise considered, advises the critic to regard the works of which he treats no more as a show-case of rhetorical devices, or as a specimen of metrical structure, than as a *corpus vile* for linguistic dissection, or as an illustrative manual of historical and social conditions. He is admonished by it that a great poem is more than words and phrases and facts and examples, curiously conjoined to test his sensitiveness or erudition; that on the contrary it is a living thing in whose creation was motive, in whose soul is aspiration, in whose heart is feeling, in whose mind is understanding, — a living being with a peculiar character which is its force.

"Art for art's sake" advises the poet to write with purely ideal aim, with eye single to untarnished truth, intent on showing forth the faith that is in him without fawning or fear. By it he is admonished to exalt in his composition whatsoever things are honest, just, pure, lovely, and of good report, and to scorn any compromise with imperfection. It keeps before him the highest standard of a book, that it shall be a thing of beauty and a joy forever.

We are agreed that our present concern is only with imaginative literature. This, you remember, De Quincey distinguishes from unimaginative literature, as the "literature of power" — opposed to that of knowledge; and Pater makes clearer the contrast by this addition: "In the former of which the composer gives us not fact, but his peculiar sense of fact, whether past or present, or prospective, it may be, as often in oratory." Accepting De Quincey's definition, let us proceed to examine certain of the relations in which literature may exert power.

Had I time I might dwell on the intimate relations of "belles-lettres" with the "beaux-arts," and point out superficially how many beautiful paintings, sculptures, and embroideries, how many monuments of architecture, were inspired by literary conceptions; or, *vice versa*, how often various products of fine art suggested genuine works of literature. More profoundly, I might endeavor to formulate

certain fundamental spiritual laws of "fine" creation in general, from which it would appear that all good achievements of this kind result from one and the same impulse, — to manifest and evoke beauty, — and that the medium is the least significant thing in a consideration of its permanent power. I might dwell upon the influence on one another of men diversely trying to interpret beauty, on the stimulus and restraining value of their intercourse, on the enlightenment that comes to each by understanding his fellow's struggles and triumphs. All this would be worth while — but here we must pass it by.

The relations of literature to philosophy and religion would need a man of much more learning in those fields than I possess to show forth worthily, and he would require, not a few paragraphs in a popular discourse, but a large volume of intricate reasoning, to make the situation clear. Naturally it would not be necessary to determine the service of books that systematize theory, or promulgate dogma; for such works belong not to pure literature, but to that of science. But to inquire into the value of imaginative suggestion and vivid statement as an aid to religious and philosophic contemplation, — the power of words to create an atmosphere in which men become sensitive to exalted impressions, — that would be helpful to every one who recognizes the tremendous influence of some great writing on his own spiritual life.

And how separate literature from education? More and more, education is being encouraged as a factor of social progress. School and college are now receiving in large measure the public patronage that once was the honor of the church. University men are looked to for light on most of the problems of national life. They set the tone of public thought. Fortunately, there is no student but desires acquaintance with great books. No one in the best collegiate circles is more envied than he who can communicate to thought that peculiar transfiguration of expression which is called the literary touch. The general appreciation of his work is like the response of those who, seeing a man act nobly, rise up with instinctive recognition of his superiority, to applaud character so capable of doing good. Virtue of speech is as incommunicable by command as nobility of character, but it can be inculcated by intercourse with those who are eminent for it, and the desire for its possession is common to all who think. Thus men are led to read the best books as they are led to associate with the best of their fellows, for they perceive that virtue goes out of each superior being when he is touched, and that sympathetic association awakens dormant ideals to life.

On the relations of literature to history and nationality I should like to dwell a little longer. In general, history is the record of a nation's deeds, while literature is the outcome of its thoughts. If

one stops to consider the matter, one is surprised to see that a fine literary work has very seldom *made* history, as is sometimes said, except indirectly, and not at the period of its composition. Literature may reflect history, echo it, explain it; it may be the mirror of prevailing sentiment, the sounding-board of contemporary ideas, the key of extant emotion; but it is not the foundation of the feelings it exhibits. Is it, then, without influence on history? Certainly not. If it does not move the present, it establishes it, to move the future. Thus, itself the outgrowth of conditions that were effected by previous writing, it becomes a force for new conditions destined to develop another product, and start it again on a career of influence. While history gradually unfolds itself, literature unifies its evolution. Literature is a mighty power to conserve and perfect a nation's experience. It contributes solidarity to public sentiments and ideals. It procreates patriotism. Through it a people takes cognizance of itself.

Consider, for example, the influence of a notable history of the fourteenth century, — a biography that falls within our domain because the author, we perceive, was not scrupulous to convey fact so much as his peculiar sense of fact: I refer to Barbour's *Bruce*. John Barbour in writing his story of Bruce had clearly before him the lives of the illustrious "Nine Worthies" of the world. He knew in full the romantic tales of Julius Cæsar, Hector, and Alexander, of Joshua, David, and Judas Maccabæus, of Charlemagne, Arthur, and Godefroy de Bouillon; and he deliberately distorted history to fashion for his hero a career that would make him a suitable associate of these ancient warriors. He represented Bruce as constantly mindful of their exploits, as prompted, encouraged, and kept from mistake by their example, as delivering addresses and exhortations to his troops in their manner, as displaying principles of honor, courtesy, heroic courage, and perseverance in their similitude. He made him the exponent of all the finest qualities of character that his prototypes had displayed. In the tales of the Nine Worthies, — imaginative history for the most part, almost entirely fable, — men of all stations in the Middle Ages found examples of virtue which determined their actual conduct in daily life; and the influence of these medieval narratives is not dead yet. Barbour took advantage of the emotions of his time to ennoble the standards of his countrymen. Magnifying their experience by bringing it into the light of celebrated comparison, he perpetuated as ideals of the Scottish nation those principles of conduct that many generations of literary men had agreed upon as the most worthy of applause.

Somewhat similar is the way in which the fame of William Wallace was established by the minstrel Blind Harry, or by whoever it was that wrote the poem in which he is eloquently exalted. And the

spirit that these poems infused into contemporary Scots remains still the source of their descendants' pride. Centuries after its composition, Robert Burns wrote of the story of Wallace: "It poured a tide of Scottish prejudice into my veins that will boil along there till the flood-gates of life close in eternal rest." Surely no historian can leave such literature out of consideration in estimating the bases of Scottish nationality. Is it not, then, literature of power?

We should do well to seek more in history the influence of popular legends,—old poetic imaginings that have fostered love of country, tightened racial ties. It was no vain appeal that Björnson made to his countrymen when he justified their patriotism by singing of the "saga-night that has spread dreams" over their land. Such dreams in general possession yield the secret of that common social impulse which is a nation's strength. Through literature is often made manifest the halo of a nation, which, representative of its spiritual glory, commands reverence and devotion.

It is, nevertheless, difficult to generalize about the immediate relations of literature to national movements. There seems no fixed rule apparent. With the exception of some orations, the American Revolution was neither preluded nor followed by any literary works of note, while the French Revolution presents a situation exactly the opposite. Wherein lies the difference? What has this country lost by the absence of an oracle of its former spirit? What has France gained by the concern of its writers with the form of its government?

Some historians are disposed to calculate the greatness of a nation by the number of great men it has produced, and the method is not to be wholly blamed. Great men are but the mouthpiece of great spirit, and that is usually the spirit of their time. We are justified in denying unusual uplift to the spirit of a nation when it reaches to no superior heights in gifted individuals. Grant that the originality of a people is not to be measured by its records in letters alone, but in the other arts as well, in social and intellectual progress, in the advancement of civilization variously apparent; yet an age when literature is weak, when it is frivolous, cheap, and insincere, not to say vulgar or depraved, is an age which the future historian will find it hard to call great, no matter how proudly that age may have vaunted itself on a high general level of education, or a prosperous mediocrity of culture.

It is appalling to consider how little direct influence literature has as literature on the multitudes that embrace our civilization. Frankly, if we had any way to discover how many of the eighty million American citizens read books with any concern for them as works of art, with any conception of what makes them good or bad in the eyes of the trained, with any power to discriminate on their own behalf, we should probably be ashamed to state the results of our

research. Nor is it probable that conditions in this regard are much worse here than elsewhere, though undoubtedly in older countries books of polite literature are more sure of an extensive sale. In the whole world the number of people who can and do appreciate literature as such is a very small minority of the population. This, to be sure, does not signify much to those who believe that literature is only for the *élite*, that it is a luxury for the refined, and debases itself when it goes to minister to the lowly of intellect and taste. But there is another view, the view of the democrat, who proclaims all men free and equal in the domain of letters, free to produce, free to enjoy, free to understand. And those who have most at heart the sway of ideals in the world have the greatest eagerness to enlighten the masses to comprehension of what literature means, not by telling them about its charm, but by revealing to them its quickening power, as they can be taught patriotism by the consideration of a patriot, or fair play and uprightness by observing a conspicuously "straight" man, a man of honor. It behooves writers seriously to inquire why their appeal is so limited, to see how far their failure to move many is due to a mistaken vision. I entertain no foolish notions with regard to a large increase of reading among the working classes. There are millions of men who by reason of their occupation, if for no other, will always be deprived of the chance to read at all. But I should like to have every one, if possible, surrounded by an atmosphere of imaginative thought, so pervasive that somehow they must feel it, and, being led to observe those who see and hear more than they, wittingly or unwittingly yield subservience to its power.

Good literature is a wholesome stimulant to the man in private as well as to the citizen in public. Yet now, when it is most needed, in this age of intellectuality, there is a pitiful lack of writings that serve to refresh the heart. While in conversation the other day with an economist, I asked him how much he read books that had no direct bearing on his professional work. "Very little," was the reply. "Nor can I say," he added, "exactly why. I know I need greatly the strength that literature affords, but I do not seem to find anything, in contemporary production, at least, that supplies my need." Now if this man had really sought and not found, if he had read and was unrewarded by increase of courage, not renewed in inner life, then it is a great reproach to present works of literary art. Such a man as he needs props,—Matthew Arnold remarked wisely that all men need props,—and these he had a right to claim that literature should afford him. Formerly the Bible was deemed a sufficient prop for all men in their every spiritual emergency. But more and more the educated are seeking other support in the crises great or small that daily arise. Very different are the books that serve us as

individuals, for very different are our wants. But we have a longing for beauty; we all crave the uplift that comes from contemplation of the ideal.

You will recall how a *chanson de geste* concerning Charlemagne and Roland and Oliver and those who fell at Ronceval stimulated the host of William the Conqueror at the Battle of Hastings. It helped to make them brave. You will recall how Wolfe repeated Gray's *Elegy* beneath the battlements of Quebec the night before the memorable struggle of Abraham's Heights. It helped to make him calm. You will recall how Robert Bruce sat all day long at the difficult pass of Loch Lomond and read aloud to his followers the Old French story of Ferumbras, and how the Lord gave his assailants might in their peril. It helped to hold their courage at the sticking point. You will recall, perhaps, the fascinating picture of the British king Bademagus in his chair of ivory, and how he heard the minstrel harp of Orpheus so sweetly that he was moved with great emotion and no one dared speak a word. It distracted him from his grief. You will recall the scene of the old Norse monarch Sverrir on his deathbed, as he listened with glad eagerness to the heroic sagas of his ancestors and kin, recited one after another to animate his heart. Thus he was strengthened for his approaching end.

There is, in truth, no circumstance in which literature will not serve, whether it be to increase joy or diminish sorrow, to heighten courage or evoke tenderness, to stimulate in action or soothe in repose, to give one in life wisdom and in death serenity. Literature is the consolation as well as the inspiration of humanity, an eternal spring of refreshment which never is far off, the water-brook for which the soul of every life-traveler panteth, like the hart, when he is will-of-his-way.

How, then, will the course of literature be guided aright? What is, or should be, the purpose of literary criticism, the rôle of professors of belles-lettres?

We have at Harvard a chair of belles-lettres, which since the death of James Russell Lowell has had no occupant. Why for these thirteen years past has it remained vacant? Ask this question of the members of the Corporation, and they will probably give as a chief reason that they know of no one quite fitted for the place. And in this opinion they seem to be right. In truth, it is not by learning or fidelity that one can gain the power to occupy suitably any such chair. One does not fit one's self apparently, but is fitted by nature, or fate, or God, or whatever one may term the hidden power that rules our being, to sit in this high seat, this "siege perilous," and not be confounded. For ideally the professor of belles-lettres should be the qualified spokesman of vital literary opinion, as the poet-laureate of Britain should utter in convincing phrase the deep emotions of his

land. Poets-laureate have at times been chosen who were unable to maintain the dignity of their lofty office, but it is a common feeling that a weakling in the post is worse than none at all.

Now Lowell took the Smith Professorship of Belles-Lettres with general commendation of the propriety of his appointment. If some have felt inclined to demur at the fidelity with which he performed the routine of his position, no one has ever denied his fitness, by nature and training, for what he was called upon to do, even as all admit that Tennyson's choice as poet-laureate merited public applause. It is well, then, to inquire what qualities Lowell possessed that led the wise to seal his election with open marks of approval. In the first place, he was not only a gentleman (in the best sense of that fine old word — a man of gentle, courteous instincts, of careful cultivation and dignity)—he was also a scholar, in both the ancient and the modern way.

This point I should like to emphasize. No one can read Lowell's letters or essays without becoming aware of the fact that he had large learning at his command. But if any one desires further confirmation, he will examine the books of Lowell's private collections that are now possessed by the Harvard Library. These are numerous and varied. They are not confined to productions of any one period. The poet himself declares, for example, that he had read every work of Old French literature available to him. And examination of his own texts (for he bought everything) shows that he read them with scrupulous pains, not in the superficial way that Taine might have adopted, but with the conscientiousness of Gaston Paris, to whom every fact had significance, who was not content to generalize on the basis of mere casual knowledge, who left no avenue unapproached to seek out the truth in its fullness.

And Lowell read to make use of the knowledge he thus acquired. He matured his opinions with the intent to set them forth. This fact, too, I would emphasize. I am aware that there is a foolish importance attached to publication nowadays. Every young student is encouraged to get into print, whether he have anything new to say or not. And it is too often forgotten that a man may write reams and not have one tenth the ideas of one who has been absolutely silent to the world at large. But even as music is not music, or poetry poetry, until it is composed, even as a building is not a building before it is erected, so ideas demand publication to be capable of estimate. Publication, of course, can be achieved in other ways than by written books. A professor may most potently publish his ideas by word of mouth. But where there is no evidence of a teacher's influence either by its effect on the personally taught or the impersonally wrought upon, we are justified in believing that it is a thing of nought.

Lowell had good taste, and his phrases please the sensibilities of the refined. He was thorough in research, and his judgments stand the test of careful scrutiny. Yet another quality of his publication is perhaps more notable. It has all-inspiring force. Himself enthusiastic in study, he brought others to understand its charm. Ready to restrain, he was still more eager to encourage. Not content with the consideration of the past, he inquired into the future. This also I believe it was his duty to do as professor of belles-lettres. For of what other use is the acquisition of knowledge than to revivify it and put it to better service? Odin, the wise God, sent out two ravens abroad into the world, and welcomed them back with news. Hugin and Munin, these ravens, symbolize Thought and Memory, coequal, both needed in Odin's mature counsel. But to what end should this counsel serve? Clearly, to anticipate the future for the common good. The ideal professor of belles-lettres is wise in determining tendencies — to this purpose, that the bad may be kept hidden and the good given cheerful countenance. His chief consideration must be coming accomplishment, that it may be rich in fulfillment of apparent promise or possible good chance. He must, by his knowledge of what has been, be keen to perceive the best of what may be, and keep the eyes of others open to dangers likely to overcome the unwary, teach those whom he can influence to discriminate between the meretricious and the honest, between the vulgar and the fine, between the ephemeral and the permanent, between artifice and art.

"Your young men shall see visions and your old men shall dream dreams," said the prophet. Here we have, as it were, the creators and the critics of literature. The critic indicates the course of past developments; the creator takes the lead to form the new. The student of literature makes stable standards, which he who is destined to replenish the treasured store of ideal art struggles to fulfill.

Belles-lettres! Yes, beautiful indeed are the letters that reveal nations and individuals to themselves, and stir them to noble endeavor. There will, it is evident, be no great literature worthy of America until its citizens, once again as clearly as of yore, perceive the firm basis of its national life, how and why these States are United. Are they united merely for the advantage of reciprocal trade and mutual protection, only by reason of propinquity, or convenient purchase, or warlike conquest? These are not bonds of much strength. If there is no underlying community of race, or tradition, or history among its members, by what shall they be kept one when factions arise, when local or class interests threaten to disturb the paths of peace? By nothing vital, so far as one can see, except a sympathy of moral life, a sympathy of ideals. And here above all literature has the high privilege to serve. Men of letters have the power to keep clear the vision without which the nation shall perish. Theirs is the

duty to glorify truth and make it worshiped of the people. They can touch the hearts of all fellow citizens to a common response, and surprise them to the full realization of a common love.

We hear of *La douce France* and *Bell' Italia*, of *Gamle Norge* and *Merry England*, of the *Vaterland* and the *Emerald Isle*, and such literary phrases as these suffice to arouse intense patriotic emotion. We are now in a land that preëminently deserves the title "free," and freedom as here newly conceived and enacted may well be the burden of a new nation's song. Let our writers renew the best imaginings of their fathers; but let them also open their eyes and see afar off: let them descry the land of hope.

THE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF BELLES-LETTRES

BY BRANDER MATTHEWS

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It is a characteristic of the arts that their vocabulary must needs be less exact than the terminology of the sciences, because the material of the artist is ever the varying emotion of his fellow man. In the language of the library and of the studio there can be no words like *horse-power* and *foot-ton*, the content of which is precise and rigid. Wit and humor, for example, classic and romantic, the fancy and the imagination, — these are pairs of words that a writer may employ almost as he pleases, but always at his peril, since there is no certainty of their conveying to his hearers the exact meaning with which he himself has charged them. It is in vain that the dictionary-maker seeks to differentiate accurately the one from the other, for he cannot hope to control the personal equation of every user of the language. Indeed, the dictionary-maker is often ready enough to confess his difficulty, and to admit, for instance, that *belles-lettres* has a somewhat indefinite application, synonymous sometimes with the humanities in general, and sometimes with works of the imagination in poetry and the drama, in fiction and in the essay. He tells us also that the term includes chiefly the study and criticism of literature; and that it concerns itself mainly with literature regarded as a fine art.

Here in this Congress of the Arts and Sciences, Sections have been set apart for the discussion of the literatures of each of the leading languages, ancient and modern: and to the Section of Belles-Lettres has been confided the consideration of literature as a whole, — of literature as an art, — of literature pure and simple, distinguished not only from linguistics, but also from literary history and literary biography, — of literature as it transcends the boundaries of any single tongue and as it appears in its comparative and more cosmopolitan aspects.

I

There is no disguising the difficulty of any attempt to survey the whole field of literature as it is disclosed before us now at the opening of a new century; and there is no denying the danger of any effort to declare the outlook in the actual present and the prospect in the immediate future. How is it possible to project our vision? To foresee whither the current is bearing us? To anticipate the rocks ahead and the shallows whereon our bark may be stranded? And if it is not easy to suggest the problems that are pressing for solution, it is harder still to hint at an adequate answer to them.

But one reflection is as obvious as it is helpful. The problems of literature are not often merely literary; and in so far as literature is an honest attempt to express life, — as it always has been at the moments of highest achievement, — the problems of literature must have an intimate relation to the problems which confront us insistently in life. If we turn from the disputations of the schools and look out on the world, we may discover forces at work in society which are exerting also a potent influence upon the future of literature.

Now that the century in which we were born and bred is receding swiftly into the past, we can perceive in the perspective more clearly than ever before its larger movements and its main endeavor. We are at last beginning to be able to estimate the heritage it has left us and to see for ourselves what our portion is, what our possessions are, and what our obligations. While it is for us to make the twentieth century, no doubt, we need always to remember that it was the nineteenth century which made us; and we do not know ourselves if we fail to understand the years in which we were moulded to the work that lies before us. It is for us to single out the salient characteristics of the nineteenth century. It is for us to seize the significance of the striking advance in scientific method, for example, and of the widespread acceptance of the scientific attitude. It is for us again to recognize the meaning of that extension of the democratic movement, which is the most striking characteristic of the past sixscore years. It is for us, once more, to weigh the importance of the intensifying of the national spirit and of the sharpening of racial pride. And finally it is for us to take account also of the growth of what must be called cosmopolitanism, that breaking down of the hostile barriers keeping one people apart from the others, ignorant of them, and often contemptuous.

Here then are four legacies from the nineteenth century to the twentieth: first, the scientific spirit; second, the spread of democracy; third, the assertion of nationality; and fourth, that stepping across the confines of language and race for which we have no more accurate name than cosmopolitanism.

II

"The scientific spirit," so an acute American critic defined it recently in an essay on Carlyle, — who was devoid of it and detested it, — "the scientific spirit signifies poise between hypothesis and verification, between statement and proof, between appearance and reality. It is inspired by the impulse of investigation, tempered with distrust and edged with curiosity. It is at once avid of certainty and skeptical of seeming. It is enthusiastically patient, nobly literal, candid, tolerant, hospitable." This is the statement of a man of letters, who had found in science "a tonic force" stimulating to all the arts.

By the side of this it may be well to set also the statement of a man of science. In his address delivered here in St. Louis last December, the President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science — who is also the president of one of the foremost of American universities — declared that "the fundamental characteristic of the scientific method is honesty. . . . The sole object is to learn the truth and to be guided by the truth. Absolute accuracy, absolute fidelity, absolute honesty are the prime conditions of scientific progress." And then Dr. Remsen went on to make the significant assertion that "the constant use of the scientific method must in the end leave its impress upon him who uses it. A life spent in accord with scientific teaching would be of a high order. It would practically conform to the teachings of the highest type of religion."

This "use of the scientific method" is as remote as may be from that barren adoption of scientific phrases and that sterile application of scientific formulas, which may be dismissed as an aspect of "science falsely so called." It is of deeper import also than any mere utilization by art of the discoveries of science, however helpful this may be. The painter has been aided by science to perceive more precisely the effect of the vibrations of light and to analyze more sharply the successive stages of animal movement; and the poet also has found his profit in the wider knowledge brought to us by later investigation. Longfellow, for one, drew upon astronomy for the figure with which he once made plain his moral:

Were a star quenched on high,
For ages would its light,
Still travelling downward from the sky,
Shine on our mortal sight.

So when a great man dies,
For years beyond our ken
The light he leaves behind him lies
Upon the paths of men.

Already had Wordsworth, a hundred years ago, welcomed "the remotest discoveries of the chemist, the botanist and mineralogist,"

as "proper objects of the poet's art," declaring that "if the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the being thus produced as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man."

Again, the "use of the scientific method" is not equivalent to the application in the arts of scientific theories, although here once more the man of letters is free to take these for his own and to bend them to his purpose. Ibsen has found in the doctrine of heredity a modern analogue of the ancient Greek idea of fate; and although he may not "see life steadily and see it whole," he has been enabled to invest his sombre *Ghosts* with not a little of the inexorable inevitability which we feel to be so appalling in the master work of Sophocles. Criticism, no less than creation, has been stimulated by scientific hypothesis; and for one thing, the conception of literary history has been wholly transformed since the theory of evolution was declared. To M. Brunetière — whom I hoped to have had the honor of following to-day and to whom I am glad here to be able to express my many debts — we owe the application of this doctrine to the development of the drama in his own language. He has shown us most convincingly how the several literary forms — the lyric, the oration, the epic, with its illegitimate descendant the modern novel in prose — may cross-fertilize each other from time to time, and also how the casual hybrids that result are ever struggling to revert each to its own species.

Science is thus seen to be stimulating to art; but the "use of the scientific method" would seem to be more than stimulation only. It leads the practitioners of the several arts to set up an ideal of disinterestedness, inspired by a lofty curiosity, which shall scorn nothing as insignificant and which is ever eager after knowledge ascertained for its own sake. As it abhors the abnormal and the freakish, the superficial and the extravagant, it helps the creative artist to strive for a more classic directness and simplicity; and it guides the critic toward passionless proportion and moderation. Although it tends toward intellectual freedom, it forces us always to recognize the reign of law. It establishes the strength of the social bond; and thereby, for example, it aids us to see that, although romance is ever young and ever true, what is known as neo-romanticism, with its reckless assertion of individual whim, is anti-social, — and therefore probably immoral.

The "use of the scientific method" will surely strengthen the conscience of the novelist and of the dramatist; and it will train them to a sterner veracity in dealing with human character. It will inhibit that pitiful tendency toward a falsification of the facts of life which

asserts the reform of a character in the twinkling of an eye just before the final fall of the curtain. It will lead to a renunciation of the feeble and summary psychology which permits a man of indurated habits of weakness or of wickedness to transform himself by a single and sudden effort of will. And on the other hand, it may tempt certain students of life, subtler than their fellow craftsmen and more inquisitive, to dwell unduly on the mere machinery of human motive and to aim not at a rich portrayal of the actions of men and women, but at an arid analysis of the mechanism of their impulses. More than one novelist of the twentieth century has already yielded to this tendency. No doubt, it is only the negative defect accompanying a positive quality; yet it indicates an imperfect appreciation of the artist's duty. "In every art," so Taine reminded us, "it is necessary to linger long over the true in order to attain the beautiful. The eye, fixing itself on an object, begins by noting details with an excess of precision and fullness; it is only later, when the inventory is complete, that the mind, master of its wealth, rises higher, in order to take or to neglect what suits it."

The attitude of the literary critic will be modified by the constant use of the scientific method, quite as much as the attitude of the literary creator. He will seek to relate a work of art, whether it is an epic or a tragedy, a novel or a play, to its environment, weighing all the circumstances of its creation. He will strive to estimate it as it is, of course, but also as a contribution to the evolution of its species made by a given people at a given period. He will endeavor to keep himself free from lip-service and from ancestor-worship, holding himself derelict to his duty if he should fail to admit frankly that in every masterpiece of the past, however transcendent its merits, there must needs be much that is temporary, admixed with more that is permanent, — many things which pleased its author's countrymen in his own time and which do not appeal to us, even though we can perceive also what is eternal and universal, even though we read into every masterpiece much that the author's contemporaries had not our eyes to perceive. All the works of Shakespeare and of Molière are not of equal value; and even the finest of them is not impeccable; and a literary critic who has a scientific sincerity will not gloss over the minor defects, whatever his desire to concentrate attention on the nobler qualities by which Shakespeare and Molière achieved their mighty fame. Indeed, the scientific spirit will make it plain that an unwavering admiration for all the works of a great writer, unequal as these must be of necessity, is proof in itself of an obvious inability to perceive wherein lies his real greatness.

Whatever the service the scientific spirit is likely to render in the future, we need to be on our guard against the obsession of science itself. There is danger that an exclusive devotion to science may

starve out all interest in the arts, to the impoverishment of the soul. Already are there examples of men who hold science to be all-sufficient and who insist that it has superseded art. Already is it necessary to recall Lowell's setting off of "art, whose concern is with the ideal and the potential, from science which is limited by the actual and the positive." Science bids us go so far and no farther, despite the fact that man longs to peer beyond the confines. Vistas closed to science are opened for us by art. Science fails us, if we ask too much; for it can provide no satisfactory explanation of the enigmas of existence. Above all, it tempts us to a hard and fast acceptance of its own formulas, an acceptance as deadening to progress as it is false to the scientific spirit itself. "History warns us," so Huxley declared, "that it is the customary fate of new truths to begin as heresies, and to end as superstitions."

III

The growth of the scientific spirit is not more evident in the nineteenth century than the spread of the democratic movement. Democracy in its inner essence means not only the slow broadening down of government until it rests upon the assured foundation of the people as a whole, it signifies also the final disappearance of the feudal organization, of the system of caste, of the privileges which are not founded on justice, of the belief in any superiority conferred by the accident of birth. It starts with the assertion of the equality of all men before the law; and it ends with the right of every man to do his own thinking. Accepting the dignity of human nature, the democratic spirit, in its finer manifestations, is free from intolerance and rich in sympathy, rejoicing to learn how the other half lives. It is increasingly interested in human personality, in spite of the fact that humanity no longer bulks as big in the universe as it did before scientific discovery shattered the ancient assumption that the world had been made for man alone.

Perhaps, indeed, it is the perception of our own insignificance which is making us cling together more closely and seek to understand each other at least, even if we must ever fail to grasp the full import of the cosmic scheme. Whatever the reason, there is no gainsaying the growth of fellow feeling and of a curiosity founded on friendly interest,—both of which are revealed far more abundantly in our later literatures than in the earlier classics. In the austere masterpieces of the Greek drama, for example, we may discover a lack of this warmth of sympathy; and we cannot but suspect a certain aloofness, which is akin to callousness. The cultivated citizens of Athens were supported by slave-labor; but their great dramatic poets cast little light on the life of the slaves or on the sad conditions of their servitude. Something of this narrow chilliness

is to be detected also in the literature of the court of Louis XIV ; Corneille and Racine prefer to ignore not only the peasant but also the burgher; and it is partly because Molière's outlook on life is broader that the master of comedy appears to us now so much greater than his tragic contemporaries. Even of late the Latin races have seemed perhaps a little less susceptible to this appeal than the Teutonic or the Slavonic; and the impassive contempt of Flaubert and of Maupassant toward the creatures of their imaginative observation is more characteristic of the French attitude than the genial compassion of Daudet. In Hawthorne and in George Eliot there is no aristocratic remoteness, and Turgenev and Tolstoi are innocent of haughty condescension. Everywhere now in the new century can we perceive the working of the democratic spirit, making literature more clear-sighted, more tolerant, more pitying.

In his uplifting discussion of democracy Lowell sought to encourage the timid souls who dreaded the danger that it might "reduce all mankind to a dead level of mediocrity" and that it might "lessen the respect due to eminence, whether in station, virtue, or genius"; and he explained that, in fact, democracy meant a career open to talent, an opportunity equal to all, and therefore in reality a larger likelihood that genius would be set free. Here in America we have discovered by more than a century of experience that democracy levels up and not down; and that it is not jealous of a commanding personality even in public life, revealing a swift shrewdness of its own in gauging character, and showing both respect and regard for the independent leaders strong enough to withstand what may seem at the moment to be the popular will.

Nor is democracy hostile to original genius, or slow to recognize it. The people as a whole may throw careless and liberal rewards to the jesters and to the sycophants who are seeking its favor, as their fore-runners sought to gain the ear of the monarch of old; but the authors of substantial popularity are never those who abase themselves or who scheme to cajole. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were only two writers whose new books appeared simultaneously in half a dozen different tongues; and what man has ever been so foolish as to call Ibsen and Tolstoi flatterers of humanity? The sturdy independence of these masters, their sincerity, their obstinate reiteration each of his own message — these are main reasons for the esteem in which they are held. And in our own language, the two writers of widest renown are Mark Twain and Rudyard Kipling, known wherever English is spoken, in every remote corner of the seven seas, one an American of the Americans and the other the spokesman of the British Empire. They are not only conscientious craftsmen, each in his own way, but moralists also and even preachers; and they go forward in the path they have marked out, each for

himself, with no swervings aside to curry favor or to avoid unpopularity.

The fear has been expressed freely that the position of literature is made more precarious by the recent immense increase in the reading public, deficient in standards of taste and anxious to be amused. It is in the hope of hitting the fancy of this motley body that there is now a tumultuous multiplication of books of every degree of merit; and amid all this din there must be redoubled difficulty of choice. Yet the selection gets itself made somehow, and not unsatisfactorily. Unworthy books may have vogue for a while, and even adulation, but their fame is fleeting. The books which the last generation transmitted to us were after all the books best worth our consideration; and we may be confident that the books we shall pass along to the next generation will be as wisely selected. Out of the wasteful overproduction only those works emerge which have in them something that the world will not willingly let die.

Those books that survive are always chosen from out the books that have been popular, and never from those that failed to catch the ear of their contemporaries. The poet who scorns the men of his own time and who retires into an ivory tower to inlay rhymes for the sole enjoyment of his fellow mandarins, the poet who writes for posterity, will wait in vain for his audience. Never has posterity reversed the unfavorable verdict of an artist's own century. As Cicero said, — and Cicero was both an aristocrat and an artist in letters, — “given time and opportunity, the recognition of the many is as necessary a test of excellence in an artist as that of the few.” Verse, however exquisite, is almost valueless if its appeal is merely technical and merely academic, if it pleases only the sophisticated palate of the dilettant, if it fails to touch the heart of the plain people. That which vauntingly styles itself the *écriture artiste* must reap its reward promptly in praise from the *précieuses ridicules* of the hour. It may please those who pretend to culture without possessing even education; but this aristocratic affectation has no roots and it is doomed to wither swiftly, as one fad is ever fading away before another, as asianism and euphuism have withered in the past.

Fictitious reputations may be inflated for a little space; but all the while the public is slowly making up its mind; and the judgment of the main body is as trustworthy as it is enduring. *Robinson Crusoe* and *Pilgrim's Progress* hold their own, generation after generation, although the cultivated class did not discover their merits until long after the plain people had taken them to heart. Cervantes and Shakespeare were widely popular from the start; and appreciative criticism limped lamely after the approval of the mob. The *Jungle-Book* and *Huckleberry Finn* will be found in the hands of countless readers when many a book now bepraised by newspaper reviewers has

slipped out of sight forever. Whatever blunders in belauding the plain people may make now and again, in time they come unfailingly to a hearty appreciation of work that is honest, genuine, and broad in its appeal; and when once they have laid hold of the real thing they hold fast with abiding loyalty.

IV

As significant as the spread of democracy in the nineteenth century is the success with which the abstract idea of nationality has expressed itself in concrete form. Within less than twoscore years Italy has ceased to be only a geographical expression; and Germany has given itself boundaries more sharply defined than those claimed for the fatherland by the martial lyric of a century ago. Hungary has asserted itself against the Austrians, and Norway against the Swedes; and each by the stiffening of racial pride has insisted on the recognition of its national integrity. This is but the accomplishment of an ideal toward which the western world has been tending since it emerged from the Dark Ages into the Renaissance and since it began to suspect that the Holy Roman Empire was only the empty shadow of a disestablished realm. In the long centuries the heptarchy in England had been followed by a monarchy with London for its capital; and in like manner the seven kingdoms of Spain had been united under sovereigns who dwelt in Madrid. Normandy and Gascony, Burgundy and Provence had been incorporated slowly with the France of which the chief city was Paris.

Latin had been the tongue of every man who was entitled to claim benefit of clergy; but slowly the modern languages compacted themselves out of the warring dialects, when race after race came to a consciousness of its unity and when the speech of a capital was set up at last as the standard to which all were expected to conform. In Latin Dante discussed the vulgar tongue, though he wrote the *Divine Comedy* in his provincial Tuscan; yet Petrarch, who came after, was afraid that his poems in Italian were, by that fact, fated to be transitory. Chaucer made choice of the dialect of London, performing for it the service Dante had rendered to the speech of the Florentines; yet Bacon and Newton went back to Latin as the language still common to men of science. Milton practiced his pen in Latin verse, but never hesitated to compose his epic in English. Latin served Descartes and Spinoza, men of science again; and it was not until the nineteenth century that the invading vernaculars finally ousted the language of the learned which had once been in universal use. And even now Latin is retained by the church which still styles itself Catholic.

It was as fortunate as it was necessary that the single language of the learned should give way before the vulgar tongues, the speech of

the people, each in its own region best fitted to phrase the feelings and the aspirations of races dissimilar in their characteristics and in their ideals. No one tongue could voice the opposite desires of the northern peoples and of the southern; and we see the several modern languages revealing by their structure as well as by their vocabularies the essential qualities of the races that fashioned them, each for its own use. Indeed, these racial characteristics are so distinct and so evident to us now that we fancy we can detect them even though they are disguised in the language of Rome; and we find significance in the fact that Seneca, the grandiloquent rhetorician, was by birth a Spaniard, and that Petronius, the robust realist, was probably born in what is now France.

The segregation of nationality has been accompanied by an increasing interest in the several states out of which the nation has made itself, and sometimes even by an effort to raise the dialects of these provinces up to the literary standard of the national language. In this there is no disloyalty to the national ideal, — rather is it to be taken as a tribute to the nation, since it seeks to call attention again to the several strands twined in the single bond. In literature this tendency is reflected in a wider liking for local color and in an intense relish for the flavor of the soil. We find Verga painting the violent passions of the Sicilians, and Reuter depicting the calmer joys of the Platt-Deutsch. We see Maupassant etching the canny and cautious Normans, while Daudet brushed in broadly the expansive exuberance of the Provençals. We delight alike in the Wessex-folk of Mr. Hardy and in the humorous Scots of Mr. Barrie. We extend an equal welcome to the patient figures of New England spinsterhood as drawn by Miss Jewett and Miss Wilkins, and to the virile Westerners set boldly on their feet by Mr. Wister and Mr. Garland.

What we wish to have explored for us are not only the nooks and corners of our own nation; those of other races appeal also to our sympathetic curiosity. These inquiries help us to understand the larger peoples, of whom the smaller communities are constituent elements. They serve to sharpen our insight into the differences which divide one race from another; and the contrast of Daudet and Maupassant on the one hand with Mark Twain and Kipling on the other brings out the width of the gap that yawns between the Latins (with their solidarity of the family and their reliance on the social instinct) and the Teutons (with their energetic independence and their aggressive individuality). With increase of knowledge there is less likelihood of mutual misunderstandings; and here literature performs a most useful service to the cause of civilization. As Tennyson once said, "It is the authors, more than the diplomats, who make nations love one another." Fortunately no high tariff can keep out the masterpieces of foreign literature which freely cross the frontier,

bearing messages of good will and broadening our understanding of our fellow men.

V

The deeper interest in the expression of national qualities and in the representation of provincial peculiarities is to-day accompanied by an increasing cosmopolitanism which seems to be casting down the barriers of race and of language. More than fourscore years ago Goethe said that even then national literature was "rather an unmeaning term" as "the epoch of world-literature was at hand." With all his wisdom Goethe failed to perceive that cosmopolitanism is a sorry thing when it is not the final expression of patriotism. An artist without a country and with no roots in the soil of his nativity is not likely to bring forth flower and fruit. As an American critic aptly put it, "a true cosmopolitan is at home — even in his own country." A Russian novelist has set forth the same thought; and it is the wisest character in Turgenev's *Dimitri Roudine*, who asserted that the great misfortune of the hero was his ignorance of his native land. "Russia can get along without any of us, but we cannot do without Russia. Woe betide him who does not understand her! and still more him who really forgets the manners and the ideas of his fatherland. Cosmopolitanism is an absurdity and a zero, — less than a zero; outside of nationality, there is no art, no truth, no life possible."

Perhaps it may be feasible to attempt a reconciliation of Turgenev and Goethe, by pointing out that the cosmopolitanism of this growing century is revealed mainly in a similarity of the external forms of literature, while it is the national spirit which supplies the internal inspiration that gives life. For example, it is a fact that the *Demi-Monde* of Dumas, the *Pillars of Society* of Ibsen, the *Magda* of Sudermann, the *Grand Galeoto* of Etchegaray, *The Second Mrs. Tanqueray* of Pinero, the *Gioconda* of d'Annunzio are all of them cast in the same dramatic mould; but it is also a fact that the metal of which each is made was smelted in the native land of its author. Similar as they are in structure, in their artistic formula, they are radically dissimilar in their essence, in the motives that move the characters, and in their outlook on life; and this dissimilarity is due not alone to the individuality of the several authors, — it is to be credited chiefly to the nationality of each.

Of course, international borrowings have always been profitable to the arts, — not merely the taking over of raw material, but the more stimulating absorption of methods and processes, and even of artistic ideals. The Sicilian Gorgias had for a pupil the Athenian Isocrates; and the style of the Greek was imitated by the Roman Cicero, thus helping to sustain the standard of oratory in every modern language. The *Matron of Ephesus* of Petronius was the great-

grandmother of the *Yvette* of Maupassant; and the dialogues of Herondas and of Theocritus serve as models for many a vignette of modern life. The *Golden Ass* went before *Gil Blas* and made a path for him, and *Gil Blas* pointed the way for *Huckleberry Finn*. It is easy to detect the influence of Richardson on Rousseau, of Rousseau on George Sand, of George Sand on Turgenev, of Turgenev on Mr. Henry James, of Mr. James on M. Paul Bourget, of M. Bourget on Signor d'Annunzio; and yet there is no denying that Richardson is radically British, that Turgenev is thoroughly Russian, and that d'Annunzio is unquestionably Italian.

In like manner we may recognize the striking similarity — but only in so far as the external form is concerned — discoverable in those short stories which are as abundant as they are important in every modern literature; and yet much of our delight in these brief studies from life is due to the pungency of their local flavor, whether they were written by Kjelland or by Sacher-Masoch, by Auerbach or by Daudet, by Barrie or by Bret Harte. "All can grow the flower now, for all have got the seed"; but the blossoms are rich with the strength of the soil in which each of them is rooted.

This racial individuality is our immediate hope; it is our safeguard against mere craftsmanship, against dilettant dexterity, against cleverness for its own sake, against the danger that our cosmopolitanism may degenerate into Alexandrianism and that our century may come to be like the age of the Antonines, when "a cloud of critics, of compilers, of commentators darkened the face of learning," so Gibbon tells us, and "the decline of genius was soon followed by the corruption of taste." It is the spirit of nationality which will supply needful idealism; it will allow a man of letters to frequent the past without becoming archaic and to travel abroad without becoming exotic, because it will supply him always with a good reason for remaining a citizen of his own country.

VI

Whether it is due to this correction of cosmopolitanism by national ideals, whether it is rather to be credited to the spread of democracy or to the increasing use of the scientific method, — the fact is indisputable that since the slow disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire was followed by the steady compacting of the modern nations with their several tongues (finally forcing the abandonment of Latin as the universal language of the learned), there has been no epoch until the present when all men of education and of culture have been able to consider themselves as citizens of the world. Perhaps it is not fanciful to see in this Congress of the Arts and Sciences satisfactory evidence of the solidarity of the artists and of the scientists of every race. A Congress like this has been possible only within the past score

or two of years. That it has gathered now is a good augury for the future; and that it has gathered here is a lasting benefit for us who are native to this region.

The tale is told that after the statues from the studio of Thorwaldsen had been unpacked in Copenhagen in the courtyard of the museum, there sprang up the next spring certain flowers of the Roman Campagna, never before seen in Denmark, and a few of them were acclimated and have flourished ever since in their new home in the north. Is it too much to hope that a like good fortune may befall some of the seeds of thought which have been brought here from afar?

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DEPARTMENT VII—HISTORY OF ART

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(Hall 8, September 20, 11.15 a. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HALSEY C. IVES, Washington University, St. Louis.
SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR RUFUS B. RICHARDSON, New York, N. Y.
PROFESSOR JOHN C. VAN DYKE, Rutgers College.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS AND METHODS IN THE STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF ART

BY RUFUS BYAM RICHARDSON

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THIS is the subject on which I was invited to speak. It is a large subject, almost immense. When it was announced to me it reminded me of the theological student who came to his first pastorate full of enthusiasm, and began to hit out straight from the shoulder at specific evils. After his first sermon on the sin of intemperance the deacons of the church waited upon him and told him that would never do, because one of the richest men in the church was likely to take the sermon as a personal attack. The next Sunday he hit out in another direction, coming down hard on dishonesty in business. This time *one* of the deacons came and told him that the other one had regarded the sermon as a direct attack on him. Again he was advised to be more cautious. The young man, however, having a bent for the specific, found himself getting deeper and deeper into trouble, and at last, to save himself, fell back on the noble but vast subject of "the exceeding sinfulness of sin." After that he was held by all the congregation to be a powerful preacher, and a safe man. He had a large subject, and could hammer away on it for a lifetime without hurting anybody's feelings.

"Fundamental Conceptions and Methods in the Study of the History of Art" is also a large subject. I was thankful that with the invitation came the suggestion, "Of course, there is no objection that you emphasize classical art." Better a "pent-up Utica" where one can at least get his back to a wall than "a whole unbounded con-

tinent." The field of classical art is, to be sure, no pent-up Utica; but one has in it at least the comfortable feeling of seeing boundaries. It is also easier to formulate conceptions and methods as to the *study* of the *history* of classical art than as to classical art itself. We have something tangible, an historical study.

A recent writer of a stimulating book entitled *The Spirit and Principles of Greek Sculpture* has filed a mild protest against the historical treatment of Greek sculpture. "All their books," he says, "follow the historic development. They are histories of ancient artists." And yet we find the author himself following in general the same historical development of Greek sculpture as his predecessors, the "scientific archæologists;" as he somewhat disparagingly calls them. The natural excuse of these scientific archæologists is that no art was ever so clearly a natural development with a birth, a growth to maturity, and a decline, as Greek sculpture. If we try to give an orderly description of it we naturally make it a history. It is true that about three quarters of Winckelmann's great *History of Ancient Art* is not in the form of history, but is rather a tender, loving rhapsody, ever held in check, over the objects taken singly and in the order of his liking, an order with which one need find no fault; and then follows about one quarter called *The History of Ancient Art in Relation to External Circumstances among the Greeks*, which deals with the subject chronologically. Brunn, on the other hand, wrote a *History of Greek Sculptors* apart from any description and estimate of their works. But in later times, in Germany, France, England, and America, it has become the custom to clothe the skeleton with flesh and blood, and treat the works along with the workmen. One will hardly abandon the form of Collignon's *History of Greek Sculpture* to go back to Winckelmann's arrangement.

It is an interesting, one might say a fascinating, study to trace the development of Greek sculpture from the almost formless Nikandra statue to the Lemnian Athena and on to the Niké of Samothrace, from the stiff "Apollon" to the Hermes of Praxiteles and the works of Lysippos represented to us by the *apoxyomenos*, apportioning as we go, to each great sculptor, as far as we can, his share in the development which came not of itself, but was brought about by men whom we begin to know and honor as elemental forces.

I foresee that the subject will be large enough if I limit it once for all to Greek sculpture, and take as a subject the study of the history of Greek sculpture as the most prominent branch of the history of Greek art. The world has suffered no greater loss in art than the wiping out of Greek painting. One might infer from Pliny that it was almost, if not quite, as important and interesting as Greek sculpture.¹ From his description it is clear that the great painters, Zeuxis,

¹ The Laocoon group and the Pergamon altar frieze did not perhaps fall a whit

Parrhasios, Protogenes, and Apelles gave a freer rein to expression than ever Myron did in sculpture. What the Greek painters could do in the way of expression can be only inadequately brought home to us by late frescoes like those of Pompeii and by the delicate work on red-figured vases. The best of these vase-paintings, however, would probably compare with the paintings in the Stoa Poikile as pastels to the Sistine Madonna. Sculpture is, and probably will always remain, the art which ancient Greece has given us.¹

Before speaking of methods in the study of the history of Greek sculpture we should speak of the conceptions which underlie that art, and differentiate it from modern art, and exercise an influence on our methods of studying it. During the whole period of the greatness of Greece sculpture was *religious*, inasmuch as most of the statues were representatives of divinities or heroes, offerings devoted to them, and adornments of their shrines. It was also *popular*, in the sense that a whole people appreciated and enjoyed it, as they enjoyed the national poetry. This was perhaps more true of Athens than of other parts of the Greek world, but the statement will stand for all Greece.

Modern sculpture as well as painting is neither religious nor popular; and does not seem likely to become so. It has ceased to be religious in large measure from the slackening of religious fervor. It is not in the heart of painters of to-day to produce Madonnas like those of Bellini, and the people do not clamor for them. Sculpture is still further from being religious. In this practical and bustling age the artist who tried anything as august as the Olympian Zeus would find himself behind the times, and out of touch with the public. Nor are the old conditions likely to return.

The artists have become a guild, and are not in and of the people. Their clientèle is limited to a few, mostly wealthy persons, and some others who patronize art often as a mere fad. No one feels this more than the artists themselves, who often have to resort to something striking in order to keep themselves alive. For us who are simply lookers-on, there is something refreshing in the frankness of those who make no pretense of appreciating art, and are as outspoken as the "bourgeois gentilhomme," whose love of music was satisfied with the "trompette marine." In one of the most interesting rooms of the Berlin Museum I heard a man by no means of the lower classes say in a stentorian voice, "Diese Sachen interessiren mich gar nicht." The days seem forever past when a whole city would rise up in arms as

short of painting in this matter of expression. Pliny indeed (36, 37) lets his enthusiasm run away with him, and says that the Laocoon "is worth all the pictures and bronzes in the world."

¹ But what has happened in the case of painting would have happened in sculpture also had not rich Romans of taste demanded copies of masterpieces to adorn their houses and villas.

one man to protest against the removal from it of a beautiful statue. Artists and art-lovers, while they may well despair of bringing back those golden days, may perhaps say with Touchstone, "We that have good wits have much to answer for."

It may seem like beginning history with Adam to go back here to Winckelmann; but back to him we must go if we wish to get a view of the beginnings of the study of the history of Greek sculpture. He is the founder of that study and an example to us all. How far he outran his generation is seen by the fact that his enlightened patron, Count von Bunau, said, "Winckelmann is a fool, and will come to a terrible end." Others were willing to concede that he was an *inspired* fool. Rome was to him Mecca and Jerusalem combined. So absorbed was he in its treasures of art that the question of becoming a Catholic instead of a Protestant seemed to him much like a question between tweedledum and tweedledee. His coming to Rome was an event in the history of the study of art almost as important as the arrival of Greek scholars in Europe which brought on the renaissance.

When he had once become papal antiquary and had charge of the museums of Rome his one thought was the mastery of all the *material*. His contempt of Belesenheit and of "those who excogitate huge books and sicken the understanding"; his saying that "no scribe can penetrate the inmost essence of art," show how proud he was, intrenched in his museums. He could hardly disguise his contempt for a certain "superficial English writer" who formulated theories on the sight of a few statues, and said of him, "such an inference was to be expected only from those who had seen Rome in dreams or like young travelers in one day." He exacted as much from himself as he did from others. Nothing less than an acquaintance with the whole field satisfied him. His principle was comparable to that which Ritschl formulated for the study of the classics, "Lesen, viel Lesen, Möglichst viel Lesen." In his judgment only he who had seen a thousand statues was capable of understanding *one*.

The wonder is that dealing as he did with copies, he still felt the spirit and power of Greek sculpture as perhaps no man since has felt it. No one can ever improve on his defining the essence of Greek art as "noble simplicity and quiet grandeur" (Edle Einfalt und stille Grösse). Bosanquet, an English writer, offers as a substitute "harmony, regularity, and repose." But this leaves out the prime qualities of "simplicity, greatness, and nobility."

Winckelmann was not so visionary and rhapsodical as to fail to give some practical directions for the study of art, as follows:

(1) "Seek not to detect deficiencies and imperfections in works of art until you have previously learned to recognize and discover beauties."

(2) "Be not governed in your opinion by the judgment of the guild, which generally prefers what is difficult to what is beautiful."

(3) "The observer should discriminate as the ancient artists apparently did between what is essential and what is only accessory (in the drawing)."

He could be, we see, as practical as when he was teaching troublesome boys in Saxony; and yet the fervor of his great work shook Germany, stirred Lessing and Goethe, and made the author recognized as a power wherever there were lovers of art.

Of course, no one could make so many utterances as he did without making some mistakes, "Es irrt der Mensch so long er Strebt." Even with the first publication of his great *History of Ancient Art* came many corrections by the editors and others. But he stands colossal above editors and annotators.

One hundred and thirty-six years have passed since the tragic death of Winckelmann, and we know immensely more of the history of Greek sculpture than it was permitted him to know. A presentation of some of the principal additions to our knowledge will also illustrate some of the fundamental methods of the study of the history of Greek sculpture. We have gone on to larger acquaintance with the field, and have gathered in the fruits ripened by reflection and comparison. It might not be difficult to find twenty such lines of advance. But I will confine myself to three:

(1) *Modern Excavations.*

(2) *The Study and Groupings of Copies of Ancient Statues.*

(3) *The Examination of the Literary Sources of our Knowledge.*

(1) Modern excavations have modified, if not wholly revolutionized, the old notions of Greek sculpture, and rapidly made our handbooks of sculpture antiquated. The excavation of Olympia, the first suggestion of which came from Winckelmann, a suggestion that ripened in the mind of Ernst Curtius, did not, it is true, yield so many fine statues as might have been expected from the statement of Pliny that seventy-three thousand statues remained at Olympia in A. D. 67, after the Romans had been systematically transporting statues from Greece for nearly a century and a quarter. But even apart from the other important discoveries at Olympia the yield in sculpture alone put the stamp of success on the enterprise. For the Hermes of Praxiteles alone, the only Greek statue on which we can put our hand and say "this is an original from the hand of one of the great masters,"¹ probably some rich man could be found who would gladly pay the whole cost of the excavation of Olympia. Having now a sure Praxite-

¹ Pliny (34, 87) speaks of a Hermes of Kephisotodos holding a child. On the strength of this Miss Sellars, in *Pliny's Chapters on the History of Greek Art* (addenda, p. 236), has suggested that Pliny must be preferred to Pausanias, and that we must understand the famous Hermes to be the work of Kephisotodos, father or elder brother of Praxiteles.

lean statue, the obvious method is to judge all material hitherto supposed to be Praxitelean by this standard. By this test, for example, the so-called Eubouleus head is accepted or rejected as a claimant for membership in the Praxitelean group. The sculptures of the great temple of Zeus have taken a very important place in the history of art. The statement of Pausanias that Paionios and Alkamenes made the gable sculptures has generally been rejected on account of their style, which seems to point to a date earlier than that of these two sculptors. It is quite possible that there will never be agreement as to the school that produced these temple adornments; but one thing seems fairly well settled, *viz.*, that both gables and the metopes bear the stamp of a single style. Since the metopes were surely made at the time of the building of the temple, the gables also must have been made at about the same time; and their style fits well enough to the reported date of their execution, about 460 B. C., long before Phidias had appeared to make his Olympian Zeus.

The excavation of Delphi has at present raised more questions than it has settled. Of the miscellaneous cargo of statues found in the sea at Antikythera the same may be said.

But the excavations on the Athenian Acropolis have thrown a wonderful light on the history of sculpture. They made Mrs. Mitchell's carefully prepared *History of Greek Sculpture* antiquated almost as soon as it was printed. Luckily in their case we had a *terminus ante quem* to fix the date of the objects. The debris left by the Persians came forth, and lo! it silenced all doubts as to the painting of statues. Not only did the old statues of soft limestone here show a coating of most brilliant colors, red and blue, thickly laid on, but the somewhat later archaic *marble* statues showed garments with painted borders, hair, diadems, and eyes painted with discretion if not with taste. That the nude parts also had a toning of less strong color could hardly be doubted. Where color was lacking it might in some cases be seen that it was simply because it had worn away. The garment of the Moschophoros could be properly understood only by the supposition that it was painted. The notion of chaste, white marble as the material of Greek sculpture vanished at a touch of truth. The question became, not whether the Greeks painted their statues, but *how* they painted them. One simply surrendered to the evidence, which was compelling. That this practice did not cease with the archaic period, but was continued as long as Greece practiced the art is absolutely certain. That this was true of Praxiteles might have been well enough known from the statement of Pliny, so much neglected, that Praxiteles valued most his statues that had been touched up by the painter Nikias.¹

Now applying the proper method of study, one sees traces of

¹ Pliny, 35, 133.

paint everywhere, even where it was least expected. One finds them especially on the backgrounds of reliefs. On metopes of temples it is best recognized by the fact that strong colors, especially blue, were there used, although red was not uncommon.¹ Even on a statue clearly of Roman times, found at Corinth in the recent excavations, the folds of the outer garment carried large patches of vermillion color.

How little Winckelmann knew of the marked difference between local schools! What would he have said if he had seen the Ægina statues with their lean stiff style and the full forms of the gable groups of both the Old and the Oldest Athena temple on the Athenian Acropolis? It is wonderful that two schools some ten or twelve miles apart should have been producing at the same time sculpture of such distinctively opposite character.

(2) *The study and grouping of copies.* How little did Ulrichs know of Skopas when over forty years ago he wrote his book *Skopas, sein Leben und seine Werke!* One smiles now at the list of works there ascribed to Skopas. But twenty-five years ago two male heads were found on the site of ancient Tegea which evidently belonged to a gable. They were left unwrought on one side, and the top of each was cut off a little to fit the slope of an ascending cornice. Since the head of a boar was found near by, the conclusion was at once drawn that the pieces, one or all, came from the east gable of the temple of Athena Alea which Pausanias described as containing the Hunting of the Caledonian Boar. Skopas was the architect of the temple, and since he was a sculptor it was natural to suppose that these sculptures were as much influenced by him as the sculptures of the Parthenon were influenced by Phidias. Luckily they had a very marked character. The heads were distinctively different from the Praxitelean type. Their greatest dimension was from front to rear, while the Praxitelean head is extended upward in a dome. The under jaw and cheek were strongly marked, giving an impression of intense energy. The peculiar feature, however, was the eyes, which being deepset in their sockets, with the inner corner depressed, had a pad of flesh drawn down over their outer corner so that the upper lid entirely disappears in a profile view. The gaze directed upward and onward expressed an intensity of emotion contrasted with the dreamy look of the Hermes of Praxiteles. For the first time we seemed to catch the characteristics of Skopas.

In spite, however, of the admirable discussion of these sculptures by Treu,² the connection with Skopas was not regarded as absolutely fixed. But eight years later, Botho Gräf³ was struck by the similarity

¹ On the Zeus Temple at Olympia the metopes, it is said, were alternately red and blue.

² *Ath. Mitt.*, 1881, p. 393 ff.

³ *Röm. Mitt.*, 1889, p. 189 ff.

of two heads of a youthful Herakles crowned with poplar wreaths, in Roman museums, to the heads from Tegea. He then enlarged his list materially with copies poorer or more remote from the presumed original. It was evident that some famous original had led to this multiplication of copies. Pausanias records that a youthful Herakles made by Skopas was set up in the gymnasium at Sikyon. Coins of Sikyon of a rather late date show a beardless Herakles with the tænia of a wreath, a fact that makes it certain that the statue was highly esteemed at Sikyon. That, then, was probably the famous original which evoked so many copies. This series combined with the Tegea heads made a base both broad and firm, and other statues were invited to come and stand on it, and form a Skopasian group. A Meleager in Rome and a female head from the south slope of the Athenian Acropolis, supposed by some to be an original, were invited by acclamation. The test was then applied to the sculptures of the Mausoleum of Helicarnassus with the result that while many heads there appeared to bear the Skopasian features they were not confined to the east side, as we ought to expect if we trust Pliny's already incredible report that each one of four sculptors executed the sculpture on each of the four sides, Skopas, as the elder, receiving the front.¹ And if any single frieze does not seem to be more Skopasian in character than some of the others the safest inference to be drawn is that Skopas as the master mind left the Skopasian stamp upon the work as a whole.

Pliny also records that Skopas sculptured one of the drums of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus; and the British Museum possesses such a drum from that temple, which represents probably Alcestis between Thanatos and Hermes, who has the Skopasian eye. By the method thus established several other candidates were severely scrutinized and some admitted and some rejected. The Ludovisi Ares receives a majority of the suffrages. But it fares hard with some of the old claimants. The Niobe group is rejected. Furtwängler has invited in the Aphrodite of Melos (Venus of Milo) as a descendant, through the Aphrodite of Capua, of the famous but lost Aphrodite of Knidos. She ought to be received with shouts and almost with tears of joy if her title can be made clear.

The resurrection of Skopas's Herakles was a single application of a method which in the hands of a master has produced great results. Eleven years ago appeared an epoch-making book, *Meisterwerke der Griechischen Skulptur*, by Adolf Furtwängler.² The book is full

¹ It seems more reasonable, inasmuch as there were several friezes going around all four sides of the building, that a given sculptor should execute a given frieze rather than parts of several friezes.

² Translated in the following year into English by Miss E. Sellars. Eighteen plates and nearly two hundred figures in the English edition represent by no means all the statues that are cited.

of illustrations, that the reader may not grope in darkness when comparisons are made. The first impression made upon many people by the book was that Furtwängler had inaugurated a boom in second-class sculpture, and brought to honor many trifles. But let any one pay careful attention to the method by which the first section of the book brings before us the Lemnian Athena, a perfect flower of Phidias's work, and he will realize that it is a method with no *madness* in it.

Whether every one of the heads which the author puts into a certain group is there to stay remains, of course, yet to be seen. Let it be conceded that half the groupings are open to contention, the method is still the method of the future. The only danger is that tyros will try their hand at constructing groups and proclaim or assume their success. But this is a field where the tyro ought to realize that he must proceed with caution or he will find that he has let loose the Geister and to lay them he must call in the "alte Meister."

To continue a work such as Furtwängler has inaugurated is not Jedermann's Ding, but there lies the path of progress even if it is the path of danger. Every few years somebody tries to construct a Pythagoras group, generally out of some outlying part of Myron's preserves. Much as we may desire to construct such a group we do not appear to have the materials for it yet. For whipping back into the Myronian corral certain waifs that sometimes threaten to make a group by themselves, we get a sort of sanction from Furtwängler, who allows that a great sculptor cannot always be credited with only one shape of head. In speaking of the Discobolos, Ince Blundell, and Riccardi heads, he says, "the strikingly different individuality of these three heads need not perplex us, for from what artist should we expect such variety as from Myron who *multiplicasse veritatem videtur*." He also gives the reminder that "copyists allow themselves great freedom in the execution of details, especially in the case of the hair." In fact, to the casual observer there is in some of the bearded heads which Furtwängler calls Myronian very little superficial resemblance to the head of the youthful Discobolos.

(3) *The study of ancient authorities.* It may be profitable to confine ourselves to two cases, Pausanias and Pliny. Pausanias, the traveler, has long been suspected, and sometimes unjustly suspected, of making great mistakes in his descriptions of ancient sculpture. It has long been customary to regard the two corner figures in the west gable of the Parthenon as representing the Kephisos and the Ilissos, and writers on sculpture have recognized and admired forsooth the "liquid flow" in the form of the Ilissos. The great master, Brunn, went on to the natural conclusion that the other figures of the gable must be interpreted in like fashion; and he accordingly made this gable into a sort of animated map of Attica.

The starting-point of this manner of interpreting such corner figures seems to be that when Pausanias was at Olympia some local guide told him that the two reclining figures of the east gable of the Zeus temple represented the river Alphaios and the brook Kladeos. It is more than likely that Pausanias, who belonged to an age when this sort of personification was current, more than half extorted this statement from his guides, who may well have told him what he wanted to have them tell. At any rate Furtwängler is authority for the statement that "in the artistic products of the fifth century there are no instances of any figures serving merely as indications of locality."

It is pretty generally believed that Pausanias's statement that Paionios and Alkamenes were the sculptors of the gables of the Zeus temple at Olympia was based on information of about the same character. It was quite likely unknown to the ciceroni of that time in Olympia, more than six hundred years after the erection of the temple, who did execute these gable figures. The ciceroni might fall upon almost any known sculptor rather than say that they did not know. The name of Paionios was right at hand, cut on the pedestal of his Niké, famous and admired, adjacent to the east front of the temple.

The other so-called authority is Pliny the Elder, who wrote more than a century before Pausanias. We know from his nephew something as to how he wrote. He allowed himself little sleep. He had readers read to him all the time that was left to him after his onerous official duties were attended to, even when he was being rubbed after the bath, through his dinner, and far on into the night. He never read a book without making copious extracts. "My thirty-six volumes," he says, "contain twenty thousand matters worthy of attention, gathered from some two thousand books." Well, we have his wonderful book, called *Natural History*, which corresponds pretty closely to what one would expect as result of such omnivorous reading. Books 34, 35, and 36 are concerned with the history of art; and this is all that interests us here. Inasmuch as it was known in advance that these were a patchwork from older writers, some of whom are casually mentioned, here was a grand chance for *Quellen-Studien* offered as a challenge. Perhaps never was such study more successful. It has been continued down to the present time with unabated interest, in many lands and by many hands. One rises from a reading of these studies with admiration for the acumen which has arrived at a fair understanding of what Pliny himself did, and at what some of the main contributors furnished. If we could ever find a copy of Pliny with quotation marks and footnotes we could go somewhat, but not very much, beyond what we now know as to the sources of the art-historical part of Pliny's compilation.

It has been made clear that very little except a few outbursts of enthusiasm are the thoughts of Pliny himself. The greater part was soon traced to Varro, who, though he had been swallowed by Pliny, was already fat with what he had swallowed from others. The interest really began when it was made out that Varro's work was largely taken from Xenocrates of Sikyon, who lived in the first part of the third century B. C.

To Xenocrates may be ascribed the praise of his townsman Lysippos as the head of an ascending scale, who, guided by another Sikyonian, Eupompos the painter, took nature as his teacher. Phidias, Polykleitos, Myron, and Pythagoras¹ had made each his own advances in art, but Lysippos gained the summit. To Xenocrates also is usually ascribed the ascending scale of painters, ending in Apelles.

Antigonos of Karystos, a contemporary of Xenocrates, also prepared a history of art, adding to his work many of the things which pleased him from Xenocrates' works. Features that are supposed to be characteristic of him are passages with epigrammatical and art-historical points. He probably set the proud Zeuxis and Parrhasios over against the mild Apelles and Protogenes; the poor Protogenes against the rich Apelles; Polygnotos taking no pay for his painting in the Stoa Poikile while Mikon took it. He is also supposed to be the contributor of the criticism of the story that Hipponax's satire drove the sculptors Bupalos and Athenis to suicide, adducing inscriptions later than the time of the alleged suicide which showed that they were still producing works which were the pride of Chios.

Duris of Samos, who lived in the fourth century B. C., was the most prominent citizen of Samos in his time, being the tyrant and at the same time the historian of the island. He was a literary personality. Xenocrates and Antigonos of Carystos drew so strongly on him that if we had the books of all three we should probably see that these two later writers indulged in one of the most gigantic literary thefts that was ever practiced. In Pliny 34, 61, we read that Duris declared that Lysippos was nobody's pupil. Much of the anecdotal element of Pliny may probably be traced to him. An example is the story of the money-box into which it was Lysippos's custom to drop a gold-piece every time that he made one of the fifteen hundred statues that are ascribed to him, and the astonishment of the heir when he came to break open the box. It was the contrast between the poor worker in bronze and the famous and rich sculptor that tickled Duris's fancy.

¹ It has been thought that Pythagoras, and perhaps Myron also, were chronologically misplaced in order to create this climax; but it appears from the recently discovered table of Olympic victors, discussed by Robert (Hermes, 1900), that in all probability no such violence need be assumed. Polykleitos was active in 460 B. C., Myron in 448, Pythagoras also in 448. The table also shows that Polykleitos and Myron could have been pupils of Ageladas as well as Phidias.

He delighted to represent the poor ship-painter Protogenes as living to decorate the Propylæa at Athens, and Erigonos, the slave who ground colors for his master, as becoming a great master himself. That such contrasts especially pleased Duris appears from Plutarch's citing him as recording that Eumenes of Kardia rose by the kindness of Philip from the son of a poor porter to wealth and power.

The whirl of fortune's wheel was a pleasing subject of reflection to him. "He hath put down the mighty from their seat and hath exalted them of low degree." The story of Apelles telling Alexander when he began to indulge in art-criticism that he had better stop because the servants who were grinding colors were laughing at him is supposed to be one of the best of Duris's anecdotes.

It may perhaps seem to one who has not looked into this matter that it is precarious to try to dissect Pliny in this way. But a legion of the best minds in Germany have devoted their best efforts to the understanding of the genesis of his work: and they are pretty well agreed except in some small details. We may take it for an established fact that hardly anything in his work was original with him. He was willing, however, as practically all ancient authors, to palm off other people's ideas as his own.

By the studies here briefly sketched, Pliny, instead of being despised, has grown in value because we understand him better. Both he and Pausanias are invaluable, partly because we have lost the literature from which they so freely drew, and partly because we have read their riddle.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HISTORY OF ART

BY JOHN C. VAN DYKE

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GENTLEMEN, — I have been asked by the officers of this Congress to speak to you to-day on the "Development of the History of Art" — not of art itself, nor of its history, but of the men who write the history and of the methods which they use in its construction. In other words, I am to speak of the science of the history of art. There has been strict injunction laid upon me that I talk not more than forty-five minutes, so you will pardon me if I plunge into the subject without preface or apology.

Some months ago, in conversation with one of our most distinguished critics, I chanced to remark that the art-books of to-day were so much better than those of twenty years ago. "Yes," he answered, "the books are better than the art." By which caustic extravagance he probably meant that the art was not so very bad nor the writing so very good, but merely that both had improved. Certainly there has been a great advance since the days when our fathers wrote expansive essays upon sculpture and painting, guessing at both their facts and their feelings, with a charming commingling of frankness and ignorance. The standard has been raised. Something more is now required of the writer than a miscellaneous "taste for art." He must have knowledge gained at first hand, knowledge not only of the work of art whereof he writes, but knowledge of materials, methods, mediums, schools, guilds, peoples, languages, countries, climates, skies — all things that may even remotely relate to the production of the artist or his art. He must have discernment, judgment, and above all sympathy, or that intuitive feeling which enables him to grasp the spirit and quality of a work without perhaps knowing just why or how. And finally he must have the ability to tell what he knows in a readable manner — in a language that may be understood by the common people.

Happily much of this equipment is now our possession. The writers

of the newer art-criticism are certainly far ahead of all predecessors in knowledge. As for their writing, it is so good that one wonders it is not better. By that I mean more convincing, more satisfying, more acceptable as the final word. "But there is no final word," you say. Pray, why not? "Because history has to be rewritten every ten years." And again I ask, Why? You may retort about "a new point of view," "more perspective," "a broader outlook," and all that; which is perhaps only another way of saying that we of the present do not see truly or estimate truly, or report truly. If we did, history would not have to be rewritten "every ten years." Either the system or the operator is at fault, and we shall not go far astray if we entertain suspicions of both. At any rate, let us look into the matter for a moment. I am not here to combat the higher criticism in art, nor am I here to accept it with an unthinking gulp as one would a dose of medicine. It has been of immense value and is not to be sneered at; but if it were quite perfect, quite acceptable, there would be no need of revised editions; and the art-historian of the next generation would lack an occupation. Instead of something tentative we should have a finality.

Now it is frequently said — and often with a little smile as though conscious of some absurdity — that the archæologist or historian is lost if he have not imagination. He must have a mind for the plausible and the possible, a mind to discern a mountain in a mole-hill, perceive Praxiteles in a Roman garden sculpture, or a forgotten masterpiece by Giorgione in a panel signed Cariani. And that as a general proposition is perhaps sound enough. It would be a strangely deficient intelligence that could not put signs and characteristics together and conclude that Cariani and Giorgione were of the same school and period. That Cariani painted certain alleged Giorgiones or Correggios is a much longer step, a much larger imagining, and one that may very easily lead us into error unless guarded at every point. Let me illustrate that.

When Mr. Charles Waldstein saw a water-worn marble head among a group of broken fragments in the Louvre he felt almost instantly, as he tells us, "that this was a work not Roman, but Greek, and moreover of the great period of Greek art." That, to begin with, is a perfectly proper exercise of the archæologist's imagination. He tells us further that "the conviction soon forced itself upon him that here was a piece of Attic workmanship of the period corresponding to the earlier works of Phidias and, though reserving the final verification for the time when it would be possible to make a detailed examination and comparison with the metopes, he was morally convinced that this was the head of a Lapith belonging to one of the metopes of the Parthenon." So far, so good; but had Mr. Waldstein stopped there and claimed a newly discovered fact in art-history by virtue of his

intuition or imagination he would not have been writing art-history, but arrant assumption. It was a mere conjecture and not a demonstration — not a fact proved. But in this instance at least, he did not stop there. He ran down the history of that head and found in it confirmation. He compared the kind of stone, the exact measurements, the treatment of frontal bone, flesh, and hair, the frown of the brow and the protrusion of the lip, the passion, spirit, and whole quality of the head with the Parthenon metopes. Finally he took a cast of the head to London, fitted it on the shoulders of one of the Lapiths in the British Museum, and had the satisfaction of seeing that it fitted exactly even to the lines of the fracture in the neck. That I should say was a proper exercise of the combining imagination — nay, more, a stroke of real genius. And that is art-history properly constructed, authoritative, and final in its conclusion. That chapter at least will not have to be rewritten in ten years or in this century.

But it is not such imagination as this that satisfies some of our more advanced thinkers. They mean by "imagination" only too often the ability to construct "a working hypothesis" — a scheme of cause and effect into which the facts can be somehow squeezed and made to do service even though the machinery creaks a bit in the working. Professor Furtwängler, for example, in his learned volume on the *Masterpieces of Greek Sculpture* has no hesitation whatever in pointing out to us the exact style of Phidias, something about which we had thought our information a trifle hazy. But Professor Furtwängler explains it by supposing a case. He has an hypothesis and the hypothesis is the thing. Whether it wrecks probability, or for that matter Phidias himself, is of small consequence. He tells us that there were countless copies of Greek marbles made *in* Rome and *for* Rome, and that the works of Phidias must certainly have been among the copied. Assumption number one. All that is necessary then to understand his style, method, and spirit is to read him in the Latin translation, study him in the Roman copies. Assumption number two, resting upon assumption number one. Some people might have difficulty in picking out these copies, but Professor Furtwängler, who knows about copies, variants, and replicas, has no trouble in laying his hand upon these various marbles in European galleries. Assumption number three, or rather a substitution of Professor Furtwängler's judgment for the fact. He begins with the Lemnian Venus and ends with the coins and vases, and there you have the style of Phidias, proved to an eye-lash. If you protest that this is a mere hypothesis, that if one link in the chain is faulty or lacking, the whole falls to the ground, and that no logical proof, not even hearsay evidence, is offered, you are somehow scouted as old fogey, and not in sympathy with the modern movement.

The evil of this theorizing is two-fold. First, the hypothesis is accepted as proven fact by the rank and file, and is written down finally as history. It is the kind of history, to be sure, that has to be rewritten every ten years — a kind that could not live ten minutes by virtue of its own strength; — but nevertheless it is accepted, and confuses for a time. Secondly, the learning and research put into such a theory is not placed to the best advantage, and does not count for as much as it should because used to uphold a questionable structure. That is such a pity, particularly in the case of Professor Furtwängler, whose knowledge cannot be gainsaid.

One feels some regret of this kind in reading the works of so cautious an archæologist as Professor George Perrot. His histories of ancient art are monumental, marvels of patient research and shrewd perception; and yet when he comes to Greece, his final goal, and opens with his volumes on Mykenæan art he shakes our faith in his judgment somewhat. For instance, he accepts the Schliemann conclusion about Troy. Schliemann, it will be remembered, dreamed as a boy of finding Troy and Agamemnon's Tomb, and when as a man he started out in search of them he naturally found them in the first mound he unearthed. Had he been seeking Aladdin's lamp he would have found it in the first junk-shop on the Mouski. Professor Perrot, strangely enough, accepts this hypothesis, and couples it with the theory of the sequential development of the Greek race. Of course this combined theory is not impossible, not improbable. Indeed, it is made quite plausible; and yet one may question whether it is the archæologist's or the historian's affair to theorize and argue to such an extent. Imagination may, in the end, remain imagination, and the argument may be true enough and yet point to a false conclusion. The facts are these. The mound which Schliemann discovered and called Troy was found to contain three strata, each one reflective of a different stage of civilization. Professor Perrot's conclusion is that the so-called Stone-Age man of the first stratum was the lineal ancestor of the Bronze-Age Trojan of the third stratum. And so the links in a chain are forged to show you how the Greek finally came to power and splendor, in life as in art.

But now let us see how it might have been; let us imagine something not a whit less improbable. Suppose this city of St. Louis destroyed by an earthquake, buried deep, forgotten. Two thousand years hence it is dug up by scientific historians. They find in the ruins three strata representing three stages of civilization. They first dig out the remains of a twenty-story "sky-scraper," then the remains of a log hut, and under all they find mounds and mound-builders' pottery. The conclusion according to Professor Perrot would be most obvious. The present people of St. Louis must have evolved from their ancestors, the Mound-Builders! It is all very

plausible. There is nothing wrong with the argument. But the conclusion is somewhat beside the truth. The imagination has imagined entirely too much.

It is not different with the reconstructors of the history of painting. The higher criticism is more rampant there perhaps than elsewhere. Painters long dead and forgotten are resurrected, galvanized into life, or reconstructed on scientific principles; and panels and altarpieces are tossed about from painter to painter like balls in a tennis-court. If an ichthyologist can reconstruct a fish from a single bone, what prevents an archaeologist from writing the biography of Rembrandt from his pictures. There are only two or three bones in Rembrandt's life, but when put together by the aid of the life-giving imagination they may produce something startling. We know nothing of importance about Rembrandt's youth, family, or bringing-up; but here is a picture by him out of which we may be able to distort some evidence. It was evidently painted when he was a young man. It shows the portrait of a woman past middle life. Rembrandt being a poor young man could not afford to hire sitters or models and therefore it is probable that he painted the members of his own family. This is doubtless his mother. She holds a book in her hand. It is no doubt the Bible, because other books were scarce in those days. From the fact that it is a Bible we may infer that Rembrandt's mother was a religious woman. *Ergo*: she must have brought Rembrandt up in the faith! And that, you see, accounts for Rembrandt painting so many religious pictures!

I do not think I am here exaggerating very much the line of argument followed in the most recent and the most important life of Rembrandt. It is a very interesting way of building up a life, or a house of cards, as you please. All you need to do is to keep on with your inferences and you will surely arrive. And the result is what? Why, the acceptance of the hypothesis as proven fact. On what other ground can one explain the Vienna Gallery Catalogue naming one of its portraits by Rembrandt, "Rembrandt's Mother," or, the Berlin Gallery Catalogue writing down "Hendrickje Stoffels" as the subject of another Rembrandt portrait. There is not a scrap of evidence that would be accepted in a police court for either title. We have no facts about the looks of either Rembrandt's mother or his mistress; but the imagination of the critic can supply the vacancy. And this is sometimes called scientific art-history, when it would hardly pass muster as historical romance!

And there is my friend, Mr. Berenson, who knows more, I believe, about Italian painting than any one living, confusing history with some of his conclusions while illuminating it with others. That imagination, without which no historian's equipment is complete, seems to be leading so many of them, like a will-o'-the-wisp, into

strange morasses. Perhaps Mr. Berenson is less blinded by it than others because he frankly says that: "Method interests me more than results, the functioning of the mind much more than the ephemeral object of functioning." He is more interested in whether his hypothesis will work out than in the facts which constitute history. He has "long cherished the conviction that the world's art can be, nay, should be, studied as independently of all documents as the world's fauna or the world's flora."

Now let me cite just one instance of the way this principle has worked in the hands of Mr. Berenson. He notes, as many of us have noted, that there are a number of fifteenth-century Florentine pictures, variously attributed in the European galleries to Botticelli, Filippo Lippi, and Filippino, which are obviously by one hand. He rightly assumes that these pictures may be by a painter now unknown and forgotten. He brings them together and shows their points of resemblance quite conclusively. It is really a fine clearing up of a dubious lot of pictures, done skillfully and with great knowledge. Had he rested there, with the statement that this painter was unknown, no one could have found the least fault with his mental functioning. But he goes a step further. He ventures, half in jest and half in earnest, to give this unknown painter a name, a manufactured name — Amico di Sandro — that is the friend or companion in art of Sandro Botticelli. He not only constructs and names this painter but he actually makes him influence Filippino in order to account for a something in Filippino's work not traceable to his reputed master Botticelli!

I submit that, however clever, audacious, or inspired this method of Mr. Berenson's may seem, it is not productive of art-history; and if you ask me what harm it does I answer that I have seen since that essay was written, more than once, the name of Amico di Sandro recorded in art-histories as a fact and not a figment. It will take many years before that man of straw is finally removed from the pathway, and meantime it is a stumbling-block to those who are seeking the truth of history. I cannot but feel that the creation of such an homunculus does not exemplify the science of the history of art at all. The method is not scientific in the true sense but wildly speculative; though I admit it is interesting and in its incidental information most instructive.

The worst or the best, if you please, of all these modern critics and historians is that they are not to be ignored. They are very learned, very keen seers, very appreciative students. And in the main they are on the right track. I myself was committed to the Morellian theory over twenty years ago, and I am still a student of it and a believer in it. It is an invaluable aid in establishing the authenticity of works of art; but it is not the whole truth, not the only truth, not

finality in itself. It needs support from without, and every scrap of evidence that corroborates should be brought to bear.

As for evidence itself and its weight I sometimes sigh for a good book on the "Value of Human Testimony," and a companion volume on "What is Logic?" They should be in the hands of every historian of art. It is necessary, of course, that the connoisseur should know what is a copy, what a variant, what an original; but it is also necessary that he should know what is common sense. It is not, for instance, common sense to cast out all documents about pictures or marbles simply because some of them have been misleading or erroneous. A Raphael contract or agreement to paint a Hercules and the Nemean Lion may be worthless because the agreement was never carried out; but a Raphael agreement for a "School of Athens" would be excellent evidence because the agreement *was* carried out. To be sure, a document may point to a certain altar-piece which was afterward stolen and a copy quietly put in its place, and in such a case criticism is justified in saying that the copy is a copy and not the original; but the agreement of Correggio to paint the "Holy Night" now in the Dresden Gallery is extant and is good corroborative proof of the Dresden picture having been painted by Correggio. True enough documents have been forged and so also have signatures — forged galore — but there are true documents as there are true signatures, and either or both may be trustworthy evidence. The question of probability comes in just here. There is nothing inherently improbable about the inscription on the St. Bavon altar-piece to the effect that Hubert van Eyck began it and Jan van Eyck finished it. If it were a lie, it would not have been tolerated there in the first place. It has always been accepted as a true statement until the recent exhibition of early Flemish art at Bruges gave the critics a chance to spin theories and formulate doubts. The St. Bavon altar-piece failed to fit the theories and, of course, the theories could not be in error. The altar-piece was wrong. Then followed slur and innuendo, the glance askance, and the "I could an I would," all because the critics wanted to reconstruct the lost personality of Hubert van Eyck by taking away from the established personality of Jan van Eyck. In fact the defects of the newer criticism have been exemplified in the most extravagant form in the recent attempts at rewriting the history of the early Flemings. The writers have put down a long series of unsupported guesses and asked their acceptance as facts, ignoring all papers, past histories and traditions as mere "petty documentation."

Without doubt a signature or inscription needs support by the internal evidence of the work itself, but where one confirms the other both should be accepted. And every one knows that written history, such as that of Lucian or Vasari, is not to be trusted implicitly. It

needs confirmation, but is not the less in itself a positive aid to conviction. It cannot be tossed aside as worthless, nor yet again used as a skeleton key to unlock any door. That Pliny records the making of a Venus by Skopas is no proof whatever that a Venus found in the ruins of Rome is a copy or a variant of the Skopas marble. At that rate you could make documents prove anything you pleased. If, on the contrary, Vasari says that Giorgione was a pupil of Bellini it is to be believed, even though Giorgione does not show traces of the Bellini shop in his work. Bastien-Lepage did not show Cabanel nor did Whistler in his late work show Gleyre, but each was a pupil of each as stated.

There is, to be sure, plenty of old woman's gossip retailed by the old chroniclers that may not be believed at all. The threadbare stories about Dædalus, the first sculptor of Greece, who carved the gods so true to life that they had to be bound with ropes to keep them from walking away, about Zeuxis deceiving the birds with painted grapes, and Parrhasios deceiving Zeuxis with a painted curtain, are merely pleasant nonsense. Quite useless as well as improbable are many tales of Vasari — that story, for instance, retold from Ghiberti, of Giotto the sheep-boy being discovered by Cimabue drawing sheep on a stone and the old painter standing aghast at the excellence of the drawing. The story is of small importance, whether fact or fiction; but we have a strong inducement to doubt it because we have Giotto's sheep preserved to us on the wall of the Arena Chapel in Padua. They are miserable little wooden sheep out of a toy Noah's-Ark and not even a Byzantine-trained painter like Cimabue could have been staggered by them. On the contrary, had the story read that Giotto was a donkey-boy, and was discovered by Cimabue drawing his donkey, it would be equally unimportant perhaps, but certainly more believable, for we have Giotto's donkey in the "Flight into Egypt" in that same Arena Chapel, and a very excellent donkey it is, too. It might easily enough have astonished Cimabue, for it is astonishing to artists of greater learning even to this day.

Tradition — tradition handed down from mouth to mouth — is not a thing to be lightly set aside. It is often the very basis of history. Traditional accounts of Goethe, Shakespeare, Reynolds, or Frans Hals, their methods of work, their conversation or personal appearance may all be acceptable. Just so with traditions about art works. If all the history of the Sistine Chapel were lost, the tradition that Michael Angelo painted the ceiling would still be believable — more believable perhaps than the tale of Benvenuto's escape from the neighboring castle of St. Angelo. The frescoes themselves would corroborate it. Again, the "Madonna of the Rocks" in the Louvre is said not to be by Leonardo da Vinci. But it came to the Louvre from the

collection of Francis I, in whose service Leonardo worked and died. In the king's lifetime it was considered a Leonardo; and it is not probable that Francis would be deceived about it. The tradition has come on down to the present time and is believable. Unfortunately, however, the "Madonna of the Rocks" is not in Leonardo's best manner: *ergo*, he did not do it at all. That, on the principle that the king can do no wrong, and that Homer never nods, whereas we know that all Homers do nod occasionally, and that the greatest painters sometimes do poor work.

However, the inferior work does militate against the tradition of this Madonna picture, just as Giotto's sheep discredit Ghiberti's story about Giotto. For it cannot be denied that the internal evidence of the work of art itself is the best evidence of all. There the newer criticism is well based and deserving of all praise. Yet because the analysis of a picture or a marble is the safest of all methods, it is perhaps the one that is the most often put in peril. It is so easy to determine, almost at a glance, the national and provincial characteristics of a work — so easy to locate an unknown marble or picture in its century, school, town, and almost workshop — that the attribution to a certain artist is often jumped at with equal ease and haste. But the difficulty is enormously increased as the hunt draws to a close. When the style, spirit, *technique*, type, mannerisms, and characteristics of, say, an altar-piece are so marked that you locate it in the workshop of Bellini or Perugino or Costa, your search has but begun. You are now brought to consider the possibilities of pupils, imitators, copyists, even forgers. And the last are not so despicable. There was a clever rascal recently at work in Siena, who has deceived the very elect with his forgeries of old Sienese pictures; and we all know how forgeries of Corot and Dupré have led astray the Paris experts for many years. But forgeries aside, there are the genuine pictures of pupils and imitators that show the master's mannerisms and characteristics to the very life. No one is too cunning to be deceived by them. Botticini is sometimes read into Botticelli, and I have no doubt that sometimes Botticelli is back of the label Botticini. Great caution is necessary, and in the end the final test is hardly scientific at all. It is brought about by an appeal to the quality of the picture — the quality of drawing, contour, light-and-shade, color. The questions are formulated, "Is the line of that firm quality, that lightness of touch here and emphasis there, worthy of Raphael?" "Has that light-and-shade a subtlety and depth and gradation worthy of Leonardo?" "Does that color-note ring true to Titian?" In other words, it is by its quality that one should say whether he has in hand a piece of silk or a piece of gingham, and by a similar test he should be able to tell a work of a master from that of an imitator, a copyist, or a forger. But this brings in the person-

ality of the artist and the spirit and feeling of his work which is last century's method of criticism — a method now somewhat obsolescent because regarded as unscientific.

So you see that with all the newer and higher criticism has taught us, there is still cause for doubt and room for caution. And these must inevitably centre about extravagant theories and unproved hypotheses. That very quality of imagination, which has been esteemed a virtue in the historian, has by continuous abuse become little short of a vice. By its employment art-history has become less of a fact and more of a fiction, until now people scarcely know what to believe about, let us say, Giorgione, Lotto, the van Eycks, or Phidias, Mino, and Jean Goujon. Skepticism is bred of this, and I know of no more discouraging state of mind. When a person does not know what to believe and doubts everything, he sometimes thinks that at least he is scientific, but in reality he is only unhappy.

If I were asked the remedy for this ailment of historical criticism I should certainly suggest that there be less of this twisting and warping of facts to fit a preconceived theory — less of subjective imagination and mental functioning and more of objective fact. Why not state the facts as they are and let the reader draw his own conclusions? It is the business of the historian or the critic to get at the truth; it is not a part of his business to be forever putting the other fellow in the wrong. He is not, or should not be, a partisan advocate trying, by contorted statement and specious argument, to win the case for his client, whether rightfully or otherwise; he should be an investigator trying to establish the truth, though the finding of it should shake his idol from its pedestal.

If I mistake not, impartial investigation, with the truth only as a goal, is to be the spirit of the very newest criticism, and is to be the ruling factor in the science of art-history for the next decade. Some little volumes recently published — *Michael Angelo*, by Sir Charles Holroyd, and *Donatello*, by Lord Balcarres — will point my meaning. In them one feels the disposition to get at the truth without partisan bias; and in the *Donatello* book you have an assembling of the facts without dogmatic utterances and fine-spun theories. That, it seems to me, is as it should be. If there is anything very obvious or noteworthy about the man or his work or the period, the facts will all point toward it; if there is not, all the argument in the world will fail to convince. There is something radically wrong with the theory that has to be argued through five hundred pages. It doth protest too much.

Now I would not have it thought for a moment that I am out of sympathy with this higher criticism in art-history, or that I think it might better never have been. On the contrary, it has done great

good, and though many of its hypotheses will pass away, its discoveries and its learning will be the bases of a truer development hereafter. The theory of descent, which was so widely accepted twenty-five years ago, is now almost discarded, but evolution as a principle still exists, and it would be a strange mind that could not see wonderful development in the sciences as the direct result of that theory. Suppose we admit the hypothesis to be false, the immense information gained in its pursuit is by no means without its compensation. The art-criticism of the past fifteen years, though it may unsettle rather than convince, has nevertheless been wonderfully informing. The patient research, the collection of materials, the comparison of works, the publication of reproductions have gone far to establish a criticism that is scientifically based. The old guesswork, the hiding of ignorance by a burst of emotional enthusiasm, the trusting to impressions, the reliance upon tradition only, have rather passed into the background. We are certainly upon safer ground with a surer foundation under foot.

And what is perhaps of more moment to the people at large, we are nearer to a true understanding and appreciation of art. All this criticism that is being written, scientific or otherwise, is of no avail unless it touches and informs and influences the public. Art is meant for the public. Praxiteles carved and Giotto built and Paolo Veronese painted, not for any little group of artists, but for the mob in the street. The orator, the novelist, the critic, the historian, what use for them to talk unless they have an audience? The painter and sculptor, why should they labor if no one sees or cares? Let us have no nonsense about art being exclusively for the artist or criticism for the critic. If the arrow fly no further than that, it might better not be shot at all.

Art is for the public, but the public not being too intelligent has always needed some guidance from its better-informed members, and still needs to be told what is good and what is bad, what is to be admired, and what is to be shunned. That gives about the only reason for the existence of art-criticism. Such being the case, it is gratifying to note that present-day criticism deals with the art-product in the light of the producer's intention. Art may not be for the artists exclusively, but the artist knows his aim in his work, and it is that aim rather than his interpreter's imagination that is to be explained to the public. The day of reading literary and romantic meanings into pictures and marbles is past. We are too firmly based in materials and know the *technique* of all the arts far too well for that. In its place we are to-day appreciating the beauties of things purely decorative as well as expressive, and realizing with the artists that ideas are good or bad as they reveal or are revealed by the particular medium in which they are cast. The public is being taught to look

at art from the artist's point of view. And, once more, that is as it should be.

I trust all this means progress, expansion, enlightenment. And I certainly believe in the future of art-history, though I have devoted the most of this hurried paper to stating my unbeliefs. If I have deprecated certain tendencies it is not that the work itself is so bad. On the contrary, it is so good that I could wish it might be better, more enduring, more authoritative.

SECTION A — CLASSICAL ART

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(Hall 12, September 22, 10 a. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR RUFUS B. RICHARDSON, New York City.
SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ADOLPH FURTWAENGLER, University of Munich.
PROFESSOR FRANK B. TARRELL, University of Chicago.
SECRETARY: DR. P. BAUR, Yale University.

CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE ALLIED SCIENCES

BY ADOLPH FURTWAENGLER

(Translated from the German by Miss Ethel D. Puffer, Cambridge, Mass.)

[Adolph Furtwängler, Professor of Archaeology, University of Munich, since 1894; Director of Glyptotheca, since 1894; Conservator of the collection of Vases and of the Gypsum Museum. b. Freiburg, Germany, June 30, 1853. Ph.D. Munich, 1874. Bursar, Imperial German Archaeological Institute, 1876-78; Manager of the Excavations at Olympia, 1878-79; Privat-docent, University of Bonn, 1879-80; *ibid.* University of Berlin, 1880-84; Professor of Archaeology, Berlin, 1884-94. Member of the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, London, Archaeologic Society of Athens, Imperial German Archaeological Institute. Author of numerous books and memoirs on Archaeology.]

BEFORE we inquire what classical archaeology is to-day, and what it aims at, let us cast a quick glance over what it was formerly.

In the period of the Renaissance and the succeeding time up to the rise of Winckelmann, the study of the monuments of ancient art was either purely artistic or purely antiquarian, but always absolutely unhistorical. Artists made collections of drawings of antique works, some of which collections are still extant; many objects were also engraved and published. People rejoiced in and admired the antique, but they did not perceive that in its fashioning it was very different from contemporary art; for those drawings and engravings translated the ancient works of art completely in the stylistic forms of their own time; of an historical understanding of them there was as yet no trace. And the learned antiquarians of that period busied themselves with ancient iconography and all sorts of minor matters, while the elucidation of ancient works of art was sought mostly in Roman history, which was most familiar to them; here, too, the historical understanding of the antique is yet entirely wanting.

With Winckelmann a new epoch begins. In his *History of Ancient Art* (1763) the attempt is made for the first time to portray the antique as an evolution, as an historically conditioned product of different styles, organically unfolding one from another. Here was it first

acknowledged that the Greek is the basis of the Roman style, and that the plastic works which have been preserved to us in Italy are mostly only copies of lost Greek originals, and that the understanding of most of the works of art must be reached through Greek legends and poetry.

But Winckelmann did not carry through to fulfillment his demand for historical appreciation. In opposition to it stood his own and his time's conviction that the antique was the canon of all beauty, the model and ideal in which all laws of the beautiful were exemplified, and which modern art was bidden to imitate directly. This idea was in complete contradiction to the historical view, which saw in antique art not a rigid norm, but a play of organically developing style-forms. These two fundamentally opposed tendencies cross each other continually in Winckelmann's works; he was himself never conscious of the logical conclusions of his own new historical conception; he speaks as if there were only one antique ideal form, holding as model for all time, and forgets his own great achievement, the establishment of the demand that the antique shall be understood in its evolution.

This contradiction was not resolved for a long time afterward; indeed, it persists into modern times, inasmuch as, for instance, Overbeck's treatment of the so-called mythology of art still suffered from it.

It is the merit of that intellectual tendency — really opposed to Winckelmann's — which was manifested first in Herder, then in the circle of the so-called Romanticists, that a truly historical method in the science of antiquity came to full formulation and conquest in all fields. Men became able to put themselves sympathetically into the alien feeling of long-vanished times. They applied no longer the absolute measure of fixed concepts, but learned to use relative historical judgments. The seemingly humble and hitherto disdained now, too, attained to consideration. The religion, the folk-belief and the whole mass of legend, as it appears in poetry, or as embalmed only in local tradition, was recognized as the source, as the nourishing soil, from which even the humblest of the works of ancient art drew their intimate meaning and power.

This really new and — for the whole field of mental sciences — most blessed transformation, which this historical feeling, heretofore unattained by any epoch, brought about, had nevertheless untoward results for classical archaeology. Attention was turned from the really artistic element, the essential form of the work of art, for only the content and significance and the position of the work in the whole cultural development was inquired into, and the problems of the aesthetic form were ignored. It is a fact that very many aesthetically important examples of the antique were recognized and appreciated

by Winckelmann and his immediate disciples, but were later forgotten until in most recent times the threads were again picked up where these last had let them fall.

Another important circumstance tended to the same result, namely, to the suppression of the artistic element in the archaeological research of the nineteenth century: the extraordinary accumulation of actual material which this very period saw; what the excavations, the travels and discoveries of all kinds brought to light had to be first of all sifted and ordered, before it was possible to press on to the deeper problems. Great tracts in the archaeological production of the second half of the nineteenth century — and much work belonging to state-subsidized institutions falls into this class — are characterized by a completely sterile aridity. While aforesaid scarcely any but gifted spirits had devoted themselves to the study of antique art, now the necessary work on the abundance of new material attracted also many mediocre minds; and mediocrity, here as elsewhere, understood but too well how to fix and socially establish itself with the aid of state provision. Whoever had other and higher aims found the mighty phalanx of unproductive Philistinism against him.

But in spite of this retarding element, classical archaeology has made progress, and, if we now ask what is the present status of this science and what its aims, we must answer, that it is in truth everywhere in its beginnings, but that it has at least learned to see what is most important for it, what it lacks and what it has to do.

Its problem is, in brief, to envisage and to interpret the history of ancient art from its remains — just that task in which Winckelmann had made the first start. To interpret the history means to display the continuity of organic development in the totality of phenomena in the entire extant material of antique art, to understand and to value everything as a link in a chain, to recognize the conditions from which any given form issued, but beyond all to penetrate into the individuality of just this given form, to grasp its content as well as its artistic form, and finally to weigh in judgment what is, as history, fully understood.

These broad general requirements embrace an endless amount, and if we apply them to the special case, we are at once aware how far we are yet, for the most part, from our goal. First of all, the material, even, is by no means yet complete; it happily has daily accessions still, and the new is always a help in understanding the old. And even this understanding has ever new aspects; what the student formerly believed himself to have understood and disposed of appears now in fresh light, and this will continue, it is to be hoped, for a long time.

To be more exactly cognizant of the ultimate aim of archaeology

it will be well to determine its place relatively to the allied provinces of knowledge.

Classical archaeology is that part of the science of classical antiquity which has for its especial object antique fine art. It is therefore a part of the so-called Philology, if we dedicate this word to the whole of the scientific study of the culture of ancient Hellas and Rome; it is a twin sister of Philology if we, as is usual, confine this name to the scientific study of the antique literature.

It lies in the nature of mankind, that scientific activity should have everywhere applied itself, not to bygone art, but to bygone literature, not to the image, but to the word, of vanished times. We can to-day, in fact, observe that a simple person has deep respect for an ancient monument of language, and quite well understands the scientific preoccupation with it, while he does not make out at all what the study of a piece of ancient fine art is for. The student of epigraphy, who collects inscriptions, meets everywhere among the peasants in the classic lands understanding and reverence for his occupation; not so the archaeologist. And in truth, one can note that the higher the type of the old work of art, the harder to comprehend is a scientific occupation with it. That men find it beautiful, and collect it, every one understands; but that it can be object-matter of a science is hard to conceive; one at least sees the picture, it is said, and any one can catch the idea; old and foreign writings must be explained by the scholar, but a beautiful work of art—that explains itself. Scientific interest in the examples of a lower type is sooner understood, — in tools, utensils, pottery, and the like, whose meaning and use have to be explained, — in short, the antiquarian element in archaeology; further, the need of scholarly elucidation of the content of antique fine art is perceived; but not that the art-work as such can be material for a science.

This psychological circumstance, which moreover is to be traced not only in simple, uneducated persons, but deep in our culture itself, explains why the science of written words had to develop so much earlier than that of fine art, and why archaeology had to begin with the study of antiquarian objects and then with the explication of the meaning of ancient representative art, — and often to stick fast at that point, so that still to-day many a scholar knows no other aim.

Archaeology has its own field of research, representative art; but of course, granted the close connection of all expressions of a given epoch of culture, its special function, to accomplish the complete historical understanding of the art-work, cannot be fulfilled without the knowledge of what has found utterance in the literature of the ancients. Archaeology must build on the foundation which philology as the science of literary remains, together with its inseparable com-

panion, epigraphy, has laid. With this science archaeology stands throughout in the closest connection.

In truth, as a good part of the material of the history of ancient art is in literary form, — consists, that is, in facts from ancient writers and inscriptions, — the archaeologist must be also philologist, or at least well schooled in philology. The methods of work and the problems of modern philology must be his, too. He may no more, as earlier, — even still in H. Brunn's *History of Artists*, — make use of the various literary traditions without seeking their source, without investigating whence the authority has his information, what sort of a man he is anyway, what he could have known, and what credibility is to be ascribed to him on the basis of his personality. And the putting to use of the evidence from inscriptions naturally requires complete familiarity with that branch of philology which is commonly designated as epigraphy.

Nevertheless archaeology is no longer, as could once be maintained, a mere appendage and accessory of philology; it was that, so long as its aim was in mere antiquarianism or simply in illustrating some passages of ancient literature by means of fine art or in expounding the objective content of examples of fine art through passages of literature. Many notable scholars of the nineteenth century, who have attained a considerable name, like Otto Jahn, have yet in reality scarcely emerged from this conception of archaeology. In opposition to these, Heinrich Brunn, unquestionably the greatest archaeologist of the epoch just passed, defended the independence of archaeology on the basis of the special character of its subject-matter; yet in his works he has not drawn the full practical conclusions from this view, and he has not entirely freed himself from that tradition which the antiquario-exegetical subordination of archaeology had created. He, too, was interested in a Greek vase, for instance, only to the point of finding whether it gave a picture which illustrated a poetical passage; the vase itself he did not yet grasp as the real object of his study, — the vase as it is in itself, as an aesthetic whole, a work of decorative art. That it was possible for Brunn so to misjudge the whole aesthetic and historical significance of the Greek vase as appears in his theory of the late origin thereof, was only a consequence of that very tradition.

Archaeology must certainly, therefore, work in closest connection with philology, and with as complete as possible a mastery of the ancient literature and inscriptions; but it must also be fully conscious of its own characteristic quality and independent position, and must vindicate these last in aiming to understand the work of fine art as what it is in itself, and not merely to make use of it to elucidate something else.

A field of study also which stands very near to archaeology is that

of ancient history. The monuments of art are completely to be understood only on the basis of general history, and on the other hand the development of fine art makes an important part of the total historical development of the ancients. Moreover, a still closer bond between the two subjects is given in the fact that many examples of representative art also offer important direct material for the reconstruction of ancient political and commercial history. For the early period of Greek as of Roman history, the archaeological monuments, together with the legendary remains, are in fact the only material that we possess. The ancient historian is therefore frequently referred to the archaeologists. But also many relics of earlier times, like the distantly exported Greek vases, are of direct use for the history of the Greek states, their foreign relations and their trade. The most important objects of this kind are, however, the coins. As to deal with these requires a vast amount of special information, a special branch of science, numismatics, was early developed. This division had indeed the advantage that the immediate primary need, of sifting and classifying the immense material, was provided for relatively early and well by the work of assiduous specialists; but the separation was none the less, just as that of epigraphy from philology, disadvantageous to numismatics even as to archaeology. The former was too one-sided and narrow, and set its aim too low; the numismatist was wont to take his function as fulfilled when a coin was classified and identified, and to overlook that only then was the most important matter in order, — the elucidation and appreciation of the coin as work of art. On the other side, archaeology, through this separation, suffered the drawback that the coins, which were only too willingly left to the numismatist, were far too little made use of, and material extraordinarily valuable for the history of art, much neglected. Germany in particular was long backward in this matter, at a time when numismatics in England had already begun to deal with coins from a wider point of view.

Here should be mentioned a wider field of study, which is closely affiliated with archaeology, — ancient geography and topography, which treat, as Ernst Curtius expressed it, "the subsoil of the historical life." The exploration of the classic lands as to their geography and topography made an extraordinary advance in the past century, and that, too, always in close touch with archaeology. All civilized nations have had a part in it; in Germany in particular Otfried Müller, and, following his footsteps, Ernst Curtius, have the credit of having recognized the importance of the ground on which ancient civilization grew up. To the suggestion and stimulus of the latter scholar is due the ideally exact survey of the Attic country which the German Archaeological Institute secured. It would certainly have been more important and beneficial for archaeology,

if instead they had mapped, say, all the architectural remains in Attica, which, like everything of this kind, are subject to sudden alteration and disintegration, while the folds of mountain and valley will long outlast our day. In all classic lands one is moved to clamor for, first of all, a fixation through scientific maps of the perishable relics which still remain. None the less was the before-mentioned survey of the country most certainly a useful achievement. Even should the significance of the soil for civilization be overestimated, certainly this does no harm, and archaeology will do well always to support whatever is destined to further the knowledge of the geography and topography of classic lands. Indeed, so far as topography includes the existing monuments, so far is it but a branch of archaeology itself.

Another close neighbor of classical archaeology is to be noted in Oriental philology, and especially in Egyptian and early Asiatic research. These branches of science are still young, and have therefore not yet so fully divided off into specialties as the earlier science of classical antiquity. Linguistic study is here still one with that of history, culture, and art. Naturally here, too, the word was the first object of inquiry, and the image was for long by many only regarded if it had historical content, and only for the sake of that. Only very lately do the Oriental remains begin to be dealt with as works of art — and to this end classical archaeology has helped much; but all too often still must one deplore in the case of Orientalists, even of those engaged in excavation, that their eye is not yet sufficiently trained to see artistic forms.

The late discoveries in regard to primitive culture in Greece, when Crete was the centre of authority and fashion, have had especial influence in closely linking classical and Oriental archaeology. That civilization of 2000 years B. C. is only to be understood on the basis of a knowledge of Egypt and the Orient. We recognize the close connection with Egypt especially, but at the same time the full independence and characteristic quality of that so-called Cretan-Mycenaean culture. On the other hand we find in the Archaic-Greek epoch of the eighth and seventh centuries an Oriental tendency in art, emanating from Ionia, which is directly dependent on its models, even if it soon freely moulds them to its own fashion. The time is past when the postulate of Oriental influence on Grecian territory was regarded as a sacrilege against Hellas. Classical archaeology can solve its problem only in close connection and in constant sympathy with that of the Orient; and no mere operating with the vague word "Oriental," as was formerly so much the favorite practice, but instead a thorough-going intimacy with the rich, complex art-development of Asia Minor and Egypt, must be required even of the classical archaeologist.

A complete contrast to Oriental science is given in another subject, not less closely related to classical archaeology, — that of the so-called prehistory. While in the preceding the written monument predominates, here it is completely lacking; study of the prehistoric period is turned merely to finds without writing, and must seek to trace out the historic development from these alone. This science, too, is young, and strictly scientific treatment therein extremely recent; as its subject-matter is relatively accessible and possesses a certain charm for every one, it has given occupation to many dilettantes, whose work, however, was often of the greatest use as regards the collection of material. Through just such a dilettante, the Homeric enthusiast and fortunate treasure-seeker, Heinrich Schliemann, was classical archaeology forced, in spite of its reluctance, to affiliate itself to the heretofore disdained prehistoric study. Since then classical archaeology has learned from the method of exact observation elaborated in prehistoric study to make use even of the humblest finds, and to bring the discoveries of classic soil into a wider relation, and very often thereby to attain for the first time to a real historical understanding of them. Thus, for instance, the bronzes from the ancient treasure-strata of Olympia can only be understood by aid of the finds which have been made and studied in the prehistoric field, and the recognition of the close relation between a great part of that Olympic treasure and those of the so-called Hallstatt period in the north and the northwest of the Greek country, is important for the whole conception of early Greek history. The early period of Italy, further, is for the first time at all comprehensible, since classical archaeology has joined hands with prehistoric study. It is a matter of course that, for this last, in turn, the alliance has also had the happiest results. The two sciences will in the future seek to come into ever closer touch with one another. The science of prehistoric times must strive to make its material historical, that is, to link it with groups of finds which can be historically fixed, just as classical and Oriental archaeology deal with theirs. And the latter had learned from the former, on the other hand, to work up with care not only the literary and the aesthetically beautiful specimen, but also the quite insignificant ones, the humble potsherds and small remains of metal utensils, and to apply them to the building-up of the history of ancient culture and art. Classical archaeology, too, was first turned through its connection with prehistoric science to exact observation of the details of the finds of minor antiquities, whereby the most important conclusions were reached. In Italy Wolfgang Helbig was the first of the classical archaeologists who followed this method, and he was able forthwith, by simply proving authentic the material found in the Etruscan tombs, to refute the thesis of the late origin of the Greek vases, which Brunn had laid down.

The attention, once directed upon the relations of the so-called classical peoples with others without writing or literature, was bound to bring classical archaeology in general into closer touch with general ethnology. It was a long time, and there was, particularly in Germany, strong opposition to overcome — which is in places very active still — before the sciences of classical antiquity began to recognize and admit that the Greeks and Romans were men as other men are, and that, in spite of the high grade of their culture, they shared the basis of it with other peoples, and that for an understanding thereof an acquaintance with these other peoples was essential. This acknowledgment, which became fruitful for the most various branches of the science of antiquity, has taught archaeology in especial the better understanding of the beginnings of art on classic soil.

It is, however, especially the history of religion which has gained most from ethnology, and has undergone through its influence a complete revolution. The religion and mythology of the Greeks and Romans are to-day also dealt with by all intelligent students entirely on the basis of the teachings of ethnology; a few only, German scholars in particular, still cling in narrow one-sidedness to the old standpoint, according to which Greeks and Romans might be explained only from themselves, that is, in reality, only from the incomplete, circumscribed ideas of modern mankind. As the greatest and most important part of the content of classical art comes from religion and mythology, the history of religion becomes one of the sciences most closely related to archaeology. In particular, the understanding of that infinitely rich abundance of antique remains which are connected in any way with the ideas about departed spirits, could have been won by archaeology only by frank dependence on modern ethnological studies in the history of religion.

As it is the content or subject of antique art which leads to the alliance with the above-mentioned field of science, so it is the formal side which binds archaeology to the modern history of art. Archaeology is, as we saw, nothing else than antique art-history and a part of general art-history. But the descent of archaeology from philology has brought it about that in practice a sharp separation obtains between it and the modern history of art — so much so that, according to the dominant view, as it appears in our university instruction and in the organization of scientific congresses, the so-called "History of Art" begins with the Christian Era. This separation is greatly to be deplored, and redounds to the harm of both branches of science. That there are real scientific congresses which use the name of history of art, and at the same time shut out antique art, is an extraordinary fact, only to be explained by the historical development of that branch of science. Inasmuch as the whole art

of Christian times is founded on the antique, it can be understood only by those who know the antique; no one who aims to work in the modern history of art dare be ignorant of it; knowledge of it is simply indispensable for him. And on the other hand, the archaeologist will enlarge and illumine his view, and better understand and appreciate the antique through comparison with the much more completely and richly preserved works of modern art, if he has made himself quite familiar with the modern art-development.

A more intimate coöperation of antique and modern art-history would in any case be of the greatest value to both sides. Their separation was for a long time favored by the fact that archaeology seemed to be forgetting her chief function and to be going off into antiquarian pedantry and mere exegesis of works of antique art, while the modern history of art aimed from the first at tracing the development of style in great art and penetrating into the personalities of the great masters, — an aim which was, indeed, incomparably easier on the working basis of an abundance of well-preserved originals, than for archaeology, which has at its disposal mostly only poor, and at that mutilated, copies. This last difference had still another result: inasmuch as the material of the history of modern art is so much more accessible and can be at once utilized by every one, there were not wanting many unprepared intruders who, more than in other fields, put forth amateurish work; and this helped in its turn to deepen the cleft between the sister-sciences.

The field which is now designated as modern art-history is, moreover, a very wide one, and specialization is therefore already beginning within it, which is, indeed, very necessary. So much the more, however, must the mutual relations of the special groups, and in particular the bond with archaeology, be watched and tended. The modern science of art has for the most part followed much too exclusively the development of style, and has too little sought to exhaust the content of the work of art as a whole; it has had hitherto too much to do even in getting the material once sifted and classified according to style. Still, just in this direction it has already accomplished a vast deal, and can serve as a model to archaeology, which has long been backward in this respect, and is, for instance, just at the point of admitting that its most immediate need is to make the many scattered remains of antique sculpture accessible through photographs. In this point the modern science of art has gone to its goal much more quickly and directly; but in complete and impartial treatment of the single fact it could yet learn much from archaeology.

On the boundary between archaeology and the history of modern art stands the so-called Christian archaeology. Here, too, the actual present division of subjects finds itself in contradiction to the logic

of things. Christian archaeology is counted as a subject belonging to theology, while it is really nothing else than a part of the history of art. So far as it deals with ancient Christian art, its subject-matter can be historically grasped only by one who can survey the whole later antique art, and who is able to connect that special art-group which draws its content from Christian belief with all the other contemporary art-forms. The alliance with theology, which is divided on the basis of creed into Catholic and Protestant, can naturally not be advantageous to an historical treatment of ancient Christian research. Christian archaeology ought to be set off as a special branch of classical archaeology, which would certainly be for its gain. At present the historical understanding of the content of ancient Christian religious imagination is on the point of experiencing a tremendous furtherance not from theology, but from philology, which is treating those ideas in connection with the rest of the later antique religious concepts.

Finally, we have still to consider the relation of classical archaeology to philosophy, especially to aesthetics. In earlier time the Greek art-forms were taken to be, as a matter of course, the canons of taste, the forms in which the Idea of Beauty comes to its purest expression. Aesthetics, as the doctrine of the beautiful, was then most closely linked with archaeology. So was it, too, with Winckelmann and his disciples. Later, when the historical viewpoint in archaeology was fully dominant, aesthetics and archaeology drifted apart more and more; and at present they are quite far asunder. But aesthetics, too, is another thing to-day; it hardly believes any longer in the possibility of determining absolute beauty from itself, but limits itself more and more to the psychological problem of what appears beautiful to us, and why it does so. Now it must be emphasized that for the understanding of a work of art, in the sense of archaeology, it is by no means enough to have determined the relative position within the circle of other works of art; the question must also be put, how far it can be determined why such and such forms were chosen by the artist, — whereby one has to put himself to the extent of his power into the mind of the ancient artist — and the further question, why those forms produce such and such an effect upon me — for only of my own emotions can I give an exact account. Now if one is prepared to accept the solution of these questions as the function of the psychologically grounded aesthetics, then is aesthetics also a necessary part of the science of art. Then, however, the professional philosopher in the hitherto current sense will certainly be less fitted to pursue aesthetics; for he usually fails entirely of that full knowledge of the substratum of his inquiry, art, which is indispensable for the solution of those problems. For, in fact, even those aesthetic laws hitherto concocted by the philosophers, which were put forth without a thorough

knowledge of art itself, seem to us more as the plays of fancy than as real additions to our knowledge. To cite an instance: it has been, and even most recently, set down as an aesthetic law of plastic art, that the work must show a qualitative homogeneity of material, a law that could never be set up by any one who is familiar with actual sculpture as the greatest artists of all times have practiced it; the oneness of the material is the most unimportant of matters for sculpture, which has instead to strive only for unity of appearance. In other fields it is taken for granted that laws are deduced only from material that is exactly known; with the aestheticians, however, the opposite has frequently been the case. We believe that here real furtherance of knowledge can proceed only from those who are completely at home in the field of art; as thus in our own time an important addition to our aesthetic understanding is to be credited to a keen-thinking sculptor (Adolf Hildebrand). We should be glad, if a wish is permitted here, to hope, as a development for the future, that every special science, and in especial the natural sciences, might as it were steep themselves in philosophy, that is, might put their own philosophical questions and seek to answer them themselves. In any case, however, we hope that aesthetics, so far as it relates to fine art, may consent to be matter of art-study; certainly, however, in a quite different sense from that existing in Winckelmann's time.

Supposing us to be now clear as to the position which classical archaeology holds with reference to the other sciences, let us, before bringing these reflections to an end, say a word on the characteristic quality of this branch of knowledge and the method which it requires.

In the higher sense there can be but a single scientific method, which is fixed by the general laws of thought; but the special character of the various subject-matters of the individual sciences brings about special variations of that one method.

The primary principle of the study of ancient art is that the work of fine art shall be treated and comprehended as what it is in itself. This sounds like a complete truism, yet no requirement is wont to be so often forgotten as this. To comprehend the real aesthetic nature of a work of fine art, it is not enough to have philological, literary, historical knowledge, taste and appreciation for poetry and other arts, but there is needed also a special insight into the nature of fine art and familiarity with the problems peculiar to that art. But this, on the contrary, has evidently often been wanting, and not to petty students but to talented scholars, since so much that is alien has been read into the ancient works of art, and their true content and meaning mistaken. Thus students have construed poetic thoughts into many a Greek vase-drawing, which have a simply corrupting effect on appreciation, instead of understanding them out of the aesthetic conditions

of unfolding artistic impulses. And how much that is inartistic have they interpreted into antique statues! — beginning with Winckelmann, who saw in the Apollo Belvedere the picture of the moment after the slaying of the python — up to the scholars of our day.

Another principle of the method of our science is that every type of specimen shall be dealt with according to its characteristic quality, that its peculiar conditions shall first be known before the elucidation of a particular object is begun. Against this principle too many have sinned. The Greek vase-pictures, for instance, and the Greek votive reliefs, the tomb-sculpture, the coins and gems, are such unlike types of objects that for each one of them the standard is given by another point of view.

An especial difficulty, however, is presented by the existing works in statuary. For these are only to a slight extent original works, and unfortunately the less important part, the greater number being copies of late periods of the antique. Here the same conditions hold as for the literary works of the ancients which exist in transcripts. First all extant copies must be assembled, and out of these it must be determined what has really come down to us. That is the same thing which in philology is called the "recension" of manuscripts. Then follows what is there designated as "emendation"; the reconstruction of the lost model, which can come only through conjecture and hypothesis with the help of imagination. As in philology his conjecture is the best who has most perfect mastery of the language and grammar, just so in archaeology he can most unerringly and correctly reconstruct a lost plastic model from the extant copies who has the profoundest knowledge of the plastic forms of the antique and their "grammar." To the superficial view all conjectures seem alike hypothetical; in reality they are tremendously different in value, according to the powers of the originators.

Archaeology has only lately recognized and begun to fulfill her function with respect to the existing copies of the lost masterpieces of ancient sculpture. She was encouraged thereto by the progress of modern technique, which first furnished, in photography, the means to compare with exactness the various existing but scattered copies, and thereby to establish the tradition. Earlier students had no adequate idea of this work, and contented themselves with assembling the examples which were fairly alike, without deciding whether they were copies or more or less free remodelings. In passing judgment on these it was usual to settle on a chance-selected copy, — and on its errors, — and, with the still undeveloped knowledge of the evolution of style of the special forms, the mistakes of the copyist were ascribed to the original. We have now, no doubt, made progress in these matters; we are aware for instance, how mistaken it was of Brunn to base his analysis of the type of the Giustiniani Apollo only on the

Giustiniani exemplar, without citing at all the replica from the Baths of Caracalla; the former exemplar is one quite arbitrarily made over by the copyist, such as the thick eyelids, and it was just on those faulty traits, inserted by the copyist, that Brunn had based his analysis of the form, the result of which could not be otherwise than wrong. We now easily see further how the same Brunn erred when he wished to see a characteristic of the glance of Hera in the eyes of that head of the so-called Farnese Hera, while we now see in the modeling simply a copy of that way of treating the eye which belonged to the period of the original. But this whole field, the reconstruction of the lost plastic masterpieces of the antique from the copies which have been preserved, is an excessively difficult one, and we know well that our study is here but in its beginnings.

In general it appears to us that a thorough-going understanding of Greek art as it really was, is now for the first time dawning upon us, and we believe firmly in the future of our science and in its coming important development. The absolute worth of Greek art within the totality of the creations of the human mind comes more clearly and more strikingly to view, the interest and the joy in this unique beauty of the past are ever increasing, and still the eagerly pursued excavations bring daily fresh material. We may well describe classical archaeology as a scion of the great tree of human knowledge, youthful indeed, but lusty and full of the promise of sturdy growth.

SOME PRESENT PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF GREEK SCULPTURE

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By the term "classical art," as used in the language of this Congress, I understand Greek art and what is commonly called Roman art, which is mainly late Greek art on Roman soil. The history of each great branch of this art — architecture, painting, and sculpture — presents problems which might profitably be here discussed. Thus in the field of architecture we might take up the origins of the Doric and Ionic orders, or the question as to how much of what we are accustomed to think of as characteristic of Roman architecture — its use of arches, vaults, and domes, its combination of the arch with the decorative column and entablature, its treatment of architectural details and ornaments — was borrowed from Greek architecture as it existed in Alexandria, in Antioch, and in other flourishing centres of late Greek civilization. In the field of painting an attempt might be made to explain on what evidence and by what methods may be conjured up some shadowy semblance of the works of the great painters of the fifth and fourth centuries B. C.; or, under the stimulus of a recent essay,¹ to consider the extent of the originality in design and in technique displayed by the extant frescoes of the Roman imperial period.

Clearly, however, it would be unwise, within the limits of a single address, to include matters so various, and I have therefore chosen to confine myself to a single branch of Greek art, namely, sculpture.

What would an ideal history of Greek sculpture be? Suppose that a man equipped with the highest native capacity for the task and with the best training attainable at the present day had sources of knowledge as complete for the Greek period as for the nineteenth century of our era, what manner of history would he produce? Whatever else his work might contain, — and that might be much, — it would set forth clearly and unquestionably the general qualities characteristic of Greek sculpture in each successive phase of its development, the distinctive features of each great local school, and

¹ Wickhoff, *Roman Art* (translated by Mrs. S. Arthur Strong).

the individual styles of numerous artists great and small. The reader would learn to know Myron, Phidias and Polyclitus, Scopas, Praxiteles and Lysippus, more fully and certainly than we can know Donatello and Michelangelo. The influence of each of these great masters upon his fellow sculptors, his pupils and successors, would be disclosed. And scores of other sculptors of varying degrees of genius would receive adequate treatment. All this of course would be done with the help of illustrations, which would present to the eye a long gallery of statues and reliefs, each piece complete in form and color as when it left the master's hand.

How far we are from possessing any such history of Greek sculpture as this every beginner knows. Of the necessary materials for such a work only a small fraction exists. Instead of full and authoritative literary documents we have the brief and unintelligent summary compiled by the elder Pliny, the scattered notices in Pausanias and other writers, chiefly of Roman imperial date, — notices often vague, and only in the rarest cases penetrating and precise, — and finally some hundreds of inscriptions giving names of sculptors, occasionally with one or two additional particulars, but mostly referring to works of which not a vestige remains. However, as literary documents are of only minor importance to the historian of art, our poverty in this matter could be made light of, were the works themselves preserved to tell their story to one skilled to decipher it. But in truth the actual remains of the finest Greek sculpture are exceedingly scanty. Of grave reliefs and votive reliefs and sculptures used as decorations for temples and mausoleums we have, to be sure, a great many, though in a mutilated condition. But of independent sculptures in the round, such as statues of divinities, of athletes, statesmen, and men of letters, we have from the best period very few. The masterpieces on which the fame of the greatest sculptors rested are without exception lost, and we are fortunate when one of them can be identified in a copy or copies of Roman date. Copies, in fact, executed during the century preceding and the two centuries following the beginning of the Christian Era, constitute a large part of our monumental testimony to the history of Greek sculpture. That we have them is the chief reason why we know the art of Polyclitus or Praxiteles more fully than we may hope to know the art of Polygnotus or Apelles.

The historian of Greek sculpture, having these materials at his disposal, ought to base his views as to the artistic style or styles of a given time and place primarily upon extant original works of that time and place, including every class of artistic remains, — sculptures, paintings, coins, gems, — in short, all surviving products of the graphic and plastic arts. Into the framework thus obtained he must fit those lost works which he re-creates in imagination from copies. Where trustworthy evidence fails, as it often does, he must perforce

make large use of hypothesis, and, however cautious his temperament, he can hardly fail at times to confound plausible hypothesis with well-established fact.

If this meant that we are doomed to endless, unprogressive guess-work, it would be discouraging indeed. Fortunately nothing of the sort is true. The advance which during the last hundred years has been made in the understanding of the history of Greek sculpture has been enormous, and is going on at the present day with accelerated speed. This advance comes about in part through the constant accession of new materials. Even literary documents come to light, like the fragment of a list of Olympian victors ¹ found in Egypt and first published in 1899, which has supplied us with valuable dates in the careers of Pythagoras, Myron, and Polyclitus. New sculptors' inscriptions continue to be discovered. And above all, the stock of known sculptures is augmented each year by pieces which had been hidden underground or sometimes even at the bottom of the sea. Herein is one of the great, exciting compensations to the student of Greek art. Every fresh discovery makes a problem. The new thing must be studied and assigned to its proper place. It may become the starting-point for a new set of hypotheses, and so lead to an extensive readjustment of views previously entertained as to the history of Greek art.

To this accession of new material there must come an end, and that end cannot be very far off. But the study of old material is only less fruitful than the acquisition of new, and it is hard to foresee a time when discoveries can no longer be made with the materials in hand.

Something has already been said of the part which the study of copies plays in our reconstruction of the history of Greek sculpture. Your attention is now invited to some of the more general questions which that study involves. I realize as fully as any one that art-criticism, to be profitable, must be exercised on the actual object. Abstract discussions are likely not only to be dull, but also to miss the essential point. Yet I venture to hope that a few considerations may be worth putting forward, even without the help of visible illustrations.

To begin with, we need a working theory as to how these copies were made. We know that in the Roman imperial period, to which they chiefly belong, the practice of taking casts from statues, or at least from bronze statues, was in use. Casts are easily multiplied and easily transported, and from a cast or casts a workman or workmen, in the same or different parts of the empire, could make any number of copies in bronze or marble, agreeing with the original in dimensions and in all principal features. But the opinion has recently

¹ Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, part II, no. cccxii.

been urged ¹ with great force that the taking of casts from marble sculptures was impracticable, for the simple reason that Greek marble sculptures were always more or less painted, and the process of making a mould would have injured the coloring. Hence it is inferred that we must draw a sharp line of distinction between two classes of reproductions. On the one hand, from originals of bronze we have copies, in which a high degree of fidelity may be presumed; on the other hand, from originals of marble, and, it may be added, of gold and ivory, we have imitations, whose trustworthiness is much less. Thus, — so the inference runs, — while we may form a fair idea of the bronze Discus-thrower of Myron or the bronze Doryphorus of Polyclitus, we cannot know, except vaguely, the gold and ivory Hera of Polyclitus or the marble Cnidian Aphrodite of Praxiteles.

Here is a matter deserving serious consideration. Yet the distinction is perhaps not so important as it at first appears. We have no assurance that the copies of bronze statues were always or even usually made from casts, although that is possible. And even if they were, it must be remembered that the possession of a cast, while it made fidelity in the copy possible, did not by any means necessitate fidelity. On the other hand, Greek marble sculptures may in some instances by the Roman period have so far lost their coloring that no objection would be felt to taking casts from them. And when this was not the case, it must often have been possible to make an accurate model in clay of a marble work, and from this model to make casts, as has recently been done for one of the archaic female figures of the Athenian acropolis. It is conceivable also that a copy was sometimes based upon drawings made in the presence of the original and perhaps accompanied by measurements. However it was done, it is certain that copies much too faithful to have been executed from memory were often made from marble originals. Thus in a caryatid of the Braccio Nuovo of the Vatican we have a Roman copy of one of the caryatids of the south porch of the Erechtheum, in fact, of the particular one which was removed by Lord Elgin and which now stands in the British Museum. Again, there are numerous cases where a work of relief sculpture in marble exists in two or more copies. Take for example the relief representing Orpheus, Eurydice, and Hermes. Whether the Naples example is the actual original or not, the original, as of all such works, was certainly of marble. And in spite of the great inferiority of the Villa Albani example, and the still greater inferiority of the Louvre example, to that in Naples, the differences are not greater than we often find between different copies of a bronze statue. Now it is true that no amount of resemblance between copies affords absolute proof of their resemblance to a lost original. It may conceivably be that all derive from a single copy, and that an inexact

¹ S. Reinach, *Revue archéologique*, 1900, II, p. 384 ff.

one. Yet on the whole a high degree of resemblance, especially between copies in marble from marble, is reassuring. It shows that fairly faithful reproductions were possible and were worth while. And, to conclude this matter, it does not seem necessary to regard with much more distrust the copies made from marble than those made from bronze.

Another question may be introduced at this point, although logically it belongs rather at the end than at the beginning of the discussion. The practice of copying Greek sculptures of the fifth, fourth, and third centuries B. C., is abundantly attested for the Roman imperial period. May we then assume that *all* Roman copies go back to Greek originals of good period, or must we consider the possibility that some of them represent originals created at Rome in the first century B. C., or later? Certainly we must consider the possibility. In a copying age there is no reason why the new should not be copied as well as the old, provided the new is in demand. Such demand did exist for portraits of the Roman emperors, and we accordingly find actual duplicates, though hardly so often as one would expect, in our stock of imperial portraits. Thus the famous head of the young Augustus in the Vatican agrees in all essentials with one less well known in the British Museum, and a repulsive but powerful portrait of Caracalla is preserved in several substantially identical copies. But there is no clear case of an ideal creation of Roman date attaining to the honors of reproduction. To be sure, this statement may not pass unchallenged. A few years ago numbers of statues existing in two or more repetitions, such as the marble Artemis from Pömpëii, the bronze Apollo with the lyre from the same place, the "Venus Genetrix," so-called, and the nude youth made by Stephanus, were commonly regarded as works of an archaistic school, whose founder was supposed to be Pasiteles, a Greek sculptor working in Rome in the earlier half of the first century B. C. This hypothesis of a Pasitelean school, which has been compared to the group of the "Nazarenos" in Germany and to that of the pre-Raphaelites in England, and whose productions have been supposed to be works of considerable originality and popularity, has now been generally abandoned. Yet it still has adherents in England. Thus our best English handbook of Greek sculpture¹ defends the name of Venus Genetrix, regarding the statue so called in the Louvre and its replicas as copied from the cult-image made by Arcesilaus for the temple of Venus erected by Julius Cæsar. But as the same authority holds that "the type, in its general character, dates from an earlier age," the difference between this view and that which regards the statues in question as copied directly from a fifth-century original is not, after all, very great. Similarly with regard to the athlete of Stephanus. According

¹ E. A. Gardner, *Handbook of Greek Sculpture*, sect. 78.

to one view this is simply one of several copies of an early fifth-century bronze statue. It is not the best copy, and its singular proportions may be due to arbitrary modification of the original. According to the other view, this work, while greatly influenced by the style of the fifth century, is essentially a new creation, not necessarily of Stephanus himself, but perhaps of Pasiteles, or at any rate of about his time. Under all the circumstances of the case the former hypothesis appears to me far more probable. But the side which we choose to take in the controversy does not greatly affect our conception of fifth-century art, though it does make considerable difference in our estimate of the artistic conditions in Rome in the first century B. C. And even if we allow an exception or two, it will still remain true that in dealing with copies, excepting portraits of Roman emperors and one or two other Roman personages, we are dealing in the vast majority of cases with reproductions of much earlier originals.

Let us now suppose that we are studying a piece of sculpture which we suspect of being a copy and which we wish to assign to its proper historical place. If we are equipped for the task, that is to say, if we are endowed with good powers of observation and are extensively acquainted with the monuments of Greek art, we shall of course inevitably form a theory on the subject at the outset. But realizing the fallibility of any copy, we shall search through the existing stock of antiques for duplicates of the work under consideration. If there are any, they must all be taken into account, just as all the manuscripts of an ancient author must be taken into account in the attempt to reconstitute his original text. Let us suppose, to begin with, that we find one or more such duplicates, agreeing with the first piece in all principal features. Obviously either one of the number is the original and the others are copies from it, or all are alike copies of a lost original. The former alternative is possible enough in the abstract, and there are some cases where it is actually held, more or less confidently, by one or more archaeologists. The cases, however, where it may be considered practically certain are extremely few. In general no one of the duplicates has any claim to being regarded as the original. All are alike copies. But copies are given to varying among themselves according to the varying skill and conscientiousness of the copyists. No one of them, even though artistically it outrank the others, can be safely trusted to reproduce more faithfully than they every detail of the original. Hence they must all be diligently compared, in the hope of divining from their collective testimony the prototype. In this undertaking a merely mechanical procedure, such as deciding by a majority vote of the witnesses, will not do. There must be a divinatory instinct. But alas! the faculty of divination, however sure it may be of itself, cannot always impose its results upon others. Its operation often seems arbitrary, and carries

no conviction save to docile disciples. And if this is the case when we are comparing two or more slightly varying copies, how much greater is the danger when our search for duplicates proves unsuccessful and we are left with but the single representative! Yet in spite of all difficulties and perils the serious student cannot shirk the problem. He must form his mental picture of the lost original as best he may, and reveal it to others as clearly as possible. If he succeeds in winning the approval of expert opinion, his view has attained to as much certainty as the nature of the subject admits.

Thus far we have been supposed to be dealing either with a single copy or with two or more substantially identical copies. But the case is by no means always so simple. Often we find, besides a number of copies essentially similar to one another, one or more variants, or in other words pieces so far like the agreeing copies that they cannot be wholly independent, yet so far unlike that they cannot in any strict sense be identified with them. The most obvious explanation of such a variant is that the sculptor who executed it was simply modifying the same Greek original which is represented also by more exact reproductions. In one case he may have worked from memory and his divergences from the original may not have been intentional. In another case he may have had an exact copy before him and may have deliberately adapted it to some purpose of his own. No one doubts that this explanation, in one or other of its forms, is often applicable. Every one makes free use of it. Yet a different explanation is sometimes possible and is sometimes preferred. What I have called a variant may itself be a faithful copy of a lost Greek original, so that we are led back to two closely related Greek originals, produced by the same sculptor or by two different sculptors, one of whom in some way influenced the other. For example, there is at Mantua a coarsely executed marble figure of a Muse, holding in her right hand a tragic mask. This statue, while it has no known duplicates, is closely similar in pose and drapery to the caryatids of the Erechtheum. In view of this similarity it was seriously proposed ¹ a few years ago to treat the Mantuan figure as a copy of a Greek work of about 400 B. C. But really it seems most improbable that a Greek sculptor in the flourishing period of artistic activity, in seeking to create a Muse, should have imitated so closely figures used as architectural supports, however admirable, or *vice versa*. And I am glad to say that the author of the suggestion retracted it ² not long after in favor of the common-sense view that the Mantuan Muse is nothing but an adaptation of one of the caryatid figures by a late and clumsy sculptor.

A better example is afforded by the Farnese Diadumenus in the British Museum. Of this statue again there are no duplicates; in

¹ Arndt, *Photographische Einzelaufnahmen antiker Sculpturen*, Text, no. 9.

² Arndt, *op. cit.*, no. 257.

sense it stands alone. Yet it can hardly be dissociated altogether from those other Diadumenus figures which are believed on good grounds to be copied from a work of Polyclitus. The similarity in motive goes so far as to make probable some close interdependence. How then are the facts to be interpreted? Two theories are possible, as in the previous case: either the Farnese Diadumenus is the work of a sculptor of Roman date, a work based upon the famous statue of Polyclitus, but so far modified as to attest considerable originality on the sculptor's part; or it is a copy of a Greek work of about Polyclitus's time, perhaps an Attic work which Polyclitus saw and whose motive he borrowed and adapted. The question, it will be seen, like that of a Pasitelean archaizing school, is chiefly a question of the amount and kind of originality which may be assumed for the sculptors of the Roman imperial period. Certainly an age which produced works of such merit as the reliefs of the Ara Pacis, of the Arch of Titus, and of the Beneventine Arch of Trajan, was not wholly deficient in artistic originality. But it must be admitted that for the precise kind of originality which would be implied by the creation of the Farnese Diadumenus out of Polyclitean and other fifth-century suggestions our knowledge of the Roman period does not afford irrefutable evidence. The question is one on which serious students must for the present agree to differ.

The most ambitious historians of Greek sculpture are not content with placing a lost original, divined from a copy or copies, in its proper place and period. They would fain go farther and assign each work, or at least each important work, to the individual master who produced it, whether known to us by name or not. As slight external helps in this task, they have the scanty literary notices referred to at the outset of this address, but in the main they are obliged to rely upon the qualities of the works themselves. Here there is a temptation to apply the method pursued with so much zeal and confidence by Morelli and his followers in the field of Italian painting, the method which in discriminating artist from artist makes large use of little-noticed details, such as conformation of eye or ear. But the data presented to the student of Greek art are hardly comparable to those presented to the student of the Italian art of the Renaissance. In the latter field we have sufficiently well authenticated original works upon which to base our knowledge of the personal styles of the different masters, and from this sure foundation we may proceed to recognize other creations of theirs. But in the former field this sure foundation is almost everywhere lacking. With the fewest exceptions we are limited to mere copies. Now the broad features of a work of art, such as pose, proportions, disposition of drapery, survive in the better sort of copies; but the minutiae upon which we are tempted to rely in the effort to distin-

guish master from master — form of tear-duct, of ear-lobule, or whatever it be — may be due to the copyists and therefore valueless for the purpose desired. Indeed, the subjection of these inconspicuous details to the law of habit, which makes them useful as identifying marks, renders it unlikely that they would be reproduced save in copies of superlative accuracy; and copies of superlative accuracy are unfortunately very rare. Hence that method of connoisseurship which examines, as one means toward recognizing the individual master, the treatment of inconspicuous details must be regarded as largely inapplicable in dealing with Roman copies, or at least as of dubious probative force.

Again, the problem of recognizing, whether in originals or copies, the works of a single master is not merely the problem of recognizing decisive similarities. An artist's productions may vary greatly in different periods of his career, or even in one and the same period. If we are trying with our bits of evidence to make out the achievements and so the personal style of a great Greek sculptor, we need a theory as to the limits of the variation which we may in reason attribute to him. How are we to form such a theory? Judgments on this point commonly have an air of *a priori* dogmatism. Some one proposes to attribute two works to the same artist. The objector says, "No. The differences between the two are too great." No proof is offered, but such a verdict, in spite of its air of intuitive certainty, is doubtless derived more or less consciously from one's knowledge of art and artists generally in the past and in the present. Now I think that what is needed is a more thorough-going study directed to this very point. The work of artists of modern times lends itself to the purpose. Only when we have satisfied ourselves as to the widest limits of variation shown by any one of them are we in a position to form so much as a legitimate guess as to whether two Greek works are too unlike to have been conceived by a single brain and executed by a single hand.

Let me illustrate. There exist in Dresden two closely similar Athena figures, one headless, the other with head partially preserved. By combining, on the strength of convincing proof, a head in Bologna with the headless Dresden figure, and by supplying what else is missing in one from the other, two complete and substantially identical statues have been won.¹ It is argued that in these we possess copies of the Athena Lemnia of Phidias. Certainly the original must have been a work of extraordinary merit and one of the Phidiac age and school. There is some literary evidence, based chiefly upon the absence of a helmet from the head, for believing it to be by Phidias himself. While this external evidence is far from satisfactory, it appears to me to establish a considerable probability that the

¹ Furtwängler, *Masterpieces of Greek Sculpture*, p. 4 ff.

work, whether it be the Lemnia or not, — a point I would waive as of little consequence, — is at any rate by Phidias. But the objection is raised ¹ that the type of face is so different from the type of face of the Athena Parthenos of Phidias, known to us from unquestionable, though poor, copies, as to throw the gravest doubt on the proposed attribution. The difference does seem great: in the Parthenos a broad face with full cheeks and cheerful look, in the other a narrow oval face with sober, even severe expression. Can we suppose that one artist conceived and presented to his countrymen the same goddess in two aspects so unlike? Casting about for guidance here, I can think of nothing better than to examine the sculptured Madonnas of Michelangelo to see how far they agree among themselves in type of face. As a result I find between the circular relief in the Bargello, with its comparatively broad face and untroubled look, and the Bruges Madonna, with its narrow face and solemn expression, both of them productions of Michelangelo's early period, a difference which to me seems as great as we are obliged to suppose between the original Athena Parthenos and the original of the Bologna head under discussion. If my estimate be just, then there is surely no insuperable difficulty on this score in accepting the original of the Dresden statues as the work of Phidias.

Take another specific problem of a similar nature to the last, — a problem which has only recently come into the forefront of interest and which for this reason deserves to be treated somewhat more fully. For fifty years and more until the other day, a marble statue in the Vatican representing an apoxyomenus, that is, an athlete scraping himself with a strigil, has been universally regarded as an excellent copy of a bronze statue by Lysippus and as giving us our most trustworthy knowledge of that sculptor's style. This supposed knowledge has come to be a corner-stone in the history of Greek art. With our proneness to accept "what is believed always, everywhere, and by all," many of us had probably until lately not taken the trouble to scrutinize critically the evidence on which the identification depends. Let us look at it. Lysippus made an apoxyomenus, which was carried to Rome, was set up by Marcus Agrippa in front of his *Thermae*, and was there much admired. These facts do not carry us far, for the subject was no uncommon one and we possess no detailed description of the treatment of it by Lysippus. But the marble statue in question exhibits a system of bodily proportions radically different from that of Polyclitus and agreeing with the valuable, though inadequate, indications afforded by Pliny regarding the innovations introduced by Lysippus. On reflection, however, we see that the agreement does not really clinch the matter. At most

¹ Robinson, *Catalogue of Casts of Greek and Roman Sculpture in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston*, p. 89.

it only proves that the original of the apoxyomenus of the Vatican is not earlier than Lysippus; it does not prove that it is not later. But here other considerations come in, more difficult to weigh in the balances, but perhaps more influential in determining our opinion. We have copies, one of them certified by an inscription, of another work of Lysippus, a Heraclès leaning upon his club, and it seems as if the apoxyomenus fitted in very well with that. Moreover it has been thought that in pose and in details of modeling this statue is such as might be expected from the greatest sculptor of the age of Alexander, a sculptor whom it is permissible, if not obligatory, to regard as at least twenty years younger than Praxiteles. It has been thought that what we know or guess of other sculptures of the age of Alexander and later can be brought into intelligible relation to the apoxyomenus, considered as Lysippean. And as not the least potent argument, there has been the feeling that this statue is too fine to be the work of some nameless or obscure sculptor of post-Lysippean date.

These considerations would probably still continue to seem sufficient to every one, had not a new claimant for Lysippean authorship made its appearance, with credentials which have carried conviction far and wide. I refer to the marble statue of Agias¹ found some ten years ago at Delphi. This is one of a group or rather a row of eight statues, representing eight members of a Pharsalian family, the family of one Daochus, tetrarch of Thessaly, who set them up soon after the battle of Chæroneia (338 B. C.). The pedestal bore inscriptions, mostly metrical, giving the names of the persons represented, but no sculptors' signatures. Some of the statues, and above all the Agias, appeared from the first to the fortunate discoverer to exhibit the style of Lysippus. The matter entered a new stage in 1900, with the publication,² accompanied by an acute commentary, of a fragmentary inscription from Pharsalus, all but identical with the one engraved at Delphi below the statue of Agias, but with the important addition of the name of Lysippus as sculptor. There was then a statue of Agias by Lysippus at Pharsalus. Of this statue, presumably of bronze, nothing further is directly known, but it is inferred on reasonable grounds that it was one of a series identical in subjects with the series at Delphi and probably set up a little earlier. So far, so good. The next step is to infer that the unsigned marble Agias at Delphi is a contemporary and trustworthy copy of the bronze Agias by Lysippus at Pharsalus, and this inference has been promptly accepted by leading archaeologists, German, French, and English, without a murmur of doubt or protest, so far as I know, from any quarter. But whereas some who speak with authority have regarded

¹ *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 1899, pls. 10, 11.

² Preuner, *Ein delphisches Weihgeschenk*.

the Agias and the apoxyomenus as harmonious productions of a single artist, and as in fact confirming each other's claims to Lysippean authorship, another view is that the apoxyomenus shows such fundamental differences from the Agias and from other undisputedly fourth-century works that it must not only be denied to Lysippus, but be assigned to a post-Lysippean date. The argument is summed up in these sentences: "The feet are in the case of the apoxyomenus a feature which can scarcely be reconciled with a fourth-century origin. If we compare them with the foot of the Hermes of Praxiteles we shall find not merely a difference of school, but a difference so deep that it must show a different date. And can another work of the fourth century be found which shows the mastery of anatomy, and the precision in the rendering of detail, which we find in the apoxyomenus?"¹

But, after all, why should we regard the Agias of Delphi as Lysippean? The Thessalian tetrarch resident in Pharsalus decides to set up in his own city bronze statues representing earlier members of his family and himself, and for this series he engages the talent of the foremost sculptor in bronze of the day, and perhaps that of others. At the same time or later he decides to set up at Delphi marble statues representing the same persons. That he should use the same metrical epigrams for the two series is natural and appropriate. But is there any reason why the two sets of figures should look exactly alike? None, that I can see. The earlier members of the series, including the Agias, must probably be imaginary portraits, and I cannot suppose that any Greek would compare two sets of imaginary portraits in places separated by a journey of several days to see whether they agreed, or that he would be in the least surprised or disconcerted if he should happen to notice discrepancies. If it were a common practice of the time to make exact copies of statues, then, indeed, it would be the most economical and might be the most natural thing to have the bronze statues copied in marble. But in spite of what Pliny says about the invention by Lysistratus, brother of Lysippus, of the art of making casts from statues, there is no good reason to think that exact copying was common in Lysippus's day; indeed, some would go so far as to say that it was not practiced at all. Therefore, I think that Daochus would give the commission for the Delphian series, not to Lysippus and his associates, but to a sculptor or sculptors who habitually worked in marble, not hampering them with restrictions as to the relationship of their work to the other series. Whether they would be likely or not to be dominated by the influence of Lysippus, it is impossible to say *a priori*; perhaps not, as his work seems to have been exclusively in bronze. At all events, it is clearly unsafe to

¹ P. Gardner, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1903, p. 130.

make the Agias our basis for determining the personal style of Lysippus.

What is certain, then, is that, in the Agias of Delphi we have a marble statue contemporary with Lysippus, and the question recurs whether, in view of its qualities and those of other works of the time known to us in originals or in copies, we are forced to assign the apoxyomenus to a post-Lysippean date. As in the case of Phidias we faced the question, how wide a range of variation is possible to a single artist, so here we face the question, how wide a range of variation is possible to different artists living at the same time and under the same general conditions. For my own part, I am disposed to think that there is no fatal objection to believing that Lysippus, whom I regard as belonging to a younger generation than Praxiteles, was himself the creator of those innovations which mark the apoxyomenus off from the Agias. And I am confirmed in this opinion when it is pointed out to me how far Leonardo da Vinci was in advance of Lorenzo di Credi, who was actually by seven years Leonardo's junior.

Finally, some one may ask, "Is all this painful balancing of probabilities worth while? Why pursue this difficult path toward a dubious end? Why not take each remnant of classic art for just what it is in itself, enjoying it according to its merits, and not tormenting ourselves with trying to establish its relations to other existent or non-existent things?" Perhaps these questions take us beyond the proper bounds of the subject prescribed for this address. Nevertheless, I beg leave to say in answer that I have a good deal of sympathy with the point of view which prompts such questions. For the great multitude of cultivated people the important thing is to know and appreciate works of art, rather than to understand their history. A knowledge of the history of Greek sculpture is no more necessary to an enjoyment of the Elgin marbles than a knowledge of the history of music is necessary to an enjoyment of a symphony by Beethoven. There is reason to fear that in academic teaching the historical side of the study of art is disproportionately emphasized. But that detailed and comparative scrutiny upon which a knowledge of the history of art rests ought not to stifle the power of enjoyment. Rather it ought to make enjoyment richer and deeper. Moreover the intellect has its rights, as well as the æsthetic faculty. It is a legitimate, yes, with some an imperative, desire to know what can be known of the conditions, material and spiritual, that gave birth to immortal works of art. But let us not forget that what gives dignity to this study is the power of the work of art to stir the emotions, to divert, console, inspire. If we forget that, our study is barren of its chief reward.

SECTION B—MODERN ARCHITECTURE

SECTION B—MODERN ARCHITECTURE

(Hall 7, September 22, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: MR. CHARLES F. MCKIM, New York City.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR C. ENLART, University of Paris.

PROFESSOR ALFRED D. F. HAMLIN, Columbia University.

SECRETARY: MR. GUY LOWELL, Boston, Mass.

THE Chairman of the Section of Modern Architecture, Mr. Charles F. McKim, of New York City, spoke as follows:

"The unexampled opportunity offered our profession by this international congress to meet and hear a great number of eminent men of learning from all parts of the world, and to do honor to our distinguished guests, has drawn us together to-day. The tribute you make by your presence is abundant proof of your interest, at a time when the demands of professional practice are both numerous and imperative. It is eminently fit and proper that one of the divisions of this great congress should be devoted to architecture; not only is this true, but we are highly fortunate to be assembled here in a community whose splendid spirit of progress in recent years has placed it in the front rank of cities in the march of public improvement.

"Under these circumstances, I deem it a high privilege and pleasure to be permitted to welcome you to this session on 'Modern Architecture.' Architecture is the oldest of the arts. Its principles were developed early in the history of the race. Its laws were formulated long before the Christian Era, and its most exquisite flowers bloomed under the skies that fostered the production of beauty. An era of unequalled material and industrial prosperity throughout the country, together with a better understanding on the part of our builders, has brought to us great opportunities. But we should realize that great opportunities demand thorough training, that confidence comes not from inspiration, but from knowledge, that the architect who would build for the ages to come must have training of the ages that are gone. He must be faithful to the present, mindful of the future, and yet *not* separated from the past. I think we may say of our Muse what, in his recent tribute to Columbia, Bishop Greer said on the occasion of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of that university:

"She journeys on, o'er that lonely steep, the hinder foot still firmer."

RELATIONS OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE TO THE STUDY OF OTHER PERIODS OF THE ART

BY CAMILLE ENLART

(Translated from the French by Mr. F. P. Keppel, of Columbia University)

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I SHALL endeavor to present a rapid review of the evolution of the study of the architectural history of the Middle Ages and of the present condition of this study, so far as it relates to France. It is essentially a modern science. Nothing, however, is so modern as not to have its roots in the past, and from the sixteenth century on, there were those who were interested in the monuments of the Middle Ages: in particular, their beauties had appealed to two scholarly architects, Philibert de l'Orme, who recommended the work of the old masters in architecture as models of construction; and Jacques Androuet du Cerceau, who made a collection of *relevés* "of the most excellent buildings of France." However, the whole point of view of the artists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rendered the Middle Ages utterly unintelligible to them: the historians alone studied the period, and in their study, so far as the records show us, the fine arts played but a small part. Two celebrated scholars, Peiresc, who died in 1637, and Gauguieres, who died in 1715, made collections of drawings of those monuments which relate to the history of France; and from 1729 to 1733 the Benedictine Convent of Montfaucon published a series of engravings of the same kind of subjects under the title, *Monuments of the French Monarchy*. This work is, however, very imperfect.

It would seem that the Abbé Le Boeuf, the historian of the Diocese of Paris, who died in 1760, regarded our monuments with less scorn and with more just appreciation than did his contemporaries. His opinions regarding them were sufficiently definite to warrant him in assigning exact dates to the buildings, but no one took the trouble to gather together his lectures or his manuscript notes.

To this unjust neglect of the art of the Middle Ages the Revolution added actual hate. Until then the buildings had been spared because of religious associations or out of respect for the ancient territorial families, but now these memories became odious, and acts of vandalism became matters of principle. However, there were two men, more thoughtful than their contemporaries, who interested themselves in the monuments at this period: Alexandre Lenoir obtained permission from the Convention to create a museum of French

architecture from *débris* gathered from all the edifices that had been sacked, and Millin went about through France, in order to sketch the most curious examples and to learn something about their history. He published his *National Antiquities* from 1790 to 1798, and in 1792, an Englishman named Ducarel came over to study the subject, and published in England a book on the Norman edifices of France.

The first really critical work was written in 1816 by a member of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Emeric David. His *History of French Sculpture* shows a point of view astonishingly in advance of his time; and his work is so accurate and his references so clear that to-day one can hardly do more than change a few lines here and there. It must be added that this work could find no publisher during the lifetime of its author. It did not appear until forty years after it was written; and while the great *History of Art through its Architectural Monuments* by Seroux d'Agincourt, published in 1827, is a trustworthy effort, it is a work that in comparison to that of David seems very immature. The men who in 1795 had overturned the throne and the altar were in all matters of art most fervent believers, indeed, almost Ultramontanes. The doctrine of the infallibility of the Roman ideas in art in their eyes did not admit of the slightest discussion; the Restoration hardly modified their ideas. Châteaubriand, however, discovered the poetry of the Gothic churches; and in general it was through the men of letters that the Middle Ages were already on the way toward being understood and appreciated, when, about 1830, the Romantic movement brought about freedom of thought in matters relating to art.

Like all revolutions, the Romantic movement went too far, and it misunderstood the true nature of those principles whose beauty it had discovered; but it is not often that public opinion is conquered by just and well-balanced ideas. Public opinion was brought to appreciate the architecture of the Middle Ages by Victor Hugo and his school, and the official sanction of this worthy *renaissance* was the creation of the Commission on Historical Monuments in 1838, and, in 1847, the establishment of *l'Ecole des Chartes*, where a course in national archaeology was offered by the director, J. Quicherat. Through these institutions there has come about a logical and scholarly procedure in restorations and in the study of our edifices from the historical point of view.

With regard to restorations: Just at this time the restoration of St. Denis had made it clear that a more serious study was absolutely necessary. The idea of restoring the glories of an edifice which summed up the annals of the French monarchy had been dear alike to Napoleon, to Louis XVIII, to Charles X, and to Louis Philippe. But each one of the three régimes had ignominiously failed to carry it out. The chief architect, Debret, made himself famous by his

mistakes. It was still believed with all seriousness that all that was necessary to do in order to imitate the Middle Ages was to make mistakes in composition and in drawing, just as children think that they imitate a strange language when they make a jargon of discordant sounds. Never was so much money so maladroitly expended. All the ornaments of the façades were robbed of their character. The great bell-tower was in bad condition; the result of its rebuilding was its immediate collapse.

To the architect J. B. Antoine de Lassus belongs the honor of having rediscovered the rules and the real spirit of Gothic art, and of applying them in the restoration of the cathedral of Notre Dame de Paris, which was completed by Viollet-le-Duc, and which is a real masterpiece. At the same time Lassus published the *Album of Villard de Honnecourt*. It is a matter of great regret that this learned and artistic man should have worked so slowly and that his life was so short. Viollet-le-Duc, who was his collaborator and afterwards his successor, has eclipsed him; but although much more brilliant as a writer and much more productive, his restorations were not always so satisfactory as those of Lassus.

While Victor Hugo was inflaming all imaginations with the art of the Middle Ages, of which he himself had, by the way, a most uncritical conception, there were other writers who were rendering serious services to its history.

In 1828 Baron Taylor and Charles Nodier joined forces to publish the immense collection of the *Voyages Pittoresques et Romantiques dans l'ancienne France*, which contains some valuable information and a great number of beautiful and often very accurate lithographic drawings, precious to-day as witnesses of the condition of the great works at that time.

A very useful and reliable work was that of the Count Léon de Labord. In his researches relating to the history of the dukes of Burgundy published in 1849-50, he has set an excellent example — the first of its kind — by showing what may be done for the history of art by a careful study of the earliest records.

It was for two men, Viollet-le-Duc and Quicherat, respectively, to establish standards of taste and intelligence with regard to the art of the Middle Ages, and accurate ideas as to its history and a scholarly method for its study. Quicherat delivered erudite professorial lectures at l'Ecole des Chartes to a picked body of experts. Viollet-le-Duc, on the other hand, won the favor of the entire public by the magic of his expositions and deductions and the charm with which he was able to present his ideas. He maintained with inimitable eloquence that, however different might be Greek art, Gothic art is in no way inferior, either in structure or in beauty, and that it is far superior to Roman art, which is neither original nor delicate.

Viollet-le-Duc's mind was too keen and too active for him not to pass on from this conclusion to theories for the reform of modern art. He proclaimed the necessity of a new style which should be as original and as logical as the Greek or the Gothic. It is, however, from the point of view of the archaeologist that one must judge him here, and one is compelled to admit two defects: in the first place he undertook too much to be able always to go back to the original sources in order to verify his data. In his admirable encyclopaedia of French architecture are many errors as to details, corrected by M. Anthyme Saint-Paul in 1880. Happily these inaccuracies do not militate against the clarity and the justice of his admirable general ideas on the subject. In his restorations the same haste brings about the same defects, and here they are more serious; his confidence in the architectural principles which he deduced too often urged him to make his restorations in a spirit that is dogmatic rather than historical: he rebuilt edifices as they should have been, instead of restoring them to what they actually had been. His disciples were beguiled by his example, with results that the historical student must deplore. Even worse, charmed as they were by the beauties of unity and logic, Viollet-le-Duc and his disciples often obliterated from buildings early repairs which might have been heterogeneous, but which had their own beauty, and which in any case were of historic value.

Quicherat, on the contrary, was the apostle of truth rather than of beauty. He was too much of a skeptic to carry his preferences to the point of enthusiasm; too little a friend of the human race to permit himself to become a popularizer and proselyter; his spirit was not that of the artist, but that of the savant. Disregarding popular approval, he devoted his labor and his zeal to the attainment of historical accuracy. He was a patient analyzer, one who put all documents to the test of a most careful scrutiny, and who never generalized beyond the limits of prudence. He was the creator of an admirable school and method, both of them exerting a beneficent influence that is still felt.

Possibly the essential difference in character of these two men, to whom we owe the education of the scholar and that of the artist in France, has had something to do with the antagonism which still exists between archaeologists and architects.

Contemporary with these two masters, but much less important than they, one must place the well-known name of M. de Caumont, the popularizer *par excellence* of the archaeology of the Middle Ages. From 1830 to 1870, from the depths of his retreat in Normandy, he continued to exercise a most mischievous influence. May I be permitted to say that the reason that he succeeded in popularizing the subject is that his conception of it, in contrast to that of Viollet-le-Duc and Quicherat, was essentially a commonplace one? Thanks

to his *Alphabet of Archaeology*, constantly reissued and revised from 1830 to 1870, the archaeology of the Middle Ages had no longer any mysteries for the French curé or the chemist of the provincial town. It became the harmless pastime of the college student on his vacation; and, thanks to the foundation of the French Society of Archaeology, with its organ, the *Bulletin Monumental*, with its annual congresses and the reports presented at them, all the readers of the *Alphabet* came into touch with each other and were enabled to receive constantly, more or less regular instruction. Thus they learned to examine and pass judgment upon the architectural monuments in their neighborhood. When the congress came to them, caretakers and curés were happy and proud to appear for the occasion as learned men and to do the honors of their manor-houses or their churches; the buildings glittering with stained glass and coats of arms recently renovated and considerably embellished in the process. The work of De Caumont spread over a considerable surface, because it had practically no depth; his book is essentially the work of a provincial, it was made from a study of the Norman monuments; and his horizon is limited in every direction. Never in all his life did a general idea, a philosophical conception, or a logical train of reasoning come to him. His work consists of a series of statements, sufficiently great in number to make possible the formulating of chronological rules.

The matter was spread out with great regularity, and was then cut up just as one makes caramels. The divisions follow regular lines, the arbitrary limits of the centuries; as in geology, each period has a name. The definitions, like the names, are based upon accidents of form without real bearing, and not upon principles, or upon forms that are really generic and essential.

Another popularizer, more intelligent than De Caumont, but an illogical thinker, was Didron. This man accomplished a great deal of work, and, in his *Archaeological Annals*, has left a monument of permanent value. He was an artist of taste, a painter on glass and a designer of bronzes; a merchant who was not averse to advertisement, but, at the same time, a man of considerable scholarship. His temperament was ardent and controversial; he was an eloquent denunciator of vandalism and a militant Catholic. While rendering great services to medieval archaeology, he made three serious mistakes. Justly indignant as he was at certain restorations, but immoderate in his criticisms and not entirely free from prejudice, he did his share in bringing about the antagonism between archaeologists and architects, an antagonism which is still a misfortune to both, and, above all, a misfortune to the monuments themselves.

Didron was right in seeing in the art of the Middle Ages the expression of Christian civilization, but he exaggerated this point of view to the extent of seeing nothing but heresy in the art of the Renaissance

and that of modern times. Lastly, it was through his influence that medieval art became closely interwoven with clericalism in the minds of very many people, with two very unfortunate results: the creation of a nondescript neo-Gothic art, exaggerated by mysticism (of this, the work of Didron himself furnishes some of the earliest models) and, secondly, a distrust of medieval art on the part of the non-clerical public.

Along with these influential men Mérimée, a delicate littérateur and excellent archaeologist, should have an honorable place. In archaeology, as in literature, he had a keen eye and a refined taste, and that sense of proportion which Didron lacked. He was able to bring to light in the French provinces numberless treasures of art which, upon his recommendation, have been rescued from oblivion by the Commission on Historical Monuments.

At this time, Révoil, an eminent archaeologist and ardent Southerner, was a distinguished member of this Commission. We owe to him a number of restorations of unequal merit and a sumptuous work upon the Romanesque architecture of the Midi, which contains beautiful illustrations of more permanent value than the text.

Two other scholars, MM. Vitet and Daniel Ramée, should be mentioned as among the best of the archaeologists of the middle of the nineteenth century. Vitet was the first to prepare an elaborate and richly illustrated monograph upon a French cathedral. He chose Noyon, and his work is still the only one that contains adequate drawings of this edifice; the text is now no longer up to the standard of our present scientific knowledge, but it has formed a valuable basis for later researches. The same may be said of Ramée's archaeological studies and his short essay upon the history of architecture.

Two conscientious archaeologists of keen insight and skilled as draughtsmen were Léo Drouyn, of Bordeaux, whose *Military History of Guienne* is a complete and accurate monograph, with illustrations which were destined to form the most valuable part of the books of M. de Caumont, and Félix de Verneilh, of Périgord, known to fame for his theory that Byzantine art came into France in the tenth century from the Venetians, a most ingenious theory, but one which later documentary discoveries have exploded.

While these masters were making known the history of our architecture, that of our industrial arts was being defined by such men as Dusommerard, Paul Lacroix, known as "Bibliophile Jacob," Dareel, Ferdinand de Lasteyrie, who wrote on the arts of the goldsmith and the painter upon glass, and, above all, Charles de Linas, whose researches in gold-work and enameling leave nothing more to be done. An immense work on the *History of the Industrial Arts* by Labarte, written too early, unfortunately, is still the only body of knowledge

which we have on this subject. We are, however, expecting its replacement by the work of M. E. Molimer.

The fact that the Gothic style had been carried into foreign lands by French monks had been noted about 1857 by Félix de Verneilh; about 1860, Palestine and Syria were explored by the Marquis de Vogüé and Baron Rey. The first studied the churches of the Crusaders and the second their castles. In addition, M. de Vogüé brought to light the Christian architecture of Central Syria during the period from the fourth to the eighth century, the period which forms the connecting link between medieval and classic art, and discovered there the prototypes of our medieval architecture. The period of Early Christian art in Gaul was illumined by Le Blant's fine volumes upon Christian sarcophagi.

To the labor of these men, who did so much for the history of the art of their country, should be added that of foreign scholars. In England, about 1792, Ducarel made a study of Norman architecture; later, about the middle of the nineteenth century, Willis published an edition of the *Album of Villard de Honnecourt*; Parker made a comparison of the French edifices with those of England; Street, in studying the architecture of Spain and Northern Italy, recognized very definite French influences. In Germany, Hübsch, Schnaase, Sulpice Boisserée, threw considerable light upon the history of our art.

The results obtained by this first generation of scholars are now distanced and have had, in many instances, to be corrected; but they were none the less of value.

Medieval architecture, a dead letter for the men of the eighteenth century, who, with the sole exception of Le Boeuf, could not assign a date within a thousand years, had, in 1830, its definite limits, and, in 1880, at the time of the death of Viollet-le-Duc and Quicherat, the entire body of its history was made the property of the French people. The different epochs, Merovingian, Carolingian, and Romanesque (with its two divisions of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and its many schools), were recognized, but were not clearly defined. In the Gothic style three periods were clearly distinguished. The history of each cathedral and abbey was known and, to some extent, the history of the influences of French art upon foreign schools.

But, together with much truth, several errors were being propagated. For the most tenacious we must thank M. de Caumont, who, taking the opposite view from that of Millin, interpreted the term *croisée d'ogives* as equivalent to "pointed arched window." Caumont called the pointed arch the *ogive*, whereas ogives are in reality the salient ribs forming the groins at the intersection of two vaults (*arcus ogivus* = *arc de renfort*). A more serious error, for it lies in a fact and not in a word, was that which made him choose

the pointed arch as the characteristic of the Gothic style, which, for this reason, he christened "ogival." He would by this classification have brought into Gothic architecture practically all the Romanesque buildings of Burgundy and Provence and half of those of the Isle de France; all those of the North, of Central France, and of the Southwest.

Félix de Verneilh made another blunder; having no knowledge of the destruction of Saint Front de Périgueux in 1120 by a fire, of which a complete account appears in the chronicles of the bishops, he thought that he saw in the famous present church with its domes the edifice of 1040. He believed it to have been derived from Saint Mark's at Venice, which was also attributed to the tenth century, and he saw in it the prototype of the domed churches of Périgord; whereas, as a matter of fact, many of these latter are much more ancient, and none of them come down farther than the year 1100.

Révoil, in studying the art of Provence, believed that he could assign definite dates to very ancient foundations through certain epigraphic characteristics and certain architectural forms imitated from the antique. He believed in an unbroken persistence of these influences in Provence, whereas there was only a renaissance of it in the twelfth century, as is shown, on the one hand, by the late date of the buildings that approach nearest to Roman art, Saint Gilles and Saint Trophime of Arles; and, on the other hand, the crudeness of those relics that are known to be connected with the Merovingian or Carolingian periods, as, for instance, the crypts of Saint Victor of Marseilles, of Montmajour and of Digne.

From 1880 until the present time the schism between the disciples of Viollet-le-Duc and those of Quicherat has become more clearly defined. This is due to the divergent paths along which their masters led and which they followed. The pupils of Quicherat lived in the speculative domain of history; those of Viollet-le-Duc in the practical domain of art. Without relinquishing the study of the evolution of the medieval styles, the architects of the school of Viollet-le-Duc have more and more come to neglect historical researches in order to give their attention to the architectural forms, both in the interests of restoration and of original construction. With regard to restoration, M. Lucien Magne has come to the point of announcing as a principle that all attempts to imitate closely the ancient form should be abandoned, and that the monuments of the past should rather be completed in a modern style that will be harmonious with the ancient parts of the building. This principle he has applied very happily in the church of Bougival.

This whole point of view has met with much opposition in Belgium from the pupils of Baron Béthune, a rival of Viollet-le-Duc, and by the professors of l'Ecole Saint Luc, especially the architect Cloquet.

These men are most particular as to the question of the imitation of the Gothic style, even in new buildings, and, as a matter of principle, restore the old buildings without the slightest divergence from the original style.

In France, the most eloquent and the most learned of the pupils of Viollet-le-Duc, M. de Baudot, has exerted an excellent influence and has offered a well-attended course in the Museum of the Trocadéro. He has made the study of the styles of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance serve ends that are not speculative, but practical. In other words, his results are not copies, but logical deductions. The Rationalist school, of which he is the head, studies the principles of the masters of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance and modifies them in so far as the modern problems have become modified by new building-materials, better facilities for transportation, more practical mechanical devices, and changes in customs and needs.

Unfortunately the Rationalist School meets great difficulty in the fixed habits of contractors and workmen, who have become accustomed to work and to set their prices in accordance with the prevailing usage. Furthermore, the results obtained by mechanical appliances give a monotony that is not in the spirit of an architecture that is really carefully studied out in its details.

Still, M. de Baudot has, in the new church of Montmartre, succeeded in creating entirely new forms adapted to iron and cement construction; and another artist, M. Plumet, has carried on higher and higher the art of adapting from the Gothic forms a modern architecture that is at the same time thoroughly logical and thoroughly satisfactory.

The Middle Ages have come to exert so strong an influence on our study that, for the last fifteen years, l'Ecole des Beaux Arts itself has maintained a course by M. Paul Boeswilwald which acquaints young architects with the artistic history of their country; and, shortly after this course began, one was opened by M. Lucien Magne upon decorative art, in which the principles of M. Viollet-le-Duc were openly approved.

One idea of Viollet-le-Duc's, which was realized only after his death, has become very fruitful in its results. This was the establishment, in 1882, of the Museum of Sculpture and Architecture at the Trocadéro. The Museum has developed in an astonishing way, and it has been literally a revelation to the public. It contains casts of carefully selected examples from the architecture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and makes them still better known to the public by sale of copies.

Architectural work in France is to-day improving, and no one can question that the present advance in style and accuracy is the result

of the general propagation by those who have come under the influence of the instruction of Quicherat and of the methods of l'Ecole des Chartes.

The influence of the successor and the chief disciple of Quicherat, M. de Lasteyrie, is predominant among the present historians of French art. He had many pupils, and the results of his teaching have been more immediately felt than those of M. de Baudot, as the publication of books does not offer the same practical difficulties as the construction of buildings. M. de Lasteyrie and his pupils, of whom I have the honor to be one, give their attention as much to the careful study of historical records as to that of architectural forms, and their methods of research are equally rigorous in both. Thanks to their efforts, the history of medieval architecture has achieved an extraordinary precision as to dates and general conclusions. The desire to be able to settle everything exactly has, however, sometimes tempted some of us too far. By crediting certain vague texts with an accuracy which they do not possess, we have made serious blunders. In his last work, M. de Lasteyrie gives a rather dangerous example, when, having noticed with regard to the cathedral of Chartres that *introitur ecclesie* cannot possibly have reference to the doorway, he affirms that the portal of Saint Gilles was completed in 1170 because an act was passed in that year *ante fores ecclesie*. A similar case is that in which he affirms that the southern tower of Chartres is more ancient than the porch because a tower is a more necessary architectural feature than a porch. Some of the errors resulting from the too eager scrutiny of the texts are not less dangerous than the too absolute judgments of Viollet-le-Duc. M. Lefèvre Pontalis makes an error of more than a quarter-century as to the date of the church of Bellefontaine from having believed that a formal permission to build in 1124 must have immediately been followed by actual construction, and he has multiplied the error through assigning dates to a number of other churches as the result of his conclusions as to Bellefontaine. A disregard for historical accuracy threatens to make very difficult the establishment of a geographical chart for the Romanesque schools of architecture. For the last twenty years, the pupils of M. de Lasteyrie have devoted themselves to the study of these schools, taking as a framework the ecclesiastical boundary lines, although, as indeed would be the case to-day, the influence that held certain groups of artists within certain territories could not have been other than political,—the influence of vassalage. The frontiers of the spiritual jurisdiction were entirely different.

It was from l'Ecole des Chartes that there came an authority whose too early death occurred only a few years ago, Louis Courajod. He established a course on the history of French art at l'Ecole du Louvre, for which a worthy successor has been found in the

person of André Michel. While taking a most scrupulous account of the texts, their teaching rests much more on the æsthetic point of view than did that of Quicherat and his successors, and it certainly does not seem to be less fruitful in results than that of l'Ecole des Chartes. Courajod indeed erred, from time to time, by reason of his too vivid imagination. His theory, basing the origin of the Gothic style upon the necessities of construction in wood, which has been contradicted by the actual facts, has been abandoned. One of his pupils, M. Albert Marignan, has shown himself to be a distinguished architect of unquestioned originality. Through his undertaking to prove that they were of much more recent date than had been believed, he has to his credit the bringing about of a general reconsideration of the dates of the most celebrated monuments. The buildings lend themselves only in a small degree to Marignan's attempt; for instance, his opinions with regard to the great doorway of Chartres and the tapestries of Bayeux have provoked most interesting replies from M. de Lasteyrie as to Chartres and M. Lanore as to Bayeux.

An authority who is a teacher only by his writings, M. Anthyme Saint-Paul, has a wide and most salutary influence in pointing out the historical errors of Viollet-le-Duc and in editing with modern scholarship and critical insight the archaeological sections of the *Guides Joanne*. He has brought an immense mass of accurate information within the reach of the public, and has corrected a number of erroneous theories.

Another independent authority, the ingenious M. Auguste Choisy, has published monographs that are masterly in their technical analysis of Roman and Byzantine architecture, exhibiting a penetration and a power of synthesis that are beyond all praise. Here and there only, in points of detail, is there a lack of information or an erroneous historical deduction.

One must also say a word with reference to the interesting labors of the Count de Dion upon two branches of medieval architecture that have been too much neglected, the châteaux and the monasteries, and also the valuable research of the lamented Palustre upon the French Renaissance. One cannot say too much in praise of the work of M. Emile Mâle upon the *Religious Art of the Thirteenth Century*,—too comprehensive a title, by the way,—of which two editions have appeared within the last three years. The author has traced with astonishing success the literary sources from which have come the paintings and sculptures that decorate our churches.

In addition to the publication by provincial societies of architectural statistics, along various lines and of most unequal merit,—and in general distinctly inferior to those published in Germany,—researches have been made into the different schools of art of the

French provinces, and particularly as to the art of the Romanesque school. Révoil studied in Provence, and Ruprich Robert, the elder, worked later in Normandy. Their labors are important, but incomplete, and their conclusions can be accepted only in part. We owe to M. Brutails a masterly study on religious art in Roussillon. Finally the lamented M. Rochemonteix studied the Romanesque art of the altar. The greater part of this research appears in the form of theses by the students of l'Ecole des Chartes. Among eleven theses of this character only four have been published, those of MM. Lefèvre Pontalis, Jean Virey, Thiollier, and my own. The French school at Rome has now taken up researches into the history of art on its own account. From 1889 to 1894 I studied in Rome the French origins of Gothic art, and this year M. Bertaux published there the first volume of a most important study on the art of Southern Italy. Other works are in preparation. The students of the school at the Louvre, unwilling to be left behind by their rivals, have been doing their share in this work. Up to the present time they have occupied themselves mainly with the Renaissance, M. Vitry in a beautiful book upon Michel Colombe, and MM. Marquet de Vasselot and Raymond Koechlin in the study of the sixteenth-century sculpture at Troyes. M. Salomon Reinach has carried on to the period of the Middle Ages the course of lectures upon national antiquities delivered by M. Bertrand. Two experts, who were friends of the lamented Courajod, MM. André Michel and Lemonnier, faithfully gathered together his lecture-notes, and have published them. Finally, I myself have been able to bring out, within the last two years, two volumes of a manual of French archaeology, in which I think has been gathered together the present knowledge of our national architecture from the sixth to the sixteenth century.

For the past one hundred years foreign archaeologists have constantly been making important contributions to the history of French architecture. In 1792 the Englishman Ducarel led his French confrères in the study of the Norman architectural monuments. In our own time, an American and two Germans have, similarly, led in the study of certain historical questions.

The French archaeologists have confined themselves too closely to their own country, and the superiority of several of these foreign works lies in the fact that their authors were able to see French architecture in the light of their knowledge of that of other countries. It is these comparisons that give its great value to Professor Dehio's exhaustive work on Occidental Ecclesiastical Architecture, the publication of which began in 1885. This is a colossal work, which combines much personal research with a *résumé* of many hundreds of other books, the whole being unified by his personal point of view, just as all the drawings in the work are upon the same scale. For the future

this publication must be regarded as an indispensable tool for all who wish to make a serious study of medieval art.

The first man to publish a complete book upon Gothic architecture, and to show that the beginnings and the culmination of this architecture were in France, was Professor Charles Moore of Harvard University. This excellent book, published first in 1889, had a great success and was republished, with many improvements, in 1900. It is one of the most original and most logical works that have been written upon the subject. Mr. Moore admits as "Gothic architecture" only the purest types, all very rare, and practically limited to the Isle de France: the imperfect Gothic he calls "pointed architecture." This system of classification is a little radical, and the expression "pointed" seems unsatisfactory, because the pointed arch was a frequent element in Romanesque architecture.

Finally, among the most important foreign works must be mentioned the book of Dr. Wilhelm Vogë on *The Beginnings of the Monumental Styles of the Middle Ages*. It is a history of the origins of monumental sculpture in France, and is precious on account of the range of its researches, the accuracy of its statements, and its richness in comparisons. The general conclusions, however, appear in the light of our present information to be capable of refutation.

An Italian, Commandatore Rivoira, has made a very important study of the Lombard influences in France, and an Englishman, John Bilson, has just produced most disturbing but most convincing documents with reference to the origin of the Gothic style.

In conclusion, I should like to outline the questions that have to-day been settled, and those that are still debatable.

The chronology of the buildings and the method of their study have reached the maximum of accuracy. Nowadays, indeed, we have more than one example of too great accuracy. The history of our art in the Middle Ages has been written and many errors have been rectified. The history of our Merovingian and Carolingian epochs remains obscure. In 1891 M. de Lasteyrie pointed out Quicherat's errors in the restoration of the Basilica of St. Martin, of Tours. M. Brutails and M. Maître are still discussing the date of St. Philibert de Grandlieu. Since 1882, Daniel Ramée has been demonstrating how uncertain are all the attributions of dates to those buildings that are regarded as earlier than the year 1000. The question of Oriental origins enters into the study of the work of this period. MM. Lasteyrie and Brutails are not prepared to go as far upon this point as are M. de Vogüé and Dieulafoy and Choisy. M. Grell, however, has come to the conclusion from his study of the Basilicas of Algeria and Tunis that these developed along with those of the Occident, and notes curious likenesses between the two. Commandatore Rivoira, on the other hand, in his fine work on the origins of Lombard art, makes clear that from the

fifth to the ninth century Italy had nothing to do with the Orient, and created on her own behalf an analogous art, whose monuments are anterior to those of the Byzantine Empire. As to the Romanesque epoch, M. Anthyme Saint-Paul, in opposition to the opinions of Verneilh and Corroyer, has just demonstrated that the school of Périgord does not go back as far as the tenth century, but only about as far as the year 1100, and that Saint Front of Périgueux, rebuilt later than 1120, is not its most ancient edifice.

The Byzantine origin of this French school is denied by M. Brutails, but I hope to be able to show that its models are probably Cypriote edifices of from the ninth to the twelfth century. The geography and the classification of the Romanesque and Gothic schools has not yet been entirely cleared up, but it is in the way of being so.

That the Gothic style originated in France is to-day universally recognized. The history of its diffusion into other lands is known in a general way, and has been studied in detail with regard to France, Spain, Scandinavia, and the Island of Cyprus. I have recognized the English origin of the "flamboyant" style, which was developed in France, but whose elements found their origin in England one or two centuries before their adoption with us.

One question, however, remains in great obscurity, — the origin of the groined ribbed vault (*croisée d'ogives*). Contrary to the opinion of Quicherat, Max van Berchem has shown that the Romans did not know this feature of architectural construction, and that the "cancri" of the lighthouse at Alexandria were "crabs," analogous to those bronze crabs of the Cleopatra's Needle now in New York in the care of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. The most ancient groined ribbed vaults may well be those of Saint Ambrose of Milan. M. D'Arbois de Jubert, in his fine book on Lombard art, attributes these to the ninth century. Cattaneo refuted him in 1889, but MM. Dehio, Rivoira, and Moore still believe them to be of the eleventh century. In support of this theory, M. Rivoira has cited a church at Montefiascone which at the same time has this element, and bears a *commemorative* inscription placing its construction in the eleventh century. Unhappily, this inscription, embedded in a façade which was rebuilt in the fifteenth century, might, and probably did, belong to an earlier church of which no other trace remains to-day. This church, therefore, proves nothing. On the other hand, I have demonstrated that the most ancient examples of Gothic art in Italy date from the end of the twelfth and from the thirteenth century, and were introduced from Burgundy by the monks of Cîteaux, a fact which Mr. A. L. Frothingham, Jr., announced at the same time that I did, and one about which no one is any longer in doubt. The attribution of the Ambrosian vaults to the eleventh century does not exactly accord with this point of view.

Mr. John Bilson has shown that Durham Cathedral in England had groined ribbed vaults between 1093 and 1104, and M. de Lasteyrie has not been able to bring any convincing arguments against this. The groined ribbed vault must then have been of Anglo-Norman origin, for M. Lefèvre Pontalis has not succeeded in maintaining against the arguments of M. Anthyme Saint-Paul the attribution of the groined ribbed vaults of Morienval to an earlier date than 1120, and no other French example can with certainty be assigned to an earlier period.

As to the Gothic style itself, MM. de Lasteyrie, Moore, Gonse, and Lefèvre Pontalis believe it to have originated in the Isle de France. M. Dehio alone believes it was due to the collaboration of the master builders of France, Picardy, Burgundy, Lombardy, and Anjou, an hypothesis that neither M. Saint-Paul nor I myself regard as inadmissible.

M. de Lasteyrie has shown, as has M. Marignan, that, contrary to the opinion of M. de Vogüé, the statued portals of Saint Denis and of Chartres are earlier than those of Saint Gilles and of Arles. They were all built in the second half of the twelfth century, but the typical model came from the North and not from the South. This fact is definitely decided, and there is no longer any discussion except as to differences of a few years with regard to the dates of Chartres and Le Mans.

An error in terminology with reference to the end of the Middle Ages was started when Courajod gave the name of Burgundian School to the work of Flemish sculptors who worked at Dijon at the end of the fourteenth and during the fifteenth century. It is interesting to see that Belgium itself, following this classification, displays its national sculpture under the title of Burgundian School. I found recently in Flanders at Douai fragments that are contemporary with the famous tombs at Dijon, and identical in style. The Flemish art of Dijon was not in any way different from that of its native land. The origins of this Flemish art, however, were French, as Mr. Koechlin has now demonstrated. Finally, there is still discussion as to how great was the Italian influence in the French Renaissance. The lamented Eugène Müntz, in a clear exposition of the character of this influence, while restating the story of Laurana and his works, does not throw into sufficient light the personal character that the French architects and sculptors succeeded in giving to their imitations of Italian art. On the other hand, the late Léon Palustre showed himself most illogical in exaggerating this originality and in minimizing the influence of the Italians in France. M. Vachon has taken up in this spirit the parts played respectively by Boccador and Chambiges in the building of the Hotel de Ville of Paris. His arguments rest, however, on engravings and tapestries of doubtful

authenticity. This question will be settled not only in this particular case, but for the whole period, by the study which Baron Geymüller has just published in Germany on the French Renaissance, and which will be translated. He makes most interesting revelations as to the lack of originality of such buildings as the Château de Blois, where imperfections have been servilely copied from the Italian models. This work apparently is to be the final word upon the question.

I will conclude this rapid review, ladies and gentlemen, by saying that nothing is more fruitful than the comparative study of art and that nothing can be of greater value than such a gathering as I have just had the honor of addressing. This honor will always be one of the happiest memories of my career as a scholar, and I thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your kind reception and for the courteous attention with which you have heard me.

THE PROBLEMS OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE

BY ALFRED DWIGHT FOSTER HAMLIN

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It is not easy to estimate correctly the significance and true proportions of present-day movements. We are so near them, that by the laws of historical perspective — as inexorable as those of linear perspective — the relative importance and true dimensions of things are distorted into false aspects. If the observer would not be misled by mere appearances, he must seek to divest himself of the traditional prejudices of his present-day environment, and survey the scene from heights whence he may command broader horizons and discover the larger aspects of the view. If we cannot reach the mountain summits of detached and impartial criticism, we can at least attain the nearer heights, and find profit in the survey from even so modest an elevation.

We are asked to consider the Problems of Modern Architecture. This title may be interpreted in various ways; but for the purposes of this discussion I shall take it to refer to those great questions of tendency which have become insistent with the progress and the changes of modern civilization: the questions of the whence and the whither of modern architecture. How have modern conditions come about, and how shall we deal with them? How shall the art be vitalized? What influences are impinging upon it, and how under these influences may it be guided in the direction of progress? It is these broad problems of present drift and future development which I have chosen to discuss, rather than the technical details of modern office practice. If it is important for the critic and the theorist to acquaint themselves with the practical aspects of the art, it may also be profitable for the active practitioner to look up and away from his drawing-board and take account for a brief space of these larger questions of his art.

Let us first briefly note the way we have come during the past century, so that by observing the force and direction of the influences that have brought us to our present station we may the better take

our bearings and judge of our future course. So widely do the developments of the nineteenth century in architecture seem to differ from anything we observe in its previous history that we might almost imagine that the laws which have controlled the progress of the arts in earlier ages had ceased to operate. In the matter of style, for instance, the apparent confusion of the present day stands in striking contrast with the unity of Greek or of Gothic art. But this contrast is not due to the failure of the laws which have governed the evolution of styles in the past, but to new conditions producing new results under the same laws. These laws are not enactments, but simply the observed ways of working of the human mind in matters of art: the outward expression in practice of principles which are fundamental and immutable. If the stock formulæ of historic criticism fail to fit our modern art, the fault lies in the form of their statement, not in the laws they express; and the defect of statement comes from their being framed upon the experience of ages in which the conditions were widely different from those of to-day. We must devise new forms for their expression, in terms of present-day experience. If, for instance, we cease to define architectural styles in terms of profiles and features and details of design, and apply as criteria of style the broader considerations of spirit, feeling, structure, mass, and composition, we may discover underlying the apparent confusion of modern styles certain unities of spirit and method upon which we can build new definitions of modern styles. If the critic of future days shall find, as I believe he will find, no great difficulty in recognizing the architecture of our time by these controlling characteristics, then he will with perfect justice predicate the style of this period as defined by these characteristics. The confusion of details borrowed from past ages will trouble him no more than we are troubled by the appearance of Doric and Ionic columns together in the Propylæa at Athens, or by finding in Greek architecture elements of both Egyptian and Asiatic origin. And when he notes the prevalent use, as a decorative dress for steel-frame buildings, of forms originally belonging to lithic architecture, he will see therein the working of the same law of style-evolution by which the Greek perpetuated in stone many details originating in wooden construction, and by which the Roman incorporated into his architecture of vaults and arches, of brick and concrete, the columnar details which he had learned from the Greeks.

Let us now briefly review the origin of the changed conditions which so sharply mark off the nineteenth century from all previous periods in the history of art.

The nineteenth century was ushered in by profound political and social disturbances following the great democratic revolutions in America and France, and lasting through the whole first half of the

century. Society was adjusting itself to new conceptions of government and new political boundaries. The interests of art were crowded out of the thoughts of men. There was at the same time in progress a profound intellectual revolution. Modern philosophy, modern physical science, modern archaeology, were taking scientific shape, giving rise to new conceptions of the universe. The dethronement of the intellectual authority of hieratic religion, begun by the humanists in the fifteenth century, became complete with the establishment of the theory of evolution. Religion has become so largely a matter of the individual conscience that it has ceased to be an important factor in influencing architectural development in general.

More directly, though not more profoundly influential in the transformation of architectural conditions, were the industrial changes of the same half-century. Steam power and the rise of mechanical manufacture, with its concentration of industry in special localities, and its system of specialized activity which we call the division of labor, completely revolutionized the world's work, substituting the operative for the artist-artisan, and machine-reproduction for individual design and hand-craft. The rapid growth of international commerce was meanwhile breaking down the boundaries of national and local styles, making every region familiar with the work and taste of all others. The growth of archaeological science, greatly favored by the invention of photography and its application to engraving, was in like manner breaking down the barriers of time, making the works of past ages as familiar to our generation as those of its own time. Thus, while artistic taste and feeling were becoming atrophied from disuse, the strongest temptation was supplied to substitute archaeological imitation for original design. Out of this condition arose successively the Greek and Gothic revivals, each hailed in its turn as the sure panacea for the artistic anæmia of architecture in that day. The beauty of not a few of the individual works which resulted stands in conspicuous contrast with the general artistic destitution of the time. It testifies to the fact that the spark of art is inextinguishable, and that good architecture is good in whatever language of style it is expressed.

As if further to confuse the problem of architecture in the middle period of the nineteenth century, the development of iron introduced into construction an entirely new element. The architects, avoiding it, as intractable for Greek or Gothic or Roman design, allowed it to fall into the hands of the engineers, and the magnificent opportunity it offered for the creation of a new, living, rational, and artistic type of building-design, by the vast spans and airy construction it made possible, — this opportunity passed by unimproved. The Romans taught the world the majesty of spacious vaulted halls; the medieval builders the solemn grandeur of long and lofty vistas;

modern engineers and architects taught us how utterly forbidding and ugly a great, wide, and lofty roof can be made. Now that men have learned the fallacy of the historic revivals, and have begun to seek out more rational ways of handling these resources, they have to contend with traditions established by seventy years of inartistic engineering. The French alone have, during these years, given the world the benefit of repeated efforts to lift iron construction out of the slough of artistic despond, — as in the Halles Centrales, the Church of Saint Augustine, and the exhibitions of 1878 and 1889, particularly the Salle des Machines of the latter exhibition.

Architecture, thus, on the threshold of the twentieth century, finds itself in a condition which it has never before experienced. Its resources, both for construction and design, are richer than ever before in history. The phenomenal activity and inventiveness of the technical industries, and the interchanges of commerce, have placed at the architects' disposal a marvelous variety of building-materials and processes, which they are constantly increasing by new additions. Iron, steel, bronze, and aluminum; concrete and artificial stones; bricks of endless variety of form and color; terra-cottas, faïence and tiles without end; roofing-materials of ingenious design; paints and cements and plasters of every sort; lumber and timber from the ends of the earth, prepared in marvelously elaborate fashion; new systems of construction of extraordinary ingenuity and efficiency — all these the architect of to-day finds spread before him. Machinery lightens the physical task of those who labor to produce the results he seeks in his design. On the artistic side he has the advantage of choosing, from the endless catalogue of building-forms and materials offered him in open market, whatever shade, color, texture, quality, and effect he desires, in wood or metal, stone, glass, tile, brick, terra-cotta, plaster, or textile hangings.

But along with this marvelous increase in its resources, architecture has had laid upon it tasks at least proportionately more varied, complex, and difficult than those of earlier ages.

Greek architecture reached its perfection of refinement not only because the Greeks were endowed with a marvelous artistic instinct, but also because artistic effort was for centuries concentrated upon a few simple problems. Every feature of the place, construction, and detail of these could be and was worked out to final perfection because for three centuries at least the requirements — the programme — of the temple and propylæa and stoa remained substantially unchanged. The problems of Roman architecture were far more varied and complex, and Roman architecture, although in part the work of Greek artificers, is marked in consequence of this complexity by flexibility of adaptation and grandeur of scale rather than by extreme refinement of detail. In medieval architecture, again, a single type — that

of the three-aisled, cruciform, vaulted church — quite dominated the evolution of architectural form. All the methods of Gothic construction were established by empirical processes, through the cumulative experience of repeated experiments upon an identical problem; and the same is largely true of its decorative design. Such long-continued concentration of effort upon a single problem is out of the question in modern times. We have too many kinds of buildings to erect, — for religious, educational, administrative, commercial, social, penal, charitable, and decorative purposes; churches, colleges, and schools, railway-stations, armories, laboratories, exhibition buildings, warehouses, museums, theatres, hospitals, hotels, capitols, city halls, theatres, office-buildings, and houses large and small. Moreover, — a more serious difficulty by far, — the requirements of any given class of buildings never remain long the same. Experience can be cumulative only in small degree; the experience of a few years back may profit us, but that of twenty-five years ago is utterly out of date. No sooner does a type develop into something like final shape than new requirements or new methods of construction suddenly appear, and the whole problem must be studied anew. No style can therefore develop to-day into the unity and finality of some of the historic styles. There is never any opportunity to perfect the details of a single type.

To these difficulties must be further added the complexity of design required by our modern civilization. Even an ordinary city dwelling is a maze of intricate provisions for convenience and comfort beside which the most elaborate palace of earlier days was, in the matter of practical details, a problem of lucid simplicity. The designing, specifying, and superintending of a modern structure, with all its engineering complexities of installation, wiring-ducts, flues, and fixtures, absorb a large part of the scanty time allowed by our systems of building by contract for the elaboration of the complete design. Under these conditions the architect must design or control a range of work which covers all manner of trades, industries, and sciences. It is impossible that one person should master them all, or any considerable portion of them, in a truly satisfactory way.

Thus while the modern architect has been supplied with resources of extraordinary richness and variety, he has also been assigned a task of at least equally increased complexity. But this does not adequately express the situation. For there are in modern architectural practice two factors unknown to the great ages of the art in the past, which render it still more difficult to work out a characteristic and dignified expression of the spirit and ideals of the age. These are, in brief, the contract system, and the decline of artistic artisanship. The contract system, which has grown up with modern methods of business and has entered into the fabric of modern life, compels the archi-

tect to devote a large part of his time, before the first spadeful of earth can be turned in the excavations, to perfecting details which, in other ages, were largely given to artisans to work out, each an expert in his line, or were at most left to be elaborated during the slow progress of the work. The whole time allotted to the study of the problem is cut down to the narrow limits between the preliminary sketch and the signing of the contract; and since the greater part of this is spent in the elaboration of details, the fraction left for the legitimate artistic work of the architect — the work of study and experimentation and revision of the plan, the masses, voids, and solids of his design — is reduced to a pitiable insufficiency. How rarely, in modern work, does the designer of an important edifice have adequate time allowed him for a truly satisfactory study and discussion of his problem! And the further bane of the contract system lies in this, that, the contract once signed, further correction and amendment of the design are impossible. No amount of "happy thoughts," resulting from the experience acquired as the work progresses, can avail to improve its artistic quality. The ghost of "extras" stalks abroad, haunts the chambers of the architect's consciousness, and, indeed, is too often materialized without help from spiritualistic mediums. This spectre effectually blocks the way for those happy afterthoughts which are really the ripest artistic fruit of the architect's brain.

Artistic artisanship has been stifled between the two irresistible forces of modern industrialism and modern education. The machine and the factory have taken over the work of the hand-craftsman; and modern democratic education has opened to the young man born in the ranks of the trades a hundred gates of employment where in olden times there was but one. The execution of architectural and decorative detail has become a matter wholly apart from its design; a matter of accurate reproduction of office-drawings rather than of the artistic interpretation of suggestive sketches by the architect. Thus the design of every detail has been thrown back upon the architect, an added task and responsibility which in the older days he did not have to be burdened with.

But no statement of the actual conditions of modern architecture would be complete which omitted to mention the commercialism of our age. We must admit, I think, that the really controlling interests of our time are the commercial. These make, on the whole, for peace and for the brotherhood of man; but they can never replace, though they have largely usurped, the controlling influence of religion upon art. Office-buildings and railway-stations are more characteristic expressions of our modern culture than cathedrals. To this ascendancy of commercial interests must be ascribed the growth of public and private luxury. This may or may not be of advantage artistically; that depends upon the way in which this luxury chooses to express

itself. But there can be no doubt regarding the pernicious influence of another phase of modern commercialism, — that which imposes upon everything a valuation by dollars and cents; an influence always disastrous in art, and in no art more disastrous than in architecture. The financial criterion is fundamentally hostile to the artistic. Applied to buildings, it wipes out massive supports and deep shadows by paring down the walls to the last extreme of thinness; it excludes sculpture and mural painting from a building in order to pile an extra story upon it; it demands pretentious luxury in the place of artistic beauty. With this spirit every architect has to contend, in large works as well as small.

These, then, are the peculiar conditions of modern architecture, briefly and broadly stated. What are the really vital problems of modern architecture to which they have given or must give rise?

The fundamental problem of all architecture is to harmonize the demands of utility and beauty in structural design; in other words, to express utilitarian functions in terms of plastic art. It is this problem which differentiates architecture from engineering, in which utilitarian functions are expressed solely in terms of scientific exactitude. This problem is as truly the problem of to-day as it was of the Middle Ages or of antiquity. The utilitarian requirements of architecture have multiplied enormously in the past hundred years, but so have also the artistic resources at the architect's disposal. There is no excuse for ugly buildings to-day; if the conditions of design are more difficult, what is this but a call to forsake deep-worn ruts, to bring ourselves into harmony with our environment, to recognize our conditions instead of trying to evade them — to triumph over difficulties and obstacles by making them the very occasion of new successes, as did the medieval architects who extracted such consummate beauty out of the very limitations under which they worked? There seems to me to be no counsel demanding more urgent repetition and more earnest heeding, in this time of intense intellectual and social activity, than to make beauty the supreme aim of architectural effort.

Tradition and the archaeological spirit clamor for the reproduction of obsolete forms; commercialism seeks to suppress whatever does not appear readily convertible into cash dividends; literary critics cry out for originality at all costs as the crowning virtue; multiplying utilitarian requirements insist upon recognition by the architect, and threaten to deprive architecture of its place among the fine arts. Amid this din the architect who is a true artist keeps his eye and heart fixed upon the pole-star of pure beauty, which has guided the course of true art by its clear and steady ray through all the ages. Beauty in architecture is above and beyond all questions of tradition and historic style and passing fashion; it is a question of mass and

proportion, of balance and rhythm, of line and light-and-shade; of variety in unity, of appropriateness and common sense. The beauty which consists in the realization of the highest attainment in these qualities is the fundamental beauty which underlies all the varied forms of expression it has received in different ages from different hands; which we recognize in Greek temple and Gothic minster, in the mosques and tombs of India, the palaces and domed churches of Italy, and the masterpieces of all times, ancient and modern. How futile, in comparison with the securing of this fundamental beauty, appears all preoccupation with minor questions of style and fashion; how useless the setting forth of this or that formula of design as the sure recipe for architectural reform! It must be the study of modern architects to rid their profession and its practice of every burden which embarrasses them in their quest of artistic perfection, in their pursuit of the ideal beauty. Many, in spite of obstacles, are faithful to their ideals; the spirit of the artist lives in them and breathes in their work, but we need more of such men. The greatest of dangers confronting modern architecture is that which threatens to change it from an art into a business — a pursuit — an activity controlled by other than artistic ideals — a side issue of engineering.

As subdivisions of this great general problem, we must, I think, recognize five special problems or groups of problems as pressing for solution in the architecture of the twentieth century. The first is the problem of the artistic handling of modern structural devices and materials.

The second is the problem of the right division of labor and responsibility, in the production of modern buildings, between the architect, the engineer, and the craftsman.

The third — related to the second — is the problem of the relation of architecture to the arts and crafts, and the recovery for the craftsman of activities that have fallen wholly under the control of the factory system.

The fourth is the problem raised by the contract system: the question as to how far the burdens imposed by that system can be lightened, and the largest measure of artistic progress secured under such as cannot be thus lightened.

The fifth is the great problem of the education of the architect.

I have stated what I believe to be the problems which most seriously confront the architecture of the coming years. Their solution lies not with any one person, but with the profession as a whole, both here and abroad. There is no seer gifted with the power to forecast that solution; but every thoughtful man who reflects upon them may reach individual convictions, the free discussion of which can be made helpful and stimulating to those who take part in it. This is my excuse for the further observations I have to offer.

In no period of history have new systems and materials of construction been so multiplied or so rapidly developed as in recent years. I need only instance the remarkable rise of steel-frame or skeleton construction, and the increasing use of reinforced concrete, as examples. In the United States the growing scarcity of timber will soon eliminate wood as a cheap material for houses and temporary structures and thus create a new problem in cheap building. Here, then, are three problems demanding serious study, and which, unless our architects are active and watchful, will fall so completely into the hands of the engineers, and receive from them so purely utilitarian a treatment, that it will take a half-century or a century of ugly experiments to convert these to the service of true art. How shall we approach the task? Do we not here need most of all the spirit of devotion to pure beauty, under the guidance of common sense, leaving the resulting style to be what it will? Let us not be concerned either to perpetuate or to cast aside the language, the forms and details of the traditional styles: our real concern must be to produce beautiful buildings, using these new resources of the art as means to that end, and employing or discarding, as this controlling end may demand, the forms we have already learned by heart in the schools and offices. When to lay bare and when to conceal, when to emphasize and when to mask the structural framework, how to make new materials count for beauty; when, where, and how to apply decoration, and how far this shall be structural and how far applied, — these are the questions to be solved, and not the question whether the forms we use shall be classic, Romanesque, Gothic, Oriental, or the product of pure fancy.

But this artistic adaptation of new materials and systems of construction may, and doubtless will, proceed further than the mere invention of new decorative details and combinations. Already the elevator, the hollow-brick arch, and the steel skeleton have begotten a new type of building, — the American tall office-building, or "skyscraper." The artistic handling of this monstrous problem is still a subject of earnest study. It seems not unlikely that if our architects pursue a progressive course, other wholly new types of edifice will arise, under the pressure of new requirements and the development of new methods of building, in which broad spans, vast trusses, deep underground apartments, and the like, will be important factors. Not merely the old details, but the old mass-forms may disappear — as has been the case, for example, in ship-building. The traditional maxims of structural art, based on masonry construction, will relax their hold, and practices be adopted in design which we of to-day consider unorthodox: precisely as Gothic design threw over the classic practice as to formal symmetry and emphasis of horizontal divisions. It behooves our architects now upon the threshold of the

century to see to it that they themselves be the inaugurators of such changes, holding them under the control of high artistic principles, instead of allowing them to be forced upon the art from the outside and to be dominated by wholly utilitarian and philistine influences.

The next three problems are problems of professional relations and practice. The architect and the engineer, the architect and the craftsman, the architect and the contractor, — how shall these stand related in their joint task of realizing in permanent form the artistic dreams, the structural conceptions, which the architect delineates on the drawing-board? It is of course clear that their labors must be pursued in a spirit of collaboration; the problem is to secure greater cordiality, and above all a greater predominance of the artistic feeling and sympathy in this collaboration. The precise measure of relative independence, and hence of relative subordination of one to the other, must be differently adjusted, the labor differently divided, from what is now customary. There is too much engineering exacted of the architect to-day for the best results, from either the artistic or engineering point of view. He should not be required to know less of engineering than he commonly knows under present conditions, but to do less of it. If it were exacted of him only that he should design *constructible* edifices, the specific engineering of which should be turned over to experts working in collaboration with him, making universal the procedure now possible only in the largest offices, he would be freer to devote himself to this proper and special work of artistic design. In like manner the artisan should have a freer hand, and artisanship be encouraged as the handmaid of architecture. Something of this mingling of freedom and collaboration exists in the relations of architecture to the sister arts of painting and sculpture. It is a healthy and stimulating relation when the responsibility is rightly apportioned. To determine the right balance of apportionment is a serious but not an insoluble problem. To this problem both individuals and organized bodies will no doubt devote their best thought in the years to come. There is less promise of successful coping with the inherent difficulties of the contract system, which is not likely soon to be displaced. Both its vices and its virtues are too strongly entrenched for easy dislodgment. Only the years can decide whether the vices can be extirpated or must be endured. It is not easy to forecast any line of action for the future in this field of endeavor.

The fifth of our problems is that of the education of the architect. The nineteenth century has witnessed the disappearance of professional training by apprenticeship in law, medicine, theology, and engineering, and the substitute in its place of the modern system of analytical and theoretical studies in the class-room with practical applications in the laboratory and office. Business and journalism

are tending more and more in the same direction. How far is this system applicable to architecture, which has taken on more and more the character of a liberal profession? In France, Germany, and Austria architecture is now taught according to this theory in great schools of art, but with a strong surviving element of the apprenticeship system in the methods of the *atelier*. In America the methods of the university and technological school prevail more completely; in Great Britain they have only lately begun to be introduced to any noticeable degree. Which is nearest right? How far should the schools attempt, and how far forbear, to teach the practical practice of the profession, and how far leave this to the offices? What should be the requirements for admission to the schools? What should be the place in these schools of studies of pure culture or liberal discipline, and what the relative proportion of time assigned to the actual training in design? What should be the relative importance and the proportion of time assigned to abstract drawing and to distinctively architectural draughtsmanship? In teaching design, should the emphasis be placed on abstract design-problems, to cultivate the powers of imagination and invention, or upon more practical problems, in order to give anticipatory experience? These and other like questions press for an answer. Different schools, in different environments, will give different answers. As time goes on, changing conditions will bring about different answers in the same school, and there will always be a place also for men trained in no school but the school of office experience. Of course we can make here and now no final answer to these questions. One or two things are, however, clear. The increasingly exacting and complex duties of the modern architect have made what was once a fine art, and only an art, a profession of exceeding difficulty and importance, requiring for its worthy practice a training which is almost a liberal education in itself. The architect needs the broad view, the generous grasp of a wide range of ideas, good sense and varied knowledge, as well as artistic training and office experience. His education must lay foundations of discipline, taste, and knowledge broad enough to enable him to meet all the varied exigencies of changing methods and conditions.

I would fain enlarge upon these considerations, and discuss at greater length the relative claims of technical and artistic training, the relative share of the school and office in preparing the architect for his work, and the question of general or specific discipline in design; but I am warned that my time is spent, and I must draw to a speedy close. I have said little about the problem of style, because I believe in any age in which architecture is a vital art, — as I believe it is with us, in spite of the influences that tend to stifle the breath of its artistic life, — this problem settles itself, as I believe it is doing

and will more completely do in the years to come. It will do this not by developing any fixed and narrow range of forms which can be labeled "style of the twentieth century" and catalogued in a dozen lines, like the historic styles of the past; but by such a straightforward, rational, and artistic treatment, both structural and decorative, of modern architectural problems, as shall speak clearly of the age and time which produced them, through an endless variety of forms and details, derived no matter whence, no matter how, so long as they fit the requirements of the building and endow it with an expressive beauty and grace. When school and office cease to apply the meaningless shibboleths of particular style-formulæ, and when we cease to judge designs, or to make designs, by the rules of obsolete styles, while, on the other hand, we refuse with equal consistency to turn our backs on the past and exalt eccentricity into the throne that belongs to beauty, insisting always on fundamental beauty and good taste, our architecture will be a truly free and living art, possessed of the only qualities of style worth possessing, whether ancient labels fit or not. We must cease blind imitation as well as blind innovation, and make the highest attainable beauty the object of our pursuit.

And what of inspiration? Whence shall we draw the breath that shall kindle within us the flame of artistic enthusiasm? Religion cannot give it, because religion is no longer mistress of architecture; her throne is in the heart of the individual. Commerce cannot give it, for commerce is predominantly selfish. The collective passions of the future must supply it; but what are they to be? Intellectual culture, human brotherhood, patriotism, the worship of the past, altruism? Who can tell? The finest architectural works of recent years in this country are libraries, college buildings, museums, and expositions. This fact surely has some significance. And yet we must admit that modern architecture lacks enthusiasm. To raise it to the level of the great ages of architecture requires more than brains and money: both of these it has in greater abundance than ever before. It needs the fire of a burning passion, a great enthusiasm, an overwhelming emotion, a soaring imagination. Whence these are to come it is not for us to say. We can only hope the future will be less materialistic and selfish than the recent past, and that every one who enters upon this noble profession may cultivate within his own heart the warming fire of enthusiasm, kindling it at whatever artistic shrine gives forth the purest and the brightest flame.

SECTION C—MODERN PAINTING

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(Hall 4, September 24, 3 p. m.)

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR RICHARD MUTHER, University of Breslau.
MR. OKAKURA KAKUZO, Tokio, Japan.

PROBLEMS OF THE STUDY OF MODERN PAINTING

BY RICHARD MUTHER

(Translated from the German by Dr. George Kriehn, New York)

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OF the several works treating the painting of the century just passed which have recently appeared, we shall first consider the *Geschichte der modernen Malerei*, by Richard Muther (1893). This work for the first time attempted to give a general view of the entire activity in Europe during the nineteenth century. All painters were treated who had created works of real artistic value in France, England, Germany, Scandinavia, Italy, and Spain. If, in spite of such wealth of detail, the book has not quite solved the problem of presenting a clear picture of the artistic development of the century, this is to be attributed to the circumstance that it endeavored to unite incompatible things, and to be, at the same time, an historical and a controversial work. In the years in which it was written, modern art was fighting for its very existence. The author was enthusiastic and wished to take part in the struggle. The new ideals appeared to him so victorious, that a misguided enthusiasm for them led him to consider the earlier ideas more or less false. In reading the book one has the feeling of having climbed a high mountain, from which classicism, romanticism, and historical painting seemed gloomy ravines, through which it was necessary to pass in order to ascend. Only after reaching the summit one could breathe freely; for here all is bright, illumined by the rays of the sun of impressionism..

An artist defending his principles is, indeed, justified in such partiality, but not an historian. For he whose ideals we no longer accept is not, therefore, to be dismissed as antiquated and worthless. The actual is not necessarily the eternal, nor are present tendencies

the only truth. Every artistic movement which has ever existed is justified within the bounds of the time of its existence, and, like other organisms, when its time has come, it will die a natural death. The historian should not battle for a cause, either as accuser or defender; his proper position is rather that of a mere recorder.

In this spirit Cornelius Gurlitt approached the great theme in his work, *Die deutsche Kunst des 19 Jahrhunderts* (1890). He never blames or condemns, but, effacing the personal element, he enters into the spirit of the past, not in order to glorify our present achievements, but to mete out justice to every sincere and inspired effort. For objectivity and impersonal appreciation, Gurlitt's history cannot be surpassed. If, notwithstanding, the reader, after the perusal of the book, has the feeling that the artistic development of the present is to-day less clear than that of the past, this must be ascribed to another reason. The author takes his phenomena as he finds them; and although he analyzes and weighs them, he never inquires after the causes. He neglects to examine the soil from which the art of every age springs, which after all is the first and most important thing in historical writing. For history is not a storehouse of accidental occurrences, but the result of inevitable laws which affect each other in all directions. The problem is to find the point of view which commands the whole stream of tendency, and from which its component parts may be arranged into comprehensive groups. As we rightly explain the works of Giotto, Botticelli, and Raphael from the time and circumstances under which they arose, we must also treat modern art as a natural problem, by deducing the character of its works and the changes of style from the historical changes in culture during the nineteenth century.

It will first be necessary to cast a glance at the eighteenth. For this love-crazed and blood-shedding, this trifling and fighting century is the mighty period in which the old world passed away, and the foundation was laid upon which we are to-day building. With what seven-league boots did the spirit of the age then sweep over the nations, and with what dreadful harshness did the opposing forces crash into each other! "Vive la joie!" Such was the device at the beginning of the eighteenth century. With what feverish joy the old aristocratic families of the *ancien régime* celebrated their rococo! The whole world seemed to have become an Isle of Cythera, where nothing of the sorrow of life could enter. But while the distinguished gentlemen and ladies, disguised as Pierrots and Columbines, celebrated their gallant shepherd masquerades, rough voices suddenly sounded in the midst of their cooing and whispering. Threatening symptoms announced that the long and beautiful day of the aristocratic order must end, and that the plebeian also demanded a seat at the table of pleasure. The great writers of all countries were the bold heralds

of the battle. In proclaiming their thoughts of a new religious and social progress, they sowed the seed which ripened at the end of the century. In 1789 the die was cast, and the Revolution completed what literature had begun. "Après nous le déluge," so lightly expressed by the Marquise de Pompadour, became an awful truth.

Naturally the events which at that time shattered the old world into ruins also exercised a deep influence on art. Glancing for a moment at the days of the Renaissance, we find art supported in the main by two powers, the church and royalty. Raphael and Michelangelo, Correggio and Titian, Velasquez and Rubens, — they all created their most magnificent and monumental works either for the church or for the princes of their country. With the close of the eighteenth century these two powers ceased to be factors which determined the character of art. In Germany Kant wrote his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, showing that God, who, according to the teaching of the Bible, had created man, was in the light of philosophy a mere idea created by man. In France also the Almighty was dethroned, and the Goddess of Reason was raised in his place. The church thus lost the inspiring power which it formerly exercised upon art, and, although during the nineteenth century religious pictures were still painted, their very small number serves to show how far an age of investigation in the natural sciences has deserted the cycle of ideas in which human thought formerly moved. The close of the eighteenth century was no less fatal to the kingly power which ruled by divine right. A constitutional king no longer has the means to be a Mæcenas in a grand style, as was Louis XIV, and even if he could command them, his commissions could be of no avail to art, because they would contradict the modern view of life. The painting of our own days can no longer permit itself to be made a herald of royalistic ideas.

Now it is a characteristic of art that it can only flourish upon the basis of a quiet, clarified culture. But this clarified culture of the past had been destroyed by the Revolution, and modern culture was still in a state of formation, so incomplete and full of contradictions that it could not yet serve as a basis of a new art. Only when the spirit of an age has been clearly formed can art incorporate it in tangible form. Such was not yet the case at the beginning of the nineteenth century; and this explains what seems at first sight the remarkable circumstance, that painting, which had previously been an expression of its own epoch, now placed itself in opposition to this epoch. The eye of artists was fixed not upon their own time, but upon the past. They thought to produce better art by glorifying the beautiful culture of former centuries.

The painting of the first half of the nineteenth century was, therefore, in the main retrospective. At first the subjects were taken from the old Hellenic world, and later artists became absorbed

in the fables and legends of the Middle Age. Then, in further course of the development, they proceeded to modern times, and there came a period of historical painting which found its chief aim in glorifying, in large paintings, rich in figures, the principles and political actions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The painters of *genre* and of landscape also accommodated themselves to this point of view; for the latter did not paint nature as it existed before their eyes, but sought rather, in a reconstructive manner, to revive the vision of the earth as it appeared in the days of ancient Hellas or of the Middle Ages. The *genre* painters did not exhibit the people of the present; rather, in their peaceful painting of peasants, they depicted an idyllic world, which, like an immovable piece of the past, had survived in modern life. Paintings were not conceived as representations of the present, but as hymns of praise of the good old times. The windows of the studios were hung with heavy curtains to avoid seeing anything of the ugly world without.

Yet events were gradually taking place which caused the artist, instead of lingering in the past, to turn his eyes to the present, and to paint not only the world of long ago, but the world of his own day. The most important of these events were certainly the great changes in transportation which have taken place since the forties. Until that time the coach had lumbered heavily from village to village; now the steamship and the locomotive established rapid connection between the most distant parts of the earth. The world came under the influence of this traffic, and it would have been strange, indeed, if painters had not made use of the possibilities of travel thus made so easy. They took up the wanderer's staff and became globe-trotters, traversing in every direction the Orient, Scandinavia, and even America. In numerous *genre* paintings they recounted the manners and customs of strange people, and in numerous landscape pictures they exhibited the sights of the Universe, —

Wenn jemand eine Reise tut,
So kan ner was erzählen;

such is the content of these pictures.

While artists were thus wandering in distant countries in order to depict an exotic nature, there occurred contemporaneously another event which caused them to occupy themselves with what was going on in their own home and their immediate neighborhood. The great social problem of the nineteenth century arose after the revolution of 1789, which had been a struggle of the people against feudal despotism; the fruits of these struggles fell into the lap of the bourgeoisie. The feudal knights had been followed by knights of fortune, and a chasm yawned between bourgeoisie and proletariat, between the possessors of property and the poor. The year 1848 passed like a threatening storm over Europe. When the workmen were fighting

behind barricades, many of the painters felt the need of taking part in these struggles. Searching in the slums and tenements, they made their brush a weapon with which they entered the lists for the rights of the disinherited. "The lot of the poor is pitiful," such is the refrain that runs through their paintings. The fame of having been warm-hearted friends of mankind cannot be denied these artists. They proved that art cannot be joyful when life is serious, and they fought for noble aims with worthy intentions. Unfortunately, however, their paintings can no longer afford us a pure, æsthetic pleasure, because the intention is better than the execution. Occupied only with the thoughts they wished to express, all these tribunes of the people neglected beyond measure the purely technical side of their art.

With these tendencies we approach a difficult question, but one of great importance for the future development of modern painting. For what is true of these apostles of humanity is more or less true of all who wielded the brush in the first half of the nineteenth century. They were less painters than disguised *litterati*. The value of their paintings consisted more in what they studied than the manner in which they rendered it. It is easy to explain the literary spirit which at that time dominated painting. With the close of the eighteenth century, the bourgeoisie became the principal purchaser and the most important patron of art. In these circles purely æsthetic needs did not yet exist. They could only understand art in so far as it served culture, and therefore demanded of pictures the representation, in epic breadth, of interesting things which could be read from them. It was not thus in former centuries. During the rococo period men surrounded themselves with works of art only in order to enjoy their beauty. They knew that a picture could play upon the filaments of the soul through the noble language of line and the power of color to awaken feelings akin to those caused by music. But in the nineteenth century this purely sensuous joy in the beautiful had to be awakened again. It had to be brought home to the general consciousness that painting was not an appendix of literary culture, but an independent art which ruled a mighty realm, that of beautiful form and beautiful color.

The painters of the succeeding generations felt the need of treading this path. They desired to show by their works that it was not the function of the artist to relate, amuse, or teach, but only to paint in the best manner possible. But how and where should they begin? Under the tutelage of the literary, the purely artistic taste had greatly suffered. The prerequisite of artistic production, therefore, was to refine this taste; and this could be best accomplished by seeking advice from the classic painters of the past. With the middle of the century, modern painting, accordingly, entered upon the second

phase of its development. Artists began now to examine, technically and æsthetically, the works of classic painters, and sought to paint pictures which, in technical excellence, should not be inferior to theirs. This originated a systematic study of the colors used by the old masters.

These painters, also, may be classified in accordance with the models they chose. There were some who preferred the rugged and angular masters of the *quattrocento*; others who endeavored to acquire the light and shade of the Venetians of the sixteenth century; others, again, who became absorbed in the works of the little masters of Holland during the seventeenth century; and, finally, others who delighted in the bold brush-work and the dark tones of the Neapolitans of the baroque period. The result of these studies was an exceedingly important one. A whole generation of painters in all countries of Europe had made it a lifework to discover the secret of color possessed by the old masters; and they consequently commanded in virtuoso fashion all the technical means of the past. All of their works are pleasing on account of their cultivated, distinguished beauty, reminding us of the old masters.

But was the goal actually reached when the power was gained to imitate the old masters to the extent of actual illusion? Had these old masters themselves been in their turn imitators, or is not the wealth of varied beauty created in former centuries to be explained rather by the circumstance that every artist dared to trust his own eye and his own feelings? This independence had not yet been attained by the moderns. There existed a contradiction between the modern subjects which they represented and the style of the old masters in which they represented them. Examining their paintings, we may well ask whether the movements of modern man are actually represented, or whether they are not a slavish repetition of the positions and gestures which are found in the old masters. Does the arrangement actually express the surging activity of modern life, or is not everything forced into a scheme of composition prescribed long ago? The color deserves a special attention. The old masters observed carefully the conditions of lights under which they labored. They painted their pictures in studios into which the light penetrated through small bull's-eye panes, and their paintings were destined partly for gloomy chapels in great churches, partly for narrow rooms paneled in brown wood, into which the light of heaven fell softly through stained glasses.

In the nineteenth century life has become brighter. Through large panes of glass the light streams full into our rooms. Furthermore, the great physical achievements of the nineteenth century have brought wonders of light before which an old master would have stood speechless. When they, or even when our grandparents lived, there

were only candles and oil lamps; to-day we have gas and electricity. It is magical to see the gas-lamps throwing their flickering rays through bluish twilight; to observe the light of electricity flood a salon and mingle with the soft rays of a lamp. From all these wonders of light of the new age, painters had heretofore kept fearfully at a distance. They labored in the regular transom light of their studios, and even softened this by means of curtains and draperies, in order that it might most nearly approach the conditions known to the old masters.

The succeeding generation of painting, therefore, saw itself confronted by three great problems. Whereas formerly modern men had received a pose studied from old painters and ancient statues, the problem now was to seize upon the movements of actual life. Whereas formerly the works had been composed in accordance with a rigid scheme, it was now proposed to present real life in a picture, without doing violence to it or forcing it into the narrow prison of traditional rules. Where formerly the dark color-schemes of the old masters had been projected upon subjects of modern life, it was now proposed to substitute for this "brown sauce" the fresh brightness of nature, and to record all the wonders of artificial light which the age of electricity and gas had produced.

From two sides the painters were strengthened in this tendency. In the first place, an event of great consequence occurred in the discovery of Velasquez, on the occasion of an exhibition of his work in private possession held at Paris in honor of the two hundredth anniversary of his death. While artists had until now been only familiar with the dark masters, they here made the acquaintance of a light one. For the tone of his pictures is not a brown, but a cool pearl gray. An old master, therefore, had already painted nature as they were now beginning to see her, and it is always important for new truths to find classical verification. Of no less importance was the influence of the art of Japan upon the course of the development of European painting. At the beginning of the sixties there had been a heavy importation into Europe of colored prints, the study of which acted like a revelation. Here, too, everything that painters sought was expressed in classical perfection. They marveled at the spirited and lively arrangement of leaves, in which all architectonic balance was lacking, but which, just because of this asymmetry, had an effect as realistic as if nature itself had improvised them. They were impressed by the surety with which the Japanese seized upon the most rapid motion; things which the European had learned to see only by means of instantaneous photographs were here presented with boldest directness. Finally, they marveled at the color-effects. What fresh brightness, and at the same time what beauty of tone, was possessed by these magical prints; red and green trees, glowing

lanterns, the yellow sickle of the moon, twinkling stars, — everything was represented, and nowhere a false note; everything held together by that wonderful harmony which had formerly been attempted by a false tuning to brown. Thus did Velasquez and the Japanese contribute to the origin of modern impressionism.

Freedom from the great dead have been thus won, an independent representation of entirely new impressions became the aim of painters. Especially did they try to solve all the problems of life which had formerly been so timidly avoided. After they had been so long painting in brown, they found the wonders of *plein air* so attractive that for several years only scenes in the open air were painted. Rays of sunlight which flutter blinkingly through the treetops, great green meadows bathed in sunlight, the glimmer of glowing air, the play of a spot of light on the water and on yellow sand — such were the most popular subjects. After they had learned to paint sunlight, other problems received their turn. They attempted to depict the foggy freshness of morning and the sultry vapor of the storm, the mysterious night scenes and gray twilight. Upon open air pictures followed others representing the movements of light indoors with a delicacy previously not thought of. Lastly came the wonders of artificial light, those phenomena which the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with its unheard-of improvements in the entire lighting system, has brought about. It may, indeed, be said that never before have light-effects of such subtilty been recorded in pictures.

And to-day? Well, every art suffers from the defects of its qualities. The impressionists had discovered air: for it they neglected line, since in atmosphere the outline disappears. They had discovered light: for it they had, in a certain sense, neglected color, since color is disintegrated by light, and the colored surface is dissolved into a conglomeration of differently colored luminous points. The impressionist delighted also in the most subtle nuances of tones dissolved in light; but in eliminating from their works all pregnant lines and all pronounced colors, they destroyed, in many respects, the decorative effect of their pictures, which, from a distance, often had the effect of indistinct violet and yellow chaos. And so towards the end of the century, another new problem appeared, how to progress from the purely artistic to the decorative.

Modern painting had concerned itself very little with this problem. In reviewing the products of classical art, it will always be found that the old masters carefully weighed the relations of the picture to the space it was destined to occupy. The mosaics of Ravenna and the frescoes of Giotto were intended to fill the whole church with solemn harmonies and to be effective from every point of view, even from the greatest distance. Therefore, purely decorative artists like

Giotto used only great, impressive lines, and arranged mighty complexes of color in accordance with simple decorative laws. All naturalistic effects are avoided; all belittling detail, as well in the fall of the drapery as in the structure of the landscape, is eliminated; only the clear silhouette speaks. The pictures must be visible from a distance, and at the same time correspond, in all their lines, with the lines of the building.

Quite a different sort of painting arose in the Netherlands at a later period. In abrupt contrast to the monumental work of the Italians, the small pictures of Jan van Eyck are painted stroke by stroke, with minute exactness; the stubble of the beard, every vein of the hand, every ornament of clothing, is rendered with naturalistic accuracy. Jan van Eyck could indulge himself in such fine brushwork, because his pictures made no pretense of effect at a distance, but, like the miniatures of the prayer-books, were destined to be inspected at close quarters. They were altar-pieces for domestic use, before which the observer, after he had drawn away the curtain, knelt or stood. In like manner we may explain the style of later Dutch cabinet pictures. Placed for the most part upon easels, they hinted to the spectator that their delicacies could best be seen by close inspection. Even when they served as decoration for a wall, the delicate work of a Dou or a Mieris was calculated in accordance with the proportions of the small Dutch rooms. If any of these Dutchmen, as, for example, Koning, exceptionally received a commission in Flemish palaces, he immediately changed his style; for he knew that a picture for a large room must be differently treated, not only in style, but also in composition, from his accustomed work.

The weakness of the nineteenth century was most clearly revealed in the circumstance that it had lost every feeling for the relation of the picture to space. What awful performances did not mural painters perpetrate in our public buildings! In accordance with the literary trend of painting of the first half of the century there was no thought of beauty in form and color, but only of the didactic value of the works. Instead of proceeding on the supposition that a picture should really adorn, they endeavored to give historical instruction to the public, and tacked historical *genre* paintings on the walls. As to art in the home, we have not yet forgotten the time when small photographs and line engravings, instead of being kept in portfolios, were fastened to the walls, where they naturally had the effect of dead white and black spots. Museums and exhibitions also contributed to confuse public taste by juxtaposing the most heterogeneous things on the walls: little cabinet pieces of Brouwer and Ostade alongside of a great altar-piece by Rubens, and a mighty Delacroix flanked by dainty Meissoniers. In this way the feeling for the decorative importance of art was more and more lost. The pur-

chaser was not astonished when a picture, which he had admired at the exhibition, looked like a hole in the wall or like a monotonous dirty brown spot, when seen from a distance in a large room of his home.

The change for the better was first seen in the domain of mural painting. Almost contemporaneously in all countries, tendencies appeared, the object of which was, by means of the clear arrangement of the complexes of color and line, to restore the mural picture to its place as a decorative element. But the panel picture was also reminded of its decorative purpose. Our rooms are not only brighter but more spacious than were the small and dimly lighted Dutch rooms; and it was only a sign of a lack of originality in modern painters, notwithstanding the changed conditions of light and space, to hold fast to the manner of the old masters. Impressionism first brought the colors into harmony with the brighter light-effects of our rooms, and neo-impressionism supplemented this by paying the greatest possible attention to distant effects. It is, indeed, astonishing how impressive these dotted paintings are. The little dots, at close view a gaudy chaos, when seen from a distance shape themselves into such plastic forms, that neo-impressionistic paintings overlook the widest rooms. Pointillism (in which the surface of the picture is not smooth, but composed of little elevations and depressions) contributes further to this effect; for, by reason of their rough surface, the paintings, like the old mosaics, are effective from every point of view. Numerous masters have sought to reach the same goal of monumental decorative effect by other means, such as the simplification of form by the effect of harmonious spots of color, and by the subordination of color to decorative purposes.

But it cannot be denied that this latest art, in so far as it is good, still stands in intimate connection with impressionism. After impressionism had taught painters how to catch the finest nuances of motion and expression, an entirely new language of line was the result of their reversion to the principle of style, and of the reduction of the thousand details which they had learned to see anew to their simple and significant original forms. In observing with scientific accuracy the effect of light on color, impressionism also discovered a wealth of new shades of color. We now distinguish a hundred values where formerly we only saw one. Expressions like red, green, and brown have become meaningless for the manifold infinitely differentiated values of color. Consequently, when artists proceeded from the realistic rendering of their impressions of nature to free symphonic composition in the colors which impressionism had discovered, there arose wealth, harmony, and softness of color, not hitherto achieved. Such, in its principal stages, is the course which painting has traversed from the beginning of the nineteenth to the dawn of the twentieth century.

MODERN PROBLEMS IN PAINTING

BY OKAKURO KAKUZO

[Okakuro Kakuzo, b. Tokio, Japan, 1863. Graduate of Tokio University. Director of the School of Fine Arts, Tokio, 1890-98. Member of Archæological Commission of the Imperial Japanese Government, 1888-1905. Blue ribbon of the Order of Industry, Senior Fifth Rank; Sixth Rank of the Order of the Jewel; Knight Commander, St. Michael, Bavaria. President of the Nippon Bijitsuin, Vice-President of the Society of Japanese Painters. *Author of Ideals of the East; Awakening of Japan.*]

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, — In thanking you for the honor you have conferred on me in inviting me to address you on the "Modern Problems in Painting," I cannot but acknowledge that I approach you with great trepidation. It is barely a half-century ago that we children of Japan were admitted into the comity of nations at the gracious instance of your first Embassy under Commodore Perry. Since that time the name of America has been for us associated with the best of Western culture. We have been so accustomed to sit at your feet and listen while you discoursed that it seems strange, indeed, that one should ever stand and face your learned audience. My only reason for nerving myself to this heroic effort is because of my belief in your time-honored courtesy and the sympathy shown by you for all that pertains to my country. My address shall chiefly concern the problems as seen from the standpoint of Japan. It is to be a confession, therefore an appeal, — an appeal, therefore a protest. Protests are more or less wearisome. It is needless to say that my imperfect command of your language will further tax your patience.

Perhaps there is some shade of humor in the situation if we consider that the present difficulties of Japanese painting are partly due to your introducing us to the lights and shadows of a modern national existence. It may be that a cruel retribution has come over you in being asked to lend your ears to my incompetent presentation of the very problems of which you yourselves are the remote and innocent cause. For I must warn you beforehand that there is nothing new or instructive in what I am going to submit to your consideration. So much has been already voiced by the illustrious thinkers of America and Europe that my utterance can have no special value except that it comes out of the Far East.

I hope, however, that the Eastern point of view may not be altogether devoid of interest to you. Your modern painting, and the circumstances under which it is created, are still seen by us against the background of our own ancient traditions. Our criterions may not be orthodox in your eyes, but they at least represent the stand-

ards of taste which had guided the æsthetic attempts of India, China, Corea, and Japan through these hoary centuries. If, perchance, in the course of this paper, my comments on the state of painting in the West should sound impertinent, I beg you to recall that I am speaking as one from the Orient.

I wish you further to remember that my criticisms are not dictated by my want of respect for Western art, compelling as it does in all its phases the unconscious homage of wonder, if not always of admiration. Our reverential attitude toward all true expressions of art can be explained by our old axiom to approach a picture as one would enter into the presence of a great prince. We have been taught to prostrate ourselves even to a vase of flowers before examining the beauty of its arrangement.

In the first place, I wish to distinguish between the problems which concern the individual painter and those which concern society. To our Eastern conception of art the questions of technique belong to the painter himself. The public has no right to determine what it shall be in the present or the future. The individuality of the artistic effort forbids that an outsider should meddle with its methods. The painter himself is but half-cognizant of the secret which makes him a master, for each new idea imposes its own modes and laws. The moment when he formulates his secrets is the moment when he enters on his old age and death. For beauty is the joy of the eternal youthfulness of the creative mind. And it is the sharing the gladness of the artist in his discovery of a reawakened life in the universe that constitutes the love of art to us. One of our monk-painters of the Ashikaga period in the fourteenth century claims that art is the *Samadhi* of the playfulness of the human soul. Indeed, it is the magnificent innocence of the playful genius which is too selfish to be exclusive that makes all great art so unapproachable and so inviting to all.

Art is nothing if not the expression of the individual mind. A Chinese painter in the sixth century defined painting as the movement of his spirit in the rhythm of things. Another Chinese of the Sung Dynasty (the eleventh century), in the epigrammatic style characteristic of his age, has called it the mind on the point of the brush. Art-appreciation is always a communion of minds. The value of a picture is in the man that speaks to you behind his pigments. It is in the quality of his intonation that we respond to his personality, not in the pitch of the key nor in the range of his voice. What an intense personality lies in the silk and canvas of the old masters whose names we do not know, whose date even is a matter of archaeological controversy? Who of the recognized great painters either in the West or the East has not directly appealed to us despite the distance of time and race? Their language is necessarily different.

Some may be in the Confucian sequence of the white, some in the Italian sequence of the brown; others again in the French sequence of the blue, but behind the veil is the mind, always eager to tell its own story. The trade of the connoisseur is founded on the fact of this great individuality of the master which distinguishes him from the forger or the copyist.

The common weakness of humanity is to offer advice when it is not asked. Society has been ever ready to invade the sanctuary of art. Patronage, with its accustomed superciliousness, has often imposed its authority on a realm where gold could not reach. Public criticism with the best intentions in the world has made itself only ridiculous by trying to interfere in questions where the painter must be the sole judge. Why enchain the dragon-spirit of art? It is evanescent and always alive, and is godlike in its transformations. Was it a Greek who said that he defined certain limits in art by what he had done? The Napoleonic geniuses of the brush are constantly winning victories mindless of the dogmatic strategy of the academicians. The foremost critic of modern England has been ironically censured for his undue depreciation of Whistler, as one who was to be remembered by what he failed to understand. The fate of æsthetic discussions is to hang on the Achillean heel of art, and therein to find the vulnerable point of attack. We can Ruskinize only on the past.

If I may stretch a point, the masters themselves may be said to be responsible for allowing society to frustrate the spontaneous play of later artists. Their personality has been so great as to leave a lasting impression on the canons of beauty so that any deviation from the accepted notions is certain to be regarded with suspicion. Society has been taken into the confidence of art, and, like all confidences, it was either too little or too much. The world has become disrespectful toward art on account of the proffered familiarity. It feels at liberty to dictate where it ought to worship, to criticise where it ought to comprehend. It is not that the public should not talk, but that it should know better. It is not that society should not be amused, but that it should enjoy more. We are sorry to realize how much of real æsthetic sympathy is lost in the jargon of studio-talks.

The very individuality of art which makes its problem so subjective to the artist at the same time makes it defy classification in time. It is a matter of doubt whether we can speak of the "modern problems" in painting as such with any amount of accuracy or with profit. The problem which confronts the painter to-day has been always with him since the days he first traced the mastodon on bone-fragments in the primeval dens of the cave lions.

Of course the history of painting means the constant accretion of the problems of lines, light, and color, until nowadays the complex machinery requires a gigantic intellect to set it successfully in

motion. The step from the symbolic outlines of the early Nara painters to the depth and intensity of the concentrated ink-poems of the fifteenth century, the change from the archaic drawings on the Etruscan vases to the mystery of color-equations as conceived by your living master, John LaFarge, presents such a contrast as to make them seem totally different. Yet the agony and the joy of the later workers have been equally shared by the primitive artists. They all belong to the common brotherhood of the brush who with infinite patience devoted themselves to the adjustment of styles and materials in order to create and appease the craving for beauty. It must not be supposed that the task of an earlier age was lighter because it was simpler. The burden of artistic effort must have been proportionately the same, for the desire of its real votaries is to carry all that it can bear. Life is eternal, and so is art. The ancient and the modern meet within ourselves on the hazy borderland where yesterday parts from to-morrow.

In this age of classification we often forget that the eternal flow of life joins us with our predecessors. Classification is after all a convenience to arrange our thoughts, and, like all objects of convenience, becomes in the end troublesome. The modern scientific mind is apt to consider itself to have conquered matter by simply labeling it. But definitions are limitations, and thus the barriers to our insight. A seventeenth century Japanese poet has written that we feel the coldness of things on our lips like a blast of autumn whenever we begin to speak. Laotze, in his supreme adoration of the Unspeakable, has pointed out that the reality of a house is not in the roof nor the walls, but in the spaces which it creates. So the reality of painting consists in its innate beauty, not in the names of the schools or periods in which we love to arrange it on the shelves of our historical consciousness.

The demarcations into the classical, romantic, or the realistic schools, are meaningfully applied to the great masters, for they meant to represent one and all of those modes. They are in a sense anachronisms, for they transcend all time. They are each a separate world in themselves, reflecting the universal formulas with the particular phases of the life around them. The age belongs to them as much as they themselves belong to the age.

It has been said that romanticism is the distinctive characteristic of modern art. But which of the so-called classic masters have not been romanticists? If the term means individualism, the expression of the self instead of impersonal ideals, it must be the common property, nay, the very essence, of all creative efforts. If the term means the emotional side of the art-impulse, in contradistinction to the intellectual, or the sensuous, which respectively represent the classic or the realistic, it is again a name for art itself, because art is emotion.

A painting is the whole man, with his infinite susceptibilities to the thoughts of other men and nature around him. It is his essay on the world, whether it be a protest or an acquiescence. Delacroix has been considered the acme of modern romanticism. But do we not see in him the all-roundness of a great artistic mind? He is an artist. He is a Delacroix.

Again, people are wont to claim that realism is the insignia of modern painting. There is no realism in art in the strict sense of the word, for art is a suggestion through nature, not a presentation of nature itself. We may notice that a vast amount of conventionality exists even in the French impressionists, who are said to have given the last word of realism. Their best productions command respect, not on account of their power of painting sunlight, but in the value of the new poetry they are enabled to express through their outdoor technique. The idea of division of color was extant long before the modern impressionism — am I correctly informed? — already found in Titian.

Realism could not be the special characteristic of modern painting. What painting of all times and all nations has not evinced the desire for being true to nature? The relation of the artist to nature has been defined ever since art was born. The climate of the land in which he worked, the amount of light, the landscape, the occupations of men, his hereditary memories, the moral and the scientific ideas of the age, which were intended to give him confidence in the universe, have determined the character of his representation. His instinct was always to record what he saw or imagined that he saw around him. We must remember that what appears symbolic to us in the archaic forms of painting was considered highly representative in their own age. The earliest annals of painting both in the East and the West reflect the admiration for realism. We have stories which I think you also have of the wondrous depiction of fruits which the birds came to peck, of horses so true to life that they neighed at night and often ran away from the walls.

Although the development of painting in different countries has created different methods of approaching nature, the original relation to it has never been broken. For nature is a part of art as the body is a part of the soul. A Sung writer has called attention to the interrelation when he remarked that one admires a landscape for being like a picture and a picture because it is like a real landscape. Art is no less an interpretation of nature than nature is a commentary on art. The types of physical beauty in man or woman which have been the source of inspiration to great masters are in their turn determined by the ideal which they set for the succeeding generations. The waves have become Korin to us as shadows have grown to be Rembrandt to you.

I do not know that I have made my meaning clear to you. I have tried to say that the problems of the painter are individual and subjective, that the method of expressing his personality lies entirely with each artist and forbids any interference from the outside. I hope that I have conveyed to you the idea that the questions which we may discuss profitably regarding painting are not whether it shall be more idealistic or less realistic, whether the artist should create in this scheme of color, or that tone of light. These belong to the painter exclusively, and he is well able to take care of himself.

Then what is the objective side of the question? What are the modern problems of painting which society can fitly discuss at all? I reply that it is the relation of painting to society itself. Society regulates the conditions under which art is produced. If it cannot claim the artist, it can claim the man. If it cannot dictate his technique, it can furnish his theme, and to a certain extent his ideals. It is in the secret understanding between the performer and the audience that delight both. It is the humanity that reverberates alike through the chord of art and the hearts of the people. The more human the call, the more universal and deep the response.

Sociological conditions have not, however, always been favorable to the free development of art and have often threatened to crush its existence, and sometimes succeeded in doing so. It is owing to this that the great masters are so rare. Indeed, it is a tribute to the virility of the art-instinct that we should have even the few. Their lives both in the East and West have shown remarkable instances of struggle and victory over circumstances. Hosts have suffered and have succumbed to social tyranny. Hosts are suffering and succumbing to their destiny.

Nothing touches us more than the weary lines on a great painter's face, for they are the traces, not of his contest with his art but with the world. One is a joy and a solace, the other is an eternal torment. The antagonism between the two lies in the laws of their existence. Art is the sphere of freedom, society that of conventions. The vulgar ever resents the ideal. Society is somehow always afraid of the living artist. It begins to offer applause when his ears are deaf,—flowers when he is safely laid in his grave. The success and popularity of a living painter in many cases are signs of lowness of spiritual level. For the higher the artistic mind soars the greater becomes the possibility of local or contemporary miscomprehension. Even in the perfection of Raphael or the princely ease of Rubens we are tempted to miss the sublimity of the tormented soul of Michael Angelo.

Society has not only been inimical to individual masters but has at times indulged in wholesale destruction of schools. Political changes have often enacted tragedies. War has devastated many a garden of beauty. With due respect to the interesting qualities

of German art we cannot help contemplating the enormous ravages inflicted upon it during the long religious wars of the Reformation. After Dürer there seems to be no painter of that calibre, and the Teutonic race has come to be characterized as "ear-minded" by other more fortunate nations. The Flemish, the Dutch, the Italian, the Spanish, all have had their share of the disastrous consequences of national convulsions. The French Revolution, despite its far-reaching beneficence, gave a severe blow to traditional excellence. In these we are but alluding to a few instances of the constant persecutions of European art which society has perpetrated on art since the days of the Greeks.

Eastern art has had also its ample measure of such catastrophes. To give an example, — the conquest of China by the Mongols in the thirteenth century brought about a sudden downfall of Chinese art from which it has never since been able to recover. As you are doubtless aware, the time at which this calamity occurred was the brightest age of Chinese painting. It was in the Sung dynasty, so rich in poetical and philosophical inspirations. It was the age when Confucianism had evolved a new meaning by the synthesis of Taoist and Buddhist ideals. It was the age when China was breaking through the crust of her ancient formalism, when political and economical experiments were tried on a vast scale. You will remember that the wonderful porcelain of China was the special product of this period of universal activity.

Painting was the art of the Sung. It is to their masters that the later Chinese, and we, Japanese, owe the higher conception of the quality of the line, or the manipulation of light and atmosphere within the condensed area of ink treatment. Before them Chinese painting was beautiful in its repose, with the stately completeness of style which we see in the remains of early Indian or Graeco-Roman painting. The Sung artists emancipated Asiatic art from this classicism to turn its gaze on the poetry of movement and seek new meanings of life in the intimate aspects of nature.

It is always fatal to generalize on art-epochs, but never more than on this Sung period when each artist is a school by himself. I shall but tire you with the enumeration of illustrious names like Ririomin, Beigensho, Bayen, Riokai, Choshikio, or Mokkei, for they may signify very little to you. I shall only draw your attention to the series of paintings of Buddhist saints owned by the Boston Museum, which, though not by any recognized master, are fair specimens of the later Sung work. There you will find the expression of an artistic mind of a high order which can hold its own beside the early Italians.

Alas! all these brilliant achievements of the Sung "Illumination" were stopped in their full career by the advent of the Mongol

conquerors. Their barbarous rule crushed the vitality of the native civilization, and painting had barely a chance to survive. Thenceforward it is a decadence relieved here and there by few exceptional geniuses. It was not the Mongols alone who inflicted such disaster on Chinese art. The Manchus have come again from the North to impose another alien government. Wars and disturbances never ceased to harass the Chinese painter. What one regards to-day as representative of Chinese art is but a dismal shadow compared with what it was in the glorious age of the Tang or Sung masters.

In Japan, owing to our insular position, we were saved from the Mongol disaster which beset Chinese art. Yet there are instances when a civil war was the cause of destroying local centres of art. One on the largest scale, which affected the whole of Japan, was the war of the Ashikaga-Shogunate, which raged with few breaks for nearly a century following the fifteenth. It ravaged Kioto and Nara, the ancient capitals where the arts and crafts had clustered from early days. The school of portraiture which culminated with Nobuzane, the virile representations of contemporary life which are seen in the Tosa makimonos, were a vital force before this sanguinary period. The vigor of Buddhist painters had then but slightly abated, for the splendid kakemonos, commonly attributed to Kanoaka, are mostly produced within two centuries of this crisis. But in the incessant turmoil of the late Ashikaga period the artist had no place to pursue his vocation. The monasteries, which were the nurseries of painting, were burned or their occupants were dispersed. The function of the hereditary court painters ceased, for the court itself was suffering through the misfortune of continuous war. Any one conversant with the history of Japanese art will notice how our art wears an entirely new aspect after the restoration of peace. It has evolved new and interesting phases; but the ancient traditions of the Kasugas and Tosas were lost forever.

The calamities imposed upon art by the social conditions do not end here. Even in the days of peace we shall find that the so-called encouragement was by no means a boon to art. The self-complacency of society is apt to make itself believe that patronage is everything. On the contrary, the word "patronage" is in itself an insult. We want sympathy, not condescension. If society really cared for good art, it should approach it with the respect due to all the noble functions of life. As it is, painting has been often called to the degrading service of society. It was this that made the great Tang painter Yenripon tell his children that he would disown them if they ever learned to paint.

Maeterlinck has said that if the flowers had wings they would fly away at the approach of man. I would not blame them if they ever flew away from the cruelties of floriculture. Art, the flower

of thought, has also no wings. Its roots are bound to humanity. It is painful to think how it has been trimmed, cut, and tortured by unfeeling hands to be confined in a vessel for temporary admiration. Sotoba, a Sung poet, has remarked, "Men are not ashamed to wear flowers, but what of the flowers?" If the Buddhist idea of retribution is to be believed in, the flowers must have committed terrible crimes in their former lives! Let us hope for the painters a better incarnation in their next.

Religion has been supposed to be the greatest inspiration of art. It is often claimed that the loss of religious zeal caused the decadence of art. But art is a religion in itself. The mere fact of painting a holy subject does not constitute the holiness of the picture. The inherent nobleness and devotional attitude of the artist's mind toward the cosmos alone stamps him as the religious painter. It has been remarked that in the picture of the bamboo by Sankoku lay the whole mystery of Taoism. The stereotyped representations of Christian or Buddhist subjects, of which, we are sorry to say, there are so many, are not only a parody on religion but a caricature of art itself. Here we see another instance of the effects of misplaced patronage, where even religion made a handmaiden of art, and thus diverted it from its legitimate expression.

Again, the ambitions of kings and potentates have led them to use art for their own glorification. Their monumental works were not the patronage of art, but patronage of themselves. The same spirit of self-importance moved them as that which led to the encouragement of portrait-painting by the modern bourgeoisie. The instinct is natural, but not favorable to the elevation of art-ideals. In the hundred golden screens of Momoyama, we find the magnificent tediousness that characterizes the work of Kano Yeitoku, painter-in-ordinary to the Japanese Napoleon. On the walls of Versailles we feel the elaborate insipidity of Horace Vernet, the historian of the Taiko Hideyoshi of Europe.

Society, in posing as the patron, forgets that its true function is that of the mother. Art was rarely allowed a place to nestle on its bosom. The waywardness of art, born of her innate individuality, has caused her to be treated as a stepchild. The palmy days of painting were only when the painters had a recognized place in the social scheme. In old times painting was either a trade or an occupation of the religious. The great masters belonged to the guild if not to the cloister. They were Bellinis, or Fra Angelicos.

In the East, where hereditary profession is an important factor of society, the family took the place of the guild. Our old master was either a scion of the Tosas, or a monk, a Yeshin-Sodzu, or a Chodensu. Monasticism itself later on gave protection to the brotherhood of painters, for, in the strict formalism of Oriental life, the

Buddhist gown afforded the means of liberation from social trammels. You may notice that the Kanos always held ecclesiastical titles, that Hokusai had a shaven head.

It must not be implied that the conditions in the past which gave to both the Italian and the Japanese painters a recognized place in society are to be considered ideal or perfect. I am simply pointing to the fact that the position of art was not at least anomalous, as it is nowadays. The difficulty at the present time is that society has broken the ancient harmony, and offers nothing to replace it. The academy and the institute are poor substitutes for the medieval guilds or the Japanese monasticism, — the groups which kept up the traditions and furnished a home for art.

The modern spirit, in emancipating the man, exiles the artist. The painter of to-day has no recognized function in the social scheme. He may be nearer nature, but is further from humanity. Have we not noticed how intensely human are the pictures of all the great masters? Do we not notice how distant and cold are the modern productions? Art for art's sake is a wail of Bohemia.

If we look on the surface of things, it would appear as if there were no time in history when art was so honored as it is to-day in Europe or in America. The highest social distinctions are conferred on the successful painter, and the amount of his remuneration is incomparably greater than that given the old master. Yet it is a matter of doubt whether he enjoys the fostering care and the stimulating influences which the community and brother-workers accorded him in the past. The very lack of finish and refinement in their work shows the difference between the new and the old. It is significant that in France, where the relation between the artist and the community is better kept than elsewhere in the West, where traditions are still adhered to by its "Institute," we find the most vital of contemporary achievements.

Modern art-education is not altogether the blessing that it is generally supposed to be. It is true that the academies and the museum have opened up to all what was once a secret of the trade. It is also true that systematic instruction has enabled one to overcome the apparently unnecessary hardship of apprenticeship. But the art academies cannot impart the benefits of the older method. The grinding of colors and the attendance on the master, however irksome it might have been, were the means of developing the moral fibre of the artistic mind. The constant contact with the master-worker, and the participation in the details of his work, were the best means of obtaining insight into the entire complexity of production. It is the home-life of art, which no school-life can replace. Art-education, as it is generally conducted, is destructive to individuality. Its systematic nature enforces a uniform rule on all. Again, the very

facility of modern methods robs the student of that severe training which gave the finish to the work of old masters. Even the universal use of photographs, which have come to be an important factor of art-work in these days, saves the artists from the necessity of the arduous copying of masterpieces which was the essential point of traditional teaching. Who is not a painter nowadays? We have so many amateurs that there are no great masters. We have made so much of ourselves that there is very little left in others.

We of the East often wonder whether your society cares for art. You seem not to want art, but decoration, — decoration in the sense of subjugating beauty for the sake of display. In the rush for wealth there is no time for lingering before a picture. In the competition of luxury, the criterion is not that the thing should be more interesting, but that it should be more expensive. The paintings that cover the walls are not of *your* choice, but those dictated by fashion. What sympathy can you expect from art when you offer none? Under such conditions art is apt to retaliate either with incipient flattery or with brutal sarcasm. Meanwhile the true art weeps. Do not let my expressions offend you. Japan is eager to follow in your footsteps, and is fast learning not to care for art.

The social conditions of modern Japan have laid grave problems on her art. Indeed, it is with a feeling of sadness that I approach the subject, for at the present moment Japanese painting is threatened with entire destruction. The danger is due to the effects of the series of wars that have continually disturbed us since the middle of the last century, and also the occidentalization of the national life. The advent of the American Embassy in 1853 precipitated the revolution which was to end in the Restoration, the restoration of the classic rule of the Mikado in 1868. This movement was the outcome of the Japanese Renaissance which began in the eighteenth century to recall us to a consciousness of the age preceding the Shogunates. The whole energy of our scholarship was then concentrated on the research and reconstruction of the literature and arts of the Nara and early Kyoto period which had so long been obscured during the feudal age, — especially during the long wars of the Ashikagas which we have already mentioned. The early half of the last century is marked by the rise of a classic school of painting as a resultant of this revival of ancient knowledge. The age was rich in artistic activity in all branches. Even the old-fashioned school of Kano caught new inspiration by a return to Sessiu and a renewed study of the Sung masters. The Bunjin school in the style of the later Ming and early Manchu dynasty were in full swing. Kyoto was famous through the names of Okio, Goshun, and Ganku. Hokusai was living until 1848. But the political agitations which then came over the nation turned our energies into other channels beside that of art. The

threat of foreign complications was coupled with the actual struggle of overthrowing the Tokugawa Shogunate. The gleam of the sword and the flash of gunpowder were before the people's eyes by the year 1860. Kioto and Yeddo became the main centres of commotion, and unrest was over all the country. Uprisings in various provinces culminated in the general civil war which began in the vicinity of Kioto, and convulsed the nation from Kiushiu to Yesso. It was in those days that the art-treasures of the daimios were scattered to form the ornaments of Western museums, when Buddhist painting and sculpture in the monasteries were wantonly destroyed in the mistaken zeal of Shinto converts.

It is heart-rending to hear of the burning of wonderful lacquer boxes to collect their gold, for nobody could afford what was considered a luxury in that moment of universal calamity. Painters had to abandon their profession. Those who did not follow the wars had to eke out a hard subsistence by rude hand-work.

The Restoration was accomplished in 1868, which marks the year when the last remnant of the army of the Shogunate was defeated and submitted to the authority of the imperialists. It was in that year that his Majesty the present Mikado ascended the throne and inaugurated the enlightened policy which was to give Japan a place in the family of nations. But the necessary friction attending the adjustment of the old to the new social and economic conditions was a source of constant disturbance. We had riots and rebellions, — the last of which, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1878, was of quite a serious nature. After that, peace was assured, and art had a chance to survive. In 1882 we had our first national exhibition of painting. But the community was too deeply involved in solving the problems of modern industrialism to show any deep sympathy for the revival of art. The best energies of the leading men were devoted to the framing and application of constitutional government, and the revoking of the ex-territorial jurisdiction inflicted upon us by the foreign powers.

Another great drain on our resources and intellect was the organization of the army and navy to secure our independence; for our national existence was threatened by the continental aggression on our legitimate line of defense. We must try to live before we could paint. In 1894-95 we had the Chinese War. At the present moment we are in a death-grapple with one of the mightiest military nations of Europe.

The ravages of war are bad enough, but in Japan we have the hard task of facing the antagonistic forces which peace itself had brought to bear upon us. I refer to the onslaught of Western art on our national painting. A great battle is raging among us in the contest for supremacy between Eastern and Western ideals. With what

results time alone can determine. I am aware that sincere lovers of art in the West have always emphatically urged us to the preservation of our national style. I have heard many wonder why we should have tried to imitate you in painting, as in everything else. You should remember, however, that our wholesale adoption of your methods of life and culture was not purely a matter of choice but of necessity. The word "modernization" means the occidentalization of the world. The map of Asia will reveal the dismal fate of the ancient civilizations that have succumbed to the spell of industrialism, commercialism, imperialism, and what not, which the modern spirit has cast over them. It seems almost imperative that one should mount the car of Juggernaut unless one would be crushed under its wheels. Socially, our sympathy towards painting, as towards all other questions of life, is divided into two camps, — the so-called progressive, and the conservative. The former believes in the acceptance of Western culture in its entirety, the latter with a qualification. To the advocates of the wholesale westernization of Japan, Eastern civilization seems a lower development compared to the Western. The more we assimilate the foreign methods the higher we mount in the scale of humanity. They point out the state of Asiatic nations and the success of Japan in maintaining a national existence by the very fact of recognizing the supremacy of the West. They claim that civilization is a homogeneous development that defies eclecticism in any of its phases. To them Japanese painting appears at one with the bows and arrows of our primitive warfare, — not to be tolerated in these days of explosives and ironclads.

The conservatives, on the other hand, assert that Asiatic civilization is not to be despised; that its conception of the harmony of life is as precious as the scientific spirit and the organizing ability of the West. To them, Western society is not necessarily the paragon which all mankind should imitate. They believe in the homogeneity of civilization, but that true homogeneity must be the result of a realization from within, not an accumulation of outside matter. To them, Japanese paintings are by no means the simple weapons to which they are likened, but a potent machine invented to carry on a special kind of æsthetic warfare.

I would like to say in this connection that Japanese art has not yet been presented in its true light to outside nations. Except to the few who have made a special study of it, or to those whose real insight into beauty has made it possible to enter into its spirit, the real meaning of our national painting seems not to have been grasped by the general Western public. Our painting is still known to you through the color-prints of the popular school, and the flower and bird pictures which represent the prettiness, not the seriousness of our artistic efforts. I beg you to know that in the works of our

masters lies as deep a philosophy of life and a religion of beauty as those which animated the creations of your own. The mode of expression is different, but the intensity of the emotion is the same.

There is a certain phase of Japanese painting which is difficult for Western comprehension on account of its very Eastern nature. The monistic trend of the Eastern thought has led to concentration where it became expansive in yours. The microcosmic notion of our later philosophy has even accentuated the tendency to express with simplest means the most complex ideas. In some cases, color and shading have been discarded in the eagerness of preserving the purity of the idea. It is not symbolism but infinite suggestiveness. It is not the simplicity of the child but the directness of the master-mind. An ink-landscape of Kakei or Sessiu is a world in itself, replete with the meaning of life. Without actual examples before us it is hard to make myself understood. To take an analogy, the self-completeness of those masters is in its own way the self-completeness you find in the *Mona Lisa* of Leonardo or *The Gilder* of Rembrandt.

The fact that these concentrated poems were enjoyed by our society was the proof of its culture. It showed the ability of the public to sympathize and fill out the background which the artist has purposely left unfilled. The public was as much the painter as the painter himself, for both were required to complete an idea. It belonged to the age when the tea-ceremony was universally practiced, as a serious attempt to perfect the art of sympathy. You are doubtless aware that the tea-ceremony is called a ceremony because it is not a ceremony. It was a vital method of realizing the harmonious appreciation of the facts of mundane life. The guest and the host were alike called upon to create the unity of the room, and the rhythm of the conversation.

I do not assert that Japanese painting has been always able to keep up to this high standard. Like the tea-ceremony, it has often become formal and meaningless. We feel the fatigue of the art-impulse instead of its virility. But the worship of the suggestive has been an integral part of our art-consciousness. The ideal was always there, however we may have failed to approach it.

The conservative thinks that it is a great pity these ancient ideals should be lost. I, for one, who belong to the humble ranks of the conservatives, find it deplorable that the traditions of Chinese and Japanese painting should be entirely ignored. I do not mean to say that we should not study the Western methods, for thereby we may add to our own method of expression. Nor do I desire that we should not assimilate the wealth of ideas which your civilization has amassed. On the contrary, the mental equipment of Japanese painting needs strengthening through the accretion of the world's ideals. We can only become more human by becoming more uni-

versal. The value of a suggestion is in the depth of the thought that it conveys. What I wish to protest against is the attitude of imitation which is so destructive of individuality.

Disastrous as have been the consequences of the sweeping inundations of Western ideals, its ravages on Japanese painting might have been comparatively slight had it not been accompanied with modern industrialism. It may be that Western art is also suffering from the effects of industrialism, but to us its menace is more direful as we hear it beating against the bulwarks of our old economic life. To us it seems that industrialism is making a handmaiden of art, as religion and personal glorification have made of it in the past. Competition imposes the monotony of fashion instead of the variety of life. *Cheapness* is the goal, not *Beauty*. The democratic indifference of the market stamps everything with the mark of vulgar equality. In place of the hand-works, where we feel the warmth of the human touch of even the humblest worker, we are confronted with the cold-blooded touch of the machine. The mechanical habit of the age seizes the artist and makes him forget that his only reason for existence is to be the one, not the many. He is impelled not to create but to multiply. Painting is becoming more and more an affair of the hand rather than of the mind.

The task of preserving Japanese painting against all these antagonistic influences is not easy. It is a matter of no small wonder that we should have produced within recent years a new school of national painting. Our hope in the future lies in the tenacity of the Japanese race which has kept its individuality intact since the dawn of its history. Two generations cannot change the idiosyncrasies of twenty centuries. The bulk of our traditions still remains practically unharmed. Of late years there has been a marked tendency to a deeper recognition of the best in our ancient culture. We are glad to see in the heroic sacrifices of our people in the present war that the spirit of old Japan is not dead. Our greatest hope is in the very vitality of art itself which enabled it to thrive in spite of the various adversities which it had encountered in the past. A grim pride animates us in facing the enormous odds which modern society has raised against us. At the present day we feel ourselves to be the sole guardians of the art-inheritance of Asia. The battle must be one fought out to the last.

Perhaps it may have seemed to you that I have painted in too dark a color the modern problems of art. There is a brighter side of the question. Western society itself is awakening to a better understanding of the problem. The suspense of art-activities at the present moment has aroused the anxious inquiry of serious thinkers into the cause of the universal decadence. It is time, indeed, that we should begin to work for the true adjustment of society to art.

I shall be only too grateful if my words have been of service in drawing your attention to the grave nature of the situation in the East. In the name of humanity, I call on the brotherhood of artists and art-lovers to a solution of these world-wide problems.

SHORT PAPER

MR. CHARLES H. COFFIN presented a paper on "Some Considerations of our System of Instruction in Painting."

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